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 “Torch Song Trilogy” 
Harvey Fierstein 1 
 
Ma: What are you doing? 
Arnold: I‟m doing the same thing you‟re doing. 
Ma: No! I‟m reciting Kaddish for my husband. You‟re blaspheming 
your religion. 
Arnold: Ma. Do you know who this is? This is my lover. 
Ma: Wait! Wait! Wait! Wait! Wait! Are you trying to compare my 
marriage with you and Alan? Your Father and I were married 
for thirty-five years, had two children and a wonderful life 
together. You dare compare yourself to that? 
Arnold: That's not what I mean. I‟m talking about the loss. 
Ma: What loss did you have? You fooled around with some boy. 
Huh? Where do you come to compare that with a marriage of 
thirty-five years? Come on, Arnold. This isn‟t one of your pals 
you‟re talking to. 
Arnold: Ma, I lost someone I loved very much. 
Ma: So you felt bad. Maybe you even cried a little. But what would 
you know about how I felt? Thirty-five years I lived with this 
man. He got sick, I brought him to the hospital, and do you know 
what they gave me back? I gave them a man ... They gave me a 
paper bag with his watch, wallet, and wedding ring. They gave 
me a place to visit High Holy days. Hmmm! How could you 
possibly know how I felt? It took me two months before I could 
sleep in our bed alone, and a year, it took me a year before I 
could say “I” instead of “we”. Ha? And you‟re gonna tell me you 
are “mourning”. How dare you? 
Arnold: You‟re right, Ma. How dare I? I couldn‟t possibly know how it 
feels to take somebody‟s things, put them in plastic bags, and 
watch garbage men take them away. Or how it feels when you 
forget and you set him his place at the table. How about the 
food that rots in the refrigerator „cause you forgot how to shop 
for one? How dare I, right Ma? How dare ...? Believe me Ma, 
you had it easy. You have thirty-five years to remember. I have 
five. You had your children and your friends to comfort you. I 
had me! My friends didn't want to hear about it. They said, 
“What're you gripin' about? At least you had a lover”. That‟s 
right, Ma. You had it easy. You lost your husband in a nice 
clean hospital. You know where I lost mine? I lost mine on the 
street. That‟s right, Ma. They killed him on the street. Twenty-
seven years old, lying dead on the street. Killed by a bunch of 
kids with baseball bats. That‟s right, Ma! Killed by children! 
Children taught by people like you. „Cause everybody knows 
that queers don‟t matter. Queers don't love. And, those that do, 
deserve what they get! 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fierstein, H., Torch Song Trilogy, Villard Books, New York (1983), 145-6. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Scope of work undertaken 
This thesis focuses on access to marriage as a fundamental human right, 
and the premise that there is no justifiable reason, in terms of New 
Zealand law, why same-sex couples should be excluded from this right.  
 
Method of investigation 
This thesis is the result of participatory action research and academic 
analysis. 
I have been centrally involved with the issue of equal access to same-sex 
marriage and, therefore, this thesis has been an experiential exercise 
involving engagement with key protagonists in human rights issues in 
New Zealand – proponents and detractors. 
However, I have also considered a great deal of primary and secondary 
material, particularly in relation to human rights law and family law, and 
have considered key developments regarding relationship recognition in 
a range of overseas jurisdictions. 
 
Main divisions of the thesis 
Part I  provides introductory information, setting the objectives and the 
parameters of the thesis. This part also includes the methodology used 
in the gathering and analysis of information in the writing of this thesis. 
In Part II, I provide a range of information to set the context in which I 
have considered the issue of same-sex marriage. This includes a 
personal perspective, an analysis of the human rights imperatives, and a 
commentary on a range of issues relating to New Zealand’s 
constitutional and social arrangements. 
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In Part III, I consider developments in the law in New Zealand and 
overseas. I examine the response of the New Zealand courts, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, and the Government and Parliament 
of New Zealand to the call for same-sex marriage in New Zealand. I also 
examine legislative initiatives and court challenges in a range of overseas 
jurisdictions and the extent to which these have been successful in 
providing equal access to marriage for same-sex couples and the impact 
these might have on future developments in New Zealand. 
Finally, Part IV provides a summary of the key themes of the thesis, a 
consideration of options for possible future action, and suggestions with 
regard to ensuring future success. 
 
Conclusions reached 
My conclusion is that there is no valid justification for denying full 
marriage equality to same-sex couples in New Zealand, and that there 
are steps that we can take to ensure the achievement of full and equal 
treatment under the law. 
It is my thesis that there is no valid justification for denying full marriage 
equality to same-sex couples in New Zealand. 
 
Contribution to knowledge of the subject 
This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of law and historical fact 
relating to the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships in New 
Zealand, and in that sense, provides a cultural and historical tool for 
immediate use. 
The thesis also, however, provides a platform for future progress. I 
consider that it will be able to be used as a reference to shift attitudes. 
Much of the material in this thesis has been used already, both in New 
Zealand and internationally, in helping to bring about change.  
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FOREWORD 
 
In our opinion, this thesis is the most comprehensive analysis of history 
and facts relating to the recognition of lesbian and gay relationships in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand that has ever been compiled. 
This living document provides a cultural and historical tool for now, and 
in the future, as a poignant reference to put facts in place over myth and 
homophobic prejudice. 
This work provides a valuable contribution to make a difference for our 
community over time to come, and already has in terms of the research, 
analysis, representation and speaking on the issue that Nigel has done 
during the time of writing his thesis. 
We are very proud to have Nigel as a friend and supporter throughout 
the time we struggled to achieve recognition of our marriage. We have 
experienced Nigel as a man of complete integrity and passion, who has 
worked tirelessly to present the true reality of equality in the context of 
recognition of lesbian and gay relationships in New Zealand. 
The truth is that as lesbians and gays in this country we already play 
our part in making our society and respective communities function in a 
respectful and structured way. We contribute in a society that professes 
equal opportunity for all its citizens, but chooses to discriminate against 
our community, putting rules and policies in place that bring a 
perception that blinds the reality that we are still second class citizens. 
The truth is that we are all human beings and are entitled to expect no 
less than to be afforded the same protections, responsibilities and 
consequences as anyone else in our society. 
The truth is that our Parliament must at some point be called to account 
for the injustice it has bestowed on us through creating the Civil Union 
Act as a compromise semblance of ‘equality’. 
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The truth is that we are all wonderfully different individuals, alongside 
all the other wonderfully different non-gay individuals in this country, 
and we should all have the same rights and status under our law. 
Nigel has dedicated his time and energy to search out and present these 
truths as an undeniably real and justified case for the right to complete 
equality for all lesbian and gay couples who seek recognition of their 
relationships in marriage. This work will add to the rich conversations, 
the high quality sources of research and the personal stories of our 
lesbian and gay history and culture here in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and 
we believe form a significant contribution to the achievement of a just 
and equal society for all. 
Thank you, and well done Nigel. 
 
Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin 
3 September 2009 
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Part I 
 
INTRODUCTORY MATERIAL 
 
For me, this thesis is far more than an academic exercise conducted 
merely for the sake of completing the requirements for a postgraduate 
degree qualification in law. This work is the record of a personal journey 
that I have undertaken in the company of others, including the following: 
• My partner, who has endured the many hours of my absence and 
the on-going saga of “the thesis”. In addition, he and I have 
discussed the possibility of celebrating our relationship in some way 
and, with me he has made the commitment that we will marry in 
New Zealand when the law permits us to do so. We will not accept a 
civil union in New Zealand, and we will not marry overseas. We will 
marry in the country of our birth and citizenship. 
• Our son, who my partner and I welcomed into our family almost 
three years ago. His presence in our lives has resulted from us 
challenging the status quo to enable us all to live our dream. His 
presence in our lives has served to cement our commitment to our 
equality ideal. 
• Same-sex couples for whom the goal of full equality under the law 
for their relationships is a reality worth fighting for, and for whom 
anything less will not be sufficient. I have worked very closely with 
them and I value their absolute support over a considerable period of 
time. 
• In addition, there have been many others for whom this issue brings 
no personal advantage, but who are committed to equality under the 
law, the elimination of discrimination and, above all, the 
fundamental notion of the dignity of, and respect for, others. 
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The purpose of Part 1 
To set the scene for this journey, the first Part of my thesis provides an 
introduction and the methodology to enable the substantive material 
supporting my fundamental thesis to be presented in a clear and 
meaningful way.  
The Introduction, in Chapter 1, provides my thesis statement and the 
over-all objective of the thesis.  
This is followed by an outlined of the parameters of the thesis – some 
introductory comments, additional to those contained in the Preface, 
that give the perspective from which I approach the topic of same-sex 
marriage. I also outline my reasons for including or excluding certain 
categories of material. 
I then outline the general format of this thesis, summarising the stages 
through which it passes and the ground it covers. 
In Chapter 2, the Methodology, I show how this thesis has been not only 
an academic exercise, keeping abreast of developments in thinking and 
law from throughout the world, but how this has also been very much an 
experiential exercise. A key component of this thesis has been engaging 
in dialogue with key protagonists in the advancement of human rights 
issues in New Zealand – not only those in favour of enhanced and 
enlivened human rights for all, but also the detractors. 
I am convinced that my fundamental thesis is correct. Furthermore, I am 
convinced, that by the time you have read the following evidence, you 
will agree. 
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THESIS STATEMENT 
It is my thesis that there is no valid justification for denying full marriage 
equality to same-sex couples in New Zealand. 
It is my submission that the current denial of access to marriage by 
same-sex couples results from a questionable application of New Zealand 
human rights laws and does not constitute a valid limitation on the 
rights of same-sex couples. I therefore submit that, in the face of the 
provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act s.5, the current denial 
constitutes: 
• an unreasonable limitation on the rights of same-sex couples; and 
• is not based upon demonstrable justification. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The over-all objective of this thesis is to show that same-sex couples in 
New Zealand can reasonably expect that they should have access to civil-
legal marriage in the same way, and on the precisely the same terms, as 
different-sex couples. There is no suggestion that same-sex couples are 
seeking special rights. Rather, by seeking access to the recognition of 
relationships through civil-legal marriage, same-sex couples are seeking 
equal treatment before and under the law. 
In specific terms, the aims of this thesis are several-fold. It will 
demonstrate that same-sex couples can reasonably claim a right to 
recognition of their relationships through civil-legal marriage on the 
basis that:  
• access to relationship recognition through marriage is a basic civil 
right; 
• New Zealand‟s domestic human rights legislation prohibits 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation; 
• international human rights standards prohibit discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation; 
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• many of the current objections to same-sex marriage lack valid and 
reasoned foundation; 
• with the increasing extension to same-sex couples of entitlements 
under New Zealand law, exclusion from civil-legal marriage becomes 
increasingly illogical; and 
• with increasing access to civil-legal marriage for same-sex couples in 
overseas jurisdictions, exclusion in the New Zealand setting is 
becomes increasingly untenable. 
The thesis statement and the title of this thesis also reflect my strong 
personal conviction in relation to the human rights imperatives of 
equality before the law and of respect for the dignity of the person. It is 
this personal conviction which led me to begin researching this area in 
depth.  
Furthermore, my involvement in the Quilter same-sex marriage case,1 
and a range of other issues relating to the treatment of same-sex 
couples, and my examination of this issue at an academic level, have 
strengthened this conviction and my commitment to a principled 
approach to the right of same-sex couples to marry. This resolve has 
been strengthened further by the wider examination of developments in 
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships in overseas jurisdictions. 
 
PERSONAL STATEMENT 
Essentially, the fundamental issues that will be explored in this thesis 
are associated with equal treatment before and under the law for same-
sex couples with regard to: 
• status – same-sex couples being able to access the same civil-legal 
relationship status as different-sex couples; 
• choice – same-sex couples being able to access the same range of 
choices with regard to relationship recognition that can be accessed 
by different-sex couples; and  
                                                 
1  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
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• entitlements – same-sex couples being able to access exactly the 
same relationship benefits, protections, and obligations that can be 
accessed by different-sex couples. 
Marriage is a fundamental social institution, entry into which is seen by 
most New Zealanders as a natural part of the way their life progresses. 
Marriage, amongst New Zealanders generally, is not seen as a privilege, 
but rather as a right – a stance that is recognised and supported at a 
judicial level:2 
… [the] freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. 
In accord with New Zealand human rights legislation, it is arguable that, 
if marriage is a basic civil right that is extended to different-sex couples, 
then, in reliance upon the prohibitions against discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
s.19, marriage is a basic civil right that should be extended also to same-
sex couples. To quote Thomas J more fully:3  
Based upon this personal characteristic, gays and lesbians are denied 
access to a central social institution and the resulting status of married 
persons. They lose the rights and privileges, including the manifold legal 
consequences which marriage conveys. They are denied a basic civil right in 
that freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. They lose the 
opportunity to choose the partner of their choice as a marriage partner, many 
again viewing the right to choose as a basic civil right of all citizens. In a real 
sense, gays and lesbians are effectively excluded from full membership of 
society. 
As the State incrementally extends the number of statutory provisions 
that include same-sex couples (and de facto different-sex couples), it is 
possible to argue that these couples are being provided for in a way that 
does not undermine traditional marriage, and that marriage should be 
„left alone‟. However, I do not adhere to the argument that, the ability of 
same-sex couples to access, by alternative statutory means, an 
increasing number of the specific entitlements that flow from marriage, 
derogates from the argument that same-sex couples should be permitted 
to marry.  
                                                 
2 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
3  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
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However, it is the very concept of these being „alternative‟ arrangements 
that is the key concern. It is not the formal legal entitlements alone that 
are important. Rather, as addressed in this thesis, it is the issue of 
equality that is fundamental, and the ability of same-sex couples to 
access marriage as a means of formalising their relationship in the same 
way that different-sex couples can access marriage to formalise their 
relationships. What is being sought is equality in terms of the status that 
marriage attracts in the eyes of society at large. One of the important 
aspects of marriage is that it is a recognised and respected social 
institution that brings with it an (often unspoken) acknowledgement of 
the intangibles of a relationship, and an acknowledgement of the 
assumed value and validity of the relationship. 
The marriages of different-sex couples, and families based on the 
heterosexual ideology, are privileged by the law. Such relationships are 
established as the norm by those who seek to perpetuate this privilege, 
and relationships that are different are consequently portrayed by them 
as abnormal, or at least inferior.  
For this reason, those in decision-making positions actively seek ways of 
providing recognition to these different forms of relationships – without 
providing access to marriage. To date, the most usual response has been 
to provide legal recognition of same-sex relationships by way of 
registered partnerships.4 However, it is my view that registered 
partnerships fail in that they offer to same-sex couples neither legal nor 
social equality with different-sex couples. What registered partnerships 
do offer is a legal compromise and the positioning of gays as second-
class citizens. 
Offering „alternatives‟ such as increased entitlements to partners in de 
facto relationships or through providing for registered partnerships does 
not provide for full and equal treatment before the law. In my view: 
• there can be no such thing as “degrees of equality”;5  
                                                 
4  Here, and throughout this thesis I will use the term „registered partnerships‟ to 
include civil unions and other similar models (as in the Vermont and French models, 
and the model adopted in New Zealand), but not lesser forms of partnership 
recognition. (See more detailed discussion on this point later in this chapter). 
5  See the Human Rights Commission submission to the Ministry of Justice on the 
Ministry‟s Discussion Paper on “Same-Sex Couples and the Law” (April 2000). 
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• equality under the law is a destination rather than a journey; and 
• incrementalism is not part of the language of (civil and political) 
human rights. 
It is the principle of equality that is fundamental to this thesis. Although 
the discussion moves in and out of areas such as family law, and culture 
and tradition, it will be directed predominantly towards the issue of 
access to marriage by same-sex couples on the basis of human rights 
imperatives.  
 
THE PARAMETERS OF THIS THESIS 
Timeframes 
The writing of this thesis commenced in 1994 as a Masters in 
Jurisprudence at the University of Waikato. My interest in this topic was 
sparked jointly by: 
• my interest in family and human rights laws; and  
• the fact that the same-sex marriage case, Baehr v Lewin,6 was 
progressing through the courts of the State of Hawai‟i in the United 
States of America.  
Although the ultimate outcome of Baehr was a denial of access to 
marriage for same-sex couples, I found the presentation of the cases in 
court and the associated public debates were fascinating. There had 
been earlier cases,7 but still by 1994 access to marriage for same-sex 
couples was a somewhat distant hope, and Baehr fuelled some of that 
hope. 
In retrospect, we can now say that it would be a further 7 years before 
any jurisdiction in the world extended equal marriage rights to same-sex 
couples – in The Netherlands in 2001. However, the first Baehr case 
                                                 
6  Baehr v Lewin 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Note that the „Baehr case‟ was, in the final 
analysis, a series of cases (four in all) with the original case in the Circuit (Trial) 
Court going to appeal, being referred back to the trial court, and then to the State 
Supreme Court for a final decision, and subsequent stay of proceedings pending 
Constitutional referendum. See discussion on this (and the subsequent cases) in 
Chapters 6 and 7. 
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prompted further legal action in, for example, Alaska and Vermont in 
the United States of America, and arguably in other national 
jurisdictions also such as New Zealand. Following on from the Baehr 
cases, and in particular since the 2001 legislative breakthrough in The 
Netherlands, there has been a significant increase in activity with regard 
to advocacy through court cases and the lobbying of legislatures with 
the objective of seeking access to marriage for same-sex couples. 
At the time of final submission of this thesis, there are 7 national 
jurisdictions (countries), plus 6 states within the United States of 
America, that offer same-sex couples access to recognition of their 
relationships by marriage in exactly the same way as for different-sex 
couples:8 
• Canada – 14 January 2001 9 
• The Netherlands – 1 April 2001 
• Belgium – 1 June 2003 
• Massachusetts, USA – 17 May 2004 
• Spain - 19 June 2005 
• South Africa - 30 November 2006 
• Connecticut, USA – 28 October 2008  
• Norway - 1 January 2009 
• Sweden – 1 May 2009 
• Iowa, USA – 27 April 2009 
• Vermont, USA – 1 September 2009 
• Maine, USA – 14 September 2009 
• New Hampshire, USA – 1 January 2010 
                                                                                                                                     
7  See discussion in Chapter 6 about early cases. 
8  Note that the dates given are not the dates of the court decision or passage of 
legislation, but the dates on which the decision or the legislation took effect. Note 
also, that seven of these have come into effect or have been approved after the „cut-
off‟ point for this thesis. Brief comment on these cases appears in Chapter 9 only.   
9  In Canada on 10 June 2003, the Supreme Court of Ontario, in Halpern v Canada 
(2003) 65 O.R. (3d) 161, issued a decision which validated the marriages that had 
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Additionally, there have been further attempts in other jurisdictions, 
through courts or by way of legislative change, to achieve legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships by access to marriage. However, 
not all attempts have been successful – an example of this being the 
Quilter same-sex marriage case here in New Zealand.10 
In some instances, the recognition sought by way of marriage has been 
„replaced‟ with recognition by way of one or other of the myriad of forms 
of registered partnership regimes, or by way of the extension of 
individual legal entitlements that are available to unmarried different-
sex and same-sex couples.  
There are significant practical issues associated with writing a thesis on 
a topic where there is such a steady development of the issues, whether 
successful or unsuccessful, and where there is such a level of change 
whether negative or positive.  
The key difficulty arising from the constant development and change is 
the purely practical difficulty with regard to keeping all aspects of the 
thesis up-to-date. There have been several occasions where the writing 
of the thesis has been all but complete and then there have been major 
developments in one jurisdiction, or announcements with regard to a 
significant court case in another. 
However, for this reason, I have decided to set a formal cut-off date, for 
the period of consideration in this thesis, as at 31 December 2006. 
This means that, with regard to developments here in New Zealand, I 
have covered the period up to and including the passage and 
implementation of the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Bill 2005.11 
With regard to developments overseas, this covers the period beyond the 
advent of marriage for same-sex couples in Canada, The Netherlands, 
Belgium, Massachusetts, Spain and South Africa; as well as some 
consideration of a range of jurisdictions that, during the same time 
period, opted for registered partnership or civil union regimes. 
                                                                                                                                     
been solemnised on 14 January 2001. Retrospectively, therefore, these marriages 
became the world‟s first modern legally-recognised same-sex marriages. 
10  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
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It is difficult, when some events have occurred in the past, but are still in 
effect or impact on the present, to ensure that all information is 
presented in the proper time context. However, I have endeavoured as 
much as possible throughout the thesis, to present information from a 
consistent perspective with regard to sequencing.  
I am aware also that this means that some matters do not receive 
detailed consideration and analysis in this thesis. However, Chapter 9 
will provide some introductory information about: 
• the arrival of same-sex marriage in Connecticut, Norway, Sweden, 
Iowa, Vermont, Maine, and New Hampshire; and 
• the advent and subsequent removal of access to marriage for same-
sex couples in California, and the ongoing legal action in that 
jurisdiction.  
It is intended that Chapter 9 will act solely as a brief post-script in order 
to provide a summary of the relevant events and what those events 
might mean for the pursuit of access to marriage for same-sex couples in 
New Zealand. 
 
Different approach from that in the Quilter case 
When the issue of same-sex marriage was placed before the courts in 
New Zealand in April 1996 (High Court) and December 1997 (Court of 
Appeal),12 the respondents / appellants were seeking a declaration that 
same-sex couples must be permitted to marry under the existing 
Marriage Act 1955. 
The opening line of the Court of Appeal judgement states:13 
The issue in this case was whether the Marriage Act 1955 allowed for 
marriages between persons of the same sex.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
11  See discussion on the passage of these statutes in Chapter 8. 
12  Quilter v Attorney-General (1996) 14 FRNZ 430 and Quilter v Attorney-General 
[1998] 1 NZLR 523, respectively. 
13  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 523. 
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In essence, the argument was that the Marriage Act 1955 is gender-
neutral and that the Act could be, and must be, interpreted to include 
same-sex couples. In this respect, the issue before the Court was not 
whether or not the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was 
(and is) discriminatory, but rather whether the existing Marriage Act 
1955 could be interpreted so as to enable same-sex couples to marry 
under that Act. 
The Court of Appeal held that the meaning of marriage in New Zealand, 
as intended by Parliament when it passed the Marriage Act 1955, was 
clear. The Court upheld the traditional meaning of marriage in New 
Zealand as being the “voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others”. Essentially, the Court, in its 
majority, said that regardless of whether or not the denial of access to 
marriage was discriminatory: 
• it was not possible to interpret the Marriage Act 1955 in a manner 
that would permit same-sex couples to marry; and 
• any change to the Marriage Act 1955 to enable same-sex couples to 
marry would have to be made by Parliament. 
This thesis does not focus on that same definitional issue. Rather, this 
thesis focuses on the issue of equality and shows that, under current 
New Zealand law: 
• the denial of access to marriage by same-sex couples constitutes 
different treatment for same-sex couples as compared with different-
sex couples based on gender and sexual orientation; 
• this different treatment is not demonstrably justifiable in New 
Zealand law and therefore constitutes discrimination; and 
• in order to comply with New Zealand‟s human rights imperatives, the 
law must be changed to permit access to marriage by same-sex 
couples. 
 
A Gay Male Perspective 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to clarify that I do not 
consider myself qualified to discuss the issue of same-sex marriage from 
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other than a gay male perspective. While I may make reference to lesbian 
writings and the views of lesbian women, I use these in the broader 
context of same-sex marriage and not in the context of a discussion 
about lesbianism per se. Similarly, I will draw on information arising 
from experiences of transgender persons, but this is not a discussion 
about transgenderism. This thesis is about the issue of same-sex 
marriage. 
 
Sexual Orientation and Gender: A Clarification of Terms 
It is important in this discussion to clarify the distinction between issues 
of sexual orientation and issues of gender. Both sexual orientation and 
sex (gender) are enumerated grounds on which discrimination is 
prohibited in the Human Rights Act 1993 s.21. They are separate 
grounds and, while there is some philosophical overlap, they are 
generally intended to deal with separate issues. 
There still appears to be a view amongst many people in wider society, 
including some of the members of our House of Representatives, that 
being a homosexual person is the first step along a continuum towards 
being transvestite and then transsexual.14 In fact, these are three 
distinct categories of individuals.  
Some of the confusion which has arisen in relation to the above distinct 
identities may stem from a term which has been used in recent times. 
The term “queer” has been used as a generic term for all of the above 
groups. It is a term with political origins used in an attempt to embrace 
the various types of alternative identity,15 relating to sexual orientation 
on the one hand, and gender on the other. As a generic term, it includes 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transvestite and transsexual.  
                                                 
14  A view expressed often by, for example, John Banks during his time as a Member of 
Parliament, and as a Minister of the Crown, and as a host on radio talkback, and as 
Mayor of Auckland City. 
15  That is, an alternative to the hegemonic norm – namely, an alternative to the male 
who identifies as male and is attracted to females, or the female who identifies as 
female and is attracted to males. 
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However, each of these groups is distinct and each person within each 
group has the right to define their own identity without this definition 
being obscured by being merged into a generic whole. Further, each 
person and each group has a right to choose to be free from the 
derisiveness that the term „queer‟ can attract when used by those who 
seek to attach to it the connotations of stigma and judgement.  
Homosexuality (or being gay or lesbian) is a matter of sexual orientation, 
not of gender.16 For example: 
• A male homosexual is a person who identifies as a male, and is 
emotionally and physically attracted, exclusively or predominantly, 
to other males. It is the attraction to males which is his sexual 
orientation.  
• A female homosexual (lesbian) is a person who identifies as female 
and who is emotionally and physically attracted, exclusively or 
predominantly, to other females. It is the attraction to females which 
is her sexual orientation.  
• The attraction of a man or a woman to persons of the opposite 
gender is the manifestation of their heterosexual orientation. 
Conversely, transvestism and transsexualism are gender issues.  
• A male transvestite is a person who identifies as a male but who 
experiences a desire to dress as a woman. In addition to identifying 
as a male, a male transvestite may be either homosexually or 
heterosexually oriented. That is, in addition to his or her gender 
identity, a transvestite‟s orientation may also be either heterosexual 
or homosexual. 
• A male-to-female transsexual is a person who is born physically of 
one gender (male) but whose gender identity is that of another 
(female). 
                                                 
16  The term homosexuality has tended to be misleadingly defined in terms of the sexual 
behaviour of an individual rather than the relationship with another person. That is, 
a homosexual male is defined as a person who seeks sexual contact with other men. 
In reality, a homosexual male is a person who is attracted to a person of the same 
gender on a range of levels – emotional, physical, psychological, personal, and 
sexual. 
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Issues arising in relation to transvestism, or transsexualism will only be 
considered in this thesis in so far as they relate to, and impact upon, the 
issue of same-sex marriage. The discussion surrounding transsexualism 
and the law, for example, has important implications for the evolving 
definition of family and in the recognition of non-traditional 
relationships.17 
 
The Marriage Debate Amongst Gays 
As stated, this thesis is about access to marriage by same-sex couples. I 
am aware that, whether or not marriage is the ideal form of relationship 
recognition has been the subject of some debate within the gay and 
lesbian communities. 
First, for example, there has been debate amongst gays and lesbians 
themselves as to whether they see marriage as a desirable institution to 
which they want access, or whether they see it as a patriarchal and 
anachronistic institution of which they want no part. This thesis will 
show that this is an irrelevant consideration.  
Second, there is the issue of whether or not there is sufficient demand 
amongst gays and lesbians for access to marriage, or whether or not 
access to equality should be premised on the level of demand. This 
thesis will show that, on the basis of equal treatment before and under 
the law, this is also an irrelevant consideration. 
The fundamental premise of this thesis, in relation to both these 
considerations is that, on the basis of equal treatment before and under 
the law, so long as marriage is available as a form of relationship 
recognition, access to this should be available to same-sex couples. 
Throughout the period during which the issue of same-sex marriage has 
been under serious consideration in New Zealand, there has been a 
significant level of agreement amongst gay and lesbian communities that 
marriage must be available for those same-sex couples who want it. This 
agreement is supported, and this support has been expressed quite 
                                                 
17  For example, see the transsexual marriage case: Attorney-General v Family Court at 
Otahuhu (1994) 12 FRNZ 643; [1995] NZFLR 57 (HC). 
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strongly, by those who would not wish to avail themselves of the ability 
to marry even if it should become available to them.18 
The gay and lesbian community has also demonstrated a strong 
commitment to equal treatment without compromise in other issues 
relating to equality in the treatment of gays and lesbians. This was the 
case, for example, when: 
• only an equal age of consent of 16 for consensual adult sexual 
activity was acceptable at the time of homosexual law reform;19 and 
• it was seen as unacceptable for there to be exemptions for the Armed 
Services and the New Zealand Police Force with regard to the 
inclusion of prohibitions against discrimination in the Human Rights 
Act 1993.20 
To incorporate lesser standards and expectations into our laws with 
regard to the treatment of gays and lesbians solely on the basis of sexual 
orientation is to suggest that gays and lesbians are less valued, and gay 
and lesbian relationships are less valid, than others in our society. 
The specific issues outlined above will surface during the course of the 
discussion about access to marriage, however, it is not intended 
necessarily that these will form a specific and detailed discussion in their 
own right.  
The key issue is whether same-sex couples who wish to have their 
relationships recognised through civil-legal marriage should have access 
to marriage in exactly the same way that different-sex couples can 
choose to have their relationships recognised. 
 
Discrimination vis-à-vis Different Treatment 
I note that some commentators use the term „discrimination‟ in the same 
way as others use the term „different treatment‟. They then open up to 
                                                 
18  For example, Alison Laurie (formerly of an anti-marriage lesbian group “Dykes Who 
Don‟t Want A Bar Of It”), in her oral submission to the Justice and Electoral Select 
Committee on the Property (Relationships) Act 2001, supported access to marriage 
for same-sex couples who wish to marry. 
19  See further discussion in Chapter 6 with regard to several proposals for 
decriminalisation with unequal ages of consent. 
20  See discussion on this point also in Chapter 6. 
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themselves the possibility of talking about justified (lawful) 
discrimination and unjustified (unlawful) discrimination. The New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission, for example, defines the term 
„unlawful discrimination‟ as follows:21  
Unlawful discrimination occurs when a person is treated less favourably 
than another person in the same, or similar, circumstances. Discrimination 
may be unlawful if it is based on one or more of the following grounds … [the 
grounds prescribed in the Human Rights Act 1993 s.21 are listed]. 
I do not adhere to this use of the terminology, and I consider the term 
„lawful discrimination‟ to be oxymoronic. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5 sets the standard for 
discrimination in New Zealand and provides that: 
Subject to section 4, the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights 
may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
In this thesis, therefore, I employ terminology essentially as follows: 
• less favourable different treatment that is justified, in terms of the 
requirements of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5, 
constitutes „different treatment‟ – acceptable under New Zealand law; 
• less favourable different treatment that is not justified, in terms of 
the requirements of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5, 
constitutes „discrimination‟ – not acceptable under New Zealand law. 
 
Marriage vis-à-vis other forms of relationship recognition 
In this thesis I focus, in the main, on access to same-sex marriage as a 
matter of human rights equality. It is necessary, therefore, to compare 
marriage with other forms of relationship recognition.  
                                                 
21  Human Rights Commission, “Fact Sheet #04”: 
 http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/09-May-2008_13-19-
52_Factsheet_01_Welcome.doc (Retrieved: 6 July 2009). 
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There are, in my analysis, three broad categories of relationship 
recognition regimes available. These can be listed as: 
• marriage;  
• registered partnerships; and 
• other forms of recognition. 
 
Marriage 
For the purposes of this thesis, marriage means civil-legal marriage as 
provided for in marriage legislation of most jurisdictions.22  
 
Registered partnerships 
There is a range of terminology used to describe very similar regimes, 
including, for example, Registered Partnerships (Denmark), Civil 
Solidarity Pacts (France), Life Partnerships (Germany), Civil Unions (New 
Zealand, Vermont), Civil Partnerships (United Kingdom), amongst others. 
However, to a greater or lesser degree, each of these can be described as 
opt-in statutory regimes designed to emulate marriage by way of 
providing many or most of the entitlements of marriage without 
providing access to marriage itself.23 
 
Other 
In this category, I include any regime, whether opt-in or opt-out that 
provides a „lower-level‟ form of relationship recognition. This lower level 
of recognition can stem from several different considerations, including: 
• the nature of the relationship;  
• the type and amount of protections and entitlements provided; and 
• the nature and standing of the jurisdiction offering recognition. 
                                                 
22  For a discussion on the separation of the civil-legal and the religious aspects of 
marriage, see Chapter 3. 
23  For further discussion on the merits of registered partnerships, especially as 
compared with marriage, see Chapter 3. 
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First, there are numerous instances where statutory protections and 
entitlements are extended to any two persons who share their living 
environment. That is, in some jurisdictions two persons who are 
flatmates or friends sharing a home, or a care-giver and the person for 
whom they care, or a grandparent and grandchild who share the same 
home, may, by virtue of the relationship between them, have access to 
protections and entitlements in law.24  
Second, the range of protections and entitlements offered is, in most 
instances, somewhat restricted. They tend to be limited mainly to 
tangible matters such as housing (being able to take individual 
possession of the home that was previously shared) and finances 
(insurances, pensions, etc). They do not extend to intangible or family-
related matters (such as adoption, custody, etc). 
Third, in some cases these types of recognition regimes are provided at a 
national or federal level. Often, however, they are provided by regional 
authorities at state, county or city council level. In some instances, some 
protections and entitlements may be provided at a corporate level – 
whether public agencies or commercial organisations. 
 
                                                 
24  For example:  
- The Hawaii (Reciprocal Beneficiaries law (Act 383) 1997) includes any two single 
adults. 
- The Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania, Australia) includes older companions, 
carers and the people they care for and people in ethnic and indigenous families 
whose kinship ties are not recognised in traditional western law. 
- The Significant Personal Relationships Bill (New South Wales, Australia) includes 
same sex relationships and “other relationships irrespective of their sexuality”: 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/PARLMENT/hansArt.nsf/V3Key/LA19
970925006 (Retrieved: 23 June 2009). 
- The Relationships Act 2008 (Victoria, Australia) which applies to de facto couples, 
known under the Act as domestic partners. Can be „opt-in‟ (by registration) or by 
presumption (where relationship of 2 years or more and certain residential 
requirements in Victoria are met, etc). 
- The Family Relationships Act 1975 (South Australia), as amended by the Statutes 
Amendment (Domestic Partners) Act 2006, Includes persons who live in a “close 
personal relationship” (s.11A), which includes “(a) the relationship between a 
legally married couple; or (b) a relationship where 1 of the persons provides the 
other with domestic support or personal care (or both) for fee or reward, or on 
behalf of some other person or an organisation of whatever kind” (s.11); 
http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/V/A/2006/STATUTES%20AMENDMENT%2
0(DOMESTIC%20PARTNERS)%20ACT%202006_43/2006.43.UN.PDF (Retrieved: 
23 June 2009). 
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In the context of this thesis, contrary to considerations of „dignity‟ (which 
will develop throughout this thesis) it is not acceptable to suggest that: 
• a loving, committed relationship „in the nature of marriage‟ should be 
equated to flatmate or friends who happen to be sharing a home; and 
• same-sex couples, by virtue of being equated to flatmates or friends, 
should accept a lower level of protection or entitlement. 
For these reasons, I have eliminated from any further consideration in 
this thesis, any type of relationship recognition that might come within 
this „other‟ category. 
 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Overseas Jurisdictions 
It is recognised that overseas jurisdictions must, by nature of their own 
legal evolution, have some very different matters to consider when 
examining an issue such as same-sex marriage. However, it is also 
useful to draw parallels or distinctions where appropriate. On this basis, 
my thesis includes comparative material from overseas jurisdictions. 
There are useful comparisons amongst several of the countries that, in 
terms of over-all parliamentary system, are most alike to New Zealand. 
Of these, Canada has shown itself to be the most activist in relation to 
gay rights matters – now leaving New Zealand in its wake, in my view. 
Conversely, other jurisdictions, Australia being a notable example, tend 
to be dragging along behind.  
Comparisons with Canada are particularly useful in light of the fact that 
the wording of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is based very 
closely on the wording of the Canadian Charter.  
It is useful also: 
• to consider events in the State of Massachusetts in the United 
States of America (USA), in South Africa, and in European countries, 
such as The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain, where access to 
marriage is a reality; and 
• to consider these in direct comparison with the States of Hawai‟i, 
Vermont and California in the United States of America, and 
Denmark and France (for example) in Europe, which have registered 
partnership legislation. 
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THESIS OUTLINE 
There are five key Parts to this thesis, each consisting of a number of 
Chapters. These are outlined as follows: 
 
Part I - Introduction 
This Part provides introductory information, including: 
• the thesis statement; 
• a statement of objectives; 
• a personal statement; 
• an outline of the parameters of the thesis; and 
• the methodology applied to this thesis, and ethical considerations. 
Part I contains the following Chapters: 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Chapter 2 – Methodology 
 
Part II – Contextual Considerations  
This Part provides a range of information relating to the context in which 
this thesis was written. It is my intention that this information provides 
the reader with a framework for receiving and considering all the 
information that is presented in these and the subsequent chapters. 
Part II contains the following Chapters: 
Chapter 3 – Personal Perspectives  
Chapter 4 – Human Rights and Citizenship 
Chapter 5 – Commitment and Courage 
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Part III – Chronology and Comparative Analysis 
This part examines what has happened in New Zealand and in a number 
of overseas jurisdictions with regard to the provision of equal access to 
marriage for same-sex couples. Over-all, this part provides a chronology 
of events, and a comparison of the progress made in New Zealand as 
compared with the other countries. As was stated in Chapter 1, this 
thesis has a „cut-off‟ date as at the end of 2006, and for this reason, 
Chapter 9 provides only a brief summary and comment on developments 
from the beginning of 2007. 
Part III contains the following Chapters: 
Chapter 6 – Developments up to 1993  
Chapter 7 – Developments 1994 to 2000 
Chapter 8 – Developments 2001 to 2006 
Chapter 9  – Postscript: 2007 onwards 
 
Part IV – Summary and Conclusion  
This Part provides a summary of the key themes arising in this thesis, a 
list of options for future action towards access to equal marriage for 
same-sex couples, and a summary of some of the changes that will be 
needed if any of these options are to be successful. 
Part IV contains the following Chapter: 
Chapter 10 – Summary and Conclusion 
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BACKGROUND 
I entered law school at the University of Waikato in 1991 having already 
been in the workforce for a period of 14 years as a secondary school 
teacher and as a social worker and family counsellor. These jobs 
required an awareness of the statutory parameters of the law.  
I learned from experience that law is not merely a matter of “black letter” 
law but is much more than that. The law in operation impacts directly 
upon peoples‟ lives. Depending on how the “black letter” law is framed it 
can be interpreted in a supportive way which protects the rights of 
individuals or groups or, conversely, it can be employed to hinder 
citizens‟ enjoyment of their daily lives. Even where the “black letter” law 
is seemingly good law, often, through its interpretation or 
implementation, it can work against particular persons or in favour of 
others.1  
Before the Law School at the University of Waikato formally opened its 
doors to fully-fledged law students,2 there was talk about the new type of 
programme that the Law School was preparing to offer, as a departure 
from the way in which other law schools were operating at the time. In 
direct comparison with the more traditionalist, “black letter” law 
focussed approach of the existing New Zealand law schools, there had 
been discussions and planning for a Law School that would teach and 
research the law, not in isolation from, but within the context of, the 
wider social setting.  
                                                 
1  In New Zealand, for example, since 1993, permanent residency applications for 
overseas partners of New Zealand citizens in de facto opposite-sex and same-sex 
relationships have been assessed under the same immigration policies and rules. 
However, statistics would suggest that a same-sex partner is significantly less likely 
to be successful than an opposite-sex partner – for the period from 1993 to 1999, 
almost twice as many same-sex partners were declined (32.11%) as compared with 
different-sex partners (17.18%). Thus the rules (the “black-letter law”) are the same, 
but the application of those rules is different. It should be noted that separate 
statistics for same-sex and different-sex relationships are no longer kept by the 
Immigration Service as same-sex and different-sex de facto couples are now said to 
be treated the same under New Zealand law.  
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The philosophy of the Law School was to be centred on the “demands for 
social justice and human rights”,3 and was particularly to focus on the 
rights of disempowered groups in society and to focus on such rights 
with a proactive social conscience. As noted in “Te Mātāhauariki” 
(essentially the founding document of Waikato Law School) the “Gold 
Report on the Reform of Legal Training in New Zealand” stated that law 
students needed:4 
… to know the relationship between law and business, human and 
industrial relations, politics, social policy and so on. The study of laws alone 
is an insufficient preparation for a complex social milieu in a dynamic 
nation. 
Te Mātāhauariki went on to say:5  
We understand that law and the personnel of the legal system operate not in 
vacuo but within a social, political and economic environment, and can only 
be understood as such. Law is a product of both these forces and a force in 
its own right affecting their developments. 
The study of “law in context” was a founding principle of the Waikato 
Law School, and the phrase “law in context” became the Law School‟s 
catch cry. 
I feel particularly comfortable with this approach. I do not consider that 
law operates in isolation. Law colours and shapes the attitudes of all 
members of society. Likewise the attitudes of all citizens of our country 
influence the fabric of the law. 
In this thesis, I have emphasised my focus on the issue of access to 
marriage by same-sex couples not in isolation from the context in which 
the issue is being debated, but with particular reference to this context. 
The context includes a range of points of focus, including: 
• the human rights environment; 
                                                                                                                                     
2  The University of Waikato had offered a Law Intermediate programme before the Law 
School formally opened with successful students then progressing to Law Schools at 
other universities to continue with their degrees. 
3  University of Waikato, “Te Mātāhauariki”, Report of the Law School Committee, 
University of Waikato (February 1988): 5. 
4  Cited in: University of Waikato, “Te Mātāhauariki”, Report of the Law School 
Committee, University of Waikato (February 1988): 22. 
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• the personal perspective; and 
• the historic and legal framework. 
In turn, the legal framework includes considerations of the legal sector / 
legal system generally, and family law and human rights law specifically. 
Further, I consider it important to view the legal sector / legal system as 
being comprised only of existing legislation (statute law) and the actions 
of the courts in interpreting (case law). An integral part of the legal 
framework in which this thesis is located is the development of policy 
relating to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships and the 
encapsulation of that policy within legislation.6 
Placing the legal considerations within this wider context means that the 
thesis moves from being solely a legal academic thesis, to a thesis which 
includes a significant level of meaning for those persons directly affected 
by developments in this area of family and human rights law in New 
Zealand. 
This has inevitably influenced the manner in which I have approached 
this topic and the methodology employed in the research and writing of 
this thesis.  
By virtue of my extensive involvement and keen interest in the specific 
issue of same-sex marriage and the more general issues of recognition 
and treatment of same-sex relationships, much of the thesis is written 
from a person, experiential perspective. In general, the methodological 
approach is qualitative rather than quantitative. However, the essentially 
qualitative approach employed does not deny the ability to incorporate 
some quantitative information about, for example, the level of support 
amongst particular or general populations for same-sex marriage, the 
response of same-sex couples to registered-partnership or civil union 
regimes as compared with marriage.  
                                                                                                                                     
5  University of Waikato, “Te Mātāhauariki”, Report of the Law School Committee, 
University of Waikato (February 1988): 23. 
6  This notion was supported by the Re-Evaluation Team appointed in April 2000 to 
undertake the a review of human rights protections in New Zealand who, in their 
Report, the Re-Evaluation Team recommended “early consideration of human rights 
issues and obligations in the policy-making process, rather than waiting for cases to 
be taken to complaint or prosecuted in the courts”. See further discussion on the 
review and its recommendations in Chapter 8. 
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The combination of approaches, I believe, sits comfortably with my over-
all objective of providing a thesis that canvasses the legal issues, but 
does so in a manner that is readable and accessible in a meaningful way 
to those for whom the issues are also important. 
In an analytical framework, it is wholly acceptable and appropriate to 
employ a range of approaches in the presentation of argument on an 
issue such as that which is the focus of this thesis.7 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
Introduction 
In this thesis, I have employed two key research methodologies that I 
consider to be complementary. In essence, the research styles of this 
thesis are: 
• participatory action research; and 
• academic investigation and analysis. 
Very commonly, a thesis in the discipline of laws will be written from a 
purist legal academic perspective. However, because of my desire to 
emphasise the law-in-context nature of this issue, and because of the 
range of my experience and involvement with the issues, it is appropriate 
that this thesis be founded fundamentally in these two approaches. 
As stated previously, I have been committed to ensuring that this thesis 
is meaningful to those who are involved in, and affected by, the issues 
under investigation and consideration – the key issue being that of 
access to marriage for same-sex couples. Participatory action research, 
by its very nature, assists in attaining and retaining this connection:8 
Community-based action research takes into account people‟s history, 
culture, interactional practices, and emotional lives. Although it makes use of 
techniques and strategies commonly applied in the behavioural and social 
sciences, it is a more user-friendly approach to investigation than most. 
                                                 
7  Babbie, Earl, The Practice Of Social Research, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
California, USA (1992): 109: “The use of several different research methods to test 
the same finding is sometime called triangulation and you should always keep it in 
mind as a valuable research strategy”. 
8  Stringer, Ernest T., Action Research: A Handbook For Practitioners, Sage 
Publications, California (1996): 15. 
 Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
  28  
 
Unlike the elaborate routines of traditional scientific research, which, from 
the perspective of the practitioner, are often shrouded in the mists of 
technical language and mystified by complex statistical procedures, 
community based action research is presented in terms that make it 
accessible to both practitioners and laypersons.  
Participatory action research – being heuristic in nature 9 – reflects the 
experiences of the analyst or decision-maker, and other participants, as 
persons living from day to day within the current social, cultural and 
legal contexts – a „subjective‟ element.  
On the other hand, with this being a thesis in laws, it is necessary to 
undertake academic analysis of human rights law and family law. Also, 
in the context of same-sex marriage and international developments in 
this area, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of development in New 
Zealand, both in their own right and compared with what has been and 
is happening overseas – an „objective‟ element. 
Academic investigation and analysis serves to bring a wealth of „arms-
length‟ information about developments (past and present) in New 
Zealand and across a range of other jurisdictions. It entails analysing 
and synthesising primary and secondary resources relating to the rights 
of gays and lesbians as individuals and as couples. In undertaking this 
examination, the goals are to consider the findings of others (in this 
case, including judicial decisions and academic writings), and extending 
or challenging those views. 
The use of these complementary research techniques enables the 
experiential involvement and learning to be combined with, and 
balanced by, academic rigour. This dual approach, on the one hand, 
allays concerns about the potential for accusations of bias stemming 
from the participatory approach and, on the other hand, offsets potential 
accusations that the overall analysis lacks the empathic understanding 
of issues from the point of view of those most affected at a personal level.  
Accessing and analysing information from a diverse range of sources and 
by applying a range of research approaches and techniques provides a 
broad knowledge base from which to: 
• analyse the key issues (problems); and  
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• formulate proposals for change and improvement. 
This section provides a background and some of the theoretical 
reasoning behind the methodologies employed in writing this thesis. 
 
Participatory action research 
Action research is defined as:10 
a form of self-reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social 
situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own 
practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which 
the practices are carried out. 
In using action research as a research tool, the researcher is actively 
involved in the cause for which the research is conducted. Basically, 
action research is about „learning by doing‟, where:11 
a group of people identify a problem, do something to resolve it, see how 
successful their efforts were, and if not satisfied try again. 
Action research could be described as a combination of learning by 
experience, problem-solving and being results-focussed. Throughout the 
writing of this thesis I have been actively engaged with others working 
closely on the same-sex marriage issue in defining „the problem‟, seeking 
options for change, and working for such change. 
According to Dorothy Gabel, action research is suitable for participants 
who recognize the existence of shortcomings in existing practices and 
who would like to, in an iterative fashion:12 
• adopt some initial stance in regard to the problem; 
• formulate a plan to modify existing practices; 
                                                                                                                                     
9  See brief discussion on „heuristics‟ later in this Chapter. 
10  Carr, W., and Kemmis, S., Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge And Action 
Research Lewes, Falmer (1986): 162. 
11  O‟Brien, Rory, “An Overview Of The Methodological Approach Of Action Research”, in 
Richardson, Roberto, Theory And Practice Of Action Research, Universidade Federal 
da Paraiba, João Pessoa, Brasil (2001): 1. 
12  Gabel, Dorothy, “Presidential Address: National Association For Research In Science 
Teaching”, San Francisco (24 April 1995), citing Hopkins, D., A Teacher‟s Guide To 
Classroom Research”, Philadelphia, Open University Press (1985): 
http://physiced.buffalostate.edu/danowner/actionrsch.html (Retrieved: 30 June 
2009).   
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• carry out an intervention; 
• evaluate the outcomes; and  
• develop further strategies. 
Action research, by its very definition, relies on involvement in the issues 
and therefore: 
• requires that the researcher has a strong interest in the issues; 
• requires that the researcher has a keen understanding of the issues;  
• lends itself to a study of the issues within the context in which they 
occur; 
• above all, action research fulfils a dual (research and social) purpose 
in that it: 
-  enables the researcher and other persons involved to undertake 
a study of a system or process; and 
-  collaboratively, between the researcher and the other persons 
involved, to bring about what is intended to be positive change. 
Action research tends to be used in real, „field‟ situations rather than in 
theoretical „laboratory-type‟ situations. It is an approach often employed 
by professionals / practitioners wishing to improve the way in which 
they operate, or by lobbyists or activists seeking to change the way in 
which, for example, they are treated by a particular law or practice. It is 
an approach in which the researcher: 
• takes an existing practice, becoming conscious of the problems that 
arise from that practice and who is most affected by those problems 
and how; 
• formulates questions about the problems which are faced in order to 
be able to focus on what is required to respond; 
• plans and deliberates about how to commence the process of inquiry 
and who else should be involved in this process; 
• needs to be systematic and rigorous in the effort to get answers; 
• must undertake careful recording and documentation of the actions 
that are being undertaken; 
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• is required to be self-reflective and self-critical when seeking to reach 
conclusions; 
• strives to understand the problems, issues, and potential solutions 
in order to be able to improve current actions or processes; and 
• seeks to change current actions or processes as a result of research 
undertaken, and is prepared to re-evaluate these changes. 
As part of the research process, the researcher is open about the 
subjective nature of the approach, acknowledging the potential for bias, 
and therefore being open either about ways of moderating that bias or, at 
least, being open about the very possibility of the existence of that bias.  
The researcher must be aware that being involved in the issues is likely 
to have a direct influence on what is being investigated and on 
developments that may occur within the area being investigated. 
Conversely, the researcher needs to be receptive to being influenced by 
the events and people who are the subject of the research. Essentially, 
the researcher needs to be able to ask: 
• “What?” –What did I learn from it?; and 
• “So what?” –How would I do things differently? Has it opened up an 
avenue I hadn‟t thought of before? Am I being open to what has been 
presented to me? 
As Monica Colombo puts it:13 
The task of researchers therefore becomes to acknowledge and even to work 
with their own intrinsic involvement in their research process and the part 
this plays in the results that are produced. Researchers must view the 
research process as necessarily a co-production between themselves and the 
people they are researching. 
With research taking place in the real world, the goal is about solving 
real problems. Being involved in the issues is a great way to learn about 
those issues, and also assists greatly in being able to apply the results of 
what has been learned.  
                                                 
13  Colombo, Monica, “Reflexivity And Narratives In Action Research: A Discursive 
Approach”, in [2003] 4:2 Forum: Qualitative Social Research Art.6. 
http://www.qualitative-research.net.fqs/ (Retrieved: 29 July 2009). 
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Participant observation 
This thesis also contains some elements of participant observation. 
Participant observation tends to suggest that the participant observer is 
(originally) an „outsider‟ who becomes an „insider‟ for the purposes of 
observational research. Although I have come to this study as an „insider‟ 
from the outset, this topic is an ideal candidate for study and 
consideration from this standpoint of involvement. As commented by 
Jorgensen:14 
The methodology of participant observation is appropriate for studies of 
almost every aspect of human existence. Through participant observation, it 
is possible to describe what goes on, who or what is involved, when and 
where things happen, how they occur, and why – at least from the 
standpoint of the participants – things happen as they do in particular 
situations. The methodology of participant observation is exceptional for 
studying processes, relationships among people and events, the organization 
of people and events, continuities over time, and patterns, as well as the 
immediate sociocultural contexts in which human existence unfolds. 
Jorgensen continued:15 
The methodology of participant observation consists of principles, strategies, 
procedures, methods, and techniques of research. 
Participant observation is defined here in terms of seven basic features: 
1) A special interest in human meaning and interaction as viewed 
from the perspective of people who are insiders or members of 
particular situations and settings. 
2) Location in the here and now of everyday life situations and 
settings as the foundation of inquiry and method. 
3) A form of theory and theorizing stressing interpretation and 
understanding of human existence. 
4) A logic and process of inquiry that is open-ended, flexible, 
opportunistic and requires constant redefinition of what is 
problematic, based on facts gathered in concrete settings of human 
existence. 
                                                 
14  Jorgensen, Danny L., Participant Observation: A Methodology For Human Studies, 
Sage, Newbury Park, California (1996): 12. 
15  Jorgensen, Danny L., Participant Observation: A Methodology For Human Studies, 
Sage, Newbury Park, California (1996): 13-14. 
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5) An in-depth, qualitative, case study approach and design. 
6) The performance of a participant role or roles that involves 
establishing and maintaining relationships with „natives‟ in the 
field. 
7) The use of direct observation along with other methods of gathering 
information. 
Ultimately, the methodology of participant observation aims to generate 
practical and theoretical truths about human life grounded in the 
realities of daily existence. 
Overt participant observation involves the researcher being openly 
involved in activities in the field of study, and it is essential that the 
researcher become integrally involved in the issues – as has been the 
case with my involvement in working on the issue of the legal recognition 
of same-sex relationships through marriage.  
This involvement should also be sustained – the longer the period of time 
involved and the more complete the involvement, the more meaningful 
the information obtained:16 
The character of field relations heavily influences the researcher‟s ability to 
collect accurate, truthful data. 
The ability to consider the issue central to this thesis from the point of 
an insider is invaluable. With an issue based in a human rights 
framework, where the consequences of decisions made on the issue 
impact on the lives of individuals of the affected group, it is particularly 
pertinent to have an understanding of the reality of that impact. That is, 
it is vital to have an intimate understanding of the perception of those 
centrally involved in this issue on how it impacts on them. While it may 
be possible to measure, through surveys and questionnaires, 
quantitative aspects of impact, such evaluation fails to register the 
qualitative and more personal aspects. 
An understanding at this level also provides greater ability to assess the 
potential impact of changes that might be made. For example, the 
participant observer is arguably in a better position to consider proposed 
                                                 
16  Jorgensen, Danny L., Participant Observation: A Methodology For Human Studies, 
Sage, Newbury Park, California (1996): 21. 
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legislative amendments and assessing what impact they might have on 
the object group. 
Participant observation is an appropriate methodology to employ in an 
investigation of the issue of legal recognition of same-sex relationships – 
especially when the key tool for this examination is human rights law. 
 
Academic analysis 
In relation to legal studies, academic analysis can mean a number of 
things. Specifically in relation to law the key areas of consideration here 
are: 
• statutory interpretation; 
• case-law reasoning; 
• examination and analysis of primary information; and 
• examination and analysis of secondary information.  
 
Statutory interpretation 
Statutory interpretation is the process of taking the words of a statute, 
as written, and giving them meaning. In the formal or official sense, this 
is generally the role of the courts. Bennion describes this role as a „duty‟ 
of the court as an interpreter to arrive at a legal meaning of legislative 
provisions that are placed before it for consideration:17 
(1) The interpreter‟s duty is to arrive at the legal meaning of the enactment, 
which is not necessarily the same as its grammatical meaning. This must be 
done in accordance with the rules, principles, presumptions and canons 
which govern statutory interpretation … 
(2) The court is never entitled, on the principle non liquet (it is not clear) to 
decline the duty of determining the legal meaning of a relevant enactment. 
In fulfilling their interpretive role, the courts are obliged to adhere to 
certain principles of interpretation in seeking to attain clarity in their 
understanding of the legislation, and in conveying that clarity to all who 
                                                 
17  Bennion, F.A.R. (Ed), Bennion On Statutory interpretation: A Code, 5th Edition, 
LexisNexis, UK (2008): 24. 
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use, or are affected by, the legislation:18  
… courts are to apply that which they take to be the intended meaning of a 
statutory provision so long as it is a possible meaning of the language used 
… In deciding what is a possible meaning the courts should rely on their 
understanding of the conventions governing the ordinary use of language. To 
decide what was the intended meaning of a provision they should take 
account of what appears to be its purpose, as well as of any other indications 
of its meaning available to them. 
In essence, the courts are required to establish the meaning of statutory 
provisions having regard to the purpose of the relevant provision, the 
intention of Parliament in enacting or retaining that provision, and the 
meaning of the words of the provision (bearing in mind that the purpose 
and intent of a statutory provision cannot be given effect if the wording 
of the provision precludes such an interpretation).19 
Although there are overarching principles applied to statutory 
interpretation, the „rules‟ of interpretation are not definite. Rather, they 
comprise a menu of techniques that can be employed by Judges in their 
decision-making role, but can and should also be used by those who are 
preparing their arguments for consideration by the courts. It is an 
essential element of the roles of legal academics, practitioners or 
advocates to interpret and re-interpret the language of the legislation 
with which they work. In a general sense, the same principles of 
statutory interpretation apply whether it is domestic or international 
legislation that is under consideration.  
I have engaged with the processes and principles of statutory 
interpretation in this thesis as a means of establishing what I consider to 
be the meaning of specific statutes and statutory provisions, and 
examining and analysing the courts‟ interpretations of various statutes 
and statutory provisions. 
 
Case-law reasoning 
                                                 
18  Evans, J., Statutory Interpretation: Problems Of Communication, Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, New Zealand (1988): 2.  
19  For further discussion on these points see the section on „heuristics‟ later in this 
chapter. 
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Similarly, it is vital for legal academics, practitioners and advocates to be 
able to read the decisions of Judges and to understand what those 
judgments are saying about the legal issues in question. 
As part of gaining an understanding of the current status of the law in 
practice, it is imperative to be able to identify and isolate the core issue 
or issues before the Court in any particular case. This requires being 
able to discern the difference between the reason for the decision (that 
is, the „ratio‟ or „ratio decidendi‟) and the general opinings of a Judge 
(that is, the „obiter‟ or „obiter dictum‟). 
The ratio decidendi constitutes the core reasoning and basis for the 
decision in any case. The decision, based on this elemental reasoning, is 
binding on inferior courts. The “New Zealand Law Dictionary” defines 
ratio as follows:20 
The principle of law on which a Court bases its decision. The ratio decidendi 
of a case is binding on inferior Courts under the system of judicial precedent. 
On the other hand, obiter is a statement of opinion, a statement given by 
the way, and, while it may be persuasive, is not binding on lower courts 
The “New Zealand Law Dictionary” defines obiter as follows, using the 
given example.21 
A statement of a Judge on a point of law not essential to the decision of the 
case before him or her. “… the statement of the Court was not part of the 
decision in that case. It must therefore be regarded as obiter and in no way 
binding on this court  …” 
The distinction between ratio and obiter becomes particularly important, 
for example, in analysing and providing commentary on the decisions of 
the court. It enables, on the one hand, the identification of those 
elements of the written judgment upon which the court has relied for its 
decision and which therefore comprise the binding law on the relevant 
point or points. And it enables, on the other hand, the identification of 
those parts of the judgment that may be relevant to, but are not binding 
on, future considerations of the issues.22 
 
Examination of information 
                                                 
20  Spiller, P. (Ed), “Butterworth‟s New Zealand Law Dictionary”, 5th Edition, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, New Zealand (2002): 253. 
21  Spiller, P. (Ed), “Butterworth‟s New Zealand Law Dictionary”, 5th Edition, LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Wellington, New Zealand (2002): 207. 
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In addition to a consideration of the statutes and court decisions, it is 
essential to consider and analyse a range of information from other 
primary sources.  
For example, documents such as Parliamentary records including 
Hansard (transcripts of Parliamentary Debates), Reports of Parliamentary 
Select Committees, and Commentaries attached to Parliamentary Bills 
can all provide valuable information about the intent of Parliament as 
well as wider information about the views of Parliamentarians and their 
constituencies. 
Additionally, the writings of legal scholars, whether these be 
acknowledged legal texts or published articles, can provide authoritative 
analysis of past or current legal issues and environments, or they may 
provide information that acts as a catalyst for further discussion. Such 
writings can also provide points of agreement or points of disagreement 
and argument. In the process of analysing any issue, it is important not 
only to provide reference to material that supports a particular point of 
view, but also to be able to refute that which opposes the writer‟s 
preferred point of view. 
It is useful also to use a range of secondary source information. This can 
be particularly useful, for example, in assisting to establish the social 
context in which a particular point is being made. 
These secondary sources are available, for example, through media 
reports (printed media and radio and television), public debates and 
general public commentary and, particularly from other persons directly 
involved in or directly impacted upon, by the topic and issues which are 
the subject of research. 
 
Comparative Analysis 
As I have stated previously, it is preferable to consider the law, and the 
impacts of that law, in the context in which it functions. In a similar 
vein, legal developments in New Zealand do not happen in isolation from 
developments in other jurisdictions. Historically, New Zealand law has 
derived from British law but, particularly in recent decades, has moved 
                                                                                                                                     
22  See application of this in relation to my commentary on the Quilter same-sex 
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away from those colonial connections and New Zealand jurisprudence is 
developing in its own unique way to suit the New Zealand situation. On 
the other hand, greater global connection, through travel and 
technology, means that we inevitably look to other jurisdictions for ideas 
and, possible, guidance. This will be demonstrated in this thesis by the 
close jurisdictional connection between New Zealand and Canada, in 
particular, but also the influence of developments in countries such as 
the United States of America, South Africa, and a range of European 
countries. 
Naturally, the jurisdictions with which a comparison is to be made 
should have some similarities to the „home‟ jurisdiction – socially, 
culturally, constitutionally, and jurisprudentially.  
It is also important to undertake these comparisons within a meaningful 
framework. In this respect, while the obvious point of comparison is the 
success in attaining of marriage equality for same-sex couples and the 
reasons for that success. 
 
HOW THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN GATHERED 
The source material for this thesis is reflective of the different 
approaches and involvement in the issues as outlined above, being a 
combination of information gathered as a consequence of my personal 
involvement in the issue, and a consideration of primary and secondary 
materials gathered for the academic and comparative analysis of the key 
issues. 
The material used for this thesis consists of: 
• statute-law and case-law from New Zealand; 
• statute-law and case-law from various overseas jurisdictions; 
• academic writings (books and journal articles) authored by legal 
academics; 
• notes and records from personal experiences as part of the team 
involved in the Quilter same-sex marriage case at the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal;  
                                                                                                                                     
marriage case in Chapter 7. 
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• participation in conferences and seminars either specifically about 
gay and lesbian issues, or more generally about human rights laws, 
or the place of human rights laws within the New Zealand 
constitutional framework; 
• discussions with groups in the community (both gay and lesbian – 
“queer” – groups, and other groups interested and involved in wider 
human rights issues); 
• lessons learned in the process of providing advocacy for gay men and 
lesbian women with regard to specified legal issues; 
• communications with Members of Parliament – either by way of , for 
example, formal submissions to Parliamentary Select Committees, or 
individually;  
• media reports - newspaper and newswire items from around the 
world, radio and television discussions and reports. 
This material has been gathered from a range of difference sources as 
outlined in the following sections. 
 
Primary sources 
I have gathered a range of judgments on the issue of same-sex marriage 
itself and on related issues. The same-sex marriage cases specifically 
referred to in this thesis have occurred in New Zealand, Canada, United 
States of America and South Africa. There are also other cases of 
relevance relating to matters such as mixed race marriage,23 and partner 
entitlements.24 
I have also examined a wide range of legislation from New Zealand and 
from overseas jurisdictions. Most of this has been related to the central 
issue of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships (marriage and 
registered partnerships). Some, however, has been on related issues 
                                                 
23  Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
24  Egan v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (Canadian case on superannuation 
entitlements); M v H (1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (Canadian case on definition of 
„spouse‟ and access to range of entitlements available to married partners. 
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such as the criminal law,25 partnership-related laws,26 human rights 
laws,27 and family law.28 
I have also undertaken a substantial review of a side range of academic 
writings. These have consisted of books specifically on the topic of same-
sex marriage, as well as a large number of publications from journals on 
law and human rights issues as well as on matters relating to sexual 
orientation, family and other associated subjects. I have also participated 
in a number of international conferences in the legal recognition of 
same-sex couples, same-sex families and gay (same-sex) rights as 
human rights. I have gathered a wide range of information from all these 
sources. 
 
Advocacy  
Quilter 
In 1996, I provided information to the applicants, and their legal 
counsel, for the same-sex marriage case that was heard on 24 and 26 of 
April of that year in the High Court in Auckland.29 I was also involved in 
the discussions that took place in the lead up to that case, attended the 
hearing, and participated in follow-up discussions. 
I had similar involvement in 1998, when the appeal from the High Court 
case was heard by the Court of Appeal in Wellington.30 I also acted as 
Junior Counsel in that case. 
 
Joslin 
In 1999, I provided comment to Andrew Butler on the draft  
Communication (Complaint) to the United Nations Human Rights 
                                                 
25  For example, the Offences Against the Person Act 1867 (NZ), the Criminal Code Act 
1893 (NZ), and the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 (NZ).   
26  For example, the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (NZ). 
27  For example, the Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ), New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and various international law 
treaties. 
28  For example, the Adoption Act 1955 and the Care of Children Act 2004. 
29  Quilter v Attorney-General (1996) 14 FRNZ 430 (High Court). 
30  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (Court of Appeal). 
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Committee on same-sex marriage in New Zealand.31 Subsequently, I 
acted as Counsel for the Authors (Complainants) in drafting the Final 
Response to the United Human Rights Committee in relation to the 
original Communication and in response to the Response of the 
Government of New Zealand. 
 
Civil Union Bill Committee 
In 2000 and 2001, I was a member of a committee established by Tim 
Barnett (Government MP) to assist with work on proposals for the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships. The initial work consisted of an 
examination of legislative requirements for: 
• possible amendments to the Marriage Act 1055 to enable equal 
access to marriage for same-sex couples; and 
• possible new legislation providing for the registration of partnerships 
as an alternative to marriage. 
As the work of this Committee progressed, work on amendments to the 
Marriage Act was set aside, and the Committee focussed on what was to 
become the Civil Union Bill. In the absence of any intention to consider 
amendments to the Marriage Act 1955 but, instead, to implement a 
registered partnership regime only, I resigned from this Committee on 11 
April 2001 stating that:32 
I continue to have a great deal of difficulty in working towards a regime 
which would continue to tell me, my partner, and other persons with whom I 
interact on a daily basis, that my relationship and those of other same-sex 
couples are not as valid as those of different-sex couples. 
 
Relationship Property 
I have been involved with the „new‟ relationship property legislation in 
three ways through: 
• preparing and presenting a submission to the Parliamentary Select 
Committee during the consideration of the property (Relationships) 
Bill 2000; 
                                                 
31  Joslin v New Zealand, Communication No. 902/1999.  
32  Nigel Christie, Letter of Resignation to the Civil Union Bill Committee (CUB 
Committee) (11 April 2001).  
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• providing educational presentations on the new legislation to groups 
of same-sex couples wanting to know more about the new legislation; 
and 
• drafting Relationship Property Agreements for same-sex couples who 
have wished to opt out of the statutory regime. 
 
Immigration 
I have assisted partners of New Zealand citizens who have applied for 
permanent residence in New Zealand, in some instances, acting as the 
„agent‟ of the applicant.  
 
Domestic Violence 
I have assisted gay men who have become the victims of domestic 
violence perpetrated towards them by their partners in working through 
the issues they have faced. I also participated in the New Zealand Law 
Commission‟s work on domestic violence in same-sex relationships by 
providing resources and discussing, with the researchers at the 
Commission, the unique issues faced by gay men as victims of domestic 
violence. 
 
Adoption and family issues 
I have been centrally involved in the issue of adoption by same-sex 
couples in New Zealand. This entailed the presentation of a complaint to 
the New Zealand Human Rights Commission with regard to the 
discriminatory nature of the Adoption Act 1955.33 
 
Community Involvement 
Communications (debate, commentary, and education) 
I have participated in public debate, through speeches and public 
discussions, and involvement with the media (newspapers, radio and 
television). 
                                                 
33  See brief discussion of a recent revival on the issue of adoption by de facto (same-sex 
and different-sex) couples in Chapter 9. 
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I have been involved in various gay (and other) community groups, where 
discussion regularly takes place on legal issues relating to same-sex 
couples. 
I have established a „virtual‟ organisation that provides information on 
gay rights issues and, to the extent relevant, on lesbian rights issues. I 
have made a certain amount of information available online at 
http://homepages.paradise.net.nz/nigelchr/index.htm, and receive 
requests for further information which is provided by e-mail.  
 
Involvement in Government processes 
With regard to the recognition of same-sex couples, I have participated, 
as a private citizen, in the presentation of material to Select Committees 
and in discussions with politicians, both individually (through letters 
and meetings) and through the political processes of submission-writing 
and oral presentation. 
My intimate knowledge of Government processes has influenced greatly 
the way in which I have approached this thesis. In my paid employment, 
I have worked as a legal researcher with the New Zealand Law 
Commission (on topics unrelated to this thesis), as a Senior Policy 
Analyst with the Ministry of Maori Development (Te Puni Kokiri), and as 
a Manager in Operational Policy with the Special Jurisdictions Group of 
the Ministry of Justice (once again, in both cases working on topics 
unrelated to this thesis). These positions have all given me an 
opportunity to participate directly in the processes of Government, to 
attend and chair meetings with other Government officials, and to attend 
meetings with, and present papers to, Ministers, Cabinet Committees 
and Cabinet.  
 
Conferences and publications 
I have attended, and participated in conferences in New Zealand and 
overseas: 
• International Conference on “Same-Sex Couples and the Law” in 
London, England, in July 1999;  
• International Conference on “Marriage, Partnerships and Parenting 
in the 21st Century” in Turin, Italy, in June 2002; 
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• International Conference on “Gay Rights as Human Rights”, 
Montreal, Canada, in July 2006; and 
• Pink Health Conference on “Celebrating Our Relationships”, 
Christchurch, New Zealand, in May 2007. 
In addition to minor commentaries for New Zealand and overseas gay 
and mainstream publications, I have had three key publications: 
• “Comment: Thinking About Domestic Violence in Gay Male 
Relationships”, in [1996] 4:1 Waikato Law Review 180; 
• “Same-Sex Relationships In The Nature Of Marriage”, in [2003] 6:3 
Human Rights Law And Practice 188; and 
• “The New Zealand Same-Sex Marriage Case”, in Wintemute, Robert, 
and Andenaes, Mads, Legal Recognition Of Same-Sex Relationships, 
Hart Publishing, London (2001). 
I have also had direct involvement by providing information to Counsel 
or as Amicus Curiae in: 
• the Halpern same-sex marriage case in the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario (Canada);34 
• the Goodridge same-sex marriage case in the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts (USA);35  
• the Kerrigan same-sex marriage case in the Supreme Court of the 
State of Connecticut;36 and 
• the case of Lawrence v Texas in the United States Supreme Court (a 
case relating to the criminality of two persons of the same sex 
engaging in intimate sexual conduct).37 
 
HOW THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN ANALYSED 
An heuristic approach 
Heuristics is about employing a simplifying strategy to assist in solving a 
problem or a series of associated problems. Rather than having, or even 
                                                 
34  Halpern v Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161. 
35  Goodridge v Department Of Public Health 440 Mass. 309 (2003). 
36  Kerrigan v Commissioner of Public Health 289 Conn. 135, 957 A.2d 407 (2008). 
37  Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
  45  
 
pretending to have a step-by-step, process or set of rules to be followed 
in a particular circumstance, heuristics is about analysing the key 
indicators and making from them the best estimate, based on our 
experiences, of what might be a logical outcome:38  
As used in much of the legal literature today, „[heuristics refers to] a rule of 
thumb, simplification or educated guess that reduces or limits the search for 
solutions in domains that are difficult and/or poorly understood‟. 
It is clear that statutory interpretation itself is heuristic in nature – with 
judges not employing definite and precise rules, but rather relying on 
principles that are applied to circumstances which, on the one hand, 
may have many similarities but, on the other hand, may have a range of 
differences. The court may be limited in the extent to which it is able to:  
• apply strict legal principles from one case to another; 
• analogise principles from one situation into another situation; or 
• distinguish one situation from another situation. 
Having said this, unlike trying to predict uncertain events (for example, 
the outcome of a general election), heuristics in a legal setting do have 
some degree of constancy, consistency and certainty. Over time, the 
principles of statutory interpretation, for example, have been examined, 
considered, analysed and refined. Over time, certain conventions have 
been accepted into the „toolkit‟ of the judiciary and therefore those who 
work with the law. 
However, as suggested by Mullins, the principles of statutory 
interpretation are tools rather than rules.39 While policy-writers and law-
makers strive for as much certainty as possible, this certainty is limited 
to some extent by complexities stemming from the imprecision of 
language. There are consequent difficulties with consistency in 
interpretation even where intellectual processes are consciously applied, 
and the potential for even greater inconsistency where subconscious 
influencers enter into the equation.40 
                                                 
38  Mullins, Morell E., “Tools Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory 
Interpretation”, in [2003-04] 30 J. Legis. 1: 49: quoting Christopher T Furlow and 
David B Hennes. 
39  Mullins, Morell E., “Tools Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory 
Interpretation”, in [2003-04] 30 J Legis 1. 
40  Mullins, Morell E., “Tools Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory 
Interpretation”, in [2003-04] 30 J Legis 1: 34-47. 
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This thesis extends beyond the relatively narrow framework of statutory 
interpretation per se. In this thesis, I bring into the equation my 
interpretation of circumstances, decisions, and public comments, as well 
as the interpretations of those persons and groups who are directly 
affected by the key issue under discussion. It is inevitable that our 
interpretation of the actions of Government, the views of society at large, 
developments in New Zealand as compared with overseas, are all going 
to be coloured by the extent and manner of the impact of those elements 
on us. In turn, these views are going to influence the manner in which 
we choose to deal with these issues and the processes that we might 
choose to employ in order to progress these matters in a direction that is 
satisfactory to us.   
 
Analysis of the New Zealand situation 
The examination of the New Zealand situation commences with a 
preliminary commentary on the historic origins of New Zealand laws on 
homosexual behaviour. However, the central examination focuses on: 
• legislative developments from decriminalisation in 1986 through to 
the advent of civil unions (and the accompanying extension of 
legislative entitlements to same-sex couples) in 2004; 
• a consideration of the New Zealand same-sex marriage cases; 
• a consideration of the Communication on the issue of same-sex 
marriage in New Zealand to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee. 
This analysis is undertaken, not only from the point of view of my 
personal involvement, but also as an exercise in legal analysis and 
commentary. 
 
Comparative analysis 
It is recognised that overseas jurisdictions must, by nature of their own 
legal evolution, have some very different matters to consider when 
examining an issue such as same-sex marriage. However, it is also 
useful to draw parallels or distinctions where appropriate. On this basis, 
my thesis includes comparative material from overseas jurisdictions. 
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In the context of this thesis, I pay particular attention to developments in 
Canada in relation to same-sex marriage – interesting in a general sense 
because both countries share similarities socially, culturally and 
constitutionally – interesting specifically because the human rights laws 
in both countries are somewhat similar, with specific key provisions 
sharing exactly the same wording.41  
The comparative analysis also extends to examining the New Zealand 
situation alongside developments in some European countries (The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Norway), the United States of America 
(Massachusetts, in particular), and South Africa in relation to access to 
marriage; and in a range of other countries with regard to the provision 
of registered partnership / civil union regimes. 
This comparative analysis examines specific similarities and differences 
with regard to the regimes – marriage or registered partnerships – that 
are available and the level of entitlements that stem from these. But 
more importantly, in relation to those jurisdictions where access to 
marriage for same-sex couples has become a reality, a key point of this 
analysis is an understanding of how this success was achieved.  
As part of this analysis, there is a discussion of key themes, including 
the notion of personal dignity that grows from being subject to equal 
treatment before and under the law, and being seen as full citizens of the 
country in which one lives.42 This discussion will take into account: 
• the degree to which same-sex couples have been required to seek 
access to marriage, as compared with the extent to which this access 
has been extended to same-sex couples at the behest of governments 
or Parliaments; 
• the degree to which same-sex couples have been provided with 
access to (equal) marriage rights rather than (“separate but 
(un)equal”) partnership regimes; and 
                                                 
41  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.1 provides: “The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society” (Emphasis added). The New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5 provides: “Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society” (Emphasis added). 
42  See discussion in Chapter 3, and subsequent references throughout the thesis. 
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• the degree to which gays and lesbians, as individuals or couples, are 
thereby enabled to participate fully as citizens in the society within 
which they live. 
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Throughout the writing of this thesis, I have been taken measures to 
ensure respect for individual privacy, confidentiality and other matters of 
ethical concern. There is no information in this thesis that breaches the 
privacy of any person or persons.  
Where case studies have been included, these have been anonymised, 
and where personal communications have been included this has been 
done with the authorisation of, and / or with acknowledgment to, the 
persons involved.  
In addition to analysis of statute and case law, I have drawn on material 
from a range of activities associated with the legal recognition of same-
sex couples or the treatment of same-sex couples before and under the 
law in New Zealand – for example, group discussions, working groups, 
and participation in online newsgroups. Any material obtained from 
these sources is either public information that is freely available, or the 
persons involved have given their informed consent for the use of the 
information gathered to be used in the writing of this thesis. 
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Part II 
 
CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A central consideration in my writing of this thesis has been the 
importance to me of: 
(a) the context in which the thesis is written, and  
(b)  the context in which the thesis is read. 
This means that it is centrally important that I convey my perspective on 
a variety of matters that assist the reader to understand key points of 
relevance and the significance of these from my perspective as person 
who: 
• is in a long-term, committed same-sex relationship; 
• has been involved actively in issues relating to the recognition of 
same-sex relationships;  
• is legally trained; 
• has worked extensively in social service fields; and 
• has worked extensively in legal research and government policy. 
It is my view that each of the above contributes to a broader 
understanding of the issues. Each of these underlines the importance to 
me of ensuring that I explain the broader context in which this thesis is 
written.  
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Part II establishes thematic contexts through the discussion of: 
• personal perspectives relating to the key forms of relationship 
recognition, some of the anomalies that exist in the current situation, 
and how these reflect on the dignity of gay and lesbian citizens; 
• the extent to which the current situation facilitates, or limits, full 
participation in society of gays and lesbians and our ability to reach our 
full potential within that society; 
• issues relating to the level of commitment we, as a society, might have 
with regard to our human rights laws, and the level of courage we, as a 
society, maintain with regard to adhering to those laws; and  
• a background consisting of historic and legal factors up to the point of 
decriminalisation of homosexual behaviour in New Zealand, and a 
background of international human rights laws to which New Zealand 
has become a signatory. 
These are perhaps the most important chapters of the thesis, cumulatively 
setting the scene for the chronological and comparative analysis that follows. 
For me as the author, the key purpose of writing this thesis was to produce 
a document that is meaningful to the people involved with this issue in the 
New Zealand setting, and a document that is useful in a practical way in 
progressing towards full equality. 
For this reason, I urge the reader to keep, to the forefront of the mind 
throughout the reading of the thesis as a whole, the information that is 
presented in these chapters. I am certain that this will assist in gaining a 
much greater understanding of the importance of the battle for equal access 
to marriage by same-sex couples, and the true meaning of equality for those 
engaged in this battle. I am certain also that the reader will be persuaded 
that there is no valid alternative to full and equal recognition under the law. 
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In Chapter 3, I provide my own thoughts on why access to marriage for 
same-sex couples is considered to be the most appropriate goal by 
addressing the questions: 
• What is it about ‘marriage’ that separates it out from any other way of 
having same-sex relationships legally sanctioned? 
• What is it about marriage that causes me to argue that we should be 
seeking this as our primary form of relationship recognition? 
In Chapter 4, I examine issues of citizenship and human rights. In doing 
this, I focus on the fundamental precept that any person can only be a full 
and equal citizen within their society to the extent that that society permits. 
There is also a difference between the acceptance of gays and lesbians as 
individuals, and gays and lesbians as couples in loving, committed 
relationships, and gay and lesbian families. Acceptance of gays and lesbians 
as couples and families will lead us to full and equal treatment under the 
law – including access to the right to marry, or access to the right to choose 
to marry. 
In Chapter 5, I raise issues referencing the importance of our commitment, 
individually and collectively, to human rights standards and the need for us 
all to have the courage to stand up for those standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Personal thoughts 
Same-sex couples in New Zealand do not yet have the option of getting 
married. This thesis does not intend to suggest for one moment that the 
only valid form of formal (civil-legal) recognition of our relationships 
should be by way of marriage. What it does argue is that the full range of 
legal options that is available to different-sex couples must also be 
available to same-sex couples – and this includes marriage as one of the 
key options.1 
The fight for fairness in the recognition of relationships is the fight to have 
access to the full range of options for relationship status, protection and 
benefits. Like our heterosexual counterparts, gay men and lesbians have 
relationships in a variety of ways, and we choose to structure our lives in 
many different forms. As such, we need legal options that reflect this reality.  
Not all same-sex couples in New Zealand wish to marry. But then, not 
all different-sex couples in New Zealand wish to marry. Those same-sex 
couples who do wish to marry cite a variety of reasons for wanting to do 
so, including: 
• the fact that the couple wishes to access the same provisions of the 
law with regard to relationship recognition as other members of their 
families; 
• the fact that the couple wishes to access the same entitlements that 
are accessed by those couples around them who choose to marry; 
• the very nature of marriage itself, and the status that marriage holds 
and provides within our wider society; and 
• the visibility that recognition brings to an individual / particular 
relationship and to same-sex relationships generally. 
                                                 
1 Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group, Out Law: A Legal Guide For Lesbians 
and Gay Men in New Zealand, Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group, Auckland, 
New Zealand (1994): 7: Although the incidents of recognition have increased since 
1994 (for example, same-sex partners are expressly included in the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995), the core relationship is still not accorded the same degree of 
recognition that opposite-sex de facto couples are given. 
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For the couple concerned, any one of these might be a valid reason for 
seeking to marry. 
It is acknowledged that some of the attributes of marriage can be 
achieved by same-sex couples with regard to their relationships without 
requiring access to marriage itself. For example: 
• Same-sex couples can hold secular commitment ceremonies in the 
presence of friends and family.  
• For those who need some religious recognition of their relationship, 
some churches will willingly hold ceremonies to bless the 
relationship. 
• In some jurisdictions, access to a range of legal protections is 
extended to same-sex relationships by way of legislation relating to 
de facto couples.  
• In some jurisdictions same-sex couples can access some legal 
protections by registering as domestic relationships.  
• In some jurisdictions same-sex couples might be able to enter into a 
registered partnership (civil union).  
However, none of these provides the equality, inclusion, and acceptance 
aspired to by those same-sex couples who seek access to marriage. Why, 
then, has marriage, as an institution, become a goal for many same-sex 
couples, and why is it seen as a symbol of equality?  
The issue of same-sex marriage as a human right is wider than just the 
ability of a couple to marry. It is about what that means for a couple in 
two fundamental ways. First are the ―practical‖ reasons for seeking 
marriage. By practical reasons, I mean those reasons which can be 
viewed as the more tangible and outwardly demonstrable elements of a 
relationship. These include property rights and those matters generally 
linked to financial and economic matters, rather than the core 
relationship issues. Second, and I believe more importantly, are the more 
ethereal elements related to the essence of the relationship. By this I 
mean matters related to the core relationship between the two partners 
and the meaning of this relationship to them as a couple and to their 
family and friends around them.  
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There are forms of relationship recognition other than marriage. In 
Chapter 1, I provided a preliminary discussion in which I discounted the 
‗lower-level‘ recognition through what I termed domestic partnerships. In 
this chapter, therefore, I concentrate on the comparison between 
registered partnerships (civil unions in the New Zealand setting) and 
marriage. With this in mind, I first consider registered partnerships and 
the extent to which I consider they provide adequate and appropriate 
recognition of relationships. Second, I consider marriage and, in 
particular, the points of difference that elevate marriage above registered 
partnerships as an acceptable form of relationship recognition. 
 
REGISTERED PARTNERSHIPS 2 
After the first registered partnerships regime was enacted by Denmark 
in 1989, there was a fairly steady flow of other jurisdictions following 
suit.3 Because of the blurring at the edges, it is difficult to categorically 
list the characteristics of registered partnerships.  
The range of entitlements extended by virtue of registered partnerships 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction from those that, with regard to 
partnership entitlements rather than status, provide a high level of 
equivalence to marriage,4 to those that provide somewhat less.5 
In many instances, the entitlements attached to registered partnership 
regimes have been limited initially, but have been expanded over time. 
Such limitations have generally been related to: 
• matters of citizenship; 
                                                 
2  I have used the term ‗registered partnerships‘ as a generic term to include regimes 
labelled, for example, registered partnerships (as in Denmark), civil unions (as in 
New Zealand), civil solidarity pacts (as in France), civil partnership (as in the United 
Kingdom), life partnerships (as in Germany), etc – see earlier discussion in Chapter 
1. 
3  For example: Norway – registered partnerships since 1993; Finland – Registered 
partnerships since 2001 (entry into force 2002); France – Civil Solidarity Pacts since 
1999; Germany – Life Partner Registration since 2001; Sweden: Registered 
partnerships since 1994 (entry into force 1995). 
4  For example Denmark and Sweden (amongst others) that largely emulate the 
provision of entitlements available to married partners. 
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• family issues such as adoption and custody; or  
• access to artificial birth technology.6 
There are, however, some on-going difficulties arising from the 
differences between registered partnerships and marriage. 
 
Who may register? 
In some jurisdictions, registered partnerships are offered to same-sex 
couples only.7 In other jurisdictions, they are available both to same-sex 
couples and to different-sex couples.8 
In some jurisdictions, in order to be eligible for a registered partnership, 
at least one partner must be a citizen of that jurisdiction.9 In some 
jurisdictions there may be a residency requirement.10 New Zealand has 
no citizenship or residency requirements for eligibility for entering into a 
civil union.11 
It is worth noting that, in New Zealand, under the Civil Union Act 2004 
both same-sex and different-sex couples may enter a civil union. It was 
stated that to provide civil unions for same-sex couples and to exclude 
                                                                                                                                     
5  For example, the significantly weaker registered partnership model in Slovenia that 
covers relationship property, reciprocal support rights and obligations, and some 
inheritance rights. 
6  For example, the original registered partnerships in 1995 in Sweden did not allow for 
adoption and required that one partner must be a Swedish citizen. In 200, non-
Swedes legally resident in Sweden became entitled to apply for registration; in 2003, 
registered partners became able to adopt each others children or to adopt non-kin 
children from within Sweden or from overseas; and, in 2005, lesbian couples gained 
access to in-vitro fertilisation.  
7  For example, Denmark, Greenland, Iceland, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom, Czech Republic. 
8  For example, The Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Hungary. 
9  For example, Greenland, Iceland, Finland. 
10  For example, in Denmark, non-citizens may register their partnership if they have 
lived in the country for two years.  
11  The Department of Internal Affairs in New Zealand provides procedures for both New 
Zealanders who wish to enter into a marriage or civil union overseas, and for 
overseas persons who wish to enter into a marriage or civil union in New Zealand. 
See: http://www.dia.govt.nz (range of relevant information and forms. (Retrieved: 23 
July 2009)  
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different-sex couples would not be compliant with New Zealand‘s human 
rights legislation:12 
Why does the Civil Union Bill allow for the registration of different-sex 
couples? 
There are two key reasons for including different-sex couples: 
1. It is imperative from a rights perspective that this recognition model does 
not discriminate by reason of sexual orientation; and it avoids possible 
social stigma of being perceived as a “gay” marriage model. 
2. It provides a choice that could meet the needs of 230,000 de facto 
couples, who may wish to be legally recognised, but not as a “married” 
couple. 
It would be inconsistent with human rights protections to deny different-sex 
couples access to civil unions as a choice of relationship recognition, by 
reason of their sex or sexual orientation. The gender of each partner to a 
relationship is, legally speaking, irrelevant to a vehicle of public recognition 
and the conferment of statutory entitlements. 
And yet, the converse argument has not yet been extended by our 
lawmakers to the existing Marriage Act 1955. 
 
Adoption and child-related legislation 
There has been a wide range of variation with regard to the treatment of 
same-sex couples and their access to family-related laws. Most 
jurisdictions have limited same-sex couples‘ entitlements with regard to 
adoption, guardianship and custody, and access to artificial birth 
technology. 
There are significant variances in how different jurisdictions have 
approached the adoption issue insofar as this reaches same-sex 
                                                 
12  Draft ―Proposal for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in New Zealand‖, 
March 2001, prepared by the Civil Union Committee chaired by Tim Barnett MP. 
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couples. In some instances the rules were initially restrictive but have 
subsequently been relaxed. In other instances, these limitations remain 
in place. For example:  
• Denmark originally granted no adoption rights to same-sex couples, 
but in 1999 extended adoption rights to same-sex couples to enable 
the adoption by registered partners of each others‘ children. 
Adoption of children from outside of the relationship is still not 
permitted.13  
• Sweden first introduced registered partnerships in 1995 at which 
time adoption rights for same-sex couples were limited. Since early 
2003, however, same-sex partners have been able to adopt each 
other‘s children and to jointly adopt children from outside the 
relationship.  Since 2005, lesbian couples have had access to in 
vitro fertilisation services.14 
• Iceland passed legislation on 27 June 2006 removing all prior 
adoption restrictions and providing lesbian couples with the right to 
fertility treatments.15 
• New Zealand‘s civil unions do not enable access to joint adoption for 
registered couples – whether same-sex or different-sex. Under New 
Zealand law, the Adoption Act 1955 permits single persons to adopt. 
This enables one partner to a relationship to adopt, and the other 
partner to ‗construct‘ a legal relationship with the child through 
guardianship and parenting arrangements – but not joint 
adoption.16  
Issues such as adoption and other incidents of marriage are extremely 
important for same-sex couples. For any couple in a committed 
relationship, there is much more to the relationship than the procedural 
                                                 
13  Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, ―Registered Partnerships: The 
Scandinavian Approach‖: http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-scan.html (Retrieved: 
23 July 2009). 
14  Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, ―Registered Partnerships: The 
Scandinavian Approach‖: http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-scan.html (Retrieved: 
23 July 2009). 
15  Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, ―Registered Partnerships: The 
Scandinavian Approach‖: http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-scan.html (Retrieved: 
23 July 2009). 
16  Adoption Act 1955 s.3 and s.4. 
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aspects of registering the relationship between partners. What is 
important is the desire to become, and to be recognised as, a family – 
which may or may not include the presence of children within that 
family. What is important is the ‗meaning-making‘ elements, rather than 
the procedural, that attach to the core mutual relationship itself.  
 
International recognition 
There is wide variation in the recognition by one jurisdiction of a 
partnership that has been registered in accordance with the laws of 
another jurisdiction. With different-sex marriages, the presumption is 
that the marriage of one jurisdiction will be recognised in another. With 
same-sex marriages, the presumption is still largely untested. With 
same-sex registered partnerships, the presumption tends to be that they 
will not be recognised in a ‗host‘ country unless express provisions are 
in place either by way of express legislative provisions or by way of 
express agreement between jurisdictions. In most instances, the default 
position is that a registered partnership will not be recognised outside of 
the country of origin.  
The most obvious reason for this is that only a limited number of 
countries / jurisdictions have such registration regimes and, that even 
where a country does provide registered partnerships, it may not provide 
for the recognition of registered partnerships from all or any of the other 
countries who also provide them. Another reason is that the coverage 
provided by registered partnerships varies significantly from country to 
country. 
There are some instances of multi- or bi-lateral agreements with regard 
to mutual recognition of registered partnerships. Some of the 
Scandinavian countries have entered into agreements to recognise each 
other‘s registered partnerships.17 For example, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden have such an agreement, as do Denmark and Iceland. 18 A 
                                                 
17  Toner, Helen, Partnership Rights, Free Movement, and EU Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford (2004): 45. 
18  Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, ―Registered Partnerships: The 
Scandinavian Approach‖, http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-scan.html (Retrieved: 
23 July 2009). 
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similar bi-lateral agreement is in place between the United Kingdom and 
The Netherlands.  
In other instances, there are specific statutory provisions prescribing 
what relationships from overseas will be recognised as registered 
partnerships.  
The United Kingdom‘s Civil Partnership Act 2004 expressly recognises 
same-sex civil unions registered in the Principality of Andorra, Belgium, 
Quebec and Nova Scotia (Canada), Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, 
Iceland, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and 
California, Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey and Vermont.19 
In some instances, same-sex marriages (from countries where these are 
possible) are recognised as registered partnerships. For example, the 
United Kingdom recognises, as civil partnerships, same-sex marriages 
from Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, South Africa, 
and some States in the USA.20 It must be noted that different-sex 
marriages from these same countries are recognised in the United 
Kingdom as marriages. This raises serious questions about issues of 
equality with regard to the treatment of same-sex couples as compared 
with different-sex couples, and arguably constitutes an affront to the 
dignity of those couples and the laws of the country of origin. 
The statutory regulations accompanying New Zealand‘s Civil Union Act 
2004 provide that certain registered partnerships from overseas 
jurisdictions will be recognised in New Zealand. There are five such 
relationships, namely:21 
• registered partnerships of Finland;  
• life partnerships of Germany; 
• civil partnerships of the United Kingdom; 
• domestic partnerships of New Jersey; and 
• civil unions of Vermont.  
                                                 
19  Equality Network, ―Civil Partnership In Scotland: What Civil Partnership Means For 
You And Your Partner‖ (Questions and Answers on International Recognition), 
http://www.civilpartners.org/Equality/Web.nsf/webpages/B4519B8ED16AF4EF80
25709400835695?OpenDocument (Retrieved: 23 July 2009). 
20   Equality Network, ―Civil Partnership In Scotland: What Civil Partnership Means For 
You And Your Partner‖ (Questions and Answers on International Recognition), 
http://www.civilpartners.org/Equality/Web.nsf/webpages/B4519B8ED16AF4EF80
25709400835695?OpenDocument (Retrieved: 23 July 2009). 
21  Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 2005 cl.3. 
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It is unclear why some overseas relationships were not included in this 
list at the time of the passage of the Act – for example, the Pacte Civil de 
Solidarite (PACS) of France, and registered partnerships of countries 
such as Norway. It is also unclear why further have not been added 
since the passage of the Act – for example, registered partnerships of the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. I would suggest that most of these are 
more alike New Zealand civil unions than are registered partnerships 
from New Jersey in the United States. 
What is pleasing, with regard to the New Zealand recognition of overseas 
relationships, is that New Zealand has not attempted to recognise same-
sex marriages from overseas jurisdictions as civil unions in New 
Zealand. This does leave open the question as to whether a marriage 
entered into by a New Zealand same-sex couple in Canada will be 
recognised as a legally valid marriage under New Zealand law.22   
The fact that there are so many variables with regard to registered 
partnerships – who can register what entitlements they attract, and 
what recognition they might or might not receive internationally – all 
contribute to the sense that they do not easily and adequately provide 
for equality in treatment between same-sex and different-sex couples. 
While there may still be some questions with regard to international 
recognition of same-sex marriages, the equality of treatment within 
jurisdictions is essentially unquestioned, and the presumption of 
equality across jurisdictions is very strong. 
 
Summary 
Some jurisdictions offering registered partnerships to same-sex couples 
provide a greater degree of recognition and entitlement than others. 
However, where registered partnerships are put in place as an 
alternative to marriage, even where the statutory entitlements that flow 
from registration are as close as they possibly can be to those that flow 
from marriage, there is still a failure to provide same-sex couples with 
                                                 
22  See further comment on this point in the following section in this chapter; further 
comment on the comity of (marriage) laws, in Chapter 8; and, the potential for 
further consideration of the issue of whether or not same-sex marriages from 
overseas should be recognised in New Zealand, in Chapter 10. 
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equality in relationship recognition. Registered partnerships do not 
provide same-sex couples with the same relationship status that is 
provided by marriage. 
This is not now an issue in countries such as The Netherlands and 
Belgium where registered partnerships now exist alongside marriage as 
true alternative choices for both same-sex and different-sex couples. 
This fact in itself, however, reinforces my view that true equality only 
exists where both same-sex and different-sex couples have access to 
both registered partnerships and marriage – not where: 
• registered partnerships are offered to same-sex and different-sex 
couples, but marriage is available only to different-sex couples;23 or 
• registered partnerships are offered to same-sex couples only, and 
marriage is available to different-sex couples only.24 
Neither of these situations is acceptable on an equality basis, and both 
retain and perpetuate the primacy of heterosexual marriage. 
 
MARRIAGE 
So, what is it about marriage that provides what is, arguably, a superior 
form of relationship recognition as compared with registered 
partnerships? 
 
Marriage as a fundamental social institution 
Marriage is a fundamental social institution, entry into which is seen by 
the majority of New Zealanders as an expected and natural part of their 
life journey. Marriage, amongst New Zealanders generally is not seen as 
a privilege, but rather as a right. This view of marriage is supported in 
New Zealand law:25 
… [the] freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. 
 
                                                 
23  As is the case in New Zealand and France, for example. 
24  As is the case in Denmark, Finland and Germany, for example.  
25 Thomas J in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
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In accord with New Zealand human rights legislation, it can be argued 
that, if marriage is a basic civil right that is extended to different-sex 
couples, then, in reliance upon the prohibitions against discrimination 
on the ground of sexual orientation in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 s.19, marriage is a basic civil right that should be extended also to 
same-sex couples.26 To quote Thomas J more fully:27  
Based upon this personal characteristic, gays and lesbians are denied 
access to a central social institution and the resulting status of married 
persons. They lose the rights and privileges, including the manifold legal 
consequences which marriage conveys. They are denied a basic civil right in 
that freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. They lose the 
opportunity to choose the partner of their choice as a marriage partner, many 
again viewing the right to choose as a basic civil right of all citizens. In a real 
sense, gays and lesbians are effectively excluded from full membership of 
society. 
It must be recognised and emphasised, therefore that a discussion about 
access to marriage for same-sex couples is not only a discussion about 
relationship recognition but also, and perhaps more importantly, it is a 
discussion about the place of gays and lesbians within our society.  
It is much more difficult for any person to reach full potential as a 
member of society when being told constantly and consistently that they 
are inferior to other (heterosexual) members of society.28 Many gay men 
or lesbian women strive to distance themselves from these negative 
messages by rising above them. For others, however, the pressures 
might be too great. In the struggle to reject an identity as societal 
outcasts, individuals might, for example, resile to the negative messages 
and turn to prostitution or suicide.29 Alternatively, they might strive to 
live up to the expectations placed on them – living a lie of heterosexuality 
when that does not reflect who they are behind that lie.  
                                                 
26  On the basis of the prohibitions against discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation as contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.19. 
27  Thomas J in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
28 See discussion on the analogy with the Maslow ‗Hierarchy of Needs‘ in Chapter 3. 
29 It is thought to be for this reason that many gay youths commit suicide, or enter into 
male prostitution. This is an area in which very little research has been done to date. 
There are some narrative writings, for example about teenage gay suicide rates, but 
very little documented evidence about prostitution. Outrage magazine (October 1994: 
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For society to provide for a lesser form of recognition for same-sex 
couples than for different-sex couples is to continue to emphasise and 
reinforce this sense of inferiority, and to validate the pretence rather 
than the reality. For society to recognise the equal worth of gay 
relationships is for society to validate the existence of a large number of 
persons within its midst, enabling them to contribute in a more 
proactive, positive, constructive way to that society rather than in a 
reactive and destructive way, expending energy to combat the negative.  
The legal recognition of same-sex relationships by marriage underpins 
the more personal issues of acceptance, of self-esteem, and pride. It is 
this which is perhaps the most important contextual theme of this 
thesis. 
The marriages of different-sex couples, and families based on the 
heterosexual ideology, are privileged by the law. Such relationships are 
established as the norm by those who seek to perpetuate this privilege, 
and relationships that are different are consequently portrayed by them 
as abnormal, or at least inferior.  
It would be possible to cite a multitude of examples where same-sex 
couples point to particular aspects of their lives, or particular events in 
their lives, to demonstrate either the inequality that arises out of an 
inability to access marriage, or to symbolise the role of relationship 
validation in providing a sense of social belonging. 
On 3 January 1996, Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin held a wedding 
ceremony in Wellington.30 Jenny and Jools have been staunch 
advocates of the view that only marriage, in exactly the same form as is 
offered to different-sex couples, is adequate for same-sex couples. Their 
reasons for this are founded in the equality principle, and in the fact 
that they, having raised children together, having owned property 
together, and having lived in a committed and loving relationship for 
some 12 years, were aware of the inadequacies of protections for same-
                                                                                                                                     
38) states that "[a] recent American survey found that nearly 30% of the young gay 
men and lesbians surveyed had attempted suicide". 
30  Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin were subsequently parties to the Quilter same-sex 
marriage case in New Zealand – first to the High Court in Auckland in April 1996, 
then to the Court of Appeal in September 1997, and (as Joslin v New Zealand) to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee in December 1998. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  66  
 
sex couples under the law. Jools‘ response to a suggestion that 
registered partnerships would cater for same-sex couples:31 
Absolutely ghettoising. It would create a legal partnership, or a piece of 
legislation around a partnership, that is specifically for same-sex couples. … 
They’re saying that it could include heterosexual couples as well, but that’s 
not why it’s being created. I think that, if registered partnerships happen in 
this country, it puts us back immediately. It says that the best way to cope 
with this group of people, who we all feel a bit uncomfortable about, is to 
have separate legislation. 
On 12 February 2001 (―Freedom to Marry Day‖) a pro-same-sex 
marriage protest about the unequal treatment of same-sex couples was 
held in Chicago, Illinois. Those involved in the protest stated that:32 
The ban [on same-sex marriage] is government-sanctioned second class 
citizenship to all same-sex couples … They refuse to extend a basic human 
right to a whole class of people … there are a host of typical benefits from 
marriage – access to partner’s health care, social security and pension 
survivors’ benefits, adoption rights, immigration rights, etc – which should be 
of concern to all those who support equal justice. … The reality is that even 
in western societies, marriage has changed … The institution of marriage 
has evolved to respect the rights of individuals and of couples, and … must 
expand to encompass … individuals of the same gender. Anything else is to 
accept the position that same sex relationships are less valid than those of a 
man and a woman. 
On changing his surname, by deed poll, to that of his partner of 17 
years, James Macky, wrote:33 
Within our close-knit family circles Kim and I had been recognised and 
accepted as a couple for nearly 17 years. Two major family trees, one from 
each side of our families, list us with that little equals sign that is 
genealogical shorthand for a married couple. 
Work colleagues, neighbours, everyone knew exactly what we meant to each 
other. Surely we had nothing to prove to anyone. So why was it that now, 
after so many years together, I’d decided to take his name. … 
                                                 
31  Matthews, Richard, ―Partners In Crime‖: Bringing Same-Sex Marriages Out Of The 
Closet‖, in NZ Listener (18 September 1999): 30. 
32  Chicago Anti-Bashing Network (CABN), ―Two Face Felony Charges For Protest For 
Gay Marriage‖, Press Release (17 February 2001). 
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…from our earliest childhood we’re told fairytales that emphasise the 
marriage rite as life’s major milestone. However, celebrating this milestone 
becomes problematic for many couples because of the narrow definition 
accorded to those suitable to undergo this magical, transforming ceremony. 
… the new birth certificate … is nothing like a marriage certificate … [b]ut … 
it will have to do until the real thing comes along. 
 
Public acknowledgement and support 
Many gays in long-term relationships feel a need to publicly seal that 
bond. Of course, opponents of the idea of same-sex couples gaining 
access to existing marriage law will no doubt say that same-sex couples 
are free to hold commitment ceremonies and to ―announce‖ to family, 
friends and colleagues, their commitment to each other. And, in fact, 
this does happen.  
Each of the couples involved in the New Zealand Communication to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee did get married, in the sense 
that they have held commitment ceremonies – these ‗marriages‘, of 
course, were given no legal recognition.  
Writing about the ceremony between herself and her partner, Lindsay 
Quilter (now Lindsay Zelf) said:34 
In August 1994, we stood up in our living room, before our chosen 
community (friends, family and cats) and asked them to witness our 
commitment to each other as a monogamous couple, and to support, honour 
and, if necessary, protect our relationship. Like many other couples, we 
discovered that private vows of love, truth and support for ourselves and for 
each other strengthened the bond between us. Paradoxically, they also gave 
us more room for personal growth and for independent exploration, both in 
our relationship, and of friendships and interests outside it. 
For each gay man or lesbian who “comes out”, there is a similar “coming out” 
necessary for anyone who cares for them. Making our private vows publicly, 
before our own community, gave each of them the opportunity to 
acknowledge their own courage, loyalty and love and to see themselves not 
standing alone. 
                                                                                                                                     
33  Macky, James, ―Private Lives‖, Metro (September 2000) 90: 92 and 97. 
34  Quilter, Lindsay, ―Going For Our Lives: ‗By The Power Vested In Me … I Now 
Pronounce You Man And Wife…‘ – A Personal View Of Legal Same-Sex Marriage‖, An 
Essay (1996). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  68  
 
Barbara McDowell and Gail Donnelly, and Joe Bourassa and Kevin 
Varnell married on 14 January 2001. They did not apply for a marriage 
licence, but rather announced their intention to marry through the 
‗reading of the banns‘ in their church – the Metropolitan Community 
Church in Toronto. The church subsequently issued the couples with a 
marriage certificate, as is generally permitted of churches by Canadian 
law, and the couples proceeded to submit their marriages for 
registration with the Province of Ontario. Registration was refused and 
the couples turned to the courts to declare their marriages legally 
valid.35  
Barbara McDowell wrote about her marriage:36 
It was truly a wonderful moment. We were surrounded by so many people 
who love and support us in being who we are. They came from all walks of 
life. Our friends, both straight, gay or transgender were there to celebrate 
with us. We felt amazingly blessed. 
Kevin and Joe had previously held a commitment ceremony but they 
wished to become legally married because, in Kevin‘s words:37 
Unless we can have the full status as a married couple, it’s hard to get full 
recognition of our relationship in the eyes of the community, in the eyes of 
our family, in the eyes of some of our friends. We have had a holy union, but 
that’s a half measure, and to us half measures are not enough. Already 
we’ve noticed a change in people’s attitudes towards us, even people who 
have been with us on this journey from the beginning and who witnessed 
our holy union relate differently to us now. My parents for instance, took 
extra steps to come from a small town and my mother who is in her 70s, 
made a big effort to find a baker that would make a wedding cake with two 
grooms on the top … So that’s why this wedding and a legally recognized 
marriage is so very important to us. It allows us to be viewed differently, to 
be fully recognised alongside all other Canadians. 
In talking of the first legal same-sex marriages, and the success in 
                                                 
35  See discussion on the Canadian marriage cases in Chapter 8. 
36  McDowell, Barbara, ―The Importance Of Being Married‖, 
http://cangay.com/relation/partner/barb_gail.htm (Retrieved: 20 February 2001). 
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human rights and equality terms that surrounded them, Joanna 
Radbord wrote:38 
All of the couples emphasized that the denial of the freedom to marry 
stigmatized gay and lesbian relationships. It promoted a culture of 
intolerance. “[M]arriage … is the institution that accords to a union the 
profound social stamp of approval and acceptance of the relationship as 
being of the highest value”. The denial of marriage sanction treated the 
relationships as inferior to those of different-sex couples. …  
We argued that only full inclusion in marriage would promote substantive 
equality. If we won equivalent rights and obligations, but were denied the 
status of marriage itself, the case would be lost. 
The above are all examples of couples saying that merely being in a 
relationship and being aware of that relationship only as an insular 
couple is not enough. Being in a relationship and not expressly sharing 
that fact with others is the parallel for a couple, to being closeted as an 
individual. There is no opportunity for the couple to share that 
relationship with others, to celebrate that relationship with others. The 
fact that the couple does not see fit to share their relationship with 
others might convey negative messages about the couples own 
perception of their relationship – suggesting perhaps that they are 
ashamed of the relationship and, therefore, of who they are as people.  
It is a further element of the public nature of marriage ceremonies that, 
not only is the couple entering a marriage saying to family, friends and 
colleagues (and society at large) that ―we are a couple and wish to be 
treated as such‖, but also they are giving to those persons gathered 
around them an opportunity to offer support. It is common, at a wedding 
ceremony, for the celebrant calling upon those present to make a pledge 
to support the couple through times of need, to be there for the couple 
in stressful times and to share with the couple in their times of 
celebration and joy. 
                                                                                                                                     
37  Jean, ―Two Men Who Were Married‖: http://cangay.com/relation/relationship.htm) 
[Note: Surname withheld from original document for reasons of anonymity] 
(Retrieved: 20 February 2001). 
38  Radbord, Joanna, ―Lesbian Love Stories: How We Won Equal Marriage In Canada‖, 
in [2005] 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 99: 120, quoting: MacDougall, B., ―The 
Celebration Of Same-Sex Marriage‖, in (2000) 32:2 Ottawa Law Review 235: 242. It 
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To relegate same-sex couples to invisibility, or to a different or lesser 
status, is to say to those couples ―we do not, as a society, consider your 
relationships to be as valid and as valued as particular other types of 
relationships‖.  
Brent Hardinger, writing as a guest columnist in a USA newspaper, 
summed up this concept:39 
Our ceremony, held on a beach on Vashon Island, was intentionally simple. 
We sang songs, a few friends spoke and, yes, we did kiss. Then Michael 
and I spent the whole evening listening to friends and family tell us how 
honored they were to have been invited. Couple after couple, gay and 
straight, also told us they considered our relationship to be a role model for 
their own.  
A role model? That’s when it finally occurred to us. We didn’t need to tell our 
friends and family how important we are to each other. They already knew. 
That’s also when I learned a profound truth about weddings. They aren’t 
about the couple saying anything to friends and family. They’re about 
friends and family saying something to the couple, telling them that they’re 
valued and appreciated, an important part of the community. 
When Michael and I got married, it made our family, and our community, 
that much stronger. 
These are not just mere musings about marriage. These are the voices of 
people who have experienced commitment ceremonies or who have lived 
their lives as partners, visible to their friends and communities. All 
communicate the message that a marriage ceremony is not only about 
the vows of commitment between the couple, but also it is about the 
public expression of that commitment.   
Couples can live together in committed relationships without publicly 
signifying their commitment. However, receiving the sanction of family 
and friends adds a significant layer of support that is not available 
                                                                                                                                     
is interesting to note that this same passage was quoted in: Halpern v Canada 
(Attorney-General) (2002, 60 O.R. (3d) 321 (Div.Ct.): para.188. 
39  Hartinger, Brent, ―Ceremonial Wedding Of Gay Partners Affirms Values Of Family, 
Friends‖, Tacoma News Tribune (4 March 2001). 
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otherwise. Receiving the sanction of society at large, through official and 
legal recognition of the marriage adds a further layer of support, and a 
vital symbol of value and validity. 
 
The “meaning-making” capacity of marriage 
The above examples illustrate that relationships are about much more 
than practicalities and technicalities. Personal relationships between a 
committed, loving and caring couple are about the intimate bonds 
formed between two people. It is the significance of the relationship at 
this intimate level which is ignored when the law only recognises same-
sex relationships for the purposes of clarifying the rights of one partner 
as compared with the rights of the other. 
In the discussions following the decision in Baker v State of Vermont,40 
and prior to the decision of the State Legislature of Vermont to legislate 
for civil unions (their form of registered partnerships), Will Rountree 
added the following to the discussion:41 
… most importantly … the court opened the door to a separate but equal 
institution that will do nothing to change the symbolic construction of 
marriage as a heterosexual institution. While the decision mandates a legal 
structure for same-sex couples through domestic partnership or “marriage 
lite” arrangements, in opening the door to this separate legal structure, the 
court ignores the unique meaning-making power of marriage in constructing 
visions of intimate commitment. Domestic partnership arrangements just 
don’t, and won’t, have the same meaning-making capacity, and thus 
“separate but equal” claims are just a charade. 
 
It is, for gays, the ‗meaning-making capacity‘ of marriage that is perhaps 
the most important element of the battle for same-sex marriage. 
                                                 
40  Baker et al v State of Vermont et al 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.1999). 
41  Will Rountree (University of California, Berkeley) commenting on the Vermont same-
sex marriage judgment by e-mail to a same-sex marriage newsgroup 
(marriage@lists.qrd.org) (4 January 2000), cited in: Christie, Nigel C., ―The New 
Zealand Same-Sex Marriage Case: From New Zealand To The United Nations‖, in 
Wintemute, Robert, and Andenaes, Mads, Legal Recognition Of Same-Sex 
Partnerships: A Study Of National, European And International Law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford (2001): 335. 
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Equality under the law is not only about gaining access to equal laws 
relating to, for example, procedural issues (how to get married), property 
protections, employment benefits, family and parental rights and 
obligations, and so on. Equality under the law is, for myself and my 
partner, being able to conduct our day-to-day lives in the same manner 
as the people next door. It is being able to do this because the law says 
that each of us as an individual, and the two of us as a couple, are 
equally respected by the law, are equally valued as citizens of the 
country in which we live, and our relationships are equally as valid as 
our heterosexual counterparts.  
Dr Margrit Eichler, a sociologist who furnished an affidavit to the 
Halpern case, wrote:42 
“Marriage” is imbued with unique cultural meaning that cannot be replicated 
by some other means of partnership recognition. Given the history of 
oppression of gay and lesbian people, the denial of the freedom to marry 
perpetuates and promotes stigma and invisibility. The creation of a separate 
regime marks lesbian and gay relationships as inherently different from and 
inferior to the relationships of heterosexuals. 
Jodi O‘Brien writes: 
Culturally, we are saturated with the notion that marriage is truly the 
pinnacle of inter-relational attainment (the “happiest moment of your life”). 
Given similar acculturation, it stands to reason that many lesbians and gay 
men would grow up desiring the same cultural rites of belonging. 
Of course statutes other than the Marriage Act are important, whether 
they relate to Accident Compensation insurance, or the ability to write a 
will which will be upheld by the courts, or any other of a myriad of 
possible provisions. The importance of these pieces of legislation is what 
each one of them does individually. What is really important is the 
picture that is painted over-all, and whether this is a picture of 
inclusion, or a picture of exclusion – the picture that same-sex couples 
can and do play an integral and vital part in the community as a whole. 
Specific pieces of legislation, such as the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976, outline the rights of individuals vis-à-vis one another. Such 
                                                 
42  Eichler, Dr Margrit, Affidavit sworn 15 November 2000, in Halpern v Canada 
(Attorney-General) Court File No.684/00: 266-277. 
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legislation does not provide a recognition of the relationship of each 
partner with the other. That is, much legislation (such as the Property 
(Relationships) Bill 1976) formulates what my individual property rights 
are in competition with the individual property rights of my partner. 
Furthermore, this particular piece of legislation is about the end of a 
relationship for which the law has not yet recognised the beginning. 
Civil unions, as instituted in New Zealand from 26 April 2005, do 
provide a means of formal recognition of the relationship, and a range of 
entitlements that attach to that relationship. Civil unions at least serve 
to recognise the core relationship between the two partners. However, 
they do this by maintaining the separation between civil unions and 
marriage – and consciously and deliberately so by the very Government 
which promoted and enacted them. In this context, the picture that the 
existence of civil unions paints is one of exclusion. 
With regard to relationship recognition, equality under the law is not 
about finding some other way to provide same-sex couples with as many 
of the same entitlements, protections, responsibilities that we can 
without providing them with civil-legal marriage. No matter how closely 
the ‗other way‘ might imitate existing civil-legal marriage, it is not civil-
legal marriage. By the very existence of the two regimes – side by side – 
there is unequal treatment. 
The importance of inclusion in marriage is that it is such an all-
embracing, cultural and social institution that does carry such a 
significant level of meaning for and within society. 
 
The benefits associated with marriage 
As mentioned previously, it is not my intention in this thesis to debate 
whether or not marriage is an anachronistic institution or an institution 
that, historically, has been oppressive towards women. The fundamental 
focus is equal access, for those same-sex couples who desire such 
access, to marriage and the entitlements and status associated with 
being married. Above all, the issue is whether those who are able to 
marry are conferred with a unique status that is not available to those 
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who are not able to marry, and whether same-sex couples are deserving 
of access to that status on the basis of full and equal treatment before 
and under the law.  
It is worthwhile, therefore, to summarise some of the advantages and 
disadvantages that attach to marriage.  
There are some benefits, previously available only to married couples, 
that are now available to de facto partners, whether same-sex or 
different-sex. These include, for example: 
(1) the protection of individual financial interests during, and at the 
conclusion of, a relationship;  
(2) the sharing of joint financial interests at the conclusion of a 
relationship;43 and 
(3) recognition of de facto partners for the purposes of various 
legislation.44 
In addition to those benefits, there are further benefits that can now be 
attained by same-sex couples and different-sex couples who enter into 
registered partnerships. These include, for example:45 
(1) the conferral of a recognised relationship status upon a civil-legal 
registration conducted in accordance with the relevant legislation; 
and 
(2) the possibility of ceremonies associated with the registration 
process which serve to reinforce the status and, consequentially, 
the stability of the relationship in the eyes of the couple 
themselves, as well as their families and friends. 
At the same time, there are some benefits that can only be attained from 
gaining access to marriage. Being married is like being a member of a 
‗club‘. Membership of the married couples‘ club is, by definition, only 
available to couples who marry and, by extension, is only available to 
                                                 
43  For example, in New Zealand, relationship property for partners in de facto, civil 
union, or marriage relationships is covered by the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
44  For example, theft of property by a partner – Crimes Act 1961 s.222. 
45 Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service, "The Bride Wore Pink", in [1993] 3 
Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 67: 90-91. 
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those who can to marry. While other regimes may try to emulate the 
benefits of membership of the marriage club, exclusion means that 
those benefits do not carry the same meaning. There are some benefits 
that truly derive only from the status of being married and are therefore 
available to different-sex couples only. These include the following:46 
(1) Social recognition and reduced discrimination – Public recognition 
and support, from family friends and the community, to same-sex 
couples in the context of the long-standing, socially- recognised 
institution of marriage. That is, access to marriage for same-sex 
couples provides recognition in the context of equal status with 
different-sex couples – not in the context of a second-rate, ‗inferior‘ 
status. This colours the way in which family friends and 
community view the validity and value of the relationship. 
(2) Enhanced self-esteem – Same-sex couples already have every right 
to feel proud of themselves and their relationships. However, in 
many cases this pride may reside in the fact that they have worked 
hard to establish or maintain a relationship in the face of social 
prejudices. Greater self-esteem can come from being recognised as 
successful in a socially approved and respected marriage 
relationship. 
(3) Choice – The State prescribes, through its laws, the types of 
relationship recognition that are available to its citizens. There is 
no specific ‗freedom of choice‘ provision within New Zealand law, 
however, based on the premise that the State cannot treat citizens 
less favourably on the grounds of an irrelevant characteristic, it is 
possible to argue that limiting the choice of form of relationship 
recognition is discriminatory. All couples, whether same-sex or 
different-sex should freely have the choice of remaining in a de 
facto relationship or entering into a civil union or a marriage. 
Same-sex couples should not be restricted only to those forms of 
relationship recognition that others deem to be suitable for them. 
 
                                                 
46 Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service, "The Bride Wore Pink", in [1993] 3 Australian 
Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 67: 90-91.  
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(4) Status – Being provided with access to marriage means that, if 
same-sex couples have cause to interact with agencies of the State, 
they do so on the same basis as different-sex married couples, not 
as members of an ‗other‘ category, such as being partners in a 
registered partnership. This equivalence in status can affect the 
perception of officials dealing with the couple in areas such as 
immigration, human rights, and family law.47 
Conversely, there may also be some disadvantages that flow from 
recognition through marriage. In the main, these disadvantages would 
not be specific to same-sex couples, but apply to different-sex couples 
also. For example, the disadvantages might include the following: 
(1) The presence of different types of relationship recognition tends to 
create a hierarchy in how those relationships are viewed. 
Historically, for example, de jure marriages were seen as the only 
‗proper‘ relationships, with de facto relationships – or informal 
relationships in the nature of marriage – being viewed 
illegitimate.48 As de facto relationships have became more 
common, they have continued to be viewed as inferior to marriage 
relationships. It is likely that, with the advent of civil unions, 
relationships will fall into three categories – de facto, civil unions 
and marriages – with marriage retaining a superior and privileged 
social status. 
(2) Some same-sex couples who have argued against marriage have 
based their argument, at least in part, on the view that marriage 
creates an implied obligation to support and, as a result, 
Government would reduce access by individual partners to social 
assistance benefits. I suggest that this is a somewhat flawed 
argument. First, in New Zealand social assistance legislation has 
been amended to take account of civil unions and de facto 
                                                 
47  I have already alluded to the difference in treatment that occurs in practice between 
same-sex and different-sex de facto in the case of immigration. There is no reason to 
expect that the same differences in treatment will not occur in practice with regard 
to couples in registered partnerships as compared with marriage. 
48  Note that the term ‗de jure marriage‘ refers to a marriage solemnised in accordance 
with the laws of marriage, whereas the term ‗de facto marriage‘ refers to a marriage-
like relationship that exists in fact or reality, but not in accordance with marriage 
laws. 
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relationships.49 Second, rights are not conferred in isolation – 
rights occur in the context of reciprocal responsibilities.  
I consider that the most important point to remember is that the whole 
issue of access to marriage by same-sex couples is a rights-based issue 
and is a principled matter of equality under the law. In this sense, while 
it is accepted that there may be some individual advantages and 
disadvantages, these are secondary to the primary goal, and that the 
over-all advantage to be gained for the gay individual, the gay couple, 
and the gay community as a whole would far outweigh any 
disadvantages that may eventuate. 
 
The „presumption‟ that is marriage 
Same-sex couples, are not seeking ‗special‘ rights but rather are seeking 
access to the same rights that different-sex couples take for granted. 
There is a presumption of inclusion that flows from marriage – that is, 
inclusion within the provisions of other legislation. A prime example of 
this is the presumption of inclusion in relation to adoption legislation.50 
There are two scenarios that are of interest in this context: 
• First, there is the scenario in which same-sex couples have not been 
granted access to marriage, although they may have been granted 
access to civil unions. 
• Second, there is the scenario in which same-sex couples have been 
granted access to marriage under the existing marriage legislation – 
that is, on precisely the same terms as different-sex couples. 
I will now examine how addressing the issue of same-sex couple 
adoption might differ under each of the above scenarios. 
 
                                                 
49  And again, as a result of the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships (Statutory 
References) Act 2005, same-sex couples were recognised in social assistance 
legislation after a period of 2 years from the Civil Union Act coming into effect. The 
―grand-parenting‖ period was designed to enable those same-sex couples affected by 
the change to rearrange their financial affairs. 
50  I discuss the current situation in New Zealand with regard to the ability of same-sex 
couples to apply to legally adopt children, in Chapter 6. 
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When same-sex couples are not able to marry 
To date, the tentative, inconclusive, and inconsequential reviews of 
adoption law in New Zealand have taken place, considering amongst 
other issues, whether or not same-sex couples should be permitted to 
apply to adopt.51  
If we accept that the current interpretation of adoption law is that only 
couples who are legally married can adopt jointly,52 the presumption 
would be that same-sex couples would not be able to adopt jointly, 
because same-sex couples are not able to marry.  
In essence, therefore, the presumption is one of exclusion.  
As same-sex couples are currently not able to marry, the presumption of 
exclusion would have to be rebutted by robust policy considerations 
based, for example, on the paramount interests of the child rather than 
dubious assumptions about same-sex couples.  
 
When same-sex couples are able to marry 
Let us now assume that same-sex couples are able to marry in New 
Zealand. In this case, because married partners are spouses by 
definition, the presumption would be that same-sex couples would be 
able to lodge jointly an application to adopt – provided they have 
married. 
In essence, therefore, the presumption is one of inclusion.  
                                                 
51  (1) New Zealand Law Commission, ―Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different 
Approach and a New Framework‖, NZLC R65 (September 2000). The 
recommendations of the Law Commission have not been adopted by subsequent 
Governments.  
 (2) ―Inquiry Into New Zealand‘s Adoption Laws‖, the Report of the Government 
Administration Committee (August 2001). The Report of the Committee was 
inconclusive and resulted in no recommendations to Parliament.  
 (3) In 2005, an officials working group, led by the Ministry of Justice, was 
established to consider adoption law reform. No Cabinet decisions have been made 
as a result of this work.  
 See further discussion on these in Chapter 8, and further comment on the adoption 
issue in Chapter 9.  
52  Currently, the Adoption Act 1955 s.3 permits joint applications for adoption to be 
lodged only by spouses. The term ―spouse‖ has generally been interpreted to include 
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In this case, any reversal of the presumption would have to be achieved 
by the demonstration of a substantive reason why same-sex couples 
should not be able to adopt. 
 
Summary 
As discussed in Chapter 2, human rights is fundamentally about 
equality and inclusion – citizenship is about full participation. Therefore 
the presumption of inclusion that flows with the ability to marry, is 
centrally important to same-sex couples both at a practical level and as 
a matter of principle. 
Although I have used adoption as an example, this same principle 
applies in relation to other areas of the law and, indeed, to other areas 
related to marriage. For example, inclusion in marriage means, 
presumptively, feeling the same sense of social belonging and status 
that is already felt by those couples who can marry. 
 
WHO CAN AND CANNOT MARRY? 
With regard to who is or is not permitted to marry, there are various 
anomalies that arise both within the New Zealand jurisdiction, and 
between the New Zealand and overseas jurisdictions. In general terms, 
persons are permitted to marry if: 
• they demonstrate that they have mental capacity to freely consent to 
the marriage; 
• are of the requisite age to be able, by law, to give consent, or that 
they have a parent or guardian prepared to give consent on their 
behalf;53 
                                                                                                                                     
only married couples, although there has been a recent development in this area. 
See Chapter 8 for more detailed consideration. 
53  Marriage Act 1955 s.17 provides that no person under the age of 16 may get 
married. Section 18 provides that, apart from specified exceptional situations, 
minors require the permission of parents to marry. By virtue of these two provisions, 
although the Act does not expressly provide, the age of consent to marriage in New 
Zealand is eighteen years. The form ―Notice of Intended Marriage‖ (BDM 60) is a 
prescribed from under the Marriage (Forms) Regulations 1995. 
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• they are not too closely related to each other by blood 
(consanguinity) or familial relationship (affinity);54 
• they are not currently married (or, in New Zealand, in a  civil union); 
and   
• they are not of the same gender (as confirmed, in New Zealand, by 
the Court of Appeal).55 
The anomalies that arise, with regard to how different couples might be 
treated by the same laws relating to marriage, generally mean that 
same-sex couples are treated differently and less favourably than their 
different-sex counterparts. 
 
Some citizens of New Zealand cannot marry in New Zealand 
Same-sex couples cannot enter into a valid civil-legal marriage in New 
Zealand. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the limits on citizenship that result 
from exclusion of equal participation in society, but, obviously, marriage 
carries with it a social status that is denied those who cannot marry. 
The birth of each person in New Zealand is registered with the State and 
a birth certificate is issued. By virtue of that birth certificate and the 
provisions of the Citizenship Act 1977 s.6, the person whose name 
appears on that certificate is a citizen of New Zealand.56 In the same way 
as others in the community we, as gay and lesbian individuals, act as 
‗good‘ citizens in our daily lives – at home, socially and at work. 
Arguably, however, we have our ‗citizenship‘ limited to the extent that 
we are denied participation in one of the key institutions of our society. 
                                                 
54  Marriage Act 1955 s.15 and Schedule 2. 
55  The Court of Appeal in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (Court Of 
Appeal) having held that marriage can only take place between a man and a woman. 
56  Citizenship Act 1977s.6 provides: 
 6. Citizenship by birth: 
(1)  Subject to subsection (2), a person is a New Zealand citizen by birth if — 
(a)  the person was born in New Zealand on or after l January 1949 and before 
1 January 2006; or 
(b)  the person was born in New Zealand on or after 1 January 2006, and, at 
the time of the person's birth, at least one of the person's parents was — 
(i)  a New Zealand citizen; or 
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In this case, the fact that we are not permitted to marry is a limit on our 
citizenship – our ―full participation in society‖.57 
 
„Bad‟ citizens of New Zealand can marry 
At the same time that we, as ‗good‘ citizens, are denied access to 
marriage, because marriage is reserved for different-sex couples, certain 
other persons are permitted to marry in New Zealand. 
One of these groups of persons includes those who could be considered 
‗bad‘ citizens. For example, people who have committed significant 
crimes and have been cut off from society by being sent to prison are 
still not denied the ability to marry. Men who have been imprisoned as a 
result of being charged for assault against their wives are not denied 
their existing marriage, or even the ability to re-marry even if one 
marriage has failed because of their perpetration of abuse. Men who 
have abused children are not denied the ability to marry. Marriage is 
seen as such a fundamental right that it cannot be taken away from any 
of these persons. However, it is not a right that currently can be 
extended to same-sex couples in New Zealand (or many other countries) 
because their inclusion might be seen to ―besmirch‖ the sanctity of 
marriage.58 
 
Overseas citizens can marry in New Zealand 
New Zealand has also become a destination of preference for many 
overseas different-sex couples to get married. There is a significant 
business within New Zealand around organising weddings and wedding 
functions for couples who travel to New Zealand specifically for the 
                                                                                                                                     
(ii)  entitled in terms of the Immigration Act 1987 to be in New Zealand 
indefinitely, or entitled to reside indefinitely in the Cook Islands, Niue, 
or Tokelau. 
57  Thomas J, in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
58  New Zealand Law Commission, ―Editorial: Recognising Same-Sex Relationships‖ 
(December 1999). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  82  
 
‗wedding experience‘.59 The couples, generally accompanied by members 
of their families, come to New Zealand and are able to marry under New 
Zealand law safe in the knowledge that their marriage will be recognised 
without question in their home country. 
However, same-sex couples who are citizens of New Zealand cannot 
marry in their home country. 
 
Some citizens of New Zealand can have „recognised‟ marriages 
overseas 
Different-sex couples who travel away from New Zealand are able to 
marry overseas and, without having to undertake any particular 
formality in accordance with New Zealand law, have that overseas 
marriage recognised without question in New Zealand. 
It is our contention that this same principle should apply to same-sex 
couples. Same-sex couples, who are citizens and normally residents of 
New Zealand, have legally married in overseas jurisdictions where same-
sex marriages are possible. The issue of recognition of these marriages 
by New Zealand has yet to be tested. However, we can say with some 
certainty that their recognition is certainly not ‗without question‘. 
 
Brothers and sisters 
Another way to highlight inconsistencies in treatment between same-sex 
and different sex couples is to consider the situation where, 
hypothetically, a brother and a sister each travel with their male 
partners from New Zealand to an overseas country and, while there, 
each couple gets married. 
This raises the same issues as above, but tends to crystalise them 
somewhat. When the different-sex couple (the sister and her husband) 
arrives back in New Zealand, the fact that they are married is accepted 
without question. They would probably not, in most circumstances be 
                                                 
59  For example, a ‗traditional‘ Maori Wedding: http://www.maoriweddings.co.nz/ 
(Retrieved: 29 July 2009); or ―The Wedding Of Your Dreams‖, as advertised at: 
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asked to produce a marriage certificate, but if they were asked to do so 
at any point, their marriage would be accepted, prima facie, as a legal, 
valid marriage for all purposes within New Zealand.  
Conversely, when the same-sex couple (the brother and his husband) 
arrives back in New Zealand it is unlikely that the couple would, without 
question, be accepted as being married – especially at an official level. 
Even if they were to produce their marriage certificate, it would not be 
accepted without question as proof of a legal, valid marriage for all 
purposes within New Zealand. Their marriage would not be accepted, 
prima facie, as a legal, valid marriage for any purpose within New 
Zealand. 
 
Only wealthy gay people can marry 
Apart from the question as to whether or not overseas same-sex 
marriages would be recognised in New Zealand, a further consideration 
associated with same-sex couples marrying overseas is that of 
affordability. If same-sex marriages from overseas jurisdictions were to 
be recognised in New Zealand, but marriage was not to be extended to 
same-sex couples, a new class of persons, and arguably a new form of 
discrimination, would be created. Marriage would only be available to 
those same-sex couples who were able to afford to travel from New 
Zealand to another country where same-sex marriage is possible in 
order to get married. On the basis that different-sex couples can marry 
in New Zealand, without needing to travel overseas, they would not be 
faced with this obstacle. 
 
Summary 
In summary, a number of anomalies arise from the inability of same-sex 
couples to marry in New Zealand. Some of these anomalies exist by 
virtue of inconsistencies in the treatment of same-sex couples as 
compared with different-sex couples with regard to New Zealand 
domestic laws. Some of them exist by virtue of inconsistencies in the 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.poronui.co.nz/Home/Events/Weddings.aspx (Retrieved: 29 July 2009). 
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treatment of same-sex couples as compared with different-sex couples 
with regard to the portability of marriage laws from overseas 
jurisdictions – although this latter issue has not yet been fully tested in 
New Zealand at this stage.60    
 
INCREMENTALISM 
During the lead-up to the passing of the Civil Union Act 2004, a variety 
of reasons were given for seeking civil unions rather than marriage: 
• New Zealand society was not yet ready to accept same-sex marriage. 
• Seeking civil unions was a politically pragmatic option in terms of 
being able to get the majority of the votes in the House to pass the 
legislation. 
• Seeking civil unions was also a politically pragmatic solution in 
terms of Members of Parliament being able to support this without 
running the risk of being voted out at the next election. 
• Civil unions would serve to achieve access to a range of legislative 
entitlements, protections and responsibilities that were not 
currently available. It would likely take longer to gain access to 
these if we were insistent on seeking access to marriage. 
• It was also made clear that civil unions were seen as a means of 
achieving ‗increased compliance with‘ the imperatives of our 
domestic human rights laws and our obligations under international 
human rights laws.61 
                                                 
60  See discussion on options for future action in Chapter 10. 
61  On the Beehive Website, in a section ―Questions And Answers On Civil Union And 
Relationships (Statutory References) Bill‖: ―Why is the government promoting these 
two Bills? The law differentiates between people in committed, exclusive and stable 
relationships depending on their marital status, with a number of legal rights and 
responsibilities accessible only to married couples. These potentially discriminatory 
laws expose the government to risks of complaints to the Human Right Commission 
(HRC), cases before the Human Rights Review Tribunal and litigation. It isn‘t fair to 
deny legal rights to people unable to marry, and establishing civil union in 
legislation means that Parliament, rather than the judiciary, determines relationship 
law for New Zealand‖; and, ―Why are different sex couples able to choose to marry or 
enter a civil union? Civil union is a new form of recognised relationship. In 
developing the Civil Union Bill the government is subject to the anti-discriminatory 
standards set out in human rights legislation. There is no justification for 
discriminating in the Civil Union Bill between different and same sex couples. In 
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However, in addition to all the above reasons, or in a sense as an 
extension of the above reasons, it was suggested, by proponents of the 
civil union legislation, that civil unions should be seen in two ways: 
• as a form of relationship recognition in their own right – for those 
who did not wish to seek relationship recognition through marriage; 
and 
• as a politically achievable form of relationship recognition that 
would act as a ‗stepping-stone‘ to full and equal recognition through 
marriage.  
That is, it was suggested that access to civil unions, in the first instance, 
would serve as a means of demonstrating to society at large that formal 
State recognition of same-sex relationships would not cause the 
breakdown of New Zealand society that some opponents predicted. 
Subsequent to showing that ‗the sky has not fallen in‘ society would be 
more accepting of a move to full equality through marriage. 
However, an incrementalist approach with regard to human rights 
issues, and the protection of minority rights, is somewhat questionable. 
 
The failure of incrementalism 
It is my view that incrementalism is not part of the language of (civil and 
political) human rights. In this sense, I describe equality as a 
‗destination‘ and not a ‗journey‘. In support of this view, I make the 
following points: 
• The language of international laws on civil and political rights 
provide that such rights are immediately enforceable.62 
                                                                                                                                     
addition, some different sex couples may wish to have their relationship legally 
recognised but not marry‖ (Dated: 21 June 2004; Retrieved: 30 July 2009). 
62  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 2(2) provides: 
―Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant‖; whereas the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICSECR) provides: ―Each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  86  
 
• There is an inherent difficulty with notion of ―degrees of equality‖,63 
or of being ‗partly equal‘ – surely, being equal cannot mean not 
being equal.64 While I acknowledge that the concept of equality is 
not a simple concept, and it is necessary to take into account wider 
considerations such as ‗formal‘ equality (essentially, equality of 
treatment) as compared with ‗substantive‘ equality (essentially, 
equality of result), I still consider that, fundamentally, equality is 
about being the ‗same as‘ rather than being, in any way, ‗different 
from‘. 
• Similarly, based on this same reasoning, I have difficulty with the 
notion of having increasing levels of equality – being more equal 
today than was the case yesterday.  
In subsequent chapters, I will show how it has been common practice to 
incrementally increase legislative ‗coverage‘ to same-sex couples.65 As 
the State incrementally extends the number of statutory provisions that 
include same-sex couples (and de facto different-sex couples), it is 
possible to argue that these couples are being provided for in a way that 
does not undermine traditional marriage. Essentially, the argument is 
that as same-sex couples are enabled to access, by other statutory 
means, an increasing number of the specific entitlements that flow from 
marriage, there is less need for same-sex couples to be able to marry. 
This argument runs counter to the fundamental equality argument 
central to this thesis. 
Different-sex couples in New Zealand have chosen different ways to 
arrange their private lives. Over time, the laws of New Zealand have 
changed to provide greater levels of recognition for these different 
arrangements. De facto different-sex couples, once placed outside the 
law, are now recognised to a far greater extent than ever before.66 
                                                                                                                                     
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including 
particularly the adoption of legislative‖ (Emphasis added). 
63  See the Human Rights Commission submission to the Ministry of Justice on the 
Ministry‘s Discussion Paper on ―Same-Sex Couples and the Law‖ (April 2000). 
64  For example, a simple dictionary definition of equality is: ―being the same in 
quantity, size, degree, value, or status‖: Soanes, Catherine, and Stevenson, Angus, 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(2004): 481.  
65  See particularly, the discussion in Chapter 8 on the Civil Union Act 2004 and the 
Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2004. 
66  Significant recognition for the rights of partners in de facto relationships came with 
the advent of the Property (Relationships) Act 2001 and, more recently, with the 
Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005. 
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Since April 2005, couples who choose not to marry or, in the case of 
same-sex couples cannot marry, have been able to enter into a civil 
union.67 This has enabled different-sex couples and same-sex couples to 
receive greater levels of recognition in a variety of legislation than has 
previously been the case.68 
However, although there has been an increase in the number of 
statutory entitlements, protections and responsibilities extended to these 
different forms of relationships, it is still not possible to say that greater 
equality has resulted. Ultimately, not all relationships are treated as 
equal – while same-sex couples may be able to enjoy various legal 
protections, and while same-sex couples may be able to enter into civil 
unions, they are still not able to achieve full and equal treatment before 
and under the law because of their exclusion from marriage. 
 
Incrementalism as resistance 
In order to protect the privileged status of marriage, those in decision-
making positions in many jurisdictions across the world have actively 
sought ways of providing recognition to different forms of relationships – 
without providing access to marriage.69 To date, the most usual response 
has been to provide legal recognition of same-sex relationships by way of 
registered partnerships. However, it is my contention that registered 
partnerships fail in that they offer to same-sex couples neither legal nor 
social equality with different-sex couples. What registered partnerships 
do offer is a legal compromise and the positioning of gays as second-
class citizens. 
In this sense, incrementalism has been used as a toll of resistance – a 
means of providing ‗a degree of equality‘ to same-sex couples without 
denigrating the historic, traditional institution of marriage.70 
                                                 
67  Pursuant to the Civil Union Act 2004. 
68  Predominantly with the passing of the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005. 
69  See earlier discussion in relation to registered partnerships. 
70  On the Beehive Website in a section ―Questions and Answers On Civil Union And 
Relationships (Statutory References) Bills‖: ―Do these Bills undermine marriage? No, 
the Civil Union Bill does not change the Marriage Act 1955. In fact, the institution of 
marriage remains solely available to a man and a woman. The terms "husband", 
"wife" and "marriage" are not being removed from any legislation. Where any 
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ATTITUDE VERSUS KNOWLEDGE  
There is a difference between ―attitude‖ and ―knowledge‖ – and, as a 
consequence, there is a difference between: 
• decision-making based on attitudes – being defined as ―opinion, way 
of thinking, view, posture‖; and  
• decision-making based on knowledge – being defined as ―awareness, 
familiarity, understanding, what is known‖.  
To me, this is a vital element in the consideration of whether or not 
same-sex couples should be provided with access to marriage. I am of 
the view that human rights matters must be decided as a result of a 
informed consideration of all the relevant issues – that is, decisions must 
be the result of informed debate. 
Human rights matters must not, conversely, be decided based on belief 
and attitude. This principle is reflected in the requirement of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act that rights and freedoms can be subject ―only 
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society‖.71  
Unfortunately, I would consider that, when it comes to matters of sexual 
orientation, there is much argument based in attitude rather than 
knowledge – turning to tradition and belief as a purported justification to 
discriminatory treatment. Much argument against same-sex marriage is 
couched in terms of both secular and religious tradition, but very few 
which are based in objective justifications.  
 
Tradition  
Introduction 
A former Minister of Justice (who ―personally‖ did not agree with the idea 
                                                                                                                                     
legislation currently refers to "husband" and "wife" the terms have been retained‖ 
(Dated: 21 June 2004; Retrieved: 30 July 2009). 
71  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. 
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of same-sex marriage) stated that:72  
… the law must change as society changes. If it loses its touch with the 
realities of society, the law can become outmoded, irrelevant or unjust. … 
Diversity is a key defining characteristic of families in the nineteen-nineties. 
The concept of tradition as a means of justifying existing practice is 
problematic on a number of grounds. On the one hand, if traditions are 
‗set in stone‘, at what point, and on what basis, did a particular practice 
become absolute and invariable? On the other hand, if traditions are not 
‗set in stone‘, on what basis are they are able to change over time? 
There are a number of historic practices that, although they may have 
been acceptable at a particular time in the past, are no longer acceptable 
because there is a different social context. For example, if there we were 
to adhere unswervingly to traditional practice, slavery would persist to 
the present day.  
While I do not intend for this discussion to become overly tied up in 
semantics of the word ―tradition‖, I consider it relevant to consider two 
rather different dictionary meanings attributed to the word. The first 
meaning to which I refer is:73 
a system of principles, values and customs which a particular culture or 
society has built up over a period of time, and patterns of behaviour to which 
that society adheres. 
The second meaning attributed to the word ―tradition‖ is theological, and 
describes tradition as:74 
doctrine or a particular doctrine etc. claimed to have divine authority without 
documentary evidence, esp.: (a) the oral teaching of Christ and the Apostles, 
(b) the laws held by the Pharisees to have been delivered by God to Moses, 
(c) the words and deeds of Muhammad not in the Koran. 
                                                 
72  Graham, Hon Doug A. M., Minister of Justice, ―The Minister Of Justice‘s Opening 
Speech‖, at a Symposium on Family Property, Victoria University of Wellington, in 
[1995] VUWLR 3: 3. 
73  ―The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English‖, 8th ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1991): 1293; ―Collins English Dictionary‖, HarperCollins Publishers (1995): 1631-
1632. 
74  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 8th ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1991): 1293; Collins English Dictionary, HarperCollins Publishers (1995): 1631-
1632. 
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This distinction is particularly pertinent when considering the issue of 
same-sex marriage. 
First and foremost, same-sex couples are seeking access to civil-legal 
marriage. While some couples might prefer to marry in a church or 
religious setting (religious marriage), the key consideration is equal 
access to civil-legal marriage (secular marriage).  
There will be further discussion on the separation of the religious and 
the civil-legal aspects of marriage later in this section. However, I would 
ask the reader to keep in mind the notion that certain social and cultural 
practices become normalised gradually over period of time by a group of 
people living together in a social setting. On this basis, those social and 
cultural practices can be modified gradually over a period of time. 
Tradition, by definition, is not static, but is evolutionary. 
In this section, I will examine the traditional meaning of marriage in New 
Zealand, the extent to which the definition of marriage has changed (and 
the extent to which it has not) and therefore the extent to which the 
definition of marriage is not absolute; and the distinction between 
marriage in the religious setting as compared with the secular, civil-legal 
setting.  
 
The “traditional” definition of marriage in New Zealand 
Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee of 1866 stated that 
marriage:75 
as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all 
others. 
This definition was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in the New Zealand 
same-sex marriage case in 1997,76 and remains the accepted and 
traditional definition of marriage in New Zealand. 
                                                 
75 Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1866) [1861-73] All ER 175: 177. It should be noted 
that the issue before the court in this case was that of bigamy – that is, the gender of 
the parties was not at issue. 
76  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  91  
 
The Appellants in Quilter argued that it is not logical to justify 
discrimination by using ―tradition‖ to support that discrimination – that 
this is nothing more than tautology. And yet this is precisely what is 
being done by our courts and by Parliament. 
It was argued by the Appellants in Quilter that it is not justifiable to turn 
back to a common law definition of marriage stemming from the United 
Kingdom in 1866 to justify a definition of marriage in New Zealand in the 
1990s. So, what happens? In the High Court case, the Crown takes us 
further back to the case of Lindo v Bellisario of 1795.77 And, in the Court 
of Appeal judgment of Justice Tipping (one of the more favourable 
judgments) we are told that in the 1662 version of the Anglican Book of 
Common Prayer says that the first cause for which matrimony was 
ordained was "procreation".  
In the New Zealand context, therefore, the underlying message is that 
past discrimination is sufficient to justify contemporary discrimination, 
That is, the ‗tradition‘ argument essentially states that any 
discriminatory practice is justifiable because it has been the practice for 
some time – no other explanation necessary.  
It would seem that there is a failure to appreciate that while, in some 
instances, a respect for traditional values can be positive, in other 
instances an unfounded adherence to traditional values can be negative 
and destructive. Many exciting changes of the past would not have come 
about had we adhered to certain practices purely on the basis of former 
and contemporary practice: women would still be the chattels of their 
fathers or older brothers or husbands; marriage between different racial 
or ethnic groups would be denied; and women would not now have the 
right to vote. 
Although marriage has been described by some as a patriarchal and 
oppressive institution,78 it is important to acknowledge the evolution 
that marriage has undertaken in the New Zealand context. In this same 
                                                 
77 Lindo v Bellisario (1795) 1 Hag Con 215: The issue before the Court in this case was 
the validity of Jewish marriage, and in the course of its considerations the Court 
discusses procreation – procreation is no longer seen as a requirement of the legal 
institution of marriage.  
78  For example, a Wellington anti-marriage lesbian group ―Dykes Who Don‘t Want A 
Bar Of It‖ expressed this view at the time of the Quilter same-sex marriage case.   
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context of evolution, it is also important to recognise that legal 
acceptance of same-sex marriage would bring a new dynamic to the 
institution. 
 
The definition of marriage is not absolute 
There are various ways in which the definition of marriage can be said to 
not be absolute. That is, there is no single definition of marriage that 
applies across all cultures or across all times. 
If the definition of marriage cannot be considered as absolute, how might 
the definition be varied.  
Traditions vary over time. It is highly unlikely that any particular 
tradition will remain unchanged for all eternity. The reality is that 
traditions associated with marriage, and the marriage relationship, have 
changed significantly over the years. If we had adhered to the 
―traditional‖ form of the relationships between men and women, we 
would still have, a range of practices and standards that, I suggest, we 
would now find unacceptable: 
TABLE 1: CHANGES IN THE „TRADITIONAL‟MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP 
Formerly Currently 
Unmarried girl / woman is the 
property of her father. 
Mother and Father are the guardians 
of their daughter. 
Married woman is the property of her 
husband. 
Husband and wife are legal equals. 
Women, being merely the property of 
their father / husbands, have no legal 
status and therefore cannot own 
property, or enter into contracts, in 
their own right. 
Women, no longer being merely the 
property of their fathers / husbands, 
have full legal status and can own 
property, or enter into contracts, in 
their own right. 
Women can be punished by their 
fathers / husbands as they are the 
property of their fathers / husbands. 
A husband can be charged with a 
criminal offence if he rapes / assaults 
his wife. 
 
A further example of how the definition of marriage has changed over 
time, is the current status of the ‗five elements of marriage‘ from the 
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Hyde v Hyde definition of Lord Penzance. While all five elements may 
have been essential for the existence of a valid marriage in the United 
Kingdom in 1866, this is not the case in New Zealand in 2009:  
TABLE 2: THE ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE 
Element Comment 
The voluntary 
union  
There are two ways in which it could be argued that the 
voluntariness of participants to a legally valid marriage is 
not absolute: 
– Marriages of convenience are, unless suspicion is 
aroused, legally valid marriages, although the consent 
is not given on the basis of a loving personal 
commitment of one partner to the other, but rather as 
the result of a ‗business‘ arrangement. 
– Arranged marriages similarly are legally valid 
marriages although the consent is not given (directly) 
on the basis of a loving personal commitment of one 
partner to the other, but rather as the result of a 
cultural or religious imperative. 
of one … and one 
… 
Even in New Zealand, polygamous marriages are 
permitted – providing the marriages were valid in the 
country in which they were solemnised.79 
to the exclusion 
of all others 
Previously, adultery was a ground for divorce. However, no 
fault divorce was introduced in New Zealand in 1981,80 
meaning that the failure to adhere admonition to ‗exclude 
all others‘ did not result in the invalidation of the 
marriage. 
for life The advent of divorce many decades ago,81 means that 
legal marriage does not have to, as a matter of definition, 
last until the death of one of the parties to that marriage. 
While some churches may still adhere to this element, this 
is a point of religious adherence rather than a legal 
requirement. 
man and woman In New Zealand we still adhere to this element. 
 
                                                 
79  The Family Proceedings Act 1980 s.3 provides:  
 ―Marriage‖' includes a union in the nature of marriage that –  
(a)  Is entered into outside New Zealand; and 
(b)  Is at any time polygamous, – 
       where the law of the country in which each of the parties is domiciled at the time of 
the union then permits polygamy.  
80  As a result of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 which came into effect on 1 October 
1981. 
81  The first New Zealand law permitting divorce was passed in 1867: State Library of 
Queensland, ―Family History‖ No.3.6 (2007), 
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It can be noted, therefore, that only one of the five key elements of 
marriage as defined by Lord Penzance remains totally ‗untouched‘. This 
is the element relating to – one man and one woman – while all others 
are tempered by exposure to other pressures.  
It is inconsistent to rely on tradition to justify strict adherence to this 
one element of marriage while other elements have been subject to 
change. Tradition alone cannot be used, especially selectively, as a valid 
justification for continuing any practice or behaviour.  
 
“Traditional” marriage “reductio ad absurdum” 
Traditions also vary from culture to culture, and what may be seen as 
standard and acceptable practice according to the traditions of one 
culture, may not be so standard and acceptable within another. If we 
were to adhere blindly to a set of traditions associated with marriage, we 
may have ended up with a marriage celebration and ceremony that 
encompassed the following practices. 
• The marriage would probably take place in about early June because 
most people took a bath some time in May and would still be 
smelling pretty good (England, 1500s). Prior to marrying, if the 
husband-to-be is a labourer or wage-earner, permission for the 
marriage would need to be obtained from the local Mayor or his 
representative (Bavaria and Austria, 1500s to 1921). Permission 
would be denied if the intending partners are of different races 
(Various; USA to 1967). 
• Upon publicly announcing their intention to marry, the couple would 
have to cut their arms and drink one another‘s blood (Ancient 
Persia). The prospective groom would need to inform the King of the 
couple‘s intention to marry so that the King could have sexual 
intercourse with the bride-to-be before the groom (Ancient 
Mesopotamia). The marriage could not take place until the groom 
and the bride had had sexual intercourse, and it would be preferable 
for the bride to be pregnant at the time of the wedding (Ancient 
                                                                                                                                     
 http://www.slq.qld.gov.au/info/fh/divorce (Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
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Europe). Of course, the act of sexual intercourse would have to have 
taken place after the evening meal and after the sun had gone down 
– daylight hours are to be reserved for studies and prayer 
(Alexandria, 2nd-3rd century).  
• A respectable dowry must be given by the parents of the bride (large 
amounts of cash and gifts such as televisions, cars and 
refrigerators). If this does not happen, the brides may be punished 
severely to the extent of being maimed or killed (India, modern). 
• On the day of the wedding, the bride would travel from her home to 
the church, having sexual intercourse with every man she 
encountered on the way (Marche District of Medieval France). At the 
ceremony, the bride would be dressed in her finest gowns and the 
groom would be naked (Ancient Briton). During the wedding 
ceremony, the couple would be splashed with yak grease for good 
luck and fertility (Tibet), and an animal would be sacrificed and its 
organs examined for good and bad omens (Ancient Rome). 
• Once the ceremony has concluded, the bride and groom would be 
expected to stand naked outside, and the husband would then have 
to kneel down and kiss the big toe of the left foot of his new wife to 
ensure fertility (France, 1500s). The husband would then be required 
to put on his wife‘s clothing and wear it for a month in order to gain 
an insight into her life (Masai Tribe of East Africa). 
• For the duration of the marriage, the wife would not be permitted to 
own property – all property would be that of her husband (England, 
until about 1850). Instead, the wife would be the property of the 
husband, and if she were to behave in a manner disapproved of by 
him, he would be permitted to punish her – so long as he does not 
use a stick thicker than the width of his thumb (England into the 
1900s). A husband would have a right to have sexual intercourse 
with his wife as and when he wishes – after all, she is his property 
(England, into the 1900s). If a woman is raped or sexually abused by 
a man other than her husband, the husband can take an action 
against that man for damage to property – the woman would have no 
legal standing to take a case in her own right (England, into 1900s). 
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• Any person who commits adultery will be sentenced to death 
(Justinian Code, AD500s), although the need for adultery by a male 
may be lessened because a man is permitted to have more than one 
wife (Christianity, Islam, early; Mormonism, 1820s to at least 1890s). 
• Divorce may only be initiated by the husband (Various, until modern 
times), and once the divorce is final the ex-wife must become a 
―sworn virgin‖, never again have sexual relations – under penalty of 
death – and dress, drink, smoke and act as a man for the rest of her 
life (Albania and Montenegro in Eastern Europe, Middle Ages). After 
the divorce, the ex-husband will be permitted to marry again only to 
a woman older than his ex-wife (Various Greek Societies, up to 
modern times). An alternative form of divorce is for the husband to 
sell his wife by tying a rope around her neck and presenting her for 
public sale to another man (England, 1690s – 1870s). 
 
Religion 
Secular tradition vis-à-vis religious tradition 
In some countries, religious principles are central to the governance of 
that country. In theocratic countries the rule of law is closely linked to 
the interpretation of religious texts, and may involve politics which are 
directly dictated, or strongly influenced, by religious leaders.  
In most Western democratic nations, however, there is a separation of 
the Church and State, whereby the government is a secular institution, 
there is no State religion, and there is no legislation that outlaws any 
particular religion or favours one religion over another. 
The separation protects the State from interference by the Church in the 
secular affairs of the State, and protects the Church from interference by 
the State in the religious affairs of the Church.82 This separation is a 
                                                 
82  Although the State does have a role to play in the activities of the Church when 
those activities cross over into the secular realm. See: Catholic Charities of 
Sacramento Inc v Superior Court of Sacramento County (1 March 2004), Cal.4th, in 
which the California Supreme Court ruled that a Roman Catholic charity must offer 
birth-control coverage, even though the church considers contraception a sin. The 
Court relied on the fact that the Church offered such secular services as counselling, 
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fundamental element of our constitutional structure and, in practical 
terms, reinforces the argument for same-sex marriages – or at least 
constitutes an absence of an argument against. 
New Zealand is not a theocratic state and is not strictly subject to the 
imposition of theological tradition upon it. On that basis, any concept of 
tradition based strictly on theological doctrine cannot be widely imposed 
on society generally. The style of Government we adhere to in New 
Zealand supports the notion that religious groups will not impose their 
beliefs and standards upon others.83 And, the general population of New 
Zealand, while accepting of different religious beliefs and views, does not 
generally accept that their lives should be lived under the dictates of 
religious groups.  
Conversely, particular religious denominations who so wish, may 
establish and maintain their own traditions within the overriding legal 
boundaries laid down by the state. For example, the State does not 
require the Catholic Church to recognise divorce within the Church‘s 
rules – the decision whether or not to recognise divorce rests with the 
Church.84  
The separation principle, allows for different rules between Church and 
State and, indeed, there are already instances where separate rules 
currently operate. The separation is evident, for example, in the 
differentiation between civil marriage and religious marriage. In France 
and some other European countries, there are two distinct marriage 
ceremonies – the civil-legal ceremony at the Town Hall, and the religious 
one at the Church. For the marriage to be legally recognised by the 
State, the first must occur – but the second is optional. 
In New Zealand, the same separation does apply, in fact. However, when 
a couple chooses to marry with a religious ceremony, the religious and 
the civil ceremonies occur at the same time. A Minister of Religion who 
                                                                                                                                     
low-income housing and immigration services to people of all faiths, the majority of 
whom are not Catholic, without directly preaching Catholic values. 
83  In fact, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 protects us from that (see discussion 
below). The secular New Zealand education system is a good example of this. 
84  That is, the Church may refuse to marry, in a religious ceremony, a couple where 
either of the partners is divorced, on the basis that, in the eyes of the Church, the 
couple is still married. 
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solemnises a marriage should say the words ―by the powers (plural) 
vested in me‖ (or similar) – meaning: 
• the religious power vested by the Church to solemnise and bless the  
marriage; and 
• the civil-legal power vested by the State, in accordance with the 
Marriage Act 1955, to act as a Celebrant to the marriage. 
This separation of Church and State insofar as it applies specifically to 
marriage was outlined particularly concisely by Hon Dr Michael Cullen 
during the debate on the Civil Union Act 2004 in the House on 8 
December 2004 when he said:85 
It is worth reminding ourselves that, in terms of our English law tradition, 
there was no secular law of marriage until 1754. Marriage was a purely 
ecclesiastic affair up to that point, and was regulated in part, one suspects, 
to try to force people to marry within the Church of England, because after 
1754 one could marry outside the Church of England only if one was a 
Quaker. Nobody else could get married unless he or she got married within 
the Church of England, and that state remained until 1836, when Protestant 
dissenters achieved the passage of the Civil Marriages Act, and it became 
possible to marry outside the Church of England. That probably really 
created modern secular marriage as an institution. 
 
Examples of the civil-legal (and non-religious) aspects of marriage 
The practical manifestation of the separation of the religious and the 
civil-legal procedural requirements of celebrating or solemnising a 
marriage can be seen in New Zealand marriage laws. There are several 
instances where the legal procedural requirements are somewhat 
different from the practices followed by the Church. 
 
Marriages on Sunday 
Historically, as a matter of convention, churches have chosen not to 
perform marriage ceremonies on a Sunday. This convention arose from a 
combination of circumstantial factors rather than any formal prohibition.  
                                                 
85  Hon Dr Michael Cullen, Deputy Prime Minister, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives (8 December 2004). 
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Historically, as a matter of law, no Registrar was required to solemnise a 
marriage on days when the Registry Office was not ordinarily open to the 
public or on any day outside of the hours between 6:00am and 10:00pm.  
This effectively meant that, in general, there were no marriages in New 
Zealand on a Sunday because Registry Offices were not open on 
weekends, and the Church would not marry couples on a Sunday. 
Registry weddings tended to happen during business hours during the 
week, and Church weddings tended to happen on Saturdays.  
However, there is currently no formal legal prohibition against civil legal 
marriages taking place on a Sunday.  
 
Couples who declare their intention not to have children 
Traditionally, the Catholic Church requires that couples who are 
intending to marry declare their intention to have children. Couples who 
cannot have children, or do not wish to have children immediately may 
get married, but ―an outright refusal to have children is a 
disqualification‖.86  
This is supported by the belief that, based on the physical and mental 
difference between man and woman, the first purpose of marriage is for 
the bringing of children into the world:87 
A woman’s body is made for the bearing and nursing of children; whereas, a 
man’s body is stronger so that he can protect his family and give then food 
and shelter. A woman is kinder, more sympathetic, more emotional than 
man. She needs these qualities to care for and instruct her children. 
Secular society, and our laws, make no such demand on couples who 
wish to marry. A couple who chooses not to have children may still have 
a perfectly legal and valid marriage in the eyes of civil society. 
 
                                                 
86  ―No Kids – No Marriage: Church‖, news.com.au (2 June 2003), 
http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,6530878%255E13762,00.html 
(Retrieved: 17 March 2004). 
87  William J. Bradley, Roman Catholic Christian Teaching On Marriage, Catholic 
Mission, Ontario, Canada (2004). 
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Couples where one partner has previously divorced 
Several Churches also decline to recognise divorce. In the Catholic 
Church, a couple may separate from each other, ―in especial cases … but 
the bond of marriage remains‖.88 A couple may dissolve their marriage in 
accordance with civil law, but will not have that dissolution recognised 
in the eyes of the Church and will not therefore be permitted to remarry 
in the Church. 
A similar situation exists in other Churches. The Anglican Church / 
Episcopal Church of the USA holds to a similar doctrine. And in the case 
of Jewish law, a civil divorce is not recognised without a ―gett‖ or 
religious divorce.89 
 
Other – civil-legal aspects of marriage  
There is a range of other examples of marriage as a civil-legal institution: 
TABLE 3: NEW ZEALAND MARRIAGE AS A SECULAR, CIVIL-LEGAL 
INSTITUTION 
In order for a marriage to be legally valid, the following must occur: 
Certain legal 
requirements must be 
met prior to a Licence 
being issued 
The parties to the marriage must meet the legal 
requirements before they can obtain a licence: 
• Consent 
• Age 
• Prohibited degree of relationship 
A Licence will be 
issued 
The couple must obtain a Marriage Licence issued 
by the Department of Internal Affairs (that is, a 
document in legal form, issued by a Government 
Department). 
                                                 
88  William J. Bradley, Roman Catholic Christian Teaching On Marriage, Catholic 
Mission, Ontario, Canada (2004). 
89  Hughes, R.W. (Director of Research), ―Civil And Religious Divorce: Part 2‖, Family 
Law Council, Office of the Attorney-General of Australia (3 August 1998). 
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A Celebrant must 
perform the ceremony 
A Marriage Celebrant (or, in specified 
circumstances, a Justice of the Peace) must officiate 
at the marriage. 
The Marriage Celebrant must be registered with the 
Registrar-General of Births Deaths and Marriages.  
In order to register as a Marriage Celebrant, a 
person must forward a certificate to the Registrar 
from the organisation, on whose behalf they intend 
to become a Celebrant, declaring that it wishes the 
member to be a marriage celebrant. 
The certificate must follow the folr prescribed in the 
Marriage Act 1955 s.9. 
That is, a Marriage Celebrant is a legal officer 
empowered by, and registered with, the State. 
Vows must be 
exchanged between the 
parties 
In accordance with the Marriage Act 1955 s.31: 
―During the solemnisation of every such marriage 
each party must say to the other (a) ―I AB, take you 
CD, to be my legal wife or husband‖ or (b) words to 
similar effect‖. 
That is, the form of the vows (―oath‖) is set out by 
statute. 
The parties must sign 
the Marriage Register 
The couple must sign a register (that is, a legal 
record belonging to the State). 
The Witnesses must 
sign the Register 
The witnesses must sign the register (that is, a legal 
requirement arising from statute). 
A Marriage Certificate 
will be issued 
After the marriage, the couple will receive a 
certificate from the Department of Internal Affairs on 
behalf of the register of Births Deaths and Marriages 
(that is, a Government Department and Official) 
Note that there is no requirement for, and often with a registry marriage there 
is a conscious effort to exclude, any religious component in the ceremony 
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Freedom of / from religious expression 
There are a number of arguments that have been put forward against 
same-sex marriage that seem to distil down to traditional religious 
values being the fundamental barrier. For example: 
• The ―special rights‖ argument – The view that same-sex couples are 
seeking special rights to change the definition of an established 
social institution – marriage as the religious institution based on the 
union of a man and a woman. 
• The ―political pragmatism‖ argument – The idea that we can get civil 
unions now, but we cannot get marriage because society is not ready 
for it. Society still sees marriage as a religious institution based on 
the union of a man and a woman. 
• The ―procreation‖ argument – Marriage is first and foremost about 
bringing children into the world. The very tired argument: ―That is 
why God made Adam and Eve, not ‗Adam and Steve‘ ‖. 
• The ―uncomfortable with it‖ argument – Attitudes towards persons 
who are gay or lesbian are still very much shaped by religious views 
about homosexuality. 
• The ―sanctity of marriage‖ argument – Marriage is seen as a holy 
estate, and if same-sex couples were permitted to marry, this holy 
estate might be ―besmirched‖.90 
If these arguments are to prevail, they will do so only on the basis that 
these religious concepts and values are given a prevalent status. It is my 
contention that by protecting the rights of freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, the provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 also protect the right of freedom from religion. 
There are situations in which we can apply human rights standards 
―unopposed‖. For example, if a person has suffered an obvious detriment 
as a result of being treated less favourably than other people solely 
because of a clear physical disability, then discrimination has occurred. 
Not so obviously, however, are situations in which it is necessary to 
balance one set of rights against another.  
                                                 
90  Law Commission Website Editorial ―Many consider that to permit same-sex couples 
to marriage might besmirch the sanctity of marriage‖. 
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In relation to the same-sex marriage issue, in addition to the notion of 
the secular state, it becomes necessary to balance the rights of freedom 
of religion, religious belief and expression and observance with or 
against the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex 
(gender) and sexual orientation.  
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 contains the following 
provisions: 
13. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion – 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, 
including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference.   
15. Manifestation of religion and belief – 
Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in 
community with others, and either in public or in private.   
19. Freedom from discrimination – 
(vii) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
  
And, the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 contains the following 
provision: 
21. Prohibited grounds of discrimination – 
(viii) IReligious belief:   
(ix) Ethical belief, which means the lack of a religious belief, 
whether in respect of a particular religion or religions or all 
religions: … 
These provisions protect the right of individuals to adhere to religious 
dictates which lead them to believe that homosexuality is a sin. At the 
same time, however, these same provisions protect the right of 
individuals to adhere to contrary beliefs based in their own religious 
dictates. That is, the freedom extends to religious thoughts and beliefs of 
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any kind including theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.91 It is also 
said that section 13 of the Bill of Rights Act is likely to include freedom 
from religion – meaning the Government cannot be seen to be taking 
sides in matters of religion or belief.92 This approach is consistent with 
the idea that the state cannot coerce or subject an individual to a 
particular form of preferred religious observance, and that it is not 
acceptable that one person‘s life is unduly interfered with by the 
religious beliefs and practices of another person. 
Therefore, while one person may have the right to hold particular 
religious beliefs and to express and observe them in a particular way, at 
the same time any other person has the right to be free from those  
religious beliefs and the expression and observance of those beliefs.  
On this basis, if a particular activity by one person is denied 
fundamentally because it conflicts with the held belief of another person, 
that denial is unacceptable under our existing human rights legislation. 
Consequentially, the power of the State does not extend to denying 
same-sex couples access to marriage if the fundamental reason for that 
denial hinges upon religious beliefs and practices (religious standards). 
It is important to clarify that I am not suggesting that any element of the 
freedom of religious belief, expression or observance be limited in any 
way, shape or form. What I am suggesting, however, is that in a secular 
State the freedom of religious belief, expression or observance is not 
protected so that particular individuals are able to use it as a means of 
defining same-sex couples out of civil-legal marriage. 
Conversely, the power of the State does not extend to being able to 
redefine the tenets of particular religions or the religious beliefs of the 
adherents to those religions.  
This means that while the State must be free, on the basis of its secular 
legislation, to extend civil-legal marriage to same-sex couples, religious 
                                                 
91  Ministry of Justice, ―The Guidelines On The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990: A 
Guide To The Rights And Freedoms In The Bill Of Rights Act For The Public Sector‖, 
Ministry of Justice (November 2004): 
 http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/bill-of-rights-guidelines/index.html 
(Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
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groups must also be free to decline to perform marriage ceremonies for 
same-sex couples where to do so would be in conflict with the dictates of 
their particular religion. 
I would suggest that this balance between the right of same-sex couples 
to access the civil-legal institution of marriage and the right of religious 
groups to be free from performing same-sex marriage ceremonies is 
entirely consistent with the fundamental human rights principles of 
inclusion, acceptance, and celebration of diversity. 
 
Summary – viewing marriage through the prism of change 
It is important, therefore, to acknowledge that: 
• we can view marriage through the prism of change and accept that 
just as change has occurred in the past, so then can further change 
occur into the future; and 
• there is no need for the State to require the Church to recognise 
same-sex marriages and that, in the same way that the federal 
Government in Canada, the State can open up civil-legal marriage to 
same-sex couples and, at the same time, expressly provide that there 
is no legal requirement for any Church to perform marriage 
ceremonies for same-sex couples. 
 
Knowledge 
As I have mentioned previously, I see the legal system as not just being 
based around laws as they appear on the statute books and our 
interpretation of those laws in the courts. It is my view that perhaps the 
most important element of our legal system rests in the process of 
making our laws. That is, the process of reaching agreement that there is 
an issue that needs remedying, and the process of developing policy and 
encapsulating that policy in legislation. If legislation is well planned and 
developed it would seem logical that it will take account of a range of 
matters including, for example, human rights imperatives.  
                                                                                                                                     
92  Rishworth, Paul, ―Coming Conflicts Over Freedom Of Religion‖, in Huscroft, G. and 
Rishworth, P., (Eds), Rights And Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990 
And The Human Rights Act 1993, Brookers, Wellington (1995): 230. 
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In the main, the points that follow in this discussion relate very closely 
to the concept of recognising the dignity of the person.93 I consider that 
hallmarks of treating affected persons with respect and dignity entails 
giving due consideration to all relevant matters, and making decisions on 
the basis of good information. 
 
Members of Parliament and Decision-Making 
It is frustrating to listen to a speech in a debate in Committee of the 
House and hear a Member of Parliament (MP), who is a qualified lawyer, 
misquoting the law, and then voting, at least in part, on the basis of the 
point made.94  
When Bills are being debated in the House, it is personally offensive to 
gays and lesbians to hear statements purported to reflect the ‗lifestyle‘ of 
gays and lesbians, but which bear no resemblance to the reality of the 
lives that we, as gays and lesbians live every day.  
It is frustrating also to consider that, when MPs proclaim these mis-
statements they are, in effect, mis-educating other MPs who then, in 
turn, use this mis-information to inform their own decision-making 
process. 
It is imperative that those persons who are charged with making or 
amending laws that will affect the day-to-day lives of New Zealanders 
vote for or against those laws on the basis of the best possible knowledge 
about the issues and the best possible understanding about the 
ramifications of the decisions they make. 
It is my contention that many of our MPs forget this centrally important 
aspect of their role. Unfortunately for gays and lesbians, and for that 
matter any group within society, Parliament is not only the centre of the 
                                                 
93  See discussion on ‗dignity‘ that follows at the end of this chapter. 
94  Hansard (4 May 2000): ―There is no doubt that under the Property Law Amendment 
Act 1986, de facto couples or same-sex couples can enter into property 
relationships‖ (Emphasis added). In fact, the Property Law Act 1952 s.40A (as 
inserted by the Property Law Amendment Act s.2) applies only to ―Property 
agreements between persons cohabiting as husband and wife although not legally 
married to each other‖, and does not include same-sex couples (Emphasis added). 
(Note, however, that this provision has now been superseded by the provisions of the 
Property Relationships Act 1976). 
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legislative process – it is also a focal point of the political process. 
Listening to Parliamentary debates, and reading the Hansard of those 
debates, it is clear that many voting decisions are founded in a desire to 
chalk up political points rather than a desire to achieve the most proper 
result. In other words, the very nature of our political system leads 
politicians to seek the best result for the most people, rather than 
simply the best result – an outcome which is fundamentally contrary to 
the purpose of human rights laws, and fundamentally contrary to the 
reasons why we have our Human Rights Act 1993 and our New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
In order that MPs can make informed and appropriate decisions there is 
a need for them to be educated, not only generally on human rights laws 
as they apply in New Zealand, but also specifically on the substance and 
effect of proposed legislation, and its relationship with relevant existing 
legislation. It is important, in this process, for MPs to be provided with 
quality ‗free and frank‘ advice from officials, and to take heed of that 
advice.  
First and foremost, however, the onus for this education falls to the MPs 
themselves. It is essential that MPs familiarise themselves with the 
legislation that is being proposed and its interrelationship with any other 
legislation. This must include, where relevant, the interrelationship with 
human rights legislation, the role of human rights legislation generally, 
and the responsibilities of MPs in relation to that human rights 
legislation. 
Second, the Human Rights Commission could have greater involvement 
in the education of MPs, especially now that the Bill of Rights standard 
of assessment of discrimination has been incorporated into aspects of 
the Human Rights Act 1993 and therefore squarely within the 
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission.95 96 The Human Rights 
Commission is, by definition, an independent Government institution 
which, by law, has a primary function of advocating and promoting 
                                                 
95  It may be recalled that the Human Rights Commission rejected a call for it to become 
an intervening party in the original High Court case on same-sex marriage in April 
1996, on the basis that it did not have the jurisdiction under the Human Rights Act 
1993. 
96  See discussion below under the heading ―Constitutional Watchdogs‖. 
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respect for, and an understanding and appreciation of, human rights in 
New Zealand society,97 and in order to carry out that primary function is 
required ―to be an advocate for human rights and to promote and 
protect, by education and publicity, respect for, and observance of, 
human rights‖.98  
Third, it must fall to society at large to be well-educated about issues 
which affect it. It is no longer acceptable for society to shun its 
responsibilities towards minority groups. It is no longer acceptable for 
society to base its views on uninformed or ill-informed rhetoric. 
Fourth, it falls to members of the affected groups, either individually or 
as groups, to challenge those MPs who fail to get it right. However, while 
it may become necessary to alert MPs to the fact that they are confusing 
their political role with their legislative role, care must be taken not to 
place the affected group in a position of carrying the primary burden. To 
shift the onus of the protection of minority groups onto those groups 
affected undermines the fundamental purpose of human rights 
legislation.  
 
General Education and Promotion 
It is my belief that education is perhaps the most significant weapon for 
success in any area where there is a required change in attitude. 
Communication is important in any situation where change is sought 
and especially so where there is a need to overturn prejudice. Prejudice 
is based in ignorance, and ignorance leads to fear – fear of the unknown. 
In this context ignorance and prejudice lead to homophobia.  
It is my contention that we should be able to expect our human rights to 
be respected. But, the reality is that, in spite of our human rights laws, 
there is a great deal of misinformation about what those laws mean, and 
how they can be applied.  
                                                 
97  Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1)(a). 
98  Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(2)(a). 
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There is a range of areas where increased information about human 
rights legislation, its purposed and application, could enhance the 
usefulness of the legislation.  
It has been the case that rather than seeing human rights compliance as 
something that can be aspired to, it has been seen as a threat. The 
human rights complaints procedure has been seen negatively by 
employees as a mechanism which provides employees with a means of 
holding the employer to task. It has been seen as a legislation which 
imposes compliance costs on employers, for example, in relation to the 
provision of enhanced access for persons with disabilities, and training 
in relation to sexual harassment in the workplace. 
Perhaps one of the key areas for increasing the level of information about 
human rights standards and the application of human rights legislation 
is within our House of Representatives. It is disconcerting to hear MPs 
make speeches relating to Bills which have significant human rights 
content, seemingly unconcerned about the fact that what they are 
saying, or how they are intending to vote, may contribute to legislation 
that is contrary to our human rights laws. 
It must be acknowledged that Parliament is supreme and, ultimately, 
can pass legislation contrary to the Human Rights Act and the Bill of 
Rights Act. However, such non-compliant legislation should only come 
into existence after a full consideration of the issues, and a justification 
in accordance with the Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. It should not be the 
result of a lack of understanding of the fundamental principles of human 
rights law and human rights legislation. 
In a principle that is applicable to a wide range of human rights based 
issues, it has been stated that:99 
Ethnic communities around the country agree that racism and prejudice can 
only be countered with educational strategies that promote racial harmony 
and diversity for all. 
It is often not knowing about an issue that breeds fear of that issue – the 
fear of the unknown. It has been shown that there is far less prejudice 
                                                 
99  ―Education is the Best Weapon in the Battle Against Racism‖, in Ethnic Link, Office 
of Ethnic Affairs (December 2001): 3. 
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towards Māori New Zealanders from Pākehā New Zealanders who have 
some familiarity with Māori persons and Māori culture, than from those 
who do not. 
In relation to gays and lesbians, a clear comparison can be drawn that 
there is far less prejudice against gay and lesbian people from non-gay 
and non-lesbian people who have gay and lesbian members of their own 
family, or who have other regular contact with gay and lesbian people. 
The mystery and the fear disappears along with the need to objectify the 
gay and lesbian person (―them‖) and is replaced with an ability to relate 
as people. 
As stated previously, the Human Rights Commission has a central role 
to play in human rights promotion and education. In the past, this role 
has been exercised somewhat sporadically. 
For some time, the Commission has produced pamphlets on a range of 
human rights issues, has provided access to information by way of its 
website, has provided in-house training on specific human rights issues, 
and has facilitated education programmes within schools and with the 
public at large. 
However, there have been some shortcomings with regard to this 
education process.  
In fact, the notion of comprehensive human rights education programme 
is an ideal. The reality is that education on human rights issues has to 
compete for funding and resources in the same way that any other 
initiative must do. 
Former Race Relations Conciliator, Rajan Prasad, has outlined two main 
reasons for human rights education receiving a more lowly status than 
might otherwise be the case:100 
۰ In the current environment where the emphasis is on economic 
development, the human element of the development equation has 
been left to the market to determine. 
                                                 
100  Prasad, Rajan, ―Human Rights Education In New Zealand Schools‖, in [2003] 
Human Rights Education in Asian Schools 65: 66. Note, that in the current times of 
economic constraint, the points raised by Rajan Prasad are likely to be even further 
exacerbated. 
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۰ Schools are effectively run by locally elected Boards of Trustees, 
generally made up of parents of the children in the school. Their 
focus has tended to be on the essential curriculum – reading, 
writing, mathematics, science and the like. 
These factors do not lead to the provision of intensive resources for an 
examination of, or education about, the relationship among citizens and 
between Government and citizen. The challenge therefore becomes how 
to best use the available resources to increase the level of knowledge 
about international and domestic human rights laws, and the rights of 
people under those laws. 
 
Visibility 
A key contributor to the greater likelihood of human rights compliant 
legislation is an increased visibility by those groups directly affected by 
human rights standards – or rather a lack of compliance with human 
rights standards. 
This seems to be particularly so when personal stories are told of the 
detriment caused to individuals, families, groups of persons, by the 
existence of discriminatory legislation or Government policy and 
practice. 
A lack of visibility means a lack of voice. A lack of voice means a lack of 
power to bring about change. Unfortunately, being visible is often linked 
with being vocal – the ―squeaky wheel‖ syndrome. 
The ―real‖ issues for gays and lesbians tend to be somewhat invisible. 
Gay and lesbian communities tend to be visible to the wider population 
through the HERO festival in Auckland, or the Sydney Mardi Gras. 
Often, even when the television media is presenting an item on the 
recognition of same-sex relationships, or on same-sex families, it will 
revert to file footage of a dance party. 
Surprisingly to some perhaps, the greater number of gays and lesbians 
live private lives which do not feature on television or in the newspapers. 
Often these private lives are impacted by a life crisis which results in 
gross injustice – the man who is prohibited, by the family of the 
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deceased, from attending the funeral of his life-partner of 12 years; the 
woman who is denied a legal parental relationship with the children of 
her partner during their relationship, but is then required to pay child-
support when the relationship comes to an end; and many, many more. 
While human rights should not rely on societal acceptance of a minority 
group (a topic to be developed further in this chapter), there is no doubt 
that visibility of those affected, and the way in which they are affected on 
a personal level, can be a hugely significant tool in bringing about 
change. 
I do not believe that being reactive as gays and lesbians is the most 
productive means of educating others within society. For example, if we 
face up on the news or in current affairs programmes / reports to 
counter the arguments put forward by others, we will be viewed as the 
whingers and the aggrieved. 
It is far more productive, I believe, for us to be proactive. And, there is a 
range of ways in which we can do this. 
First, we can initiate the dissemination of information in a range of ways. 
We might do this formally, by leading workshops and seminars. We 
might send out press releases from organisations to which we belong. We 
might gather statistics which help paint a picture of our communities. 
However, one of the best ways we can educate is to be visible. And again, 
there is more than one way in which we can be ‗positively‘ visible.  
For many of us, visibility might mean no more than going about our daily 
lives. By doing this, we are displaying to our families, friends, colleagues, 
and others, that we are functioning members of society. Amazingly, we 
meet the same obligations in our family, home, work and social 
environments as any other person. We experience the same difficulties 
and happinesses in our family, home, work and social environments. 
Our mere presence and visibility can serve to assist others overcome 
their fears and prejudices towards gays and lesbians.  
Visibility can also mean ensuring that our stories are told. One of the 
most powerful change tools can be the story about how a particular piece 
of legislation has been unjust and has caused distress or severe 
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hardship to someone for no reason other than the fact that their 
sexuality excludes them from the protection of the law. 
Each of these means of increasing visibility, whether it be in a formal 
setting or informally, is also a means of increasing the level of knowledge 
of others about the real issues. And increasing the level of knowledge 
reduces the opportunity for misinformation and misconception. 
 
Summary 
Decisions on human rights matters are, by definition, decisions which 
affect peoples‘ everyday lives.  
The process of decision-making is one which requires us to draw on our 
knowledge of a particular situation and to weigh up the possibilities and 
come to a conclusion about the preferable course of action. Our 
decisions, therefore, are made on the basis of our knowledge in relation 
to the issue at hand. 
If we are required to make a decision in relation to a particular issue 
about which we have a knowledge gap, we respond in one of three 
ways:101 
1) We fill the knowledge gap with opinion and belief – and make a 
decision based on that opinion and belief. 
2) We can fill that gap with inaccurate information – and make a 
decision based on that inaccurate information; or 
3) We can fill that gap with accurate knowledge – and make a decision 
based on that accurate knowledge. 
Logically, only the third of these is acceptable. When we are making 
decisions which affect peoples‘ lives, we must make those decisions on 
the basis of the best knowledge available to us. If our knowledge is 
flawed, then it follows that our decision will be flawed.  
                                                 
101  Note that there will be various permutations of these, but I have simplified them for 
the purposes of this argument. Note also that a fourth possible option could 
arguably be that we leave the knowledge gap, and make a decision in a knowledge-
vacuum. I do not believe that this is a ―real‖ option, however, as I consider that we 
always tend to fill the vacuum, whether consciously or subconsciously. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
  114  
 
It is interesting to note that, in relation to another area of human rights, 
the Human Rights Commission undertook a study which suggested that 
much of our attitude in these areas are developed in a knowledge 
vacuum. A survey of human rights and the Treaty of Waitangi showed 
that, while most New Zealanders have reasonably strong views about 
Treaty issues, very few have a clear understanding of the Treaty and 
what it represents.102 
I would suggest that the same is true of human rights and 
discrimination issues. While many New Zealanders hold quite strong 
views about issues relating to sexual orientation, very few have a clear 
understanding of human rights issues generally, and discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation (as well as gender / sex and other 
related grounds) in particular. 
What is concerning is that this lack of a good, basic understanding in 
this area extends to our Parliamentarians who should be applying 
principles of human rights and anti-discrimination law in their 
legislative role. On this point, I return to the notion of a ―free vote‖, and 
to the notion that MPs make decisions on the basis of their comfort level, 
or on the basis of their own moral judgement. In this, they ignore the 
meaning and the role of our human rights laws and standards. 
We must, in the human rights area above all others, be able to extend 
above decisions based in opinion, belief, levels of comfort, and moral 
judgement. We must reach the point where such decisions are made on 
knowledge and understanding rather than attitude and belief. 
Rajan Prasad lists a number of points which he sees as lessons learned 
that might enhance the teaching of human rights. These include (but are 
not limited to):103 
۰ Human rights education programmes will come to nothing unless 
they come from a strong belief in human rights and are seen as being 
worthy of support. 
                                                 
102  Human Rights Commission, ―Treaty of Waitangi and Related Issues: Omnibus 
Results‖, Human Rights Commission (February 2006). 
103  Prasad, Rajan, ―Human Rights Education In New Zealand Schools‖, in [2003] 
Human Rights Education in Asian Schools 65: 69-70. 
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۰ Human rights education programmes should not be seen as optional. 
No element of public policy that has an optional aspect to it has a 
good record of positive change – especially when some are cynical 
about it importance, and yet others take it on board grudgingly. 
۰ Human rights education must promote the enhancement of human 
rights as a social benefit, rather than the emphasis being on 
―excessive‖ compliance costs of human rights protections. 
۰ Human rights must be led by powerful national leaders. If leaders 
are seen as being ignorant of, or being aware of but actively ignoring, 
human rights principles and standards, education programmes will 
not be successful. 
۰ Human rights education must be approached holistically. Good work 
done in education programmes will be undone if others in the 
community do not know about and adhere to human rights 
principles and standards. 
۰ Human rights education must be delivered by people for whom 
human rights principles and standards are an accepted part of 
everyday life – leading by example. 
Courage and commitment are the key – ability to stand up for what is 
right as opposed to what is popular. 
 
DIGNITY 
It is my view that the points discussed in this chapter are all important 
considerations in relation to this thesis, the consideration of the issue of 
same-sex marriage, and in relation to human rights issues generally. As 
will be seen in further discussions in this thesis, I consider that inherent 
in human rights laws and principles is the notion of respect for the 
person. Often, this is about the respect for the individual and, 
particularly, respect for the individual who is a member of a minority 
group seeking an equal voice. It is about respecting that voice, and 
striving to understand what is being said in a meaningful and responsive 
manner. 
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In that sense, this thesis is about dignity of the individual – insofar as it 
relates to the status of gays and lesbians as individuals within society; it 
is about the dignity of relationships – in so far as it relates to the manner 
in which gay and lesbian relationships are recognised, and therefore 
validated, by and within society; and it is about the dignity of our 
communities and our society generally – in so far as it reflects the extent 
to which we are all able to relate as equals to one another regardless of 
sexual orientation. 
The concept of ‗dignity‘ has been a core component of modern 
international human rights laws documents from their development from 
the mid-1900s. For example, ‗dignity‘ is a central concept in the United 
Nations Charter:104 
We the peoples of the United Nations determined … to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small … 
And, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:105  
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world. 
And, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides 
that:106 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter 
of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world, …  
At the same time, however, the concept of ‗dignity‘ has not attracted a 
great deal of attention in the domestic human rights setting. With a 
gradual growth of awareness and acceptance of international human 
rights standards either directly by incorporation into domestic law, or 
                                                 
104  Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, and came into 
force on 24 October 1945).  
105  Preamble to the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948). 
106  Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted and 
opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly 
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indirectly by way of a greater understanding of their relevance in 
domestic human rights discourse.  
This has been attributable, in part, perhaps to the fact that it has been 
difficult to arrive at a specific definition of dignity. Historically, the notion 
of dignity has been the subject of philosophical and religious discussion 
and one of the difficulties has been arriving at a commonly agreed 
meaning appropriate in a human rights law context. 
This, of course, can have its advantages. Keeping a term such as ‗dignity‘ 
at a somewhat notional or conceptual level can allow a flexibility that is 
lost when a term becomes narrowly defined – particularly when the 
general principle that human rights provisions should receive a broad 
and liberal interpretation is applied. 
 
Development in the meaning of „dignity‟ 
In reaching a modern understanding of the meaning of dignity, the term 
has been viewed in several different ways. For example:107 
• In classical Roman times, the term ‗dignitas hominis‘ basically 
signified honour and respect deriving from ‗status‘. That is, any 
sense of dignity was attached to the office of the person rather than 
the person themselves. This gave rise to dignity in the sense of 
status, reputation and privilege.  
• Over time, the term dignity came to mean the dignity of human 
beings as human beings, not reliant on status.108 At the same time, 
rather than dignity arising from status of birth or station in life, 
‗dignified‘ man was symbolised by the distance that man was able to 
place between the baser instincts of animals, and the elevated level 
of thought and reflection of himself. 
                                                                                                                                     
Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; entry into force 23 March 1976). 
107  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 2-10. 
108  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 3.  
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• In a somewhat similar vein, the ‗dignity‘ of man has also been 
contingent upon the relationship between God and man, with man 
possessing ―the dignity of a person who is not just something, but 
someone‖.109 
• And, perhaps closest to the current, modern concept of dignity, 
dignity by reference to man as an autonomous being, dignity being 
inherent and not predicated on status, or specified relationships with 
God or creature. 
Perhaps the clearest indicators of the inherent dignity of the person are 
those that relate to others‘ respect for the person – in life or in death – 
and others‘ respect for the presumed ability of that person to be able to 
make certain decisions for him or her self, and to participate fully in the 
society in which they live. 
Dignity encompasses such characteristics as the ability to act rationally 
and reflectively which is seen as an ‗unconditioned and incomparable 
worth‘ that is beyond price,110 and the parallel view that ―persons should 
not be treated merely as a means but, rather, as ends in themselves‖,111 
coupled with the social context as demonstrated by the extent to which 
an individual feels valued within his or her own community.112    
In this sense, human dignity is about the subjective (the feelings of the 
individual) and the objective (within a broader context):113 
Human dignity … does not relate to the status or position of an individual in 
society per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately 
feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her 
unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances regarding the 
individuals affected and excluded by the law?  
                                                 
109  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 3. 
110  O‘Connell, Rory, ―The Role Of Dignity In Equality Law: Lessons From Canada And 
South Africa‖, in [2008] 6 I-CON 267: 269; quoting Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: 
Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, 434-440 (Hutchinson 1948) (1785): 
436. 
111  O‘Connell, Rory, ―The Role Of Dignity In Equality Law: Lessons From Canada And 
South Africa‖, in [2008] 6 I-CON 267: 269; quoting Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law: 
Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Morals, 434-440 (Hutchinson 1948) (1785): 
434. 
112  O‘Connell, Rory, ―The Role Of Dignity In Equality Law: Lessons From Canada And 
South Africa‖, in [2008] 6 I-CON 267: 269; citing John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice, 
62, 178, 440, Oxford University Press (1972). 
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Drafting of international human rights treaties 
McCrudden‘s provides an analysis of the significance of ‗human dignity‘ 
in the drafting of the international human rights documents, bearing in 
mind the international context in which this drafting has taken place:114 
To achieve a successful outcome, it was necessary to persuade states of 
vastly different ideological hue that the Declaration was consistent with their 
conceptions of human rights. What would a theory of human rights have to 
consist of for it to be a successful theory in this context? It would need, 
probably, to be one: 
(x) that gives a coherence to the concept of human rights so that the 
whole is greater than simply the sum of its parts and not just a 
ragbag collection of separate unconnected rights,  
(xi) that is not rooted in any particular region of the globe and 
appeals across cultures, but is sensitive to difference,  
(xii) that places importance on the person rather than the attributes 
of any particular person, but also places the individual within a 
social dimension,  
(xiii) that is not dependent on human rights originating only from the 
exercise of state authority (not least because what the state 
gives, the state can also take away),  
(xiv) that is non-ideological (in the sense that it transcends any 
particular conflicts, such as between capitalism and 
communism),  
(xv) that is humanistic (in the sense that it was not based on any 
particular set of religious principles or beliefs but is consistent 
with them), and  
(xvi) that is both timeless, in the sense that it embodies basic values 
that are not subject to change, and adaptable to changing ideas 
of what being human involves. 
Such a theory has long been the Holy Grail of human rights. 
                                                                                                                                     
113  Law v Canada (Minister of Immigration) [1999] I.S.R.C. 497: Iacobucci J: Para.53. 
114  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 26-27. 
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Disadvantages 
There are some potential problems arising from the concept of dignity in 
human rights considerations. These difficulties relate to the fact that the 
concept is: 
• open to significant judicial manipulation; and  
• increases, rather than decreases, judicial discretion. 
McCrudden states:115 
[W]here human beings are regarded as having a certain worth by virtue of 
being human, the concept of human dignity raises important questions such 
as “What kind of beings are we? How do we appropriately express the kind 
of beings we are?”. Radically different answers are possible, of course, and 
therein lies the root of the problem with the concept of human dignity. 
In a similar vein, O‘Connell states:116 
Judges decide issues of equality based on specific articulations of ideas 
regarding stereotyping, personal characteristics, and the like. “Dignity”, on 
the other hand, is an abstraction, and there is a great deal of leeway for 
unarticulated value assumptions to enter into judicial decision making. What 
one person regards as an intolerable assault on human dignity, another may 
see as incidental, as part of everyday life. What one person may see as a 
racist denial of dignity, another may see as a legitimate affirmative action. … 
Any human rights jurisprudence will require judges to make significant moral 
choices. The competing interpretations of dignity, in particular, allow for 
unarticulated value judgments to determine their decisions. 
 
                                                 
115  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 3.  
116  O‘Connell, Rory, ―The Role Of Dignity In Equality Law: Lessons From Canada And 
South Africa‖, in [2008] 6 I-CON 267: 279-280. 
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Advantages 
On the other hand, there are some significant advantages in that the 
concept of dignity:117 
• provides a standard for interpretation; but 
• can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (allowing for regional / local 
variation); and 
• can vary over time. 
While it is difficult to attribute a specific meaning to the term ‗dignity‘, 
including a consideration of dignity in the equation in human rights 
cases serves to ensure a consideration of the purposes of the relevant 
legislative provision(s), and to ensure a consideration of the more 
intangible impact upon the individual.  
 
Dignity as a contextual framework 
Bearing in mind the difficulty in defining the term ‗dignity‘, I have 
consciously kept my discussion of dignity at a conceptual level. At the 
same time, I return to this concept at various times and in various ways 
throughout the thesis. 
On some occasions these references are explicit. This is the case, for 
example: 
• in this chapter, both in this section (obviously) and in all subsequent 
sections; 
• in the other chapters setting the context in which this thesis has 
been written and should be read (Chapters 4 and 5); 
• the discussion relating to the same-sex marriage cases – particularly 
Halpern (Canada) and Fourie (South Africa) 118 (Chapter 9). 
                                                 
117  McCrudden, Christopher, ―Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights‖, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (July 2008): 4. 
118  I note that there has been a progressive increase (general trend) in reliance on the 
dignity argument in key court cases. The number of mentions of the term ‗dignity‘ 
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On the other hand, however, I consider that some of the other 
discussions also rely on the dignity argument, although in these 
instances the inclusion of ‗dignity‘ is more implicit. For example: 
• It is my view that there is a difference between acknowledgement and 
recognition of same-sex relationships. Inclusion of same-sex 
relationships within the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 provide for 
the recognition of the rights of one partner vis-à-vis the other at the 
time a relationship comes to and end and thereby acknowledges the 
existence of the relationship, but that legislation is not about 
recognising the core relationship itself. 
• I talk of human rights as a journey, rather than a destination. By 
this I mean that, for me equality means equality. While 
acknowledging that the concept of equality is not simple to define, I 
still have some difficulty with the notion that equality can be 
progressively realised. In my view, it is not possible to be partly 
equal, or to be more equal today than was the case yesterday. Such a 
suggestion flies in the face of the invocation inherent in the 
provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
that civil and political rights are immediately enforceable.119  
• I also discuss the issue of seeking public opinion on minority issues. 
Human rights fundamentally is about protecting an affected minority 
against majoritarian prejudice. Where is the principled support, 
therefore, for the notion of seeking majority view on how the minority 
group should be treated by the law? 
• I also consider that there is something offensive to dignity in the 
having to argue for access to rights. Logic would say that, where a 
                                                                                                                                     
while not a conclusive indicator of a substantive consideration of ‗dignity‘ does lend 
some credence to the view that there has been an increase consideration of and 
reliance upon this concept. Mentions rate as follows: British Columbia (EGALE) – 
2001 – dignity receives 4 mentions; British Columbia (Barbeau) – 2003 – dignity 
receives 3 mentions; Massachusetts (Goodridge) – 2003 – dignity receives 6 
mentions; Ontario (Halpern) – 2003 – dignity receives 32 mentions; South Africa 
(Fourie) – 2005 – dignity receives 48 mentions. 
119  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(2): ―… each State Party 
… undertakes to take the necessary steps … to adopt such laws or other measures 
as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant‖ [Emphasis added). Compare this with the equivalent provision in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Article 2.1: ―Each 
State Party ... undertakes to take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
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Parliament has put in place legislation that prohibits discriminatory 
treatment by the State (as is the case in New Zealand), the onus falls 
to the State to ensure that anti-discrimination rules are not 
breached by them, rather than requiring the affected individual to 
argue discrimination and prove the breach. This in itself is an issue 
of dignity.  
The following table summarises points raised in this thesis that draw on 
the dignity argument (this list includes and extends those matters 
outlined briefly above). The column entitled ―Enhancing Dignity‖ 
contains key elements and characteristics that support the concept of 
dignity in contrast with key elements and characteristics that derogate 
from the concept of dignity.  
TABLE 4: DIGNITY OF THE PERSON 
Enhancing Dignity  Demeaning Dignity 
recognition  – acknowledgement 
acceptance  – tolerance 
full participation in society  – limited participation in society 
self-actualisation / autonomy  – decriminalisation 
self-actualisation / autonomy  – anti-discrimination 
destination  – journey 
status  – process 
immediate enforcement  – progressive realisation 
immediate enforcement  – incrementalism 
policy  – politics 
presumption of inclusion  – presumption of exclusion 
conciliation / peace / contentment  – anger 
esteem / honour  – stigmatisation 
non-discrimination  – discrimination 
minority protection  – majoritarian prejudice 
onus on Government to ensure 
access to rights  
– onus on minority to seek access to 
rights 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures‖ (Emphasis added). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which an individual is able to function and participate fully 
within the society in which they live is determined largely by the extent to 
which that society allows that individual to participate. The extent to 
which a society delimits the participation of an individual also serves to 
delimit that individual‟s citizenship. The exclusion of gays and lesbians, 
and same-sex couples, from certain societal activities and institutions, 
restricts their ability to participate fully and equally in the society in 
which, supposedly, they belong.  
The exclusion of some individuals from full participation in society acts 
to the detriment of those persons in terms of access to products, services 
and entitlements that can be accessed by others, and in terms of their 
personal and social status. The exclusion of some individuals from full 
participation in society because of certain personal characteristics that 
provide no logical or rational basis for that exclusion would seem to be 
discriminatory. Cumulatively, exclusion from full participation in society 
and the concomitant denial of access to entitlements and discrimination 
are demeaning of individual and group dignity. 
This chapter investigates issues of equal treatment and different 
treatment, rights and duties, democracy and citizenship, and the premise 
that these concepts are all inter-related and inter-dependent. It is my 
contention that the extent to which democracy is well-functioning, that 
full participation in society is enable, and dignity is preserved all flow 
from the extent that minority groups are extended equal rights and an 
equal place in the society within which they exist.  
 
Background 
In most western democracies, homosexuality is looked upon with 
somewhat less fear and disdain than it was, say, a hundred years ago. 
Historically, in most western democracies homosexual activity has, at 
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some point, been criminalised and then, at some later point, been 
decriminalised.1 Physical sexual activity between consenting adults of the 
same gender is not now a criminal act in New Zealand, meaning that 
acting upon one‟s homosexual desires is not now frowned upon by the 
law, so long as those activities are not taken outside the bounds of public 
decency – the same parameters as for different-sex couples.2 
The rights of gays and lesbians to interact socially amongst themselves 
within a wider social context are acknowledged and protected. It is 
generally acceptable, for example, for gays and lesbians to congregate in 
their own social venues without interference from society at large. 
The rights of individual gays and lesbians in their interactions with other 
members of wider society are legally protected (even if the application of 
various protections can be somewhat unpredictable in practice). These 
protections are demonstrated through the prohibitions against 
discrimination in relation to, for example, housing, employment and 
sexual harassment.3 
An awareness has grown also of the presence of gays and lesbians as 
couples within society. Initially, same-sex couples were acknowledged by 
legislation and legislative provisions but there has been a gradual move 
from awareness and acknowledgement towards recognition and 
acceptance.4 In essence, the fundamental needs of gays and lesbians as 
individuals, and as collectives of individuals, have been met.   
However, there has been a hesitancy with regard to extending, to same-
sex couples, the same form of relationship recognition that is extended to 
different-sex couples. In a twist of irony, there has been a legal and, in 
the main, social acceptance of same-sex relationships at the physical, 
                                                          
1  For example, in most Westminster-based systems, homosexuality has been re-
decriminalised, having only been criminalised in 1533 under the laws of Henry VIII. 
2  In New Zealand this came about as a result of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 
1986, which decriminalised homosexual behaviour between men (lesbian sexual 
behaviour had never been criminalised) with an age of consent of 16 years, 
equivalent to that for heterosexual sexual behaviour. 
3  Human Rights Act 1993 s.21: Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination. 
4  For example, in New Zealand, same-sex couples are included in the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995, but this is more about the rights of protection of a victim of 
domestic violence than it is about the recognition of a same-sex relationship. In more 
recent times same-sex relationships have been recognised through the Civil Union 
Act 2004. This issue of acknowledgement as compared with recognition will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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sexual level,5 but a continued reticence to fully recognise and respect the 
love and commitment that is expressed by core relationship between two 
individuals in the same way that the relationships of different-sex 
couples are recognised. It may be that this stems from the desire of some 
members of society to maintain the perception that same-sex 
relationships occur only at the physical, sexual level. In that way, it 
remains easier to despise these relationships because they cannot 
possibly be equated with those relationships and families that fit the 
heterosexist norm. Furthermore, if same-sex relationships cannot be 
equated with the exclusively heterosexual social institutions that are 
worthy of recognition through marriage, they do not become a threat to 
the status of those relationships.6 
As gay and lesbian couples, the challenge for us has been, therefore, to 
find a pathway through the social and legal barriers which currently 
prohibit the full and equal recognition and acceptance of our intimate 
and personal relationships one to another.  
It is a fundamental premise of this thesis that the exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage, as a foundational institution in our social 
structure, constitutes discrimination against same-sex couples. This 
premise will be referenced many times over throughout the thesis. In this 
chapter, therefore, I examine a range of issues in order to establish, in 
philosophical and principled terms, what discrimination means for a 
minority group such as gays and lesbians. In order to achieve this, I 
consider the nature of the right to be free from discrimination, and the 
implications of the complex and intricate interactions between this right 
and: 
• citizenship – in the sense of being a member of the citizenry of the 
country; 
                                                          
5  The Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, decriminalised same-sex sexual activity with 
an age of consent of 16 years – the same as for different-sex sexual activity. 
6  This point was commented on during the debate on the Civil Union Bill. Brian 
Donnelly (NZ First) said, for example: “The message, therefore, must be that gays can 
have legal sexual relationship, but that there is no legal way they can make public 
commitment to long-term, exclusive relationships. That, I put to this Committee, is a 
position that encourages promiscuity, and that position is in no one‟s best interest in 
terms of public health”: Hansard Advances (7 December 2004), 
http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/Hansard/Hansard.aspx (Retrieved: 9 
December 2004). 
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• being – the aspirational needs of persons to reach their full potential 
as individuals and in their relationships with others; 
• democracy – not in its bare form as outright majoritarian rule, but 
more in terms of effective checks against such majoritarian rule and 
the ability of a society to protect its minority groups; 
• rights (and obligations) – and the ability to access those rights (and 
exercise those obligations)l; and 
• dignity – as a conceptual symbol of citizenship, equality and being. 
 
THE NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP 
Viewing citizenship as a presence within, and an ability to participate 
within, a country‟s social community, the extent to which an individual is 
free to participate fully in that social community is limited also to the 
extent to which their citizenship is limited.  
A person, as a „subject‟ (rather than a citizen), is separate from, and is 
expected to be obedient to, their ruling authority. The relationship is bi-
lateral with the subject owing his or her subservient and unquestioning 
allegiance to the ruling authority. Whereas being a subject is defined in 
terms of being subjected to the rule of an authority that is all-powerful, 
citizenship is defined, quite differently, as:7 
… a legal status defining the relationship between an individual and the 
state, defining both rights and duties each bears to the other. 
Citizens carry the right to a political vote and therefore the ability to elect 
to a representative body, from amongst themselves, persons who they 
believe will best represent their interests. In this sense, the citizenry is 
part of the governing body and, in turn, the governing body is the 
collectivity of the people, as so famously described by President Abraham 
Lincoln in his „Gettysburg Address‟:8  
… government of the people, by the people, for the people … 
                                                          
7  Robertson, David, A Dictionary Of Human Rights, Europa Publications Ltd, London 
(1997): 39. 
8  President Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address”, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, USA 
(19 November 1863).  
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The transition to our modern Westminster-style democracy from a strict 
monarchy was also a transition from a relationship between those who 
rule and those who are ruled (subjects), to a relationship between those 
who govern and those who are governed (citizens). 
The relationship of the citizen and the State is a complex reciprocal 
relationship between the citizen and the citizen, and between the citizen 
and Government. This implies that citizens, by virtue of a right to 
participate fully in the governance of their country, also carry duties and 
responsibilities towards the society in which they live. It also implies that 
there are certain rights that will be extended to persons who are viewed 
as citizens, but not to persons who are not viewed as citizens.9 It also 
implies that, maybe, certain rights which generally flow from citizenship 
should be denied those persons who have acted in some way in breach of 
the obligations of their citizenship, but should not be denied those 
persons who have not acted in breach of the obligations of their 
citizenship.10 However, limitations on a person‟s rights also serve to limit 
the extent to which that person is able to participate fully in society and, 
in turn, to limit the extent of their citizenship.11 
 
CITIZENSHIP AND “BEING” 
A well-known educationalist in the 1950s, Abraham Maslow, became 
famous for his theory of a hierarchy of individual social needs.12 The 
fundamental premise of his theory was that the driving force for human 
motivation is the desire for self-actualisation. Maslow identified self-
actualisation as the highest drive, but believed that before a person could 
self-actualise, certain other lower motivations, such as hunger, safety 
and belonging must be satisfied. 
                                                          
9  For example (a) formerly, women were not seen as citizens in their own right, and 
therefore were not conferred with the right to vote, (b) currently, overseas persons 
who are visitors to New Zealand are not extended the right to vote. 
10  For example, under the Electoral Act 1993 s.80(1)(d), persons sentenced to a prison 
term of 3 years or more are disqualified from voting while in prison. Interestingly 
(pertinent to this thesis), persons in prison who are convicted of a serious crime are 
permitted to marry. 
11  For example, if a person is denied the right to vote, the extent of their participation 
in society is limited.  
12  Maslow, Abraham, Motivation and Personality (1954).  
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I have employed this same general principle analogising it to the desire 
by gays and lesbians to achieve personal fulfilment in their own lives and 
within their societies – to achieve a full sense of „being‟ within the wider 
social framework. To me, reaching a state of full acceptance as gays and 
lesbians within our wider society can be likened to Maslow‟s attainment 
of self-actualisation. This process, whether as individuals, or collectives, 
or groups, suggests a growth and transition from a non-status 
(criminalised, non-lawful, non persona) to a state of „being‟ (full, 
unequivocal acceptance). I illustrate this as follows:13 
TABLE 5: ANALOGISING MASLOW‟S „HIERARCHY OF NEEDS‟ 
Level Maslow Gay and Lesbian Status 
5 Self-Actualisation Acceptance Being 
4 Esteem Needs Equal Treatment 
Needing 
3 Belonging Needs Relationship Recognition 
2 Safety Needs Non-Discrimination 
1 Physiological Needs Decriminalisation 
 
Attainment of self-actualisation can be aligned with the attainment of full 
acceptance of gays and lesbians by others (in a sense, the absolute 
absence of societal homophobia) and, perhaps even more importantly, 
the acceptance by gays and lesbians of themselves (the absence of 
internalised homophobia). In this climate, gays and lesbians are able to 
function within society, as individuals or couples, on exactly the same 
basis as their heterosexual counterparts – that is, gays and lesbians can 
equally and fully exercise their citizenship. 
                                                          
13  The application of this analogy is illustrated, for example, through the discussion in 
Chapter 6, with regard to decriminalisation in New Zealand, and in subsequent 
chapter with regard to the advent of access to marriage by same-sex in overseas 
jurisdictions.  
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Level 1 – Decriminalisation 
In order for the higher-level goals to be attained, the lower-level needs 
must first be met. The initial need for gays and lesbians is to be free of 
criminality. In practical terms, so long as homosexual behaviour remains 
criminal behaviour, it is very difficult, on a personal level, for many gays 
and lesbians to begin advocating for greater rights (and participation 
within society) – they remain always under the shadow of possible 
prosecution, let alone discrimination, if they were to be publicly 
identified. 
Male-male sexual activity remained a criminalised activity in New 
Zealand until the Homosexual Law Reform Act of 1986 which amended 
the Crimes Act 1961. While lesbian sexual activity has never been 
criminal behaviour in New Zealand, it has still been viewed negatively, 
perhaps by association with homosexuality. However, post-
decriminalisation, gays and lesbians were in a position to consider 
matters beyond criminality, and to turn their attentions towards general 
personal safety within society.  
 
Level 2 – Anti-Discrimination 
Although same-sex consensual adult sexual activity had been 
decriminalised, discrimination against gays and lesbians remained lawful 
in areas such as employment, housing, education and the provision of 
services. Certain other groups had received protection already under the 
provisions of the Human Rights Commission Act 1977.14 In 1993, sexual 
orientation became an express ground for protection from discrimination 
in both the Human Rights Act 1993 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990.15  
The presence of anti-discrimination provisions, however, was not of itself 
the panacea leading to acceptance of gays and lesbians as “normal” 
                                                          
14  The original grounds of non-discrimination were: sex, marital status, religious belief, 
ethical belief, colour, race, and ethnic or national origin. 
15  The “new” grounds, introduced in 1993 were: age, disability, political opinion, 
employment status, family status, and sexual orientation. 
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members of society. Nor did it lead to society being a totally safe place in 
which to be openly gay or lesbian. The implementation of anti-
discrimination provisions did enable gays and lesbians to more easily 
“come out (of the closet)” in certain situations (to family, friends, and in 
some cases colleagues). At the same time, those who frown upon gays 
and lesbians continued to impart homophobic messages which tend to be 
negative and derogatory and therefore impact negatively upon the ability 
of a person to come out. The time of coming out can be a most traumatic 
time for a gay man or lesbian woman. The process essentially involves 
the resolution for the individual of a conflict between the need for 
openness and truth about themselves, and the realities of being a 
member of an ostracised group within society. Negative and hurtful 
messages can have a range of effects, perhaps forcing someone "back into 
the closet", or perhaps leading them to suicide.  
In principle, however, and at a legislative level even if not in absolute 
practice, the safety of gays and lesbians within New Zealand society had 
been addressed by the introduction of anti-discrimination measures.  
 
Level 3 – Relationship Recognition 
During the 1990s, the presence of same-sex relationships became 
acknowledged by the law with the inclusion of provisions relating to 
individual partners within the relationships rather than the couple per 
se.16 
In 2000, new relationship property legislation was passed. The Property 
(Relationships) Bill was subsequently divided into various Bills which 
resulted in amendments to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
(relating to the distribution of property upon the breakdown of a 
relationship), the Administration Act 1969 (relating to distribution of 
property under an intestacy), Family Protection Act 1955 (relating to the 
distribution of property under a will), and the Family Proceedings Act 
                                                          
16  These statutes included the Electricity Act 1992, the Domestic Violence Act 1995, 
the Harassment Act 1997, the Accident Insurance Act 1998, and the Housing 
Restructuring (Income-Related Rents) Act 2000. For further discussion on this point 
and the significance of these pieces of legislation see Chapter 5. 
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1980 (relating to separation, dissolution, spousal maintenance and child 
support). This constituted a major shift in acknowledgement of the 
existence of same-sex relationships in that it recognised the propriety, at 
least to some extent, for same-sex relationships to be treated in a manner 
akin to that in which other relationships are treated. 
Although these pieces of legislation still tended to deal with the rights of 
one partner vis-à-vis the rights of the other, there was indeed a sense 
that same-sex relationships were finally being taken seriously and being 
seen as valid and „real‟ relationships. 
 
Level 4 – Towards equal treatment 
In late 2004 and early 2005, two further pieces of legislation of 
significance to gays and lesbians in New Zealand were passed by 
Parliament. First, the Civil Union Act 2004 provided that same-sex 
couples may register their relationships, in a manner similar to a civil 
marriage.17 This was followed, in early 2005, with the passing of the 
Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005.18 While the former 
provides for a form of relationship recognition, it is the latter which 
provides for most of the legal consequences that flow from that 
recognition that were not available to same-sex couples prior to its 
passing.19 
Up to this point, the range of legislation in New Zealand that 
acknowledged the existence of gays and lesbians as individuals or as 
partners to relationships was limited. At the time of the introduction of 
the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill, partners in same-sex 
relationships were included in 20 out of the approximately 140 statutes 
that applied to married couples. Partners in de facto different-sex couples 
were included in about 40 of those statutes. 
                                                          
17  The Civil Union Act 2004 was passed on 9 December 2004, but came into effect on 
26 April 2005. Note that there will be a detailed discussion on the civil union versus 
marriage issue in Chapter 3. This is certainly not an indication that I consider civil 
unions to be a satisfactory form or level of relationship recognition, but merely a 
statement of their arrival in the legal schema. 
18  The Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 was passed on 15 March 2005 
and came into effect on 26 April 2005. 
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Subsequent to the above legislation coming into effect, most statutes that 
applied to different-sex marriage or de facto relationships also applied to 
same-sex civil union or de facto relationships. However, while most 
applicable statutory entitlements were extended to same-sex couples, 
there remained some key exceptions where legislation continued to 
ignore, and thereby deny, same-sex relationships – exceptions that were, 
and remain, critical in the over-all drive for full and equal treatment 
under the law.20 
 
Level 5 – Striving for acceptance 
It is clear, however, that we have not achieved full acceptance. For any 
person, there is always an element of leaving behind certain aspects of 
the self when trying to function in a mainstream group which is different 
from that with which we are familiar, and to which we are accustomed. 
We notice this markedly when we travel overseas to a foreign country, 
especially where the rules of society, particularly its social and cultural 
customs and its language, are different from our own. This usually 
means that we are forced to try to conform with that “other” group in 
order to be understood – for survival. There is always a sense of relief 
when we return to that which is familiar to ourselves – our customs, our 
language, our “home comforts”. 
I have discussed with several gay and lesbian lawyers whose work place 
is a corporate law firm, how they feel when they enter the doors to work 
each morning. One of these people told me that she felt she had multiple 
personalities. On Friday night, she might be a lesbian woman, attending 
a “wimmins‟ dance”. On Saturday, she might be a Māori woman, 
attending a hui with other members of her hapū back at the home 
marae. On Saturday night, she might be a lesbian Māori woman, 
socialising with friends to whom she had come out. But when it came to 
Monday morning and she walked back in the doors to the firm – she was 
a lawyer. As an individual she was still a woman, she was still Māori, she 
was still a lesbian. But, in the work culture within which she now placed 
                                                                                                                                                               
19  For more detail see discussion in Chapter 6. 
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herself, she might be seen to be Māori and a woman to the extent that 
that did not interfere with being a lawyer. She certainly was not seen as 
lesbian.21 
For any gay man or lesbian woman, this is what it feels like most of the 
time. As a gay man, I am not fully a member of society. If I wish to be a 
part of society, I must leave some, or all, of that “gay” part of me behind 
and “pretend” to be merely “a man”. When I get on the bus, I am a “man” 
only. I cannot walk down the street holding hands with my partner 
(certainly not safely). In practical terms, I can only be a gay man to the 
extent to which I can “come out”, and that varies in different situations 
generally based on my assessment of what is “safe” in any given 
environment. Even more importantly, I can only “come out” and be a gay 
man to the extent that the law and social acceptance will allow. That is, 
my citizenship is based on what my family, friends, colleagues, 
acquaintances, or even strangers, will allow. This is the hidden reality. As 
a gay man, I am only able to access or exercise certain rights to the 
extent permitted by the society in which I live, and my citizenship 
depends on the goodwill of others.22 
Gay men have always had relationships; we just never had permission to. 
Where that society chooses to deny any person their rights, and curtails 
the ability to participate fully and equally in society, that person‟s being, 
as a member of society, is limited:23 
Formal declarations of equality are not enough to remove discrimination and 
exclusion. Indeed, they may perpetuate them. Formal equality is the equality 
of "separate but equal". The group is hived off, labeled "different", and told 
that they are equal with one important qualification – equal within their 
designated sphere. Cloaked by the facade of formal equality, group 
difference perpetuates denial. 
                                                                                                                                                               
20  There will be more detailed discussion of this in Chapters 6 and 9. 
21  Changes, not affecting the core message of this passage, have been made to this 
story to protect the identity of the individual who expressed this view to me. 
permission was also granted to utilise this example in this thesis. 
22  Harvey Fierstein, in Michael Portantiere, “Interview With Harvey Fierstein”, 
AfterElton.com (Retrieved: 26 March 2008): 
 http://www.afterelton.com/people/2998/3/harveyfierstein. 
23  McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, “The Civilization Of Difference”, Lecture 
delivered in Toronto on 7 March 2003 and subsequently published in The Globe and 
Mail (8 March 2003). 
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This difference between living as a gay man within society, or living as a 
gay citizen of society is fundamental. That is, should I be able only to 
participate in decriminalised activities – and be tolerated; or should I be 
able to participate fully in a meaningful (valid and valued) way in society 
– and be accepted? It is the difference between, on the one hand, being 
able to operate merely on a personal level as a gay or lesbian person (as 
an individual and in personal relationships – behind closed doors) and, 
on the other hand, being able to participate in all aspects of society 
without prejudice on the basis of sexuality (socially, emotionally, 
physically, spiritually, culturally). It is the difference between the State 
decriminalising homosexuality so that a gay man does not get locked in 
prison because he is homosexual, as compared with the State supporting 
same-sex relationships, and the parties to those relationships, by 
providing them with access to the same status and protections (and 
obligations) that it provides to partners in different-sex relationships:  
On the one hand there are those who would disdain full and equal 
acceptance:24 
What we did hope would arise from the Homosexual Law Reform Act was 
that New Zealand would become a tolerant society towards the homosexual 
community. My position is that we should extend our tolerance to them. … 
the principal concern I have with this bill, and the reason why I strongly 
oppose it, is that it is completely unnecessary for the State to take the next 
step in the process, and that is to try to declare that that activity is, of itself, 
moral. The State must be making that statement when it decides, by 
legislation, to give State sanction and State blessing to unions between two 
people of the same sex.  
On the other hand, there are those, like myself, who advocate that equal 
recognition of the core same-sex partnership relationship is a vital part of 
the over-all schema of achieving a sense of social belonging, as a gay 
person, within society. It is my contention that, by being denied equal 
recognition of our relationships, gays are being denied the fulfilment of a 
sense of belonging. The fact that not all gay and lesbian people may want 
to live in a relationship, or the fact that not all might want their 
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relationship recognised in the same way, does not detract from this 
notion. It is the entirety of the acceptance of gays and lesbians by wider 
society, and the ability of gays and lesbians to have access to the same 
range of choices as their peers that concretises a person‟s sense of 
belonging, regardless of what individual choices may result. 
Civil unions and the raft of new legislative provisions that have been 
added to those already in place are helping to secure a place for gays and 
lesbians, and their relationships within New Zealand society. But, it is a 
place that has been decided by majority agreement and, sadly, is not a 
place where all gay and lesbian persons might wish to be. 
Self-actualisation means being able to reach full potential in all areas of 
one‟s individual life – professionally, culturally, spiritually, educationally, 
personally, individually and in interactions with family, friends, 
colleagues, and socially. 
Acceptance means being able to reach full potential in all areas of 
societal life – professionally, culturally, spiritually, educationally, 
personally, individually and in interactions with family, friends, 
colleagues, and socially. 
Until gays and lesbians have full citizenship, and until gays and lesbians 
have full equality of treatment under the law as individuals, in their 
relationships, and as families, we cannot possibly say that we have 
reached our potential. No matter how hard we may try to deny or ignore 
them, the negative messages, which flow from less than equal treatment 
under the law, undermine our ability to reach our goal of full acceptance 
– the actualisation of our ideal place in society. 
In New Zealand gays have successfully negotiated the decriminalisation 
obstacle, and gays and lesbians have successfully overcome the 
discrimination hurdle (in the law, and in theory, at least). We have been 
granted the personal and property rights of partners to relationships 
when those relationships come to an end. We have been granted a 
formal, politically pragmatic, legislative recognition of our relationships.  
                                                                                                                                                               
24  Gordon Copeland (MP for United Future), Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Third 
Reading of the Civil Union Bill (8 December 2004). 
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What we have not yet achieved, and what society has not yet deigned to 
give us, is full participation in society through the equal recognition of 
our ability to form caring and committed relationships and the equal 
recognition of our ability to form caring and committed families. 
Furthermore, we have not yet received acknowledgement that these 
relationships are meaningful and positive not only to us as gays and 
lesbians ourselves (as they are already) but that they are meaningful and 
positive to society as a whole. When we have achieved that, we will have 
moved closer to achieving full acceptance, an equal place in society, and 
a true sense of being. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
Introduction – Human Rights? 
In its very simplest form, discrimination can be defined as arbitrarily less 
favourable treatment of a person or group of persons resulting in 
detriment to them.25 
In reality, however, discrimination is a very complex notion. It is not 
possible to define discrimination in isolation from other concepts. In fact, 
it may be somewhat more productive to consider discrimination in terms 
of its relationship with other concepts – for example, equality, in its 
broadest sense, can be seen as the absence of discrimination. In this 
context, human rights, as they have evolved, can be seen as tools to be 
employed in the elimination of discrimination or the achievement of 
equality – incorporating notions of reasonableness and balance.  
 
                                                          
25  In this thesis, I employ the term “discrimination” to mean “unjustified 
discrimination” (see discussion on assessing discrimination‟ in Chapter 7). Other 
commentators use the term “discrimination” more widely, referring to “unjustified 
discrimination” (what I would refer to as “discrimination”), and “justified 
discrimination” (what I would refer to as “different treatment”). For example, the New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission defines the term discrimination as follows: 
“Discrimination occurs when a person is treated differently from another person in 
the same or similar circumstances. Discrimination is not always unlawful. … 
Discrimination is only unlawful when it occurs on one of the prohibited grounds and 
in one of the prohibited areas of public life. The Act also defines a number of 
circumstances where discrimination is not unlawful”. I do not adhere to this use of 
the terminology, and I consider the term “justified discrimination” to be oxymoronic. 
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A brief history 
To a large extent, the origins of modern human rights laws can be 
attributed to a desire for equality in the face of the growth of perceived 
and actual privilege in modern Western society.26  
Protections against discrimination based on birth and social origin take us 
back to the beginning of the modern Western struggle for human rights 
against democratic privilege. 
Early rights were attributed largely on the basis of birth status which 
ostensibly meant on the basis of property ownership.27  
 … until 1815, only those white males who owned property or paid taxes 
could vote; not allowed to vote were white males who did not own property; 
all women; all African Americans, including nonslaves; and all Native 
Americans. 
Although there was a definite consciousness of some human rights 
issues earlier, World War II was a significant watershed with regard to 
human rights recognition and development. Prior to this point, there had 
been some embryonic recognition of human rights issues, but there had 
been no organised or concerted effort to deal with these imperatives. 
Modern human rights imperatives and legal frameworks have grown over 
a relatively short period of time. 
From about the mid-20th century up to the present day, human rights 
have achieved a visibility and a strength of presence within social, legal 
and political settings. This has transitioned through: 
• a period of concentration on the identification of rights and the 
formulation of the various international conventions on human rights 
to encapsulate those rights.28  
                                                          
26  Donnelly, J, Universal Human Rights In Theory And Practice, 2nd Edition, Cornell 
University Press, New York, USA (2003): 227. 
27  Ropers, Richard H., and Pence, Dan J., American Prejudice: With Liberty and Justice 
For Some, Plenum Press, New York (1995): 16; cited in Donnelly, J, Universal 
Human Rights In Theory And Practice, 2nd Edition, Cornell University Press, New 
York, USA (2003): 227. 
28  Approximately 1950-1966: See Symonds, Janusz, Human Rights: Concepts And 
Standards, UNESCO Publishing, England (2005): 10. 
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• a consideration of the role of Member States in „promoting universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms‟, and the building of treaty-based institutions – for example, 
in the mid-to-late 1970s, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee and the Committee on the elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD);29 and  
• a greater emphasis on compliance and enforcement.30 
Over this period also, different groups came to the fore seeking the 
elimination of the discriminatory behaviours perpetrated against them. 
While it is impossible to delineate in any absolute way the progressive 
classes of persons whose claims came to be heard, they can be listed in 
general terms. The progressive grounds:31 
• slavery and colonialism; 
• race, ethnicity and gender – including issues of property ownership, 
personhood, etc;32  
• (modern) religious persecution (Jews, non-conformist Christians, etc);  
• indigeneity; and 
• age and disability. 
 
                                                          
29  Approximately 1966-1985: See Symonds, Janusz, Human Rights: Concepts And 
Standards, UNESCO Publishing, England (2005): 13-14. 
30  Approximately 1985-Present: See Symonds, Janusz, Human Rights: Concepts And 
Standards, UNESCO Publishing, England (2005): 17. 
31  Donnelly, J, Universal Human Rights In Theory And Practice, 2nd Edition, Cornell 
University Press, New York, USA (2003): 228. Note also the timing and sequence of 
the adoption of / entering into force of some of the international human rights 
conventions: 1926 – Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (League of 
Nations); 1951 – Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide; 1969 – International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD); 1979 – Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); 1990 - United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCROC); 2008 – Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. 
32  Hughes, Vivien, “How The Famous Five In Canada Own Personhood For Women”, in 
[2001/02] 17 London journal of Canadian Studies 80: 80: “In 1929, five Canadian 
women won a ruling by the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council that 
women were persons in law”. 
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Beverley McLachlin stated:33 
As we approach the twenty first century, human rights are emerging as the 
dominant ethic. All over the world even where they are observed more in 
breach than in practice, they are accepted as the fundamental norm upon 
which liberal democracy is founded.  
In July 2006, a conference focussing on lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender human rights issues was held in Montreal, Canada.34 
Numerous previous international conferences had been held on “gay and 
lesbian” rights issues. Significantly, however, this conference was 
consciously and deliberately about the “human rights” of gays and 
lesbians (and bisexual and transgender people). The conscious 
placement of these issues into the human rights arena rather than 
keeping them in the gay and lesbian rights arena was designed to 
recognise and emphasise the fact that amongst gay and lesbian activists, 
and amongst gay and lesbian legal advocates and legal academics, and 
indeed amongst persons involved in human rights issues generally, there 
is a strong sense that the human rights of sexual minorities are the most 
pressing and most predominant rights issues still remaining in the early 
21st century. 
The formally drafted “Declaration of Montreal”, which was put before the 
conference for its consideration and endorsed in full by the 1500 or so 
attendees before the conference concluded is also a reflection of this 
shift. In part, the Preamble of the Declaration states that:35 
The world has gradually accepted that individual human beings have 
different sexes, racial or ethnic origins, and religions, and that these 
differences mist be respected and not be used as reasons for discrimination. 
But most countries still do not accept two other aspects of human diversity: 
that people have different sexual orientations and different gender 
                                                          
33  McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter And The Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London (1996], 20: 20. 
34  The writer was present for the duration of this Conference – including attending all 
plenary and keynote sessions, and presenting a workshop on New Zealand‟s Civil 
Union Act 2004 as a response to the human rights imperatives of New Zealand 
domestic legislation. 
35  From the Preamble to the “Declaration Of Montreal” endorsed by participants of the 
International Conference On LGBT Human Rights, Montreal, Canada (July 2006).  
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identities; that two women or two men can fall in love with each other; and 
that a person’s identity, as female or male or neither, is not always 
determined by the type of body into which they were born. 
This same concept of gay rights as human rights has been further 
supported and consolidated through the “Yogyakarta Principles”, 
developed by “a distinguished group of international human rights 
experts” who met in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, in 2006. These “Principles” 
address a broad range of human rights standards and their application 
to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. In a press release 
with regard to the “Principles”, Sonia Correa stated:36 
Human rights are for everyone, without reservation, yet women, men and 
persons whose sexuality does not conform with dominant norms face rape, 
torture, murder, violence, and abuse because of their sexual orientation or 
gender identity. These Principles affirm that human rights admit no 
exceptions. 
One of the key issues relating to the emergence of the rights of sexual 
minorities as „the most pressing and most predominant rights issues still 
remaining in the early 21st century‟ is that these groups are not seeking 
new rights or special treatment, but rather seeking access to those rights 
that other take for granted:37 
Rights of sexual orientation are fundamental human rights. Or, more 
precisely, some rights of sexual orientation are fundamental human rights, 
even if others are not. Among those which are, a core of fundamental rights 
of sexual orientation derives from the extant corpus of international human 
rights. That fundamental core need not be created and introduced into the 
human rights system as a categorically new set of rights. it derives from 
extant rights and is thus necessary to their realization.    
It is interesting to note that post-colonial New Zealand was a world 
leader in addressing some of these early human rights issues. Firstly, at 
a theoretical level, New Zealand's 1853 electoral franchise extended the 
                                                          
36  “Experts Release Groundbreaking Principles On Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, 
And Human Rights: „Yogyakarta Principles‟ Call For Action World-Wide Against 
Discrimination And Abuse”, International Service for Human Rights and the 
International Commission of Jurists, Press Release, Geneva (26 March 2007). 
37  Heinze, Eric, Sexual Orientation – A Human Right: An Essay On International 
Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston (1995): 23. 
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vote to Māori.38 In 1867, Māori electorates were established to give wider 
effect to Māori electoral franchise with all Māori men over the age of 21 
being able to vote. In 1893, enfranchisement was extended to all women 
over the age of 21 – regardless of property ownership. New Zealand 
became the first national jurisdiction in the world to extend the vote to 
women.39 
It is interesting to note also that, although we in New Zealand had the 
opportunity to be a world leader again, when the same-sex marriage 
issue was put fairly and squarely on the nation‟s agenda in April 1996 in 
the High Court in Auckland, we chose not to take up that challenge. 
Instead we decided to trail behind other jurisdictions by enacting, while 
Canada and The Netherlands had already endorsed same-sex marriage, 
a partnership registration system similar to that enacted by Denmark in 
1989 – some 15 years earlier. 
 
Categorisation of rights 
It is a product of human nature that as we attempt to understand 
anything, we tend to try and put things into boxes – discernible 
categories – and, more often than not, try to make sense of those 
categories by reference to the familiar. 
The first of these practices can have some benefit in relation to the 
fundamental question: What is discrimination? However, the practice of 
categorisation and classification can, if undertaken injudiciously and for 
the wrong purpose, have a detrimental effect. 
It is useful, however, to consider various attempts to categorise as a 
means to understanding the current approach to dealing with 
discrimination.  
 
                                                          
38  In reality, because Māori land was owned communally, very few Māori met the 
individual property ownership or leasehold requirement. In 1859 the British Crown 
Law office confirmed that Māori could not vote unless they had individual title 
granted by the Crown. 
39  Governor, Lord Glasgow, signed the Electoral Act into law on 19 September 1893.  
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Generations of Rights 
Linked with the above development of international human rights 
legislation over time, and led by the wording of the international 
conventions themselves, there has been a natural tendency to categorise 
the rights encapsulated in those conventions into „generations‟: 
• First Generation Rights – essentially those rights contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political rights (ICCPR); 
• Second Generation Rights – essentially those rights contained in the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR); and 
• Third Generation Rights – essentially the rights of indigenous peoples 
(as contained in, for example, the Draft Convention on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples).   
 
Positive and Negative Rights 
A further attempt to understand the human rights framework, led to the 
development of a division into „positive‟ rights and „negative‟ rights: 
• Positive Rights – Positive rights are those rights that grant access to a 
good. They are the rights to something. They include, for example, 
the right to an education and the right to appropriate healthcare. In 
the main, but not exclusively, positive rights can be aligned with 
second-generation rights. In this case, the fact that an individual has 
a right to healthcare does not mean that others must ensure that the 
individual receives the care available. There remains an onus on the 
individual to access the healthcare that has been made available. 
• Negative Rights – Negative rights provide for the freedom from certain 
things. They include, for example, the right to be free from torture or 
free from discrimination. In general terms, but again not exclusively, 
negative rights can be aligned with first generation rights. In this 
case, there is a distinct obligation that falls on others. Others have a 
responsibility to refrain from committing acts that contravene the 
imperatives set down by the particular human rights provisions. To a 
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large extent, the ability of one individual to access, or to exercise his 
or her right(s), relies on the actions of others. For example, for an 
individual to be free from torture requires that others do not torture 
him or her. In this sense, it is incumbent on others to respect the 
enumerated rights and to refrain from acting to limit or negate them 
and, where necessary, to act positively to ensure that the relevant 
rights are extended to members of the protected group. 
 
Formal and Substantive Rights 
There has also been a good deal of consideration given to the tension 
between equality of treatment as compared with equality of result, the 
general consensus being that neither, on its own, adequately responds to 
the equality imperatives. 
• Formal Equality (equality of treatment) – This is described as the 
“sterile legal equality of treating likes alike”.40 
• Substantive Equality (equality of result) – This is described as 
“ameliorative equality aimed at rectifying the legal disadvantages 
which members of certain groups suffer in our society”.41 
• Equality of Opportunity (in essence, a combination of formal equality 
and substantive equality) – This provides recognition that if the 
treatment afforded to individuals is the same in all cases, but that 
those individuals set out from different points, they will also all end 
up at different points. Conversely, if we concentrate only on equality 
of result, we reject the right of individuals to be treated as individuals 
in the face of “a utilitarian emphasis on outcomes”. Equality of 
opportunity suggests a recognition of individual needs, where this is 
appropriate and necessary, and greater adherence to the principal of 
equal treatment culminating in greater equality of result.42 
                                                          
40  McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter And The Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London (1996], 20: 22. 
41  McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter and the Democratic Process”, in Gearty, 
Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, London 
(1996], 20: 22. 
42  Fredman, Sandra, “Discrimination Law”, Oxford University Press Inc, New York 
(2002): 14. 
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‘Old’ and ‘new’ rights 
It was interesting that, in New Zealand during the “Consistency 2000” 
process, repeated reference was made to the “old” grounds and the “new” 
grounds as contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. The “old” grounds 
were those that had been included in the previous Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977,43 and the “new” grounds were those that had now 
been added by virtues of the Human Rights Act 1993.44 This distinction 
had the potential to undermine the effectiveness of the new legislation 
and to create a hierarchy of rights on the basis that there was an 
implication that, by virtue merely of being more firmly „established‟, the 
“old” rights had greater validity than the “new” rights. 
 
The concept of duties 
Sandra Fredman questions the “traditional division” between civil and 
political rights and socio-economic rights, suggesting that, in fact, these 
two types of rights are “inextricably intertwined”.45 She argues that they 
both give rise to positive obligations on the part of the State. A blind 
adherence to welfarism, she infers, gives rise to the impression and 
perhaps an expectation that the State will play the role of “unidirectional 
provider” with the rights bearer being merely a “passive recipient”. There 
is also an implication that a rights-based analysis gives rise to a 
perception that all rights can be claimed directly rather than indirectly – 
that is, for example: 
• that there is a perceived right to education, rather than a right to 
access education services (and therefore a duty to provide education 
services); 
• that there is a perceived right to good health, rather than a right to 
access health services (and therefore a duty to provide health 
services); and 
                                                          
43  These included: sex; marital status; religious or ethical belief; race and colour; ethnic 
and national origins: and age (in employment only). 
44  These included: disability; age; political opinion; employment status; family status; 
sexual orientation. 
45  Fredman, Sandra, “Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties And Positive Rights”, 
[2006] Public Law 498: 499. 
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• that there is a perceived right to housing, rather than a right to 
access housing services (and therefore a duty to provide housing 
services). 
In this context she postulates that the analyses based in generational 
rights and in positive and negative rights should give way to an analysis 
based in a series of duties, namely:46 
• Primary Duties – whereby the State has an obligation not to interfere; 
• Secondary Duties – whereby the State has an obligation to protect 
individuals against the actions of other individuals; and 
• Tertiary Duties – whereby the State has an obligation to facilitate or 
provide. 
The notion of rights and the notion of re-shaping of rights into primary, 
secondary and tertiary duties, still tend to focus on equality- and rights-
based treatments on an individualised, case-by-case basis.  
Further, what has tended to happen is that the law has developed:47 
along a hierarchical linear model which affords protection first to one 
category of persons and later extended protection, not necessarily to the 
same or similar extent of coverage, to other categories, in part due to societal 
recognition of disadvantage and in part in response to demands made by 
pressure groups and their coalitions of supporters. In the absence of a 
general, indivisible, approach to equality, individuals must establish a 
premise of difference based on unitary or ‘essentialist’ classifications …  
More recently, therefore, the move was one towards the recognition of 
„fourth generation‟ duties which:48 
move beyond the individualised fault-based model of anti-discrimination law 
and instead impose positive duties on states, public bodies, employers and 
other decision makers to introduce equality measures and structural 
changes. 
                                                          
46  Fredman, Sandra, “Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties And Positive Rights”, 
in [2006] Public Law 498: 500. 
47  Kenner, Jeff, “Combating Discrimination – New Concepts, New Laws, New 
Hierarchies?” in EU Employment Law: From Rome To Amsterdam And Beyond, Hart 
Publishing, Portland, Oregon (2003): 425. 
48  Kenner, Jeff, “Combating Discrimination – New Concepts, New Laws, New 
Hierarchies?”, in EU Employment Law: From Rome To Amsterdam And Beyond, Hart 
Publishing, Portland, Oregon (2003): 426. 
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Rather than attempting to address specific breaches of human rights or 
anti-discrimination legislation, fourth generation duties introduce a more 
systemic approach to countering discrimination by: 
• imposing a positive duty to promote equality – rather than simply 
refraining from discriminating;  
• imposing a duty (public and private) to develop positive plans to 
dismantle institutional [discrimination]; 
• moving beyond the fault-based model of existing discrimination 
provisions; 
• recognising that societal discrimination extends well beyond 
individual acts of discrimination; 
• recognising that the duty is not simply one of providing 
compensation for an individual victim; and 
• recognising that positive action is required to achieve change, 
whether by encouragement, accommodation, or structural change. 
The greatest shift, under a fourth generation duties approach, is that the 
responsibility for ensuring the promotion of equality for all rests with 
those with the power to bring about change. This, as opposed to the 
responsibility resting with those who are claiming the rights.   
Another of the more significant characteristics of the fourth generation 
duties approach is the fact that the affected groups become involved, 
proactively, in the diagnostic processes, the development of options for 
strategies to deal with issues that may have been identified, the decision-
making itself, and the monitoring and evaluation of the strategies 
adopted.  
Under the former „standard‟ approach, Governments have tended to 
respond to human rights imperatives based on their own desires for 
political survival rather than on their respect for the needs and rights of 
the affected groups.  
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Direct participation by the affected groups tends to move beyond 
individual acts of prejudice and promotes systemic and structural 
change. This participation at a prospective and proactive level has the 
added benefit of creating more accepted and enduring strategies for the 
promotion of acceptance.49 
If participation is built in as a central aspect of such duties, not only is it 
likely that strategies will be more successful, but the very process of 
achieving equality becomes a democratic one. 
Whereas:50 
… any attempt to encapsulate the content of minority rights without active 
participation of the groups in question will be patronizing, erroneous, and 
unlikely to succeed. 
These various attempts to categorise have come to be questioned, 
however. While categorisation can be a helpful tool in the process of 
understanding, it can also lead to the further hierarchising of rights in 
terms of the category that is the focus at any given time. 
 
A new approach 
It can be helpful to list or categorise in order to enable the human mind 
to „manage‟ its understanding of rights, discrimination and equality. 
However, there is a very real danger that comes with categorisation 
whether that categorisation be based on the chronological order in which 
classes of rights came to the fore, or whether it be based on issues of 
affordability, or based on factors related to political will. That danger 
rests in the fact that, inevitably, categorisation will result in the 
recognition of some rights over others, or the hierarchising and 
prioritising of rights.51 
Firstly, allocating human rights to particular categories inevitably creates 
artificial distinctions that tend to compartmentalise human rights. This has 
                                                          
49  Fredman, Sandra, “Discrimination Law”, Oxford University Press Inc, New York 
(2002): 123. 
50  Fredman, Sandra, “Discrimination Law”, Oxford University Press Inc, New York 
(2002): 123. 
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the effect of eroding the notions of indivisibility, universality and 
interdependence of human rights. … Secondly, there is a danger of 
perceiving different categories of human rights as static rigid definitions 
rather than simple divisions with permeable conceptual boundaries between 
them. Categories of human rights might this be seen as representing distinct 
definitions of different types of rights rather than different aspects of the 
totality of rights. 
If we take, as an example, the labelling of rights as first-, second-, or 
third-generation rights, we are able to discern some of the potential 
problems with such labelling. 
• priorisation based on the order in which those rights emerged – 
tending to delay, sideline or marginalise other „generations‟ of 
rights;52 
• immediately enforceable and justiciable (ICCPR) versus progressively 
realised and not amendable to immediate protection (ICESCR);53 
• some rights do not fit comfortably into any one particular „generation‟ 
– may fall comfortably into none, or may fall across more than one);54 
and 
• such categorisation can be seen as fuelling the debate on 
individualism and collectivism (first generation – individual) (second 
and third generation – collective) – an raising questions of 
justiciability.55  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
51  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 96-97.  
52  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 98. 
53  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 99. 
54  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 99. 
55  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 99. 
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Article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action provides:56  
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally 
in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in 
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
And, the New Zealand Human Rights Commission states:57 
Human rights are inherent, inalienable, universal, indivisible and 
interdependent. They are inherent, in that they belong to everyone because 
of their common humanity. They are inalienable, in that people cannot give 
them up or be deprived of them by governments. They are universal, in that 
they apply regardless of distinctions such as race, sex, language or religion. 
They are indivisible, in that no right is superior to another. They are 
interdependent, in that realisation of one right contributes to the realisation 
of other rights.  
 
Inherent 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states that:58 
Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our 
nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human 
rights without discrimination. 
That is, individuals are due their human rights on the basis that they 
are human – there need be no other qualification. Additionally, and as a 
                                                          
56  “The Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights” (The „Vienna 
Declaration‟), Vienna, (A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993). 
57  Human Rights Commission website, 
 http://www.hrc.co.nz/home/hrc/abouthumanrights/abouthumanrights.php 
(Retrieved: 29 July 2008). 
58  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “What Are Human Rights?”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Retrieved: 11 August 
2008). 
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logical extension of that point, human rights:59 
should be enjoyed by all people, regardless of their social status or their 
geographical or regional location. Political, economic and cultural differences 
cannot and should not be used as an excuse for the denial or violation of 
human rights. 
 
Inalienable  
Human Rights are considered inalienable, meaning that they are 
constituted of individual rights that by their nature cannot be taken 
away, violated, or transferred from one person to another. They include 
such rights as the right to life, the right to liberty, and the right to the 
pursuit of happiness. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights states that:60 
Human rights are inalienable. They should not be taken away except in 
specific situation and according to due process. For example, the right to 
liberty may be restricted if a person is found guilty of a crime by a court of 
law. 
Such rights are not negotiable and not conditional, except in confined 
circumstances as above, and are more fundamental than, for example, 
property rights (that can be given away, or transferred from one person 
to another). 
 
Universal 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states that:61 
The principle of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of 
international human rights law. This principle, as first emphasized in the 
                                                          
59  Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 93: 94. 
60  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “What Are Human Rights?”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Retrieved: 11 August 
2008).  
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights in 1948, has been reiterated in  
numerous international human rights conventions, declarations and 
resolutions. The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, for 
example, noted that it is the duty of States to promote and protect all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems. 
There has been, at the same time, some debate about whether, at all 
times and in all circumstances, rights can be universal. There are 
arguments, for example, that certain cultural imperatives may drive the 
need for some rights, upheld strenuously in some countries, not to be 
observed in other countries.62 
Cultural relativism is the assertion that human values, far from being 
universal, vary a great deal according to different cultural perspectives. 
Some would apply this relativism to the promotion, protection, interpretation 
and application of human rights which could be interpreted differently 
within different cultural, ethnic and religious traditions. In other words, 
according to this view, human rights are culturally relative rather than 
universal. 
On the other hand, however:63 
Simply assuming fundamental cultural difference, not to nuance generalized 
models but to dismiss them out of hand is as culturally imperialistic in its 
relativism as uncritical obedience to generalized models would be 
imperialistic in its absolutism. 
Essentially, there is a need to balance, in some way, the tension between 
universality and relativism. There are different ways in which this can be 
achieved (for example, consciously and with lawful justification, States 
could raise certain cultural imperatives above international human 
rights imperatives). 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
61  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “What Are Human Rights?”. 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Retrieved: 11 August 
2008).  
62  Ayton-Shenker, Diana, “The Challenge Of Human Rights And Cultural Diversity”, 
United Nations Background Note, http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm 
(Retrieved: 8 August 2008). 
63  Heinze, Eric, Sexual Orientation – A Human Right: An Essay On International 
Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston (1995): 26. 
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Interdependent and indivisible 
The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights states that:64 
All human rights are indivisible, whether they are civil and political rights, 
such as the right to life, equality before the law and freedom of expression; 
economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to work, social 
security and education; or collective rights such as the right to development 
and self determination, are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. The 
improvement of one right facilitates advancement of the others. Likewise, 
the deprivation of one right adversely affected the others. 
In and address to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the 
then Secretary-General of the United Nations, stressed that human 
rights are universal and indivisible, whether they are civil, political, 
economic, social or cultural, and:65 
… must be upheld with equal determination in every country. And that 
means looking beyond cultural differences – to recognize, for example, that 
the rights of women on one continent are the rights of women on every 
continent”. 
 
Summary  
The human rights climate that is currently being created is one which 
values concepts of inclusivity and balance. 
It is a climate which recognises and values equality consisting of:  
• equal treatment; 
• personal autonomy; 66 and 
                                                          
64  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “What Are Human Rights?”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Retrieved: 11 August  
2008).  
65  Annan, Kofi, Address to the Commission on Human Rights”, Geneva (24 April 2003). 
66  That is, to the fullest extent possible without impinging unreasonably on the rights 
of others. 
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• balance – between “excessive individualism on one hand and 
majoritarian rule on the other”.67 When reflecting on the „usefulness‟ 
of the Canadian Charter, Beverley McLachlin states that:68 
… a charter of rights strikes a balance between the will of the majority as 
expressed through the legislatures and the rights of the individual as 
defined by law and the courts; a balance between the concepts of legislative 
supremacy and guaranteed fundamental rights.  
Further:69 
[L]iberal democracy is a broad and flexible concept. It is capable of 
embracing various roles for government and the individual. At its outer 
edges, liberal democracy is threatened by totalitarianism and nihilism. 
Totalitarianism, the tyranny of the majority, imposes absolute government 
control upon the citizenry; nihilism and gross individualism lead to the total 
rejection of community institutions and values. Both extremes are to be 
feared. 
Discrimination against gays and lesbians, and gay and lesbian rights 
issues, have been seen formerly as the responsibility of gays and 
lesbians. Rights issues that have been raised by gays and lesbians have 
often been viewed, by others, as gays and lesbians seeking special or 
preferential treatment. In recent years, a recognition has been growing 
that gay and lesbian rights are, in fact, human rights. It has been said 
that the last significant human rights battle is the battle currently being 
undertaken by gay and lesbian groups for access to those same rights 
that are enjoyed by other in society. 
The “Montreal Declaration” represented a conscious effort to clearly 
portray gay and lesbian rights as human rights. Similarly, the drafting of 
the “Yogyakarta Principles” served to reinforce and consolidate this 
                                                          
67  McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter And The Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London (1996], 20: 21. 
68  McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter And The Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London (1996], 20: 21. 
69  Stamatakos, P.S., “The Bar In America: The Role Of Elitism In A Liberal Democracy”, 
in [1992-93] 26 University of Michigan Journal Of Law reform 853: 873-4; quoted in 
McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter And The Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds), Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London (1996], 20: 21. 
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message, with the Principles being:70 
… intended as a coherent and comprehensive identification of the obligation 
of States to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of all persons 
regardless of their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
The Yogyakarta Principles are not intended to be aspirational, and are 
not intended to introduce any new principles:71 
The basic premise is that lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgendered 
people and intersexuals are all human beings and are equally entitled to 
human rights. The development of international human rights law has 
largely ignored them – as racial minorities were once ignored – as women 
were once ignored – as the disabled were once ignored. So it is logical to 
state established international human rights principles and suggest how 
these principles apply to the situation of LGBTI people. 
 
CITIZENSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
Considerations of citizenship and discrimination go hand in hand. 
Perhaps the most lucid statement of this in the New Zealand context is 
that of Thomas J in Quilter when he stated that:72 
Based upon this personal characteristic, gays and lesbians are denied 
access to a central social institution and the resulting status of married 
persons. They lose the rights and privileges, including the manifold legal 
consequences which marriage conveys. They are denied a basic civil right in 
that freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. They lose the 
opportunity to choose the partner of their choice as a marriage partner, 
many again viewing the right to choose as a basic civil right of all citizens. In 
a real sense, gays and lesbians are effectively excluded from full 
membership of society.   
This thesis is essentially a consideration of the denial of access to 
marriage by same-sex couples as an example of discrimination in New 
Zealand. When considering discrimination in relation to marriage, it is 
                                                          
70  The “Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of Human Rights Law in Relation to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity” (launched on 26 March 2007). 
71  Sanders, Professor Douglas, “The Role Of The Yogyakarta Principles”, (4 August 
2008). 
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important to understand that the law is applied various effective levels. 
This thesis will examine each of the following: 
• access to the incidents of marriage; 
• access to the institution of marriage itself; 
• access to the status that marriage brings; 
• access to the broader symbolism that access to the institution of 
marriage brings; and 
• the even broader notion of human dignity, respect, and care and 
concern that equal treatment brings. 
We cannot say that we have fully attained even the first of the above 
elements, let alone any of the subsequent ones. That is, same-sex 
couples, even with the advent of the Civil Union Act 2004, still cannot 
access all the entitlements that different-sex couples can access through 
marriage.73 
Same-sex couples have committed relationships, many have children, many 
are caring for elderly parents, and many are active in church communities. 
They live in mainstream America but are not treated as mainstream 
Americans. 
True, the Government of New Zealand introduced a regime that enabled 
same-sex couples who so choose to formally register their relationship. 
In parallel with this (or shortly thereafter) the Government of New 
Zealand also extended most of the incidents of marriage to same-sex 
couples who choose to enter into a civil union. Further, same-sex 
couples who choose not to enter into a civil union are treated in the 
same way by the law as are different-sex couples who choose not to enter 
into a civil union or into marriage. 
Government would argue that the provision of access to civil unions was 
a demonstration of its commitment to ensuring that same-sex couples, 
as an affected group, are provided equal access to equal entitlements in 
the law. 
                                                                                                                                                               
72  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
73  Carlson-Wallrath, Sarah, “Why The Institution of Civil Marriage Must Be Extended 
To Same-Sex Couples”, [2004-05] Hamline J Pub L & Pol 73: 75.  
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However, this does not remove the fundamental issue that same-sex 
couples still do not have access to marriage. Formal equality may have 
been extended to same-sex couples by way of access to a range of 
statute-based entitlements.  
The provision of civil unions and a range of marriage-like incidents that 
flow from civil unions has not provided same-sex couples with equality of 
opportunity. The refusal, on arbitrary grounds, to provide access to a 
specific right sends a much broader message than just the mere fact of 
that refusal. The refusal to provide access same-sex couples with access 
to marriage conveys the message to those couples, to other gays and 
lesbians, and to society at large, that gays and lesbians are not worthy of 
the sane respect, dignity, and care and concern, that are different-sex 
couples. The institution of marriage is reserved and preserved for those 
couples who are worthy of it, and for those couples only. The message is 
one of insult to gays and lesbians. It is the violent message of exclusion. 
It is an affront to the dignity of gays and lesbians and individuals, and to 
same-sex couples and their families. 
In essence, if a person is treated less favourably than another person, 
without valid reason, and that less favourable treatment restricts them 
from participating in their society in the same way as all other citizens, 
then their citizenship is restricted.    
Conversely, being a full and equal citizen implies an ability to reasonably 
access all the rights and freedoms of a citizen, being subject to all the 
obligations and responsibilities of a citizen, being able to perform the 
same roles and functions as other citizens, being able to enter into the 
same social institutions as other citizens, and being able to participate 
full and equally in the society of which you are part. 
 
CONCLUSION 
All the strands of the above weave together to form a strong basis for the 
argument for access to civil-legal marriage by same-sex couples. 
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New Zealand has a well-founded strong commitment to human rights 
standards domestically and in international law. The very nature of civil 
and political rights means that minority groups rely on the ability of the 
majority to recognise fairness and equality and insist on proper 
treatment for minority groups. Where majoritarian rule fails to recognise 
fairness and equality and the rights of minority groups are not 
acknowledged or recognised, human rights standards should be invoked 
as a check on that majoritarian rule.  
We are provided with the opportunity to strengthen the place of the 
individual within society, and to work towards an acceptance of diversity 
and a strengthening of society through acceptance of new characteristics 
and new ideals. We have the appropriate climate for challenges to take 
place through reasoned discussion facilitated by our human rights 
legislation.  
In my involvement in the same-sex marriage issue, however, I have 
perceived that there is still a degree of suspicion towards human rights 
from politicians and the general public. Even though New Zealand has 
legislated its own domestic human rights laws,74 and has signed and 
ratified international human rights treaties,75 and has signed the 
Optional Protocols to various international treaties inviting United 
Nation‟s scrutiny of Government actions,76 there is still a lack of 
understanding of the status of these, and how they should be applied.  
An adherence to international human rights standards is seen as 
undermining the autonomy of the nation-state. An adherence to domestic 
human rights standards is seen as undermining the autonomy of the 
Government. These factors can be threatening and lead to claims that 
adherence to human rights standards serves to undermine the stability 
of society as we know it. For example, in the same-sex marriage context, 
                                                          
74  Such as the Human Rights Act 1993, and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
75  Especially, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
76  For example, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (signed by New Zealand on 26 May 1989 and entered into force for 
New Zealand on 26 August 1989), and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. It is the Optional Protocols that 
enable citizens of a signatory country to communicate a complaint, with regard to a 
breach of a Covenant protection, to the relevant United Nations judicial committee. 
 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
  161 
 
there is the expressed fear that same-sex marriage will undermine 
marriage as “we” know it, and consequently will undermine the nature of 
the family, and ultimately will cause the breakdown of society at large. 
What is needed is a greater understanding of the realities of human 
rights laws and a commitment to human rights legislation coupled with 
the courage to step beyond the fundamentalist views about society and 
family. This will assist in overcoming the traditional safety-net of 
marriage “as it was”, and to move on to acceptance of diversity within our 
social institutions and ultimately the acceptance of same-sex 
relationships as valid social institutions worthy of full and equal social 
and legal recognition. 
This thesis is entitled “Same-Sex Couples and Marriage: A Matter of 
Human Rights”, and it is human rights law and practice that forms the 
fundamental principle on which the thesis is founded. To deny me access 
to my human rights, is to deny me the opportunity to participate fully in 
the society of which I am supposedly a member. Conversely, granting me 
access to my rights grants me my citizenship, and my citizenship enables 
me to participate in society as a complete person rather than merely to 
the extent permitted by those around me. 
While there may be different levels of rights, namely, inalienable rights 
(for example, the right to life), and fundamental rights (for example, the 
right to marry), rights are not given or removed at the whim of society. 
Rights belong to the citizen and cannot be conferred or denied by 
Government or Parliament. As Sovereign, Parliament can deny access to 
rights by the passing and implementation of restrictive legislation and 
practices. Conversely, by understanding the true nature of rights, and 
acting congruently with that understanding, Parliament will demonstrate 
a respect for citizenship. 
The application of human rights standards is a balancing act. 
First, it is necessary to balance rights so that no one person is in receipt 
of rights which impinge unreasonably on the rights of others.  
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Second, there is the balance between the acceptance of rights and the 
acceptance of responsibilities. In simple terms this can be illustrated by 
the obligation of paying taxes for the right of access to Government-
funded services.77  
Third, there is a balance between the granting of rights and the 
restricting of those rights by applying “such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be justified in a free and democratic society”.78 
Outside of these restrictions, there should be no further constraints. 
There should certainly be no “blanket” constraints based on individual 
characteristics such as race or ethnic origin, or sexuality. That is, save 
for the mutuality and interaction of the rights of one person with the 
rights of another, human rights are unconditional. 
There have been, and still are, very clear examples in New Zealand of 
gays and lesbians being treated differently on the basis of their sexuality. 
This, when combined with different treatment based on marital status, 
marriage being a social institution which has been refused to gays and 
lesbians by virtue of the application of the law in New Zealand, denies to 
gays and lesbians many aspects of citizenship. This point is reflected in 
the statement of Justice Thomas in the Quilter same-sex marriage case, 
when he stated that:79 
… gays and lesbians are denied … the rights and privileges, including the 
manifold legal consequences which marriage conveys. In a real sense, gays 
and lesbians are effectively excluded from full membership of society. 
At least theoretically, the notion of citizenship is inextricably linked with 
the notion of human rights. Human rights legislation, and the application 
of that legislation, is about the interaction of individual persons one with 
another, and the interaction of a person with his or her Government. 
Human rights laws are about acceptance within society of a diversity of 
persons with a diversity of characteristics, and are designed first and 
foremost to protect the interests of minority groups against prejudices, 
                                                          
77  Used as a general concept only in this context to illustrate this particular point. With 
the "roll-back" of the State, this notion could lead to a general discussion in itself. 
78  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. 
79  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
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and the discriminatory behaviours which stem from those prejudices. In 
particular, human rights legislation is about enabling persons who are 
members of any group which experiences discrimination to rise above 
that discrimination and function fully within society at large.  
To the extent that gays and lesbians are being denied certain rights and 
privileges, and to the extent that gays and lesbians are being excluded 
from full membership of society, they are being denied their citizenship 
and being denied their dignity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I am convinced that it is of very little consequence just what our human 
rights laws say if we are not, as a society, committed to those laws and 
the policies and standards they encapsulate and, if we are not, as a 
society, committed to having the courage to stand up for adherence to 
those laws and standards. 
For me, these twin concepts reflect, very closely, the concepts outlined: 
• in Chapter 3 with regard to: 
–   marriage as a fundamental and meaningful social institution; 
–  the failure of incrementalism with regard to civil and political 
rights imperatives; 
–  the failure of tradition as a justification for different, less-
favourable treatment; and 
–  the potential for the positive over-arching effect of the notion of 
dignity;  
• and in Chapter 4 with regard to: 
–  full and equal participation as a citizen within the society in 
which one lives; 
–  respect and acceptance as compared with (opposed to) tolerance; 
and 
–  care and concern of the State as a practical demonstration of the 
dignity of the person.    
The extent to which the State and the citizens of that State are willing to 
commit to and uphold laws, policies and practices that protect its more 
vulnerable citizens, is fully reflective of the degree to which the State has 
respect for the dignity of it citizens 
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In some ways, this section is perhaps is one of the harder sections of this 
thesis to write. It is not necessarily purely concrete, but is interpretive of 
events and practices that I have witnessed and towards which I have 
developed considered views. These views are essentially responses to 
questions such as: 
• What might be the best way to protect minorities against 
majoritarian prejudice? 
• What might be appropriate to ensure that there are reasonable 
checks and balances against parliamentary excesses? 
• What might be appropriate with regard to strengthening the role and 
effect of human rights laws? 
• What might be the most appropriate way of ensuring respect for the 
civil-legal rules within a secular state? 
• based in principles such as – moral and ethical imperatives – 
somewhat  
Much of my thinking is referenced to concrete examples and the 
viewpoints of others. Conversely, some of the section is a little more 
philosophical and perhaps jurisprudential in nature. 
There are two main areas in which there is a great deal of work to be 
done in order for same-sex couples to gain access to legal marriage in 
New Zealand: 
• On the one hand, there are arguably some shortcomings in relation 
to: 
- the status of, and the procedures relating to, our human rights 
laws; and  
- the substance of some of the laws relating to couples (and 
particularly those that relate to, or fail to relate to, same-sex 
couples).  
• On the other hand, however, there is also much room for 
improvement in the way, and the extent to which, we utilise the 
options that are available to us already.  
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The shortcomings related to the status of, and the procedures relating to, 
our human rights laws are exemplified by the fact that, for example, 
while the Human Rights Act Amendment Act 2001 made provision for 
Declarations of Inconsistency, human rights legislation in New Zealand 
retains the status of ordinary law. This means that a Declaration of 
Inconsistency can be made by an independent judicial body,1 but neither 
the Government, nor Parliament as a whole, is obliged to amend the 
offending legislation to remedy the inconsistency that has been declared.  
The shortcomings related to the substance of some of the laws relating to 
couples are exemplified by that fact that, even though the temporary 
exemption for Government from the Human Rights Act 1993 expired 
some 15 months ago, Government has still not addressed all compliance 
issues. Even where some statutes have been amended, inconsistencies 
remain within statutes. In fact, Government is technically in breach of 
the human rights standards imposed by Parliament in 1993.  
In short, there is still much room, at the systemic level, for improvement 
in relation to both the legislation and the procedures relating to the 
recognition, protection and promotion of human rights standards in New 
Zealand.  
With regard to improvement in the way, and the extent to which, we 
utilise the options that are available to us already, it is important that we 
become more proactive, raising issues that we believe need to be raised. 
There has always been a core group of advocates, activists and lobbyists 
devoting a great deal of energy and time, but gay and lesbian 
communities generally tend to wait until an issue is on the agenda, and 
then react as they see appropriate at the time.  
This chapter will consider the two fundamental principles of commitment 
and courage in the context of a range of practical considerations 
designed for their further enhancement.  
 
                                                 
1  The Human Rights Act 1993 s.92J(2) (by virtue of the Human Rights Amendment 
Act 2001) provides that a Declaration of Inconsistency can be made by the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal, or upon subsequent appeal. 
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COMMITMENT  
Speaking at her swearing in ceremony as the new Governor-General in 
April 2001, the Hon Dame Silvia Cartwright, said:2 
Peace in the 21st Century extends beyond the absence of war … it is a 
phenomenon that encompasses economic development and social justice … it 
means democracy, diversity and dignity, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law. … With the nations of the world we should commit to helping 
construct a new vision of peace, one based on universal values of respect for 
life liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between 
men and women. 
In the lead up to the passing of the Human Rights Act 1993, there was a 
great deal of work done by a great many people to ensure that the 
legislation passed in the form that it did. Not the least of these was Hon 
Katherine O‘Regan, whose Supplementary Order Paper resulted in the 
inclusion in the Human Rights Act 1993 of prohibitions against 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and ―the presence in 
the body of organisms capable of causing illness‖.3 There was also much 
debate at that time about whether or not the Armed Forces and the New 
Zealand Police should be subject to a permanent exemption from the 
prohibitions against discrimination – in the end analysis, they were not. 
In a manner similar to the days leading up to the passing of the 
Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, there was much personal and 
emotional energy expended. The result was that by 1993, New Zealand 
had domestic human rights legislation which included ―sexual 
orientation‖ as an express ground of prohibited discrimination. 
The value of human rights legislation does not lie merely in words on the 
pages of the statue books. Nor does the value of human rights legislation 
lie merely in words spoken by the Governor-General in her swearing-in 
ceremony. Nor does it lie merely in words outlining the promises of 
politicians, recorded in Hansard at the time of the Parliamentary 
debates. 
                                                 
2  The Honourable Dame Silvia Cartwright PCNZM, DBE, Governor-General of New 
Zealand at her Swearing-In Ceremony, Parliament House, Wellington, New Zealand 
Government Press Release (4 April 2001). 
3  Human Rights Act 1993 s.21(1)(m) and s.21(1)(h)(vii) respectively. 
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The value of human rights legislation lies in our commitment as a 
society to putting those words into action. 
This is where I think New Zealand has fallen down with regard to 
domestic human rights issues. New Zealand has sent troops to Bosnia-
Herzegovina as peace-keepers with the United Nations. We sent troops to 
East Timor as peace-keepers with the United Nations. We committed 
troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. We spoke out against human rights 
violations in overseas jurisdictions – including our renunciation of 
apartheid in South Africa and, more recently, the actions in Zimbabwe 
resulting in the loss of land rights to white farmers to the benefit of black 
citizens.  
But back home we witnessed the lack of progress in relation to the 
―Consistency 2000‖ Project and the ―Compliance 2001‖ Programme.4 We 
witnessed the continuing placement of children and young persons in 
adult prisons justified by excuses about a lack of facilities – the 
reservation on Article 23(1) of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child was put in place in 1989 and has not yet been 
removed. 
The value of our human rights legislation lies in a commitment to those 
standards regardless of the visibility to international communities, or the 
visibility to domestic communities. When we agree to put human rights 
legislation in place, we agree to accept the obligation to commit to those 
standards, not selectively, but at all times. 
 
Executive Government 
During the main part of the 1990s, the Government of the time displayed 
a lack of commitment to human rights issues generally, and to the rights 
                                                 
4  The ―Consistency 2000‖ Project stemmed from the requirement of the Human Rights 
Act 1993 that all New Zealand legislation be assessed for compliance against the 
discrimination protections contained in the Act. See further discussion on this and 
the ―Compliance 2001‖ programme in Chapter 7. 
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of gay and lesbian couples in particular.5 This was highlighted clearly by 
(amongst others): 
• the Government‘s attempts to bring the ―Consistency 2000‖ Project 
to a premature end; 
• the refusal to include same-sex couples in the proposed de facto 
property legislation (see discussion elsewhere in this chapter); 
• comments of the Prime Minister of the time, Rt Hon Jenny Shipley, 
when she attended the HERO Parade in Auckland in 1998 and 
talked of ―celebrating diversity‖, and then returned to Wellington and 
announced, the very next day, that same-sex couples would not be 
included in the Government‘s proposed amendments to relationship 
property legislation; and 
• similarly, comments of the Minister of Justice of the time, Rt Hon 
Doug Graham, when he stated that: ―Diversity is a key defining 
characteristic of families in the nineteen-nineties‖,6 and then went 
on to announce that property law protections would not be extended 
to couples living in same-sex relationships. 
Mary Robinson, former United Nations Commissioner of Human Rights 
said, in her farewell speech:7 
Most governments today will at least acknowledge that human rights have a 
role to play. Unfortunately that does not necessarily mean that they will 
observe human rights standards. You will often still hear governments 
arguing that they must place other factors first. The difference is that today 
those sorts of claims go against the tide of opinion … It is time for those who 
believe in human rights to keep their nerve. Human rights are not 
expendable, whatever the circumstances.  
A Government that is committed to human rights standards: 
• will not compromise those standards; 
• will not self-censor its human rights goals, but rather will put 
forward its ideals for debate and, hopefully, enactment; 
                                                 
5  See, again, discussion in Chapter 7. 
6  Graham, Rt Hon Doug, ―Minister of Justice‘s Opening Speech‖, Family Property 
Symposium, Victoria University of Wellington (1 November 1994), in [1995] 25 
VUWLR 3: 3. 
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• will commit resources (time, personnel, funding) to ensure that the 
best possible human rights results are achieved; 
• will advocate for laws which are compliant with human rights 
standards, rather than those which are easily achievable; and 
• will ensure that its members look beyond personal gain in order to 
support a matter of human rights principle. 
Unfortunately, there are too many indicators suggesting that our 
Governments are not as committed to human rights standards as they 
might like us to believe. Ultimately, adherence to human rights 
principles is diluted by the competing interests of, for example, fiscal 
―responsibility‖, ensuring majority support, and political pragmatism. 
 
Development of legislation 
The development of human rights compliant policy and legislation 
currently appears to fall down in two particular ways: 
1. Officials developing the policies are not necessarily familiar with the 
specifics of human rights legislation or the requirements of human 
rights standards. 
2. Even where officials identify human rights inconsistencies, 
Government still can (and does) choose to pass policy into law. 
 
Policy development 
It is a Cabinet requirement that, when policy proposals are being 
developed, consideration must be given to their consistency with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993.8 
                                                                                                                                     
7  Robinson, Mary, Former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Farewell Speech in Geneva (10 September 2002). 
8  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ―Cabinet and Cabinet Committee 
Processes: Step-by-Step Guide‖: para.3.41: 
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As a result of the considerations, any Cabinet Paper should include a 
section which:9 
a) states the nature of any potential inconsistencies identified (or 
states that there are none); 
b) notes the steps to be taken to address the issues; or 
c) includes information on any justifications for the policy infringing a 
right or freedom. 
The upshot of this is that all Cabinet papers being prepared by 
Government departments should include a paragraph which outlines 
―human rights implications‖. Until 31 December 2002, this meant that 
any implications arising from Government‘s commitments under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the applicable provisions of the 
Human Rights Act 1993, were to be canvassed in this section. Since that 
date, it has meant that all human rights implications (that is, 
implications arising under the Human Rights Act in general, as well as 
the Bill of Rights Act) should be canvassed. 
 
Scrutiny 
Where legislative policy is being developed and there may be human 
rights implications, it is the responsibility of the Public Law Group 
within the Ministry of Justice, or the Crown Law Office, to ―vet‖ the 
proposals.10 The result of their examination of the proposal is a report to 
the Attorney-General on the status of that proposal – that is, whether it 
breaches, or potentially breaches, New Zealand human rights laws. 
If the vetting finds the proposed legislation to be inconsistent with 
human rights laws, at the time of the introduction to Parliament of the 
Bill resulting from the proposal, the Attorney-General is required, under 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.7, to table a report outlining in 
                                                                                                                                     
 http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/index.htm (Retrieved: 3 August 2009). 
9  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, ―Cabinet and Cabinet Committee 
Processes: Step-by-Step Guide‖: para.3.43: 
 http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/index.htm (Retrieved: 3 August 2009). 
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what way the legislation is, or may be, inconsistent with human rights 
standards, and how this inconsistency has been dealt with, or how it can 
be justified. 
The legislation then follows its usual path through the legislative process 
and, ultimately, Parliament in Committee votes on whether or not to 
pass the legislation.  
There are two key concerns with regard to this process. 
First, it is possible for a Section 7 Report to state that a Bill contains 
provisions which are prima facie discriminatory, that the prima facie 
discrimination is not justifiable, but for the Bill to be passed 
notwithstanding.11 Section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
provides that no court shall decline to give effect to any statute solely on 
the basis that it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act.12 That is, no 
court is able to strike down inconsistent legislation.13 This provision is 
not intended to empower Parliament to make legislation that is 
unjustifiably in breach of New Zealand‘s domestic human rights 
standards. As Paul Rishworth states:14 
It is incorrect to regard s 4 of the Bill of Rights as an affirmation that 
Parliament may legislate inconsistently with rights and freedoms, still less 
an empowerment to do so. 
In my experience, Members of Parliament tend to ‗forget‘ their obligations 
under our human rights legislation when it suits them to do so by either 
                                                                                                                                     
10  The Ministry of Justice performs this function unless the legislation is being 
developed by, and is to be administered by, the Ministry in which case the vetting is 
undertaken by the Crown Law Office. 
11  See, for example, the Section 7 Report on the Social Security (Long-term Residential 
Care) Amendment Bill 2003: http://www.justice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights/bill-list-
2003/s-bill/section7-social-sec.pdf: (Retrieved: 7 August 2009). 
12 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.4: 
 Section 4 - Other enactments not affected: 
 No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), — 
(a) hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or 
to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) decline to apply any provision of the enactment — 
 by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill 
of Rights. 
13  Although, the Human Rights Review Tribunal or the courts can make declarations of 
inconsistency as discussed in the following section.  
14  Rishworth, Paul, ―Human Rights‖, in [2003] N.Z.L.Rev. 261: 264. 
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failing to consider these human rights obligations at all, or by applying 
them incorrectly and employing questionable justifications.15  
Second, is that it has been a matter of practice that the Attorney-General 
also holds Ministerial portfolios. As a Minister, this person is responsible 
for overseeing the development of legislative policy. The same person, in 
his or her capacity as the Attorney-General, is then required to provide 
advice to Parliament on his or her own legislation.  
Currently, the Ministry of Justice website carries copies of the Ministry 
of Justice advice to the Attorney-General and, in some instances, copies 
of the Attorney-General‘s report to the House. This means that these 
documents are available for public scrutiny. However, this procedure has 
been recently initiated, and has no formal or binding status. Whether or 
not this practice is continued is a matter for the Attorney-General of the 
time on a case-by-case basis. 
In the final analysis, while there may be a degree of transparency about 
the vetting process, the fact that proposed legislation may be 
inconsistent with human rights standards does not mean that it will not 
become law. 
 
Declarations of Inconsistency 
The Human Rights Act (since the amendment in 2001) now provides for 
the Human Rights Review Tribunal, or our courts, to make a Declaration 
of Inconsistency in relation to any legislation which an applicant can 
show is in breach of anti-discrimination provisions. 
Any citizen may challenge the validity of any statute in relation to its 
compliance with New Zealand human rights legislation by making an 
application under the Human Rights Act 1993 s.92J.16 If successful, a 
declaration may be issued that the legislation is inconsistent with the 
provisions of our human rights laws. 
The ability to seek and be granted a Declaration of Inconsistency 
appeared to be a step forward in terms of human rights compliance in 
                                                 
15  See the discussion on ―Conscience Votes later in this chapter, and the discussions 
on ―MPs and Decision-Making‖ and ―MPs and One-Law-For-All‖ in the next chapter. 
16  Inserted by the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
  176 
  
New Zealand. However, the reality is that, while legislation may be 
declared to be inconsistent with human rights laws, there is no 
compulsion on Parliament to remedy the inconsistency:17 
A declaration under section 92J does not – 
(a) affect the validity, application, or enforcement of the enactment in 
respect of which it is given; or 
(b) prevent the continuation of the act, omission, policy or activity that was 
the subject of the complaint. 
It does, however, require that:18 
… the Minister responsible for the administration of the enactment must 
present to the House of Representatives – 
(a) a report bringing the declaration to the attention of the House of 
Representatives; and 
(b) a report containing advice on the Government‟s response to the 
declaration. 
That is, the inclusion of an ability for the Court to declare a statute 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights does not enable the Court to ―strike 
down‖ legislation. At best, it provides the Court with an ability to convey 
to Parliament a message about the state of the law. 
 
The “Compliance” Process 
The history of the ―Compliance 2001‖ process, in itself, encapsulates the 
lack of commitment of our Governments, and the impotence of our 
human rights compliance processes, to ensure the efficient and 
appropriate development of legislative policy.  
Technically, by the time of the passing of the Relationships (Statutory 
References) Act 2005, Government (Parliament) had been in breach of 
our human rights legislation for in excess of two years. The compliance 
process (previously ―Consistency 2000‖) began when the Human Rights 
                                                 
17  New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 s.92K(1). 
18  New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993 s.92K(2). 
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Act 1993 came into effect on 1 February 1994 and was due for 
completion by 31 December 2001 (having already been delayed by the 
previous National-led Government by two years). By 31 December 2001, 
all New Zealand legislation should have been audited for compliance 
with the Human Rights Act, and amended to either make it compliant or 
provide it with a permanent exemption from compliance.  
It is possible to take complaints to the Human Rights Commission under 
the Human Rights Act 1993 s.92J. It is also highly likely that, if an 
inconsistency were found, the Government response would be that the 
legislation is still under review. This does not respond to the fact that the 
due date for completion is well past, nor does it respond to the need for 
certainty and clarity in the law. What it does say is that these matters 
will be dealt with in a manner, and within a time frame, that 
Government see fit. 
 
Summary 
Thus, New Zealand‘s human rights laws maintain a façade of 
respectability. The reality, however, is that human rights compliance 
within New Zealand legislation is subject to the commitment and 
support of individual MPs. Ultimately, the regime which purports to 
ensure consistency with human rights standards actually enables 
Government and Parliament to ignore advice to them that proposed 
legislation is inconsistent, and to decline to remedy any existing 
legislation which is declared to be inconsistent. 
Lord Cooke of Thorndon has stated that:19 
… the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is regarded internationally as one 
of the weakest affirmations of human rights, in that sufficiently clear 
legislation passed by ordinary Acts of Parliament (and possibly very speedily 
in the absence of a second House) can override it. This is illustrated by the 
case on same-sex marriages, Quilter v Attorney-General, where the Court of 
Appeal were unanimous that the Marriage Act 1955 was so clear in 
restricting marriage to heterosexual unions that the anti-discrimination 
                                                 
19  Lord Cooke of Thorndon, ―The Role Of The Judges‖, a paper presented at the 
―Building The Constitution‖ Conference, Wellington, New Zealand (7-8 April 2000): 
67. 
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provisions of the Bill of Rights were overridden. Yet the Judges devoted 
many pages to individual discussion of whether that restriction amounted to 
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation, contrary to the Bill of 
Rights … There seems something incongruous however, in expecting the court 
to engage in an elaborate academic discussion which could not even end in a 
declaration of incompatibility, constitutionally provided for so that Parliament 
might be expected to take actions upon it.  
The power of the Bill of Rights Act lies merely in its ability to insist on 
the consistent interpretation of legislation which is already consistent 
with the Bill of Rights Act. Even where legislation is considered to be 
inconsistent with our human rights laws, correction of that 
inconsistency is reliant upon the commitment of our lawmakers. 
 
Strengthening the status and role of our human rights legislation 
New Zealand‘s constitution is neither entrenched nor supreme. That is, 
any component of our multi-document constitution is vulnerable to 
change by a simple majority vote in Parliament. This fact, and the fact 
that Parliament retains the ability to create law which is inconsistent 
with our human rights standards, and the fact that the courts remain 
unable to strike down such legislation, all potentially give cause for 
concern.  
The Human Rights Act purports to ―provide better protection of human 
rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United Nations 
Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights‖.20 The Bill of Rights Act 
purports to ―affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in New Zealand‖ and to ―affirm New Zealand's commitment to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights‖.21  
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was initially proposed for several 
reasons:22 
• New Zealand does not have a written constitution. There is, 
therefore, no single document to which New Zealanders can turn to 
seek protection of fundamental civil rights. The Bill of Rights was 
                                                 
20  Human Rights Act 1993 Title. 
21  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Title. 
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designed to cover the most fundamental rights – generally along the 
lines of those rights contained within the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
• New Zealand also lacks one of a number of constitutional safeguards 
present in other countries. New Zealand operates a uni-cameral 
parliamentary system – one House of Parliament. Many countries 
operate a bi-cameral system with an Upper House and Lower House 
in which both Houses are involved in the passing of legislation, 
although the Upper House will generally ―revise‖ legislation passed 
by the Lower House and affirm or reject it.  
 
Entrenchment  
When the New Zealand Bill of Rights Bill was first being considered, it 
was proposed that an entrenchment provision should be included. 
Entrenchment would have protected the Bill of Rights by placing it 
beyond repeal or amendment by a simple majority in Parliament. An 
entrenched statute would only be able to be amended with the support 
of, for example, 75 percent or more or the members of Parliament or a 
majority in a referendum of electors.23  
Chris Lawrence, former Proceedings Commissioner with the Human 
Rights Commission, in an interview about his time as Commissioner, 
said:24 
Our human rights laws are in the Bill of Rights Act and the Human Rights 
Act. Both of them are just ordinary statutes that could be repealed at any 
point by a simple majority of parliament. And. what‟s worse, both can be 
overridden by mere regulation (that is, a form of legislation made by 
                                                                                                                                     
22  See: Minister of Justice, ―A Bill Of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper‖, 
presented to the House of Representatives by Leave by the Hon Geoffrey Palmer 
Minister of Justice, Wellington (1985). 
23  See: Minister of Justice, ―A Bill Of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper‖, 
presented to the House of Representatives by Leave by the Hon Geoffrey Palmer 
Minister of Justice, Wellington (1985).  
24  Lawrence, Chris, former Proceedings Commissioner with the Human Rights 
Commission, ―Safeguards Needed To Protect Human Rights Gains‖, express (28 
August – 10 September 2002): 3 and 8. Note that, with the passing of the Human 
Rights Amendment Act 2001, the position of Proceedings Commissioner was 
transformed into the position of Director of Human Rights Proceedings. 
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executive government not by parliament). … [O]ur human rights laws are not 
constitutionally entrenched and are actually quite fragile. … There has been 
a great deal of improvement in recognition of same-sex relationships. But 
none of these gains are set in concrete … [and] remain hostage to an 
uncertain future. 
The key effect of entrenching our human rights legislation would be to 
provide a protection for our human rights legislation into the future. 
Such a protection cannot be guaranteed currently because our human 
rights laws can be repealed or amended by a simple majority in the 
House. Entrenchment would therefore bring greater certainty and 
security for the future of human rights protections in New Zealand law. 
 
Supreme Law 
A further way of strengthening our human rights legislation would be to 
give it the status of supreme law. This would ensure that successive 
Governments would be required to follow the dictates of that legislation, 
or their acts could be ―struck down‖ by the Courts. 
When this was first mooted in relation to the New Zealand Bill of Rights, 
there was a good deal of concern expressed at the notion of the Court 
being given the power to strike down legislation.  
There was a hesitancy about giving too much power to the judges, as un-
elected officials, instead of politicians, as elected representatives:25 
… a written constitution carries with it costs, many of which are hidden from 
superficial view. The main one is the high degree of power such written 
constitutions take from elected legislators and give to unelected judges. 
Political choices, social policy-making decisions, get transmogrified into legal 
issues. 
In submissions to the Ministry of Justice on the ―Re-evaluation of 
Human Rights Protections in New Zealand‖, responses on the issue of 
supremacy of human rights laws appeared to be reluctant to 
unreservedly support the idea. In the main, they suggested that while it 
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may be appropriate to give human rights law supreme status at some 
stage, there should be much more public debate on the issue, especially 
bearing in mind the wider-ranging constitutional issues such as the 
place of the Treaty of Waitangi. This appeared to be the same view that 
had been expressed some 15 years earlier in the original debate around 
the proposal for a Bill of Rights. Submissions seemed to suggest that the 
expectation that the existence of the Bill of Rights would promote 
discussion about it did not eventuate. Very little debate was prompted, 
and the public generally seemed fairly unaware of the role, or to a large 
extent even the existence of, the Bill of Rights.26 27 
The issue of the future of the Bill of Rights and questions of primacy have 
hardly yet been canvassed in the public arena. 
If we are to move down the path of BORA entrenchment, the most appropriate 
first step would be for Government to signal that intent and debate it in the 
run up to the next election. The whole question including the constitutional 
position of the Treaty could then be properly considered in the term of the 
new Parliament. 
At the same time, other submissions advocated a mid-level alternative 
along the lines of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the 
United Kingdom Human Rights Act. The suggestion was that, at least 
until there has been greater public debate, there should be an 
amendment to empower the courts to declare legislation to be 
inconsistent with non-discrimination provisions:28 
[W]e should be having an ongoing constitutional debate about a „superior law‟ 
Bill of Rights. However, as an interim measure, ACCL would support the 
minority view of Paul Hunt that Section 4 of the Bill of Rights should be 
amended to create a procedure by which the Courts may declare that a 
statute is incompatible with the Bill of Rights, while leaving Parliament to 
decide what, if any, action to take in respect of the statute concerned. 
                                                                                                                                     
25  Allen, James, ―No To A Written Constitution‖, paper presented to the ―Building the 
Constitution Conference‖, Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament Buildings, 
Wellington (7-8 April 2000). 
26  Unnamed submitter in: Ministry of Justice, ―Re-Evaluation Of Human Rights 
Protections In New Zealand‖, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (May 2001): 14. 
27  New Zealand AIDS Foundation in: Ministry of Justice, ―Re-Evaluation Of Human 
Rights Protections In New Zealand‖, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (May 2001): 14. 
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Summary 
The mere fact that written constitutions and entrenchment seem to 
generally go hand-in-hand, does not stop us from entrenching our 
human rights legislation separately, as supreme legislation in its own 
right. The key issue is not about process, but whether or not we take our 
human rights protections seriously enough to feel comfortable about 
entrenching them and giving them the status of supreme legislation. 
The proponents and initiators of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
hoped that its passing into law (and, presumably reinforced with the 
passing of the Human Rights Act 1993), and its presence in the New 
Zealand legal climate, would assist in the process of educating the 
people of New Zealand about the nature of human rights and human 
rights legislation. It was further hoped that this would reduce the fear 
factor in relation to any perceived shift in power from the legislature to 
the judiciary.29  
The issue is not whether or not human rights should be protected. New 
Zealand society has already decided that, in New Zealand, protection of 
human rights is important. In response, the New Zealand Parliament 
enacted two pieces of legislation designed to regulate behaviours towards 
protected groups of persons in the public sector and in the private 
sector.30 Subsequently, it is wholly appropriate that the standards that 
were put in place in that legislation should be upheld by the judges – 
this is their role, to interpret legislation where necessary (clarify the 
meaning of specific human rights provisions), and / or arbitrate on 
issues relating to the rights for which provision has been made (the 
protection of rights against undue limitation, or the balancing of 
competing rights). 
An interim measure is in place since the passing of the Human Rights 
Amendment Act 2001. As outlined above, the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal and courts of New Zealand now have the power to make a 
                                                                                                                                     
28  Auckland Council for Civil Liberties in: Ministry of Justice, ―Re-Evaluation Of 
Human Rights Protections In New Zealand, Ministry Of Justice, Wellington (May 
2001): 14. 
29  See: Minister of Justice, ―A Bill Of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper‖, 
presented to the House of Representatives by Leave by the Hon Geoffrey Palmer 
Minister of Justice, Wellington (1985). 
30  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Human Rights Act 1993 respectively. 
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declaration of inconsistency where a legislative provision is held to be 
inconsistent with our human rights standards.  
However, if we are truly committed to maintaining fundamental human 
rights standards in New Zealand, it would now seem to be an 
appropriate time for further consideration to be given to the possibility of 
providing our human rights legislation with the status of supreme law, 
possibly within the framework of a single-document, entrenched New 
Zealand Constitution. 
 
Legislature 
Conscience Votes 
It has become accepted practice for some issues before the House of 
Representatives to become issues of ―conscience‖ in relation to which 
MPs are able to exercise a ―conscience‖ vote or ―free‖ vote (hereinafter, 
―free‖ vote). 
Prior to the advent of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system of 
Parliamentary voting, decisions relating to whether or not an issue 
should be the subject of a free vote were a matter of convention. There 
were no prescribed reasons for taking a free vote on any particular issue. 
Historically, however, Parliamentary Parties have tended to permit its 
MPs to exercise a free vote where Party policy does not apply, for 
contentious issues, and for issues affecting the sanctity of life.31 
I would question the need for free votes to be taken around issues 
relating to sexual orientation. A free vote is designed to permit members 
of a particular party to refrain from adhering to the party line on a 
particular issue. A free vote is not a licence to MPs to vote in any manner 
they please. 
MPs, as with all persons in New Zealand, are required to act lawfully. A 
free vote does not release MPs from this requirement. Therefore, when 
they are exercising their vote, they are required, by law, to take human 
                                                 
31  Free votes have been exercised in New Zealand in relation to: abortion (1970s), 
homosexuality (1986), casino control (1987, 1990, 2000), corporal punishment in 
schools (1990), homosexual relationships and property (2000, 2001), age for being 
on licensed premises (2001), appointment of members to the Abortion Supervisory 
Committee (2001), shop trading hours (2002), prostitution law reform (2003). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
  184 
  
rights legislation into account and must not disregard it.32 Any decision 
on their part to limit the rights to be contained within new legislation 
must therefore be ―demonstrably justified‖. 
MPs may also see a free vote as an opportunity to reflect the views of 
those they represent. While, in general terms, voting in the House in 
accordance with the (perceived) wishes of the electors may be an 
appropriate goal, the same principle applies as above. That is, MPs are 
required to act lawfully, taking human rights legislation into account, 
and not to vote arbitrarily on the basis that a particular vote reflects the 
views of the persons they represent. 
The practical result of free votes as they are exercised currently means 
that:  
• law-makers are enabled to exercise their own free choice in a 
manner that, if the legislation is passed, will deny others choice in 
their lives – in most instances, a conscience vote provides freedom of 
choice only to that Parliamentarian, not to their constituents or any 
other member of society;33 
• religious views are often supported because most matters on which 
a conscience vote has been allowed involve issues on which one or 
more churches have a rigid position;34 
• MPs are no longer accountable to their Party – this may be of 
particular concern within the MMP system where List MPs are in 
Parliament by virtue of the Party Vote;35 
• MPs are no longer accountable to electing voters – subject to the 
qualification above in relation to acting in accordance with the law;36 
                                                 
32  The Title to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that it applies to acts done by 
the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of Government. 
33  Allum, Margaret, ―Whose Conscience Counts?‖, in Green Weekly: 
 http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/417/417p12.htm: (Retrieved: 17 January 
2004). 
34  Allum, Margaret, ―Whose Conscience Counts?‖, in Green Weekly: 
 http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/417/417p12.htm: (Retrieved: 17 January 
2004). 
35  Allum, Margaret, ―Whose Conscience Counts?‖, in Green Weekly: 
 http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/417/417p12.htm: (Retrieved: 17 January 
2004).  
36  Allum, Margaret, ―Whose Conscience Counts?‖, in Green Weekly: 
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• the views of parliamentary representatives are given more weight 
than those of the persons who will be affected by the politicians‘ 
decisions.37 
Ideally, the granting of a conscience vote should signal a need for 
Members to be even more diligent about becoming well-informed about 
the issues before them so that they can make a robust decision:38 
Conscience votes require a great deal of concentration and effort on the part 
of MPs, and it is much more intricate than the usual Party votes that are held. 
In reality, conscience votes are seen by (some) MPs as releasing them 
from the need to undertake an information-based, intellectual 
consideration of the issues. I was in the Public Gallery of the House of 
Representatives when a free vote was taken on the Property 
(Relationships) Act 2001. On that occasion, I witnessed a senior Member 
enter the Chamber of the House upon the ringing of the bells, ask his 
colleagues what was the question that was being voted upon, and then 
say: ―Oh, never mind, I‘m voting against it anyway‖ – which he did.  
It also seems somewhat spurious to grant a free vote when there is a 
tacit expectation that members will vote along the lines of Party political 
principle. The Leader of United Future New Zealand stated:39  
Where ideological extremism gets in the way of common sense, we have not 
hesitated to oppose … issues like … the Care of Children Bill”. He further 
stated: “On moral issues, which are treated as conscience votes rather than 
party votes, United Future has also stuck to its principles. All our MPs voted 
against the Prostitution Bill at every stage, and we are also strongly opposed 
to the Death with Dignity Bill. 
In spite of our human rights laws, the purpose of which is to protect New 
Zealanders from prejudice, our system permits members of Parliament to 
vote on our rights in accordance with their personal views.  
                                                                                                                                     
 http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/417/417p12.htm: (Retrieved: 17 January  
2004).  
37  Corcoran, Trish, ―Politicians Attack The Right To Choose‖ in Green Weekly: 
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1996/234/234p9b.htm: (Retrieved: 17 January 
2004).  
38  ―Wellington Watch: A Weekly Bulletin Of Parliamentary And Political Information‖, 
Issue 2001/8, Chen Palmer and Partners (16 March 2001). 
39  Dunne, Peter, ―Why Work With Labour And Not National‖, United Future New 
Zealand, Press Release (18 February 2004). 
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I consider that there is no justification for permitting free votes on 
relation to any issue generally, or in relation to issues affecting gays and 
lesbians specifically. If free votes are to remain part of our Parliamentary 
procedures it is clear that there needs to be greater clarification around 
the purpose of such votes, and the manner in which they can be 
exercised.  
 
Populist Decision-Making 
In relation to human rights issues, it is not appropriate for Members to 
rely on majority public support before they make a decision.  
The fundamental purpose of human rights legislation is to provide 
protection to minorities from the prejudices of the majority. To then go 
out and seek approval from that very majority on whether or how those 
protections should be applied is not only illogical, but also potentially 
dangerous for the well-being and welfare of those minorities.  
It must be remembered that the issue of what human rights standards 
would be applicable in New Zealand were debated, and decided upon, in 
the years leading up to 1993. That is, the anti-discrimination provisions 
were put in place by Parliamentary vote after concerted lobbying by 
interest groups – including opponents – and it is not now reasonable to 
expect members of the supposedly protected minority groups to re-
litigate those same protections.  
As a result of the 1993 changes to the Human Rights Act, a range of new 
grounds, including sexual orientation without exemptions for the Armed 
Forces or the NZ Police, became part of the Act. For this very reason, our 
domestic human rights legislation not only gives Government a mandate 
to protect our minority rights from majoritarian prejudice, but also 
places on them an obligation to do so. It is also on this very basis that it 
is inappropriate for the Government to seek the views of New Zealanders 
at large on what level or levels of protection against discrimination 
should be offered to any minority group.  
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However, in August 1999, the Ministry of Justice published a 
consultation document on the legal recognition of same-sex couples.40 In 
this instance, concerns about public consultation on human rights 
matters were magnified. Not only did the paper attract disproportionate 
numbers of submissions from conservative groups, but also it attracted 
submissions from two key legal (independent Governmental) institutions 
as part of a public submissions process.41 
 
Political Pragmatism 
As discussed above, MPs are subject to the law in the same way as any 
other person or entity in New Zealand. Political pragmatism should only 
feature in the preparation of legislative policy, therefore, to the extent 
that that political pragmatism does not give rise to a breach of our 
human rights standards.  
In a statement that fails to display a commitment to principled human 
rights standards, Peter Dunne wrote in a press release:42 
… politics are more about the achievable than the desirable, and that 
pragmatic compromise leads to more progress than rigid ideological 
extremism.  
This approach to human rights issues leads us to the incremental 
approach commonly used by legislatures which suggests that human 
                                                 
40 See discussion in Chapter 7 on this document ―Same-Sex Couples and the Law‖, 
which invited public comment by 30 April 2000. The document is available at: 
 http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1999/same_sex/index.html. (Retrieved: 
31 August 1999).  
 A prior draft of the document stated that (former National) Government policy did 
not allow for same-sex marriage nor the adoption of children by same-sex couples. 
Cf. Law Commission Report 65, ―Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach 
And A New Framework‖ (September 2000): paras.350-364: ―We recommend that the 
terminology of a new Act make it clear that de facto (including same-sex couples) 
may adopt‖, 
 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_72_144_R65.pdf, 
(Retrieved: 3 November 2000). 
41  See further discussion in this Chapter in relation to Constitutional Watchdogs. 
42  Dunne, Peter, ―Why Work With Labour And Not National‖, United Future New 
Zealand, Press Release (18 February 2004). Dunne made this comment in the 
context of negotiating a Coalition-type agreement after a New Zealand general 
election. The implication in this quote is that it is preferable to compromise on 
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rights equality is a process rather than a destination. This approach 
defies logic. To suggest that equality can be achieved incrementally is to 
suggest that equality can be enhanced in graduated steps. This is turn 
suggests that we can be equal in part, with that part being increased in 
gradation over time. The concept of partial equality is oxymoronic – it is 
not possible to be partially equal.  
In lobbying terms, there is also a difficulty with the concept of setting a 
(practical) goal which falls short of the ideal. For example, if the goal is to 
travel from Wellington to Auckland, it is of no use planning to go half 
way, without plans to complete the journey. In the same way, to reach a 
political compromise before putting the issue on the table suggests 
defeat has been accepted before the battle has been begun.  
Thinking back to the homosexual law reforms of 1986, it is notable that 
on at least two occasions previously there had been proposals for 
decriminalisation of homosexual behaviour but with an unequal (older) 
age of consent. On both these occasions, the gay community rejected the 
proposals on the basis that the compromise was not acceptable. 
Thinking back also to the passing of the Human Rights Act 1993, the 
same principle was applied. Initially, the amended grounds of prohibition 
against discrimination did not include sexual orientation, or the 
presence in the body of diseases of the blood. Even after a successful 
vote in the House for the inclusion of sexual orientation, the possibility 
of exemptions from this ground for the Armed Services and the New 
Zealand Police were considered. Eventually, the call for full equality 
without compromise won through.  
Thus, if the goal is full and equal treatment under the law, this is what 
we should work towards. Only if we are unsuccessful should we consider 
a compromise. This compromise may be a fall-back position that we have 
had in mind during the battle for equality, but the compromised position 
should not be our goal. 
On this point, it seems, we have a very unlikely ally. During the Third 
reading on the Civil Union Bill, as part of a misguided argument for a 
                                                                                                                                     
principle and get into a power-sharing arrangement than to adhere to principle and 
get no result.   
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referendum on the issue, Rt Hon Winston Peters said:43 
The supporters of the Civil Union Bill argue that this is an equality issue, an 
equity issue, a fairness issue, and a one-law-for-all issue. The real question 
is whether that is correct, right and factual.  For that to be right, correct, and 
factual the proponents of this bill know full well that it would have to have 
only one clause in it: a clause that gave homosexuals the same right as 
heterosexuals under the Marriage Act. … Does this Bill do that? No, it does 
not. It does everything but that, that is why so many fundamental 
homosexuals do not want a bar of this bill. Why is it that Mr Barnett says 
that he supports it, yet condemns those very people to second-class 
citizenry? … Fundamental homosexuals do not support this bill, and the 
proponents of this bill know that. But not having the courage of their 
convictions, they throw a sop to the homosexual community and say 
homosexuals can like it or lump it, … What has happened to the courage of 
those members‟ convictions? 
There should be no compromise on the part of a Minister on the basis 
that a particular action is more politically pragmatic – the Minister‘s role 
is to administer the laws of New Zealand relevant to his or her portfolio. 
There should be no compromise on the part of Members of the 
Legislature – their role is to advocate in the best interests of 
constituents, including the rights of minorities. Approaching policy 
issues on the basis of political pragmatism seriously and unreasonably 
limits the options available to those in the community who are lobbying 
for, and who are affected by, the changes being sought. 
 
Separation of powers 
In constitutional law classes, university law students are taught about 
the doctrine of the ―separation of powers‖. Essentially, they are taught 
that there are three arms to Government, namely the Judiciary, the 
Executive, and the Legislature. This doctrine, originally found in some 
ancient and medieval theories of government and developed over time,44 
                                                 
43  Rt Hon Winston Peters, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Third Reading of the Civil 
Union Bill (9 December 2004). 
44  Byrd, Robert, The Senate of the Roman Republic. U.S. Government Printing Office 
Senate Document 103-23 (1995):For example, the government of the Roman 
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is embodied in convention which dictates that the processes of 
government should involve the different elements in society – the 
monarchical, the aristocratic and the democratic.45  
 
The “separation of powers” in theory 
The official, formal line is that these three arms of Government must 
operate separately so that each can provide checks and balances on the 
other, and thereby ensure the maintenance of accountability and 
impartiality.  
 
The Judiciary 
The Judiciary is independent of the policy- and law-makers. Judges 
make decisions based upon the interpretation of the laws that have been 
passed by the Legislature. The laws are a manifestation of the will of the 
Legislature and may only be amended by the will of the Legislature.46 
Where the Judiciary interprets legislation in a manner which the 
Executive deems to be inappropriate, the Executive may not direct the 
Judiciary to review its decision, but may initiate a change to the 
legislation to make it clearer. Similarly, the Judiciary must neither 
comment on the worth of a particular policy, nor suggest what policy 
should be incorporated into law. The only comment the Court may make 
in relation to policy is where it deems a particular law to be unlawful. 
There is no direct role within our Courts either for Members of 
Parliament or for Members of the Executive. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Republic (about 500BC to 50BC) divided power into three independent branches: the 
Senate, the Assemblies, and the Magistratus.  
45  Walker, David M., Oxford Companion To Law, Oxford University Press, New York 
(1980): 1131. 
46  In New Zealand there is no ability for the Courts to strike down legislation. Under the 
Human Rights Act 1993 (subsequent to the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001, 
there is an ability for the Court to make a ―declaration of inconsistency‖, thereby 
declaring a particular piece of legislation inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, but it cannot change the meaning of that legislation, nor can it 
declare the legislation invalid (that is, cannot strike it down). 
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The Executive Government (―The Executive‖) 
The Executive Government consists of Ministers and the organisations 
over which Ministers have authority – Government Ministries and 
Departments constituting the ―public service‖. There are two key roles 
for officials of the public service, namely: 
• to assist with the development of policy by providing ―full and frank‖ 
advice to Ministers and to alert Ministers to the possible 
consequences of following particular policies;47 and 
• to implement the legislation which subsequently results from the 
development of that policy to the best of its ability.  
Ministers of the Crown carry the responsibility for the success or failure 
of the implementation of Government policies which have been 
incorporated into legislation. 
There is no direct role in the administration of Government either for 
Members of Parliament or for members of the Judiciary. 
 
The Legislature  
The Legislature consists of the Head of State or her representative 
together with all Members of Parliament. It is the role of the legislature to 
translate policy into legislation. For this to happen, draft legislation 
moves from the Committee of the Whole House (the Legislature) and into 
a Select Committee for its consideration and possible revision, and then 
back to the Committee of the Whole House for its decision. The 
Legislature makes the laws, levies taxes and allows public money to be 
spent. 
There is no direct role within the Legislature either for Members of the 
Executive (at least, not acting strictly in their role as Ministers) or for 
members of the Judiciary. 
 
                                                 
47  ―Full and frank‖ is alternatively described as advice that is ―honest, impartial and 
comprehensive‖. 
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Interrelationship of the Three Arms 
The relationship amongst these three branches of Government is, in 
turn, governed by five constitutional principles: 
• The Supremacy of Parliament – Parliament has the supreme power to 
make and unmake laws, which take precedence over common law. 
These laws are binding on the Judiciary, the Executive Government, 
and citizens – any of whom are obliged to obey the law and can be 
held to account, either directly or through agents, for any breach of 
the law. 
• Ministerial Responsibility – Ministers are responsible to Parliament 
for the conduct of their departments. 
• Responsibility of Chief Executives to Ministers – Chief Executives of 
Government departments are responsible to their Minister(s) for the 
efficient, effective and economical management of the activities of 
their department. 
• Political Neutrality – Public servants must be impartial, not favouring 
any party political interest over another 
• Professional independence – It is the concept of ―full and frank‖ 
advice which particularly interests me in this context. Public 
servants give policy advice, but the final decision on policy is the 
prerogative of Ministers. For this reason, public servants must 
provide honest, impartial and comprehensive advice, and,48 must not 
withhold any relevant information from Ministers, seek to obstruct or 
delay a decision, or attempt to undermine or improperly influence 
the Government‘s policy. 
 
The “separation of powers” in practice 
It is acknowledged that, in practice, there is never any complete 
separation of the three arms of Government (for example, Parliament 
                                                 
48  State Services Commission, ―The Practice Of Government: How The Public Service 
Plays Its Part‖, 
 http://www.ssc.govt.nz/Documents/working_under_pr/workpr3.html) (Retrieved: 5 
August 2002). 
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remains sovereign, with the result that decisions of the Judiciary always 
remain subject to possible legislative review).  
Bearing in mind the fundamental separation of powers, it was my 
intention, when writing about progress towards the recognition of same-
sex relationships in New Zealand, to have three separate chapters – one 
relating to the Judiciary, one relating to the Executive Government, and 
one relating to the Legislature.  
This proved impossible. While the work of the Judiciary, by virtue of the 
Quilter same-sex marriage case, is distinctly autonomous, it proved 
logistically impossible to separate the work of the Executive from that of 
the Legislature. If I had pursued my intended approach, the result would 
have been a false and cumbersome separation and, because of the need 
for continuous cross-referencing from one chapter to another, would not 
have flowed logically. 
It became clear that, while the Judiciary is somewhat detached, there is 
an extremely close relationship between the legislative and 
administrative arms of Government. This in turn manifests in a highly 
politicised administrative arm of Government. Persons who are elected to 
Parliament as representative Members, are then elected by one another 
to Ministerial positions within Cabinet. Ministers of Cabinet then return 
to sit in the House as ordinary Members of Parliament.  
Unfortunately, when performing the role of Member of the legislature, 
they do not take off their Ministerial hat. This means that, rather than 
approaching a consideration of any legislation before the House purely 
from an objectively informed, idealist or philosophical point of view, they 
tend to approach it in light of the prospective ease of administration. 
Conversely, when they return to their Ministerial offices, rather than 
approaching issues from a purely pragmatic, administrative point of 
view, their thinking is coloured by the political – ―how can I get runs on 
the board?‖. In this instance, what then often tends to happen is that 
policy-makers rely on the political wishes direction of the Ministers, and 
fail to give full and frank, honest, impartial and comprehensive advice.  
My view on this issue is based in personal observation, and situations I 
have witnessed where information has been ―edited‖ by officials, prior to 
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it being forwarded to a Minister, on the basis that it might not represent 
a politically viable course of action. There is no malfeasance in this 
instance, merely a breakdown of the conventions relating to the 
separation of powers. 
It is my contention also that Ministers are tending to confuse their dual 
roles of Ministers (members of the Executive Government) and Members 
of Parliament (members of the Legislature and representatives of the 
electors). When a Minister of the Crown speaks in his or her capacity as 
Minister, he or she should be speaking from the perspective of a 
Government administrator. When a Minister of the Crown is speaking in 
his or her capacity as a Member of Parliament (a Member of the 
Legislature), he or she should be speaking as a representative of his or 
her political party or his or her constituents. A Minister should not be 
speaking, in his or her capacity as Minister, from a personal and political 
perspective.  
A blurring of these two roles has never been demonstrated more clearly 
by anyone than by Hon Sir Douglas Graham, a former Minister of 
Justice. Sir Douglas was often introduced in public meetings or 
television debates as the Minister of Justice, and then proceeded to 
express a personal point of view. For example, in response to the 
Opposition Spokesperson‘s 49 claim that the Minister should act to 
include gays and lesbians under de facto law, said:50 
I wouldn‟t support that. [‗Why not?‘] I don‟t see that as a satisfactory 
relationship. [‗Can you tell me why?‘] I just personally don‟t agree with it. 
Perhaps I‟m a bit old-fashioned. [‗Isn‘t that discriminating against the gay 
community?‘] I‟m not saying that they should be outlawed or thrown in gaol, 
I‟m just saying that I don‟t see that in the same category as marriages, and I 
certainly don‟t see it even in the same category as de facto marriages. 
 
Ministers and Officials (Ministerial responsibility) 
A noted above, the fundamental role of officials within Government 
agencies is to provide their Ministers with full and frank advice on the 
                                                 
49 Ms Judith Tizard. 
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basis of which Ministers can then make administrative decisions. It is 
not the role of officials to make these decisions on behalf of their 
Ministers – but they do. Rather than undertake research and analysis of 
the relevant issues and present a range of options to Ministers, perhaps 
with one or more options highlighted as being the most appropriate, 
officials often present papers outlining what they think the Minister 
might like to hear.  
Conversely, Ministers often tell officials what direction they wish 
particular advice to take, rather than permitting officials to adhere to 
their prescribed role of providing full and frank advice from which 
Ministers may then make their decisions. 
From time to time, the relationship between Ministers and their officials 
may break down to the point where a Minister, who is ultimately 
responsible for the administration of his or her portfolios, will transfer 
blame for shortcomings onto the officials.  
Along with their appointments to relevant portfolios, Ministers also 
receive the authority to act to administer those portfolios, and they 
become subject to the convention of collective Ministerial 
Responsibility:51 
The principle of collective responsibility underpins the system of Cabinet 
government. It reflects democratic principle: the House expresses its 
confidence in the collective whole of government, rather than in individual 
Ministers. Similarly, the Governor-General, in acting on ministerial advice, 
needs to be confident that individual Ministers represent official government 
policy. In all areas of their work, therefore, Ministers represent and 
implement government policy. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
50 "When Love Sours", ‗Assignment‘ Documentary on Partnership Property, TVNZ (31 
August 1995). Note: The questions in square brackets are questions asked by the 
interviewer. 
51  Cabinet Office, Cabinet Manual 2008, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
http://www.cabinetmanual.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/node/64#5.22 (Retrieved: 7 August 
2009). 
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Ministerial responsibility also means that:52 
• Ministers are individually responsible to the legislature for the 
powers Parliament has assigned to the portfolio each holds; 
• Ministers are responsible for their own actions, as well as for the 
actions of the subordinate departmental officials, ―including the 
actions of all officials under their management and direction, 
whether or not the Ministers had prior knowledge‖,53 and even for 
what has occurred in the portfolio prior to his or her current 
appointment (not for the past action per se, but for further acts 
which the current Minister has done – or failed to do – in relation to, 
or as a consequence of that original act); 
• Ministers are to answer questions put to them in the House … on all 
subjects that fall within their responsibilities; 
• Departmental officials may be called upon as witnesses before 
parliamentary committee to answer questions on behalf of their 
Ministers; and 
• Ministers can be individually named and blamed for 
maladministration, even censured by the legislature, but they cannot 
be removed from office by the legislature. Officials, have no ―separate 
constitutional persona‖ 54 and should not be named, although, in 
recent times, it is arguable that there has been less respect for this 
principle than previously.55 
Conversely, it is the role of officials to make decisions for Ministers daily 
acting on their Minister‘s authority, and being responsible to their 
                                                 
52  Aucoin, Peter, Smith, Jennifer, and Dinsdale Geoff, Responsible Government: 
Clarifying Essentials, Dispelling Myths And Exploring Change, Canadian Centre for 
Management Development, Canada (2004): 26. 
53  Canada Privy Council Office, ―Governing Responsibly: A Guide For Ministers And 
Ministers Of State‖, Canada Privy Council Office (December 2003): http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=ag-
gr/2004/annex-eng.htm (Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
54  Aucoin, Peter, Smith, Jennifer, and Dinsdale Geoff, Responsible Government: 
Clarifying Essentials, Dispelling Myths And Exploring Change, Canadian Centre for 
Management Development, Canada (2004): 35. 
55  Thomas, Prof Paul G., ―A Canadian Perspective On ‗The New Public Service‘ ‖, 
Commentary presented to the Annual Conference Of The Institute Of Public 
Administration Of Canada (25-Aug-2003).  
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Minister who nonetheless retains the ultimate constitutional 
responsibility. For this reason, it falls to officials to act in a diligent, 
prudent, non-partisan and professional manner, and to be held 
accountable (not blameworthy) for their actions. If officials fail to act in a 
proper manner, then it is appropriate for them to accept responsibility 
for that improper behaviour.56 
 
Ministers and the Judiciary 
Generally, the arm‘s-length relationship between the Judiciary and the 
other two branches of Government has been maintained. It would 
certainly be fair to say that, in New Zealand, the Judiciary has generally 
acted in a manner which has not usurped the power of Parliament. This 
was seen in the Quilter case where the Justices of the Court of Appeal, 
once they have made their determination that marriage in New Zealand 
could not be opened up to same-sex couples, deferred to Parliament any 
possibility of changing that law. 
Occasionally there has been a comment made by a member of the 
Executive or the Legislature about a member of the Judiciary, but this is 
a rarity and usually draws some criticism on the basis of improper 
interference with the Judiciary. For example, Hon John Banks, as a 
Cabinet Minister made some harshly critical comments about the 
judiciary resulting in his resignation from Cabinet on 1 November 
1996.57 This was followed by a statement of support for the Judges from 
the Attorney-General of the time, Hon Paul East who stated that:58 
he had every confidence in the ability of the judges to exercise their powers 
… The public should remain confident that New Zealand is extremely well-
served by a judiciary of the highest quality. 
 
                                                 
56  Most Government Departments and agencies have Codes of Conduct that codify 
these responsibilities. 
57  ―Hon John Banks Resigns From Cabinet‖, Government Press Release (1 November 
1996) (Prime Minister, Rt Hon Jim Bolger). 
58  ―Attorney-General Backs Judges‘ Ability To Determine Bail Issues‖, Government 
Press Release (6 November 1996) (Attorney-General, Hon Paul East). 
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Hon Phil Goff, as a former Minister of Justice, criticised judges‘ 
interpretation of new legislation relating to sentencing of offenders, 
saying that:59  
Some statements from Judges indicate that not all of them have read and 
clearly understood what the new legislation allows. … While any new 
legislation takes some time to settle in, Judges need to take the time to read 
the law to avoid mistakes of this kind. 
He then went on to cite two specific cases where he considered that the 
Judge involved had got it wrong, in one case saying:  
Clearly the Judge could have imposed a sentence of reparation in this case. It 
is not satisfactory that basic mistakes of this nature are being made. 
And in another: 
The Judge‟s mistaken belief was a front-page headline … notwithstanding 
that the error was pointed out both to the judiciary and the media.  
There has been some response to this criticism from other politicians, 
but generally very little has been made of the possibility of this being an 
inappropriate attack on the Judiciary by a Minister of the Crown: 
The Minister knows that Judges cannot defend themselves against his 
accusations under our constitutional conventions … When will the Attorney-
General Margaret Wilson do her constitutional duty and start defending the 
judges against her colleague? 
 
International Human Rights Treaties 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first 
significant United Nations international human rights instrument. In 
relation to the topic at hand, the UDHR has some interesting provisions. 
The Preamble to the Declaration contains a detailed expression of the 
                                                 
59  ―Goff‘s Attack on the Judiciary is Scandalous‖, Press Release, Act New Zealand (3 
August 2002) (Stephen Franks, MP). 
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broad principles underlying the UDHR and, in particular, states: 
… the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their 
faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom, 
… Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with 
the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, … [Emphasis 
added] 
Therefore, the signatories have agreed that, in general terms, individual 
human rights are worthy of recognition and protection. Furthermore, 
they have agreed to what constitutes those rights and they have agreed 
to educate, promote respect for those rights. What is most significant, 
however, is that the signatories have agreed to implement measures by 
which those rights are recognised and observed.  
In short, by agreeing to the provisions of this Declaration, New Zealand 
as a Member State can be seen to have agreed to recognise and protect 
the rights of its citizens.60 
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was 
adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession on 16 
December 1966 by Resolution 2200A (XXI) of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. The ICCPR entered generally into force on 23 March 
1976 with ratification by New Zealand on 28 December 1978. The ICCPR 
contains many of the same provisions as the UDHR, although some have 
a slightly different wording. The Preamble provides: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, considering that, … recognition 
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world, … [Emphasis added] 
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Recognising that, … the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his 
civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural 
rights, ... [Emphasis added] 
Agree upon the following Articles ...  
 
Further, Article 2 of the ICCPR provides: 
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.  
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, 
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, … , to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant. [Emphasis added] 
By agreeing to the provisions of the ICCPR, New Zealand as State Party 
to the Covenant can be seen to have agreed to enact forthwith legislation 
to recognise and protect the rights of its citizens ‗without distinction of 
any kind‘.61 
 
What are the issues? 
The intention of this section is to select some of the main issues and deal 
with them by way of an examination of the provisions themselves and 
their interpretation to date. These interpretations are also examined, in 
some instances, in light of the changing human rights atmosphere in 
order to assess whether such interpretations are still relevant after 
recent changes in human rights law. 
                                                                                                                                     
60  See discussion on ‗legitimate expectation‘ later in this Chapter. 
61  See discussion on ‗legitimate expectation‘ later in this Chapter. 
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The key issues which will be examined are: 
(1) Non-discrimination under the international covenants; 
(2) The inclusion of gays and lesbians: 
(a) Government obligations; 
(b) ―Sex‖ discrimination includes ―sexual orientation‖ 
discrimination; 62 
(c) ―Other status‖ and the term ―such as‖ include ―sexual 
orientation‖; 63 
(d) The non-exhaustive nature of the list of grounds of 
discrimination; 
(3) The meaning of ―protection at law‖:64 
(a) the right to privacy / non-interference; 65 
(b) the right to form a family;66 
(d) the right to marry;67 
(e) the right to equality in public service. 
 
The issues discussed 
There are several general points which assist in the interpretation of 
legal documents. Some of these will be raised in the course of the 
discussions below, however, it is pertinent to outline, at this point, 
                                                 
62 UDHR Art.2; ICCPR Art.2.1 and Art.26; ICESCR Art.2.2. 
63 UDHR Art.2; ICCPR Art.2.1 and Art.26; ICESCR Art.2.2. 
64  UDHR Preamble; ICCPR Preamble, Art.2.2 and Art.26; ICESCR Preamble, and 
Art.2.1. 
65 UDHR Art.12, Art.29.2 and Art.30; ICCPR Art.3, Art.17.1 and Art.17.2; ICSCR Art.3, 
Art.4, Art.5.1 and Art.5.2. 
66  UDHR Art.16.1, Art.16.2 and Art.16.3; ICCPR Art.23.1, Art.23.2 and Art.23.4; 
ICESCR Art.10.1. 
67 UDHR Art.16.1 and Art.21.1; ICCPR Art.23.2; ISESCR Art.3. 
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overarching precepts of the statutory interpretation of human rights 
provisions:68 
(1) The general rule of interpretation of international law treaties is 
that they ―shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose‖.69 
(2) Human rights instruments generally are given a fair and liberal 
interpretation. It is the nature of human rights law that 
interpretation be expansive rather than restrictive.70 
(3) Human rights is a quickly evolving area, and for that reason human 
rights instruments must be formulated in a manner which allows 
for an evolving interpretation.71 This implies that whenever possible, 
human rights provisions should be interpreted in accordance with 
contemporary social values and standards. 
(4) Human rights legislation was initially formulated to recognise 
strictly individual rights but this recognition has now been 
extended to include group rights.72 There is also an expansion of 
individual rights to include those of individuals within groups (for 
example, discrimination against an individual as a member of a 
particular group, or individuals as partners to a relationship). 
 
(1) Non-discrimination under the international covenants 
―Non-discrimination‖ and ―equality before the law‖ and ―equal protection 
of the law without any discrimination‖ constitute a ―basic and general 
principle relating to the protection of human rights‖.73 
                                                 
68  See discussion relating to Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257, later 
in this chapter. 
69  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Art.31. 
70 This is a general principle relating to the interpretation of human rights laws. The 
general principle is supported in, amongst others, Coburn v Human Rights 
Commission [1994] 3 NZLR 323, in which Thorp J cited various cases to conclude by 
speaking of "the need for a fair, broad, and liberal interpretation": 335. 
71 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257: 266: "The law as to the bearing 
on domestic law of international human rights and instruments declaring them is 
undergoing evolution". 
72 As evidenced by the increasing emergence of human rights instruments such as the 
draft ―African Peoples' Charter‖, a proposed human rights treaty to deal with the 
rights of indigenous / ethnic groups. 
73  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.18 – on the 
meaning of ―Non-Discrimination‖ (10 November 1989). 
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States parties who have ratified the ICCPR, have agreed to: 
• ―respect and ensure to all persons within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant without any 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status‖.74 
Other provisions repeat similar notions: 
• ―The States parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and 
political rights set forth in the present Covenant‖.75 
• ―Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any 
of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable 
restrictions … to have access, on general terms of equality, to public 
service in his country‖.76 
• ―All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the 
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status‖.77 
It is worth noting that there is a key distinction between Article 2.1 and 
Article 26 of the ICCPR, which at first glance appear to be remarkably 
similar in their effect.  
Article 2.1 states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, 
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
                                                 
74  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.18 – on the 
meaning of ―Non-Discrimination‖ (10 November 1989). 
75  ICCPR Art.3. 
76  ICCPR Art.25(c). 
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Article 26 states: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
In actual fact, these two provisions are quite different, the key words 
being ―the rights recognised in the present covenant‖ contained in 
Article 2.1. These words are not contained in Article 26 with the effect 
that Article 26 applies to any form of discrimination whether or not 
expressly contained in the ICCPR. The UNHRC states that ―when 
legislation is adopted by a State party, it must comply with the 
requirement of 26 that its content should not be discriminatory‖. This is 
a far-reaching provision. 
It is to be noted that the ICCPR does not contain any definition of 
―discrimination‖. However, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
has analogised definitions from two other United Nations Conventions 
(namely, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Article 1, and the Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Article 1, to conclude that 
the term ―discrimination‖ in the ICCPR should be understood to imply:78 
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.  
 
(2) Inclusion of gays and lesbians 
It is intended that gays and lesbians should be included within the 
provisions of the international law treaties. 
                                                                                                                                     
77  ICCPR Art.26. 
78  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.23 – on the 
meaning of ―Non-Discrimination‖ (10 November 1989). 
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Firstly, it is clear that these provisions are intended for all persons.  
Secondly, it is clear that the intention of the provisions is to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination.  
The UDHR, for example, talks of ―the inherent dignity of all members of 
the human family‖. It does not make any exceptions. It could arguably be 
different if gays were seeking special privileges, but where gays are 
merely seeking the same rights as are enjoyed by others within society, 
then it is clear that they are entitled to be included under the 
international human rights provisions merely by virtue of their status as 
―members of the human family‖. 
This interpretation is further supported by the use of the word 
―everyone‖ in Article 2 of the UDHR, and the provision that ―everyone is 
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out in this Convention, without 
distinction of any kind‖. 
 
(2)(a) Government obligations 
The Government is under an obligation to ensure that the rights 
discussed are available to all persons with its Governmental and 
parliamentary jurisdiction. 
In relation to the relevant international human rights treaties, there is 
no argument, and can be no argument, that under these Conventions 
the Governments of the States parties have agreed: 
• to ―respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and 
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant without distinction of any kind‖;79 and 
• to ―adopt such legislative or other measure as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant‖;80 and 
• to ―ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all 
civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant‖;81 and 
                                                 
79  ICCPR Art.2.1. 
80  ICCPR Art.2.2. 
81  ICCPR Art.3. 
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• that ―[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, 
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any 
ground …‖.82 It should be noted that this provision is not limited to 
the scope of this particular Covenant (the ICCPR) but rather is 
concerned with the obligations accepted by the States party with 
regard to its legislation generally and the application of that 
legislation.83 
The wording in each of these provisions is clear and strong. In relation to 
civil and political rights, once the rights are defined and recognised, and 
the State has ratified the treaty, then that State is under an obligation to 
implement forthwith whatever measures are necessary to see that all 
relevant tights are guaranteed.84  
At the same time, by acceding to the international human rights treaties, 
New Zealand has accepted the monitoring mechanisms of the United 
Nations in relation to our compliance with the provisions of those 
treaties. These monitoring mechanisms include the reporting obligations 
(reports submitted to, and considered by, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee), and the ability of citizens to forward 
Communications to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
alleging a breach of international law to which New Zealand is a 
signatory (this right arising by virtue of New Zealand‘s assignation to the 
relevant Optional Protocol confirming this complaint making procedure). 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration 85 was an appeal regarding a Removal 
Warrant for a male Samoan over-stayer who, while in New Zealand 
married a New Zealand woman who had subsequently given birth to 
their baby daughter. Counsel for the Respondent argued that, because 
the Removal Warrant was issued before the birth of the child, there was 
                                                 
82  ICCPR Art.26. 
83  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.23 – on the 
meaning of Article 26 (10 November 1989). 
84  At international law, civil and political rights are immediately enforceable, unlike 
economic, social and cultural rights which can be gradually realised. On this basis 
the incremental approach, and the ―politically pragmatic‖ approach, adopted by the 
New Zealand Government is at direct odds with the international human rights law. 
85  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (Court of Appeal). 
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no need for the Immigration Service to take international law into 
account. Cooke P disagreed stating:86 
That is an unattractive argument, apparently implying that New Zealand‟s 
adherence to the international instruments has been at least partly window-
dressing. … legitimate criticism could extend to the New Zealand Courts if 
they were to accept the argument that, because a domestic statute giving 
discretionary powers in general terms does not mention international human 
rights or obligations, the executive is necessarily free to ignore them. 
Cooke P also cited Ashby v Minister of Immigration 87 stating that in that 
case the Court of Appeal recognised ―that some international obligations 
are so manifestly important that no reasonable Minister could fail to take 
them into account‖.88 
 
(2)(b) ―Sex‖ Discrimination Includes ―Sexual Orientation‖ 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has made a 
definitive statement on this matter. In Toonen v Australia, Toonen 
claimed that two provisions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code caused his 
private life and liberty to be threatened.89  
Toonen did not, in the Communication, argue the issue of the interlink 
between the grounds of ―sex‖ and ―sexual orientation‖. In the process of 
the case, however, the State party (Australia) sought clarification from 
the Committee about whether or not the term ―other status‖ in Articles 
2.1 and 26 of the ICCPR included ―sexual orientation‖.  
The Committee did not offer an opinion in response to that particular 
question, but stated:90 
The Committee confines itself to noting, however, that in its views, the 
reference to sex in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be taken as including 
sexual orientation. 
                                                 
86  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257: 266. 
87  Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
88  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257: 266. 
89  The relevant provisions are: section 122, ―unnatural sexual intercourse‖ or 
―intercourse against nature‖; and section 123, ―indecent practice between male 
persons‖. 
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It should be noted that, for purposes of the interrelationship of New 
Zealand‘s domestic law with international law, both New Zealand‘s HRA 
and BORA expressly include the terms ―sex‖ and ―sexual orientation‖.  
 
(2)(c) ―Other status‖ and ―such as‖ include ―sexual orientation‖ 
Because the United Nations Human Rights Committee did not answer 
directly the question posed by Australia, the question as to whether or 
not the ground of ―sexual orientation: is included under the term ―other 
status‖ was left unresolved. 
First, any consideration of this issue must reflect the fundamental 
objectives of the international human rights instruments. It has been 
shown that the key purposes of these instruments are to ensure that all 
persons are treated with dignity and respect, that all persons receive 
equal protection under the law, and that all persons should be free from 
discrimination.  
Second, a precedent has been set by the inclusion of ―sexual orientation‖ 
as an analogous ground in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Although the Canadian Charter does not use the term ―other 
status‖, its general form is open-ended. As a result, the Canadian 
Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights agreed that ―sexual 
orientation‖ should be read into section 15 of the Charter as a 
constitutionally prohibited ground of discrimination.91  
Third, it should be noted again that both New Zealand‘s HRA and BORA 
expressly include the terms ―sex‖ and ―sexual orientation‖. It is clear that 
any consideration at international law must provide for this. 
                                                                                                                                     
90  Toonen v Australia, Communication No.488/1991: Australia 04/04/94. 
91  Canadian Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights, ―Equality for All: Report of 
the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights‖, Canadian Parliamentary 
Committee on Equality Rights, Ottawa (1985); and Henson, Deborah M., ―A 
Comprehensive Analysis Of Same-Sex Protections: Recommendations For American 
Reform‖, in [1993] 7 International Journal of Law and the Family 282: 290. The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.15(1) states: ―Every individual is equal 
before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit 
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability. 
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(2)(d) The lists are non-exhaustive 
Similarly, it is clear that by the use of the term ―such as‖, the lists given 
in the various instruments were not intended to be exhaustive and were 
to be left open for the inclusion of other appropriate classes. 
Under the accepted techniques of statutory interpretation the use of 
words like ―such as‖ means that the following are merely examples and 
that there are other characteristics that can be added to the list.  
Once again, as noted above, New Zealand‘s HRA and BORA expressly 
include the terms ―sex‖ and ―sexual orientation‖. It is clear that any 
consideration at international law must provide for this. 
 
(3) The meaning of ―protection at law‖ 
There is nothing in the international Conventions to suggest that some 
protections of the law should be reserved for specific groups and denied 
to others, or that gays are not included. The very nature of these 
instruments and their wording, is that they are intended to be all-
embracing and all-inclusive in order to overcome discrimination. 
 
(3)(a) The right to privacy / non-interference 
Article 17 of the ICCPR states:92 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks. 
―Family‖ is to be interpreted broadly to include all those comprising the 
family as understood in the society of the State party concerned.93 
                                                 
92  ICCPR Art.17. 
93  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning of 
Article 17 (1988). 
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―Arbitrary interference‖ is to be interpreted to mean that, even where the 
State retains a power to intervene in private or family issues, such 
interference must be ―in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the 
particular circumstances‖.94 In general terms, the State has no 
entitlement to interfere in the privacy of a person except where there is 
some grave concern for the well-being of that person, or the well-being of 
others.  
The right to freedom from interference in private lives logically extends to 
the freedom of same-sex couples to be able to formalise their relationship 
in the manner they see fit, subject only to the extent that this would 
interfere with the rights of others. There is nothing to suggest that if 
same-sex couples were to be granted access to marriage as a means of 
formalising their relationship that this would be any more invasive or 
offensive to society generally than experienced currently with opposite-
sex marriage. Same-sex marriage would grant a marital status to gay 
couples and the ability to live their private lives and arrange their 
personal affairs as they wish, not a right to encroach on other peoples' 
lives and act offensively. 
 
(3)(b) The right to form a family 
Does a gay couple living in a committed relationship, with or without 
children, constitute a ―family‖? 
The concept of ―family‖ is discussed at length in Chapter 6. While not 
going into the material covered by that chapter, it is helpful to examine 
more closely the term ―family‖ in relation to the international human 
rights documents. 
Unfortunately, there is no definition of the family given in the body of 
any of the documents nor in any of the Travaux Preparatoires‘ to the 
                                                 
94  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning of 
Article 17 (1988). 
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ICCPR. However, from the General Comments and Views 95 of the Human 
Rights Committee several conclusions can be drawn: 
(1) Because these treaties are signed by a variety of different member 
states, it can be assumed that the definition of family must be 
flexible enough to cater for differing cultural constructs;96 
(2) This implies, therefore, that the definition of family may evolve and 
that this evolution should be reflected in the laws of the states. This 
is further supported by the European Court of Human Rights which 
stated that ―societal ideas about the family continue to develop, and 
that law should reflect this‖.97 
(3) The state therefore has the power to define for itself an appropriate 
meaning for the term ―family‖, however:98 
[i]t is only justifiable to define the family in such a way as to exclude 
certain groups or individuals if „objective‟ and „reasonable‟ criteria exist 
for such exclusion.  
It is contended therefore that there is no reason whatsoever why a gay 
couple in a committed relationship should not be seen to constitute a 
family. What is more, there is no reason whatsoever why that family 
should not gain the full recognition and sanction of the State. 
 
(3)(c) The right to marry 
Article 23(2) of the ICCPR recognises: 
The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a 
family … 
                                                 
95  For example: Hendricks v Netherlands 5 EHRR 223 1982: ―The natural link between 
parent and child was of fundamental importance. When the actual 'family life' in the 
sense of 'living together' had ended, continued contact between them was desirable 
and should in principle have remained possible. Respect for family life implied that 
this contact was not to be denied unless there were strong reasons under Article 8(2) 
to justify such interference‖. 
96  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning of 
Article 17 (1988). 
97  Ghandhi and MacNamee, ―The Family in UK Law and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966‖, in [1991] 5 International Journal of Law and the 
Family 104: 108. 
98  Ghandhi and MacNamee, ―The Family in UK Law and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966‖, in [1991] 5 International Journal of Law and the 
Family 104: 105. 
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There is a suggestion from some opponents of same-sex marriage that 
marriage is not, in fact, a human right.99 They argue that, on this basis, 
there can be no claim for the right to marry. This can be answered easily 
on more than one level.  
• The language of the Conventions themselves is quite clear, plainly 
refuting by their adoption of specific terminology. Article 23(2) of the 
ICCPR, fro example, refers explicitly to ―The right of men and women 
of marriageable age to marry …‖.  
• The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also written a 
General Comment on "Protection of the Family, the Right to 
Marriage, and Equality of the Spouses".100 
• The same notion has also been supported in the context of New 
Zealand human rights law by Justice Thomas when he stated that: 
―They [same-sex couples] are denied a basic civil right in that the 
freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right‖.101 
• In Halpern v Canada (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 321, the Court of Appeal of 
Ontario stated that: ―Denying same-sex couples the right to marry 
…‖ perpetuated the view that same-sex relationships do not deserve 
the same recognition and respect that is given to different-sex 
relationships.102 
It must also be remembered that, while it is arguably possible to claim 
the right to marry, the battle for same-sex marriage is not only about the 
right to marry, but also, and much more fundamentally and more 
importantly, it is about the right to equal treatment before and under the 
law. 
                                                 
99  In the debate on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill (subsequently renamed 
the Property (Relationships Bill 2000), Owen Jennings MP (Act NZ), stated: ― ... 
marriage is not a human rights issue. Marriage does not exist in any culture on the 
basis that it is a human right‖, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates (04-May-2000): 
1947. 
100  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning of 
―Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage, and Equality of the Spouses‖ (27 
July 1990). 
101  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
102  Halpern v Canada (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 321: 347. 
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In a similar vein, it has been suggested that marriage is not a right but a 
privilege, and is therefore a privilege to be granted by the state.103 I do 
not accept this notion. 
However, let us consider this further. Even if marriage were to be seen as 
a privilege to be conferred by the State on certain citizens, on what basis 
would the State be entitled to decide that different-sex couples should be 
permitted this privilege, but same-sex couples should not? Additionally, 
this line of argument begs the question that, if marriage is not 
considered to be a ‗right‘, what else is not considered a right – access to 
legal counsel, domicile? The fundamental issue here, regardless of 
categorization, is the issue of equal treatment before and under the law.  
There are very few acceptable exceptions to the principle of non-
discrimination. Basically, different-treatment that is less favourable is 
acceptable if that less favourable treatment is objectively justifiable. And, 
different treatment that is preferential is acceptable if it is designed to 
redress an imbalance caused to a particular group by prior 
discrimination.  
In its General Comment on Non-Discrimination, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee states that:104 
The principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative 
action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to 
perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. ... Such action may 
involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned certain 
preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest of the 
population. However, as long as such action is needed to correct 
discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the 
Covenant. 
There is no suggestion that ―preferential treatment‖ should be permitted 
merely because of a social desire to privilege one group, over another.  
It is clear that the right to marry is a human right.  
                                                 
103  Amongst others, for example, Wardle, Lynn D., ―Some New Threats to Marriage and 
the Marriage-Based Family: A Review and Responses‖, in [2000] 48 Cutting Edge 38: 
44-46. 
104  United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18 – on the 
meaning of Non-Discrimination (10 November 1989). 
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The next issue is therefore whether the international covenants extend 
that right to same-sex couples or they reserve it for different-sex couples. 
There is no reason to suggest that international law excludes same-sex 
couples from marriage. 
Firstly, there is no definition of marriage at international law. Therefore, 
marriage is not expressly restricted to a man and a woman. It can 
therefore quite clearly be argued that to exclude gays and lesbians from 
the status of marriage constitutes discrimination based on (a) sexual 
orientation, and (b) sex (gender). 
There has been a suggestion that the reference to the ―right of men and 
women of marriageable age to marry‖ is to the right of a man to marry a 
woman, and the right of a woman to marry a man. The ‗Travaux 
Preparatoires‘ of the ICCPR are not as specific as this on this matter.105 
On the one hand, the phrase ―men and women‖ as used in the ICCPR is 
used broadly in a manner open to the interpretation that there is not 
requirement for parties to be of different gender. There is no express 
definition requiring parties to be of different gender.106 On the other 
hand, when considering the issue of ‗equality of spouses during marriage 
and at its dissolution‘, reference is made to ―husband and wife‖.107     
The language of the ICCPR is not conclusive as to the meaning of the 
word ‗marriage‘, especially when it is considered that the language of 
international covenants is intended to be sufficiently flexible to allow for 
regional differences, and that the provisions relating to marriage are, or 
should be, subject to the equality provisions. In this light, the authors to 
the Joslin Communication submitted that that:108 
the phrase "men and women" in art 23.2 cannot be used to argue that only a 
man and a woman may marry. Rather the words, on their natural meaning, 
suggest that men as a group and women as a group may marry. Similarly, 
                                                 
105  ―Travaux Preparatoires‘ consist of notes relating to proposals for drafting of the 
ICCPR (in this instance) and include proposals for changes in drafting and whether 
or not those proposed changes were incorporated into the final document. 
106  Bossuyt, Marc J., Guide To The ―Travaux Preparatoires‖ Of The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, Martin Nijhoff Publishers (1987): 442-446. 
107  Bossuyt, Marc J., Guide To The ―Travaux Preparatoires‖ Of The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, Martin Nijhoff Publishers (1987): 447. 
108  Submission of the Authors, Communication No. 902/1999, Joslin v. New Zealand. 
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while the French text of the Covenant is expressed in the singular (“à 
l'homme et à la femme”). The French text makes no reference to “a man” and 
“a woman” (“à une homme et à une femme"), but rather to “the man” and “the 
woman”, which the authors submit is equivalent to “men and women” 
generically. 
Another argument, often propounded, is that gays currently do have the 
right to marry in that, in the same way as any other person, they have a 
right to marry someone of the opposite sex. The argument further goes 
that, because being gay is a ―choice‖, then gays themselves are choosing 
not to marry someone of the opposite sex.109  
Under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
right to marry is protected ―according to the national laws governing the 
exercise of this right‖. The relevant Articles in the ICCPR do not have any 
such qualification and therefore standards must be taken as being 
established, at least in the first instance, by the international protections 
rather than by the domestic. 
It would seem that if a State does not regulate homosexual behaviour 
any differently from heterosexual behaviour, and the State has human 
rights laws which prohibit discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, then it is inconsistent and arbitrary to deny gays the right to 
legally recognise those State-sanctioned relationships by marriage. 
 
(3)(e) The right to equality in public service 
Article 25 of the ICCPR states:110 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: ... 
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country. 
The matter of whether or not the issuance of a marriage licence by the 
Office of the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages constitutes a 
―public service‖ has been the subject of debate. 
                                                 
109  For example, see Justice Gault in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 
526. 
110  ICCPR Art.25. 
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Marriage licences are issued by officials within Department of Internal 
Affairs. These are public offices administered by the Ministry of Justice 
and part of the New Zealand Government service to provide a service to 
members of the public. The Officers of that Department are New Zealand 
public servants. 
On the face of it, the act of issuing a Marriage Licence constitutes a 
public service. 
 
Summary 
In general, therefore, it can be argued that international human rights 
provisions support the recognition of same-sex marriage – although this 
may not be so evident since the decision in Joslin.111 The general 
schema on which this proposition is based can be outlined as follows: 
(1) There are a multitude of international legislative provisions which 
support the inclusion of gays within their-parameters. 
(2) There are numerous international provisions which support the 
contention that domestic governments who, acting in accordance 
with Parliamentary will, contract into international human rights 
agreements accept an obligation to actively implement promote the 
provisions of those treaties. 
(3) The Government of New Zealand is therefore under an obligation to 
actively implement and promote legislation, policy and practice to 
eliminate discrimination against gays and lesbians. 
 
COURAGE 
Assuming that, as a society generally, we do have a commitment to 
human rights standards, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
many, if not all, of our human rights concerns would be answered. For 
example, if all New Zealanders were committed to the concept of equal 
treatment under the law, there would be no need for this thesis.  
                                                 
111  See discussion in Chapter 8 on Joslin v New Zealand Communication No. 902/1999. 
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Sadly, the reality is that the commitment of politicians, because of the 
very nature of politics, is to argue for or against a particular issue not 
based on what is right or wrong, but what is politically expedient for 
them, as individual politicians or as members of a particular political 
party.  
It is important, therefore, that our watchdogs, be they quasi-
Governmental organizations such as the Human Rights Commission, or 
private citizens, have the courage to challenge any failure to adhere to 
the principles laid out in our human rights legislation. A prime example 
of this occurred when the 1996-1999 Government attempted to halt the 
―Consistency 2000‖ Project in 1997 and provide for a permanent 
exemption from human rights compliance for Government. It was the 
commitment and courage (and the clarity and consistency of the 
message) of individuals and groups who lobbied Parliament saying the 
proposed shift in human rights legislation was not acceptable that 
resulted in the plans for the exemption being permanently shelved.  
Without individuals and groups exercising this courage and challenging 
our administration, Governments will continue to ignore human rights 
standards (as has been the case with the Compliance 2001 programme) 
or to put forward for the consideration of the House, legislation which 
compromises those human rights standards. 
In the previous section, I suggested that the first stage in ensuring 
human rights compliance is a commitment to human rights standards. 
Unfortunately, I am not convinced that we have that commitment in New 
Zealand – at Governmental / Parliamentary level, in society at large, or 
even within our own gay and lesbian communities. Without such a 
commitment, there is slim hope of acceptable compliance with human 
rights being achieved.  
This means that for those who do have a genuine commitment to human 
rights standards and compliance with those standards, there is a call for 
the courage to stand by that commitment in the face of challenge from 
others. 
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When it comes to issues such as sexual orientation (and especially the 
protection of human rights on the basis of sexual orientation), there can 
be some very negative and very dogmatic arguments thrown up from a 
range of sources. It is not easy for persons who come from a position of 
disempowerment to challenge some of the assertions made against them. 
This may entail, in the first instance, the courage to come out and be 
visible, and to tell the personal stories of how the failure to provide full 
equality under the law impinges on their everyday lives. 
 
Constitutional Watchdogs and other Statutory Bodies 
Within our justice system (in the widest sense) there are institutions that 
are described as ―constitutional watchdogs‖. The role of these 
institutions is to ―oversee, support and advise government institutions‖ 
and to ―help to ensure that public and executive powers are exercised for 
the public good‖.112 These institutions include, amongst others, the 
Human Rights Commission, the Commissioner for Children, the Families 
Commission, the Health and Disabilities Commissioner, and the Office of 
the Ombudsman. There are also non-Government statutory bodies, an 
example being the New Zealand Law Commission which was established 
as ―a central advisory body for the review, reform, and development of 
the law of New Zealand‖.113 
All of these bodies are able to contribute to the goal of compliance with 
human rights standards by advising Government on legal / human 
rights issues. As independent agencies they are also able, theoretically at 
least, to challenge Government and Parliament on any failure to adhere 
to such standards. 
                                                 
112  Ionatana, Hon, Ionatana, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, ―The Importance And Central 
Role Of Monitoring Institutions And Officials In Upholding Democratic Principles Of 
Good Governance‖, paper presented to the Pacific Parliamentarians Conference, 
Nadi, Fiji (27-30 March 2000), 
 http://fiji-gov.apdip.net/ppc/docs/PAPER_Session5.PDF (Retrieved: 23 September 
2002). 
113  Law Commission Act 1985: Title. 
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Amongst other things, constitutional office-holders are charged with:114 
1. watching, guarding and supervising public authorities and the 
working of a bureaucracy, and promoting transparency and 
accountability in the exercise of executive power, and helping to 
eliminate the misuse and abuse of such powers; 
2. promoting public confidence in government and its bureaucracy 
and thereby helping to support the smooth performance of 
government policies and parliamentary institutions; and 
3. remaining constantly aware of flaws in the system and places where 
flaws exist or are likely to develop and where reforms are desirable 
or necessary, and to provide advice on how needed reforms might 
be most effectively and efficiently implemented. 
One of the key functions of constitutional watchdogs is to provide a 
check against the ―rampant power‖ of any one of the three branches of 
Government. This means that there must be avenues for the minority 
group to be able to put forward their views on how they are affected, 
what the issues mean for them, and to have those views listened to in a 
meaningful way. It also means that those institutions, quasi-
Governmental or non-Governmental, which are charged with supporting 
minority groups, or with advising Parliament on issues of justice, must 
actively pursue their core objectives.  
 
 
                                                 
114  Ionatana, Hon, Ionatana (Prime Minister of Tuvalu), ―The Importance And Central 
Role Of Monitoring Institutions And Officials In Upholding Democratic Principles Of 
Good Governance‖, paper presented to the Pacific Parliamentarians Conference, 
Nadi, Fiji (27-30 March 2000): 
 http://fiji-gov.apdip.net/ppc/docs/PAPER_Session5.PDF, (Retrieved: 23 September 
2002).   
 Note: I will comment further, later in this chapter, on the role of two of these 
constitutional watchdogs – the New Zealand Law Commission and the Human Rights 
Commission – and how, I believe, they have (at best) let down gays and lesbians 
seeking equal access to marriage, and (at worst) undermined the efforts of gays and 
lesbians seeking such access.  
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Human Rights Commission 
The primary functions of the Human Rights Commission are to:115 
(a) advocate and promote respect for, and an understanding of, human 
rights in New Zealand society; and 
(b) to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious 
relationship between individuals and among the diverse groups in New 
Zealand society. 
In order to carry out its primary functions, the Human Rights 
Commission also has a range of further functions including (amongst 
others):116 
• advocating a respect for, and an observance of, human rights; 
• inquiring into any law or practice if it appears that it may infringe 
human rights; and 
• reporting to the Prime Minister on means of giving better protection 
to human rights and to ensure better compliance with standards laid 
down in international instruments on human rights. 
While the Human Rights Act also provides for procedures relating to the 
settlement of human rights disputes,117 the primary role of the 
Commission is to ensure, as far as it is able, that disputes do not arise in 
the first instance. In other words, the onus falls on the Commission to 
strive towards absolute human rights compliance in all matters of law, 
practice and procedure.  
 
Human Rights Commission and the same-sex marriage case 
In 1996, the Human Rights Commission was invited by the Applicants to 
become an Intervening Party in the Quilter same-sex marriage case at 
the High Court in Auckland.  
                                                 
115  Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1). 
116  Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(2). 
117  The Human Rights Act 1993 provides for the resolution of complaints about 
discrimination. As well as complaints being considered by the Human Rights 
Commission, they can be referred to the Director of Human Rights Proceedings (see 
ss.90-92A) who will then decide whether or not to refer them to the Human Rights 
Review Tribunal (see ss.93-126). Alternatively, an individual may, if the Director 
choose not to proceed, take a complaint to the Tribunal on his or her own behalf. 
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The Commission declined, stating that on the basis that the application 
to the High Court was made in reliance on the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990, the matter was outside of the jurisdiction of the Commission. 
The purpose for which the presence of the Commission was requested 
was not to address matters specifically stemming from that Act, but 
rather to provide the Court with expert knowledge about the 
fundamental meaning of discrimination. 
The Applicants felt seriously let down by the actions of the Commission 
in this instance. 
The Applicants‘ sense of dissatisfaction was supported by Grant Huscroft 
of the University of Auckland who stated that:118 
… one would expect the Human Rights Commission to have a position on this 
matter, For some reason, however, the Commission has been 
uncharacteristically silent. Indeed, it has shown no interest in Quilter v 
Attorney-General … Quilter raises important questions about equality, the 
law of discrimination, and the interpretation and application of the Bill of 
Rights.  
Huscroft continues with a discussion of why he considers the 
Commission may have decided not to become part of the case. In doing 
so, he outlines three possible reasons which he then discounts: 
• The jurisdictional question relating to the fact that the case was 
brought under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 rather than 
the Human Rights Act 1993. This he discounts, saying that the 
grounds of discrimination are the same in both Acts, the 
Commission successfully lobbied for the inclusion of sexual 
orientation as one of those grounds, and that it could reasonably be 
expected that the Commission might have an interest in how those 
grounds would be interpreted by the Courts. 
• The Commission may have preferred to address the question of 
whether or not exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is 
                                                 
118  Huscroft, Grant, ―Same-Sex Marriage and the Human Rights Commission‖, in [1997] 
NZLJ 41. 
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inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1993 as part of its 
―Consistency 2000‖ Report. This he discounts on the basis that, if 
the Commission considered that the Marriage Act 1955 is 
discriminatory, there would appear to be no reason why the 
Commission would prefer a protracted legislative process when there 
might be an immediate solution through litigation – especially where 
participation in the litigation would not compromise the 
―Consistency 2000‖ Project. 
• Possibly, the Commission did not consider that the Marriage Act 
1955 to be discriminatory, and that there was no need to be 
involved. This he discounts on the basis that it would be unusual for 
the Commission to remain on the sidelines while the Court 
establishes a precedent which impacts on the law of human rights 
for years to come. 
He then adds, fourthly, that the Commission may have considered it 
politically expedient not to intervene, and then goes on to say: 
There is significant opposition to same-sex marriage, in the government and 
in the community, and the Commission may wish to avoid the fray. This 
would be surprising, but in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for its 
silence, some may well draw this conclusion. 
It is now clear, following the new functions set out in the Human Rights 
Act 1993 s.5 (by virtue of the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001), that 
all human rights fall within the jurisdiction of the Human Rights 
Commission (although the complaints mechanism is still constrained to 
the human rights of non-discrimination). 
 
The New Zealand National Plan of Action 
The Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 mandated the Human Rights 
Commission to develop a National Plan of Action for Human Rights 
(NPA). 
In general terms, the NPA was to constitute a set of strategies for the 
development and strengthening of the promotion and protection of 
human rights in New Zealand. The Human Rights Commission said that 
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in developing the NPA, the Commission needed need to establish its 
human rights goals and identify national human rights priorities.119  
The concept of prioritising human rights is of concern for a range of 
reasons: 
• It is dangerous to prioritise human rights in that this gives rise to a 
risk of a perception that some rights are more important than others.  
• If human rights are to be prioritised, there are inherent difficulties 
and concerns related to establishing on what basis those priorities 
should be established: 
-  If a decision is based on the views expressed through a 
consultation process (as in the Commission‘s press release at the 
time), then the response is formed on the basis of what most 
people consider to be the most pressing issues. That is, there is a 
risk that the most marginalised people will be further 
marginalised. 
-  If a decision is based on statistics relating to the numbers of 
complaints received by the Commission, the response is formed 
in favour of those who have the knowledge, resources, ability to 
make complaints. I would suggest that it may be those groups 
who are making the least numbers of complaints who have the 
greatest need. Once again, the already disempowered are in 
danger of becoming more disempowered. 
-  Questions must also be asked about communication with 
marginalised groups. It may be those groups of people who 
cannot access a website, who do not receive a newspaper, who 
do not physically have the ability get to meetings, who do not 
have the personal strength to attend meetings, or who do not 
have the strength to tell their own personal / private stories in 
public – those who do not ‗have a voice‘ – who are the persons 
most in need of human rights assistance.  
                                                 
119  Human Rights Commission, ―Developing A National Plan Of Action On Human 
Rights‖: http://www.hrc.co.nz/index/php?p=23966 (Retrieved: 23 September 2002). 
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I note that the United Nations, in describing the purpose of National 
Plans of Action, gives no suggestion that there should be any degree of 
prioritisation. In fact, it seems that the General Assembly has been very 
careful to avoid any suggestion of priority by listing, in no particular 
order, the need to:120 
• establish or strengthen national and local human rights institutions 
and organisations; 
• initiate steps towards national programmes for the promotion and 
protection of human rights; 
• prevent human rights violations that result in human, social, 
cultural, environmental and economic costs; 
• identify those people in society who are presently deprived of their 
full human rights and ensure that effective steps are taken to 
redress their situation; 
• enable a comprehensive response to rapid social and economic 
changes that might otherwise result in chaos and dislocation; 
• promote diversity of sources, approaches, methodologies and 
institutions in the field of human rights education; 
• enhance opportunities for cooperation in human rights education 
activities among government agencies, non-governmental 
organisations, professional groups and other institutions of civil 
society; 
• emphasise the role of human rights in sustainable national 
development; 
• help Governments meet their prior commitments to human rights 
under the international instruments and programmes. 
After attending a meeting about the NPA at the Commission on 9 
October 2002, I forwarded a letter to the Commission (dated 14 October 
2002) in which I emphasised some issues that had been expressed by 
                                                 
120  UN General Assembly A/52/469/Add.1 (20 October 1997). 
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myself and others at the meeting. In summary, these key issues were as 
follows: 
• The more disempowered a minority group is, the fewer resources it 
will have, and the less able it will be, to provide input into the 
development of a NPA. This does not mean that its members‘ needs 
are any less than those of other groups – in fact it more than likely 
signifies that their needs are greater. 
• It is not appropriate for the Human Rights Commission to 
hierarchise human rights and to give some rights greater priority 
over others. There are 14 grounds of prohibition against 
discrimination contained in the Human Rights Act 1993. No one of 
these is given any greater status than another. 
• Public consultation on human rights issues is not appropriate. As 
human rights laws are, by nature, designed to protect the less 
empowered from the more empowered, there is an inherent lack of 
validity in the process of seeking the views of majority society – 
especially when it was acknowledged by the Commission that the 
fundamental public understanding of human rights in New Zealand 
is limited.  
Consequently, it was real concern that, on 9 December 2003, I read the 
Commission‘s press release which stated that ―the preliminary feedback 
from the first round of public consultation carried out as part of the 
development of the New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights 
(NZAPHR)‖ showed that the rights to health, to justice and to an 
adequate standard of living are ―at the top of the list of human rights 
important to New Zealanders‖.121 
 
National Plan of Action: Sector Advisory Groups 
This tendency to provide a greater voice for some groups rather than 
others is further demonstrated by the constitution of the Sector Advisory 
Groups established by the Commission.  
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As part of the work towards the NPA, the Human Rights Commission 
also appointed a National Advisory Council, and three Sector Advisory 
Groups. The appointed Advisory Groups were the Race Relations Sector 
Advisory Group, the Disability Sector Advisory Group, and the Children‘s 
Rights Sector Advisory Group. My concern was that all of these sectors 
already had Government funded or well-established community groups 
which advocate for their needs. Once again, the voices of those groups 
which are less visible, less able to communicate their issues, become 
even quieter.122 
 
Other examples of the “public consultation” process 
In August 1999, the Ministry of Justice published and distributed a 
Discussion Paper ―Same-Sex Couples and the Law‖.123 
In December 1999, the New Zealand Law Commission submitted its 
response to this paper to the Ministry of Justice,124 and on 28 April 
2000, the Human Rights Commission submitted its response.125  
The Ministry of Justice had stated, in the Discussion Paper, that it was 
seeking public submissions on ―what you think about the way our laws 
                                                                                                                                     
121  Human Rights Commission, ―First Feedback Points To Key Human Rights‖, Press 
Release (9 December 2003). 
122  The three groups represented by the Sector Advisory Groups have the following 
agencies / organisations to cater for their needs (non-exhaustive list): 
 Disabled: Health and Disability Commissioner; Work and Income, and the Ministry 
of Social Development (Disability Allowance); District Health Boards; Community 
Care Trusts; Disabled Person‘s Assembly; CCS; Foundation for the Blind; Deaf 
Association of New Zealand; Disabilities Resource Centre Trusts; IHC; and others. 
 Children‘s Rights: Children‘s Commissioner; Child Youth and Family; Youthline; 
various Church-based Social Service Agencies; Community-Based Youth 
Development Fund (which supports seven youth projects around the country); and 
others. 
 Race Relations: Te Puni Kokiri; Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs; Office of Ethnic 
Affairs; Race Relations Conciliator (Human Rights Commission); Maori Women‘s 
Welfare League; Asia 2000; NZ Asia Institute, and others. 
123  Ministry of Justice, ―Discussion Paper: Same-Sex Couples And The Law‖, Ministry of 
Justice (Aug-1999). See more detailed discussion on this in Chapter 7. 
124  Law Commission, ―Recognising Same-Sex Relationships‖, Study Paper 4 (December 
1999), 
 http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_108_277_SP4.pdf 
(Retrieved: 09-Dec-1999). 
125  Human Rights Commission, ―Same-Sex Couples And The Law‖ (28 April 2000). 
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treat same-sex couples, and whether you think anything should 
change?‖.126 
Both the New Zealand Law Commission and the Human Rights 
Commission have avenues for advising Government on matters of law 
within New Zealand.  
The main functions of the Law Commission relate to the systemic review 
of the laws of New Zealand.127 In this case, the submission made to the 
Ministry of Justice was not a report of the whole Commission, nor was it 
based on in-depth research. It reflected neither the view of the Law 
Commission as a whole, nor the views of members of the gay and lesbian 
communities in New Zealand. It was a Law Commission Study Paper, 
representing the views of one Commissioner.128 There was a danger that 
the presentation of these views as a Law Commission document is that 
they could be given undue weight, and be cited as an authoritative 
statement from the Law Commission with regard to the treatment of 
same-sex couples.129 While the Law Commission study paper does 
support the recognition of same-sex relationships, it also points in the 
                                                 
126  Ministry of Justice, ―Same-Sex Couples And The Law‖, Discussion Paper, Ministry of 
Justice (August 1999): 1. 
127  Law Commission, ―Recognising Same-Sex Relationships‖, Study Paper 4 (December 
1999), 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_108_277_SP4.pdf 
(Retrieved: 9 December 1999). 
128  The initial few Law Commission Study Papers were papers representing the views of 
individual Commissioners, not the Commission as a whole. This subsequently 
changed as it became more common for such papers to be written and views to be 
expressed which may be seen to reflect on the Commission. 
129  Law Commission Act 1985: 
3. Purpose — 
The purpose of this Act is to promote the systematic review, reform, and 
development of the law of New Zealand. 
5.Functions — 
(1) The principal functions of the Commission are— 
(a) To take and keep under review in a systematic way the law of New Zealand: 
(b) To make recommendations for the reform and development of the law of 
New Zealand: 
(c) To advise on the review of any aspect of the law of New Zealand conducted 
by any Government department or organisation (as defined in section 8(2) 
of this Act) and on proposals made as a result of the review: 
(d) To advise the Minister of Justice [and the responsible Minister] on ways in 
which the law of New Zealand can be made as understandable and 
accessible as is practicable. 
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direction of registered partnerships legislation:130 
[t]he political reality is that ninety percent of a loaf is better than no bread at 
all”.   
The issues relating to the Human Rights Commission submission are 
similar.131 Under the Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(k), the Human Rights 
Commission has the function of reporting to the Prime Minister on a 
range of human rights issues. While in this case, there is every reason to 
believe that the submission was the considered response of the entire 
Commission and not the singular response of one Commissioner, and 
while the Commission is also obliged to promote and protect New 
Zealand‘s human rights standards, I am not convinced that participating 
in a public consultation / submission with an agency of Government is 
the most appropriate or most effective way for this to happen.  
 
Summary 
It is important that we consider all possible ramifications of consultation 
on human rights issues. Fundamentally, consultation within a 
democracy implies that there will be considerable pressure to act upon, 
or take into account, the majority view. Conversely, human rights is 
about the protection of minority groups. On what basis can public 
(majority) consultation on minority rights issues be valid or acceptable? 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are well-recognised and well-
respected entities within the general human rights framework of many 
jurisdictions. There is, of course, a mixed reception for NGOs. They can 
be seen by larger, corporate-type organisations as ―flies in the ointment‖, 
they can be seen by Government as being stuck in grievance mode and 
constantly ranting against anything positive or progressive, and they can 
be seen by members of the public (particularly those who they represent) 
as saviours. 
                                                 
130  Law Commission, ―Editorial: Recognising Same-Sex Relationships‖, 
http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/editorial.html (Retrieved:  9 December 1999). 
131  Human Rights Commission, ―Same-Sex Couples And The Law‖ (28 April 2000): 12. 
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Obviously, in the human rights arena, NGOs can play a hugely 
significant role. Dame Silvia Cartwright, former Governor-General of New 
Zealand, has described NGOs as the ―indefatigable‖ organisations who 
have a ―vibrancy and raw energy‖ which assists them in playing a vital 
role in a range of issues in New Zealand, including human rights 
matters.132 
NGOs tend to be single-issue groups with a narrowly targeted mandate 
and a very small constituency.133 At the same time, however, the 
cumulative and collaborative effect can be impressive. Many NGOs are 
very professional, and the shape or the size of wealth of a specific 
organisation should not be the way of measuring the worth of NGOs 
either individually or collectively. ―Small organisations can add some real 
value to the social debate‖.134 
Unfortunately, the role of the NGO can be either: 
1. devalued, in which case they, or their ideas, are dismissed on the 
basis that these groups are not representative; or  
2. shunned, on the basis that they are nothing more than annoyances 
who get in the way of real progress. 
In human rights terms, there is nothing to say that lobby groups have to 
be representative of a view held by a certain number of people. For 
example, if marriage is a civil right within society generally, and if some 
same-sex couples wish to marry, then there should be no need to prove 
that a particular number or percentage of same-sex couples wish to 
marry before their claim is validated. Thus, it is the role of NGOs to keep 
the issue alive – and, because of their usual fundamental beliefs and 
passions, this they are able to do particularly well. 
I was particularly encouraged to learn that federal Canadian NGOs can 
be granted federal Government funding to challenge federal laws which 
                                                 
132  Cartwright, Dame Silvia, Governor-General of New Zealand, Speech to the United 
Nations Association of New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand (25 May 2001). 
133  Marshall, Steve, ―The Case Of New Zealand‖, in The Role Of Civil Society In 
Promoting Decent Work: Lessons From Innovative Partnerships In Ireland, New 
Zealand And South Africa, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva (2000). 
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may be seen by these groups to be in contravention of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.135 The funding can be substantial, and 
in looking at the Canadian response to marriage for same-sex couples, 
can be instrumental in assisting with significant advances. EGALE 
Canada, an organisation that receives federal funding, has played a huge 
role in the successes in achieving same-sex marriage in Canada. 
 
Domestic Application Of International Law 
It is a recognised principle that no Parliament can bind future 
Parliaments – the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. However, 
human rights laws have become an integral part of the legal climate of 
New Zealand. Not only has this been recognised within New Zealand, but 
also New Zealand has been proud of its internationally recognised status 
as an international leader in the human rights area. 
Human rights principles and provisions have become a strong 
component of the fabric of New Zealand society (in terms of both 
legislation and practice). It is reasonable, therefore, for persons living in 
New Zealand to hold every expectation that the New Zealand 
Government in particular, and Parliament in general, will respect the 
obligations to which it agreed when ratifying the relevant conventions (in 
this case, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)).  
Interestingly, the very reason that the ICCPR and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were 
drafted separately is that the ICCPR was seen as creating rights which 
would be immediately enforceable, whereas the ICESCR imposed an 
obligation to ―take steps … with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realisation of the rights‖.136 This is not to hierarchise the importance of 
the respective covenants, but merely to emphasise the point that 
                                                                                                                                     
134  Marshall, Steve, ―The Case of New Zealand‖, in The Role Of Civil Society In 
Promoting Decent Work: Lessons From Innovative Partnerships In Ireland, New 
Zealand And South Africa, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva (2000). 
135  Conversation with Laurie Arron, (then) Executive Director, EGALE Canada. 
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Parliaments were aware of the obligations they were accepting at the 
time of signature and ratification of international human rights treaties. 
The notion that individuals in New Zealand can reasonably expect that 
Parliament will respond actively and positively to the obligations under 
international law is even more real when it is considered that the New 
Zealand Parliament has not negated this expectation through any form 
of legislation. In fact, subsequent to its ratification of various 
international covenants, Parliament has expressed a commitment to 
international human rights laws generally and, in the context of this 
issue, the ICCPR in particular, in legislation and policy and practice.  
 
Legitimate Expectation 
The principle of legitimate expectation has come to be recognised in 
several areas of the law over recent years. Case law has already 
established that an expectation can arise on the basis of express or 
implied undertakings to persons affected that other people will act in a 
particular way. The principle has been discussed and applied in the 
context of the application of international law standards and provisions 
in the domestic legal jurisdictions. In the main, this discussion has 
occurred in the context of administrative decision-making where the 
provisions of relevant international human rights treaties may give rise 
to a legitimate expectation that certain matters will be taken into 
account by Government officials. 
In general terms, by the acts of accession to, or ratification of, 
international human rights instruments a Parliament communicates its 
implied commitment to the standards provided by those instruments.137 
By expressly affirming its commitment to those international human 
                                                                                                                                     
136  ICESCR: Art.2(1): Lallah, Justice Rajsoomer, ―Developing Human Rights 
Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms‖, at 
the Judicial Colloquium in Bangalore (24-26 February 1988): 7. 
137  ―Accession: Accession is the usual method by which a State, which has not taken 
part in the negotiations or signed the Treaty, may subsequently consent to be bound 
by its terms‖; ―Ratification: Ratification is an act by which the State expresses its 
definitive consent to be bound by the treaty. Then, the State Party must respect the 
provisions of the treaty and must implement it‖: Council of Europe, ‗Glossary on the 
Treaties‘, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/v3Glossary.asp (Retrieved: 12-
Aug-2009). 
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rights instruments in legislation, a Parliament expressly gives notice of 
its intention to be bound by those international standards. Unless such 
implied or express commitment is negated in some way, as is the case in 
Australian law but not in New Zealand law, it can be argued that 
Parliament has raised in its citizens a legitimate expectation that it and 
its Governments will act to honour those commitments. 
 
Legitimate expectation in the Australian context 
In general terms, fundamental human rights, by their very definition are 
international and ―attach to the human person because of that 
humanness‖.138 This implies that, as an overarching principle, any 
country should respect fundamental human rights. Where any country 
is a signatory to specific international human rights treaties the 
obligation to respect those rights must be even more imperative. 
It is accepted practice, however, that only the customary elements of 
international law are automatically incorporated into the domestic law of 
any country which ratifies international treaties:139 
Some parts of international law can, as a matter of common law, apply 
[domestically] without any further action on the part of anyone. … under 
common law, customary rules, and particularly principles of human rights, 
such as the principle against genocide and so on, are part of customary 
international law. 
Other (express) provisions of international treaties are incorporated into 
domestic law only to the extent expressly provided by domestic 
legislation:140 
Ratification of the ICCPR as an executive act has no direct legal effect upon 
domestic law; the rights and obligations contained in the ICCPR are not 
incorporated into Australian law unless and until specific legislation is 
passed implementing the provision.  
                                                 
138  Kirby, Justice Michael, ―The Role Of The Judge In Advancing Human Rights By 
Reference To International Human Rights Norms‖, at the Judicial Colloquium in 
Bangalore (24-26 February 1988): 71. 
139  Hon Elizabeth Evatt, former Chief Judge of the Family Court (Australia), Hansard: 
Parliamentary Debates, SLCRC (16 May 1995). 
140  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292: 305.  
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A Submission of the Attorney-General‘s Department to the Senate Legal 
and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Commonwealth Government 
of Australia stated that Dietrich illustrates that treaties, particularly 
those dealing with human rights, can be used: 
• to resolve uncertainty or ambiguity in the common law; 
• to support review of earlier decisions and then possibly their 
overtaking; and 
• to assist in the determination of community values and standards 
relevant to the development of the common law. 
More recently, however, the High Court of Australia has identified a 
further indirect effect of treaties on domestic law. In Minister for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, the High Court held (by a 
majority of 4:1) that ratification of an international convention by the 
Executive can create a legitimate expectation that the Executive will act 
in accordance with the convention:141 
[R]atification of a convention is a positive statement by the Executive 
Government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the 
Executive Government and its agencies will act in accordance with the 
Convention. That positive statement is an adequate foundation for a 
legitimate expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the 
contrary, that administrative decision-makers will act in conformity with the 
Convention … and treat the best interests of the children as a “primary 
consideration”. 
On 10 May 1995, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the 
Attorney-General issued a joint statement on the Teoh decision, stating 
that:  
1. the Court in Teoh, by holding that:142 
merely entering into a treaty could give rise to a legitimate expectation 
that government decision-makers would make decisions consistently 
with Australia‟s obligations under the treaty. 
                                                 
141  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353: 374. 
142  ―International Treaties And The High Court Decision In Teoh‖, a Joint Statement by 
the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Senator Gareth Evans) and the Attorney-General 
(Michael Lavarch) (10 May 1995). 
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had developed a new way in which treaties could affect some 
administrative decisions; 
2. only a small number of treaties could give rise to the sort of 
expectation the Court had outlined, but the Court had not given 
guidance on how decision-makers were to determine which treaty 
provisions were relevant; 
3. this created an undesirable uncertainty; 
4. the Australian Government would be taking action to restore the 
position to what it was understood to be before the Teoh case; and 
5. the action would be by way of legislation to make clear that: 
entering into an international treaty is not reason for raising any 
expectation that Government decision-makers will act in accordance 
with the treaty if the relevant provisions of that treaty have not been 
enacted into domestic Australian law. It is not legitimate, for the 
purpose of applying Australian law to expect that the provisions of a 
treaty not incorporated by legislation should be applied by decision-
makers. 
On 28 June 1995 the Administrative Decisions (Effect of International 
Instruments) Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives. The 
key provision of the Bill stated that: 
The fact that Australia is bound by, or party to, a particular international 
instrument, or that an enactment reproduces or refers to a particular 
international instrument, does not give rise to a legitimate expectation, on the 
part of any person, that: 
(a) an administrative decision will be made in conformity with the 
requirements of that instrument; or 
(b)  if the decision were to be made contrary to any of those requirements, 
any person affected by the decision would be given notice and an 
adequate opportunity to present a case against the taking of such a 
course. 
In effect, the Government of Australia had overturned the Teoh decision 
and reverted to the pre-Teoh position whereby treaties could be used to 
supplement an understanding of domestic law, but their provisions 
would not be seen as part of Australian domestic law. 
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Legitimate expectation in the New Zealand context 
The situation in New Zealand is somewhat different. The notion that 
there might legitimately be an expectation that New Zealand will adhere 
to its agreed obligations under international law is supported in several 
ways: 
• In Tavita v Minister of Immigration,143 the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal found that international treaty obligations might be an 
implied relevant consideration in administrative decision-making.144 
Tavita was eventually permitted to stay in New Zealand and the 
immigration policies were reviewed for compliance with New 
Zealand‘s international obligations. 
• The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states in its Short Title that it is: 
An Act –  
To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in New Zealand; and 
To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
• The legislation of the sunset clause in the Human Rights Act 1993, 
and the subsequent work undertaken in relation to ―Consistency 
2000‖ and ―Compliance 2001‖ and eventuating in amendments to 
various legislation by way of the Relationships (Statutory) References 
Act 2005, serves as further evidence of the New Zealand Parliament‘s 
intention to adhere to international human rights standards in the 
domestic jurisdiction. The sunset clause demonstrates that 
Parliament intended that Government (and Parliament) would 
ensure, through the auspices of the Human Rights Commission, that 
legislation would comply with the HRA (as the domestic 
manifestation of international human rights standards).145 
                                                 
143  Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257. Note that the Court in Tavita 
did not make a substantive decision in the immigration case, referring the 
consideration back to the Minister of Immigration for a decision. 
144  In this case, under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
145 Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1)(i): ―To examine, before the 31st day of December 
1998, the Acts and regulations that are in force in New Zealand, and any policy or 
administrative practice of the Government of New Zealand‖. 
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• The Executive Government of New Zealand signed and ratified the 
ICCPR. 
• The Executive Government of New Zealand has not expressly 
negated its signed intention to ―promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and freedoms‖,146 and other provisions 
of the ICCPR. 
This would imply that the Executive Government of New Zealand has 
given, and has affirmed, a commitment to (amongst other provisions): 
… recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world – The Preamble to the ICCPR. 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, 
each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary 
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions 
of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognised in the present Covenant – 
Article 2.2. 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth, or other status – Article 26. 
It is important to note that the obligations to recognise, respect and 
promote rights under the ICCPR do not carry with them the same 
qualifications as do those of the ICESCR. That is, under the ICCPR, 
Parliament has undertaken to ―take the necessary steps … to give effect 
to the rights‖. Under the ICESCR, Parliament has undertaken to ―take 
                                                                                                                                     
 Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1)(j): ―To determine, before the 31st day of December 
1998, whether any of the Acts, regulations, policies, and practices examined under 
paragraph (i) of this subsection conflict with the provisions of Part II of this Act or 
infringe the spirit or intention of this Act‖. 
 Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1)(k): ―To report to the Minister, before the close of the 
31st day of December 1998, the results of the examination carried out under 
paragraph (i) of this subsection and the details of any determination made under 
paragraph (j) of this subjection‖. 
146  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Preamble. 
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steps … to the maximum available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realisation of the rights‖. 
Add to these matters, the facts that New Zealand has: 
• a long-standing record of formal involvement in international human 
rights, having entered into participation with the United Nations in 
the middle of last century; 
• led the world in some human rights matters (for example, being the 
first nation in the word to grant women the vote in 1893, 
implementing innovative youth and family legislation in 1989);  
• entered into the international arena as a staunch supporter of 
human rights, commenting on human rights abuses in other 
countries, and acting in a peace-keeping role under the auspices of 
the United Nations. 
In other words, taking into account all the matters raised above, New 
Zealand citizens can reasonably expect that, as a good international 
player, the New Zealand Government and Parliament will generally 
recognise, respect and promote human rights, and specifically uphold 
the provisions of international law to which Parliament has acceded. 
These provisions include obligations to actively pursue legislative 
measures to promote equality under the law for its citizens, and 
eliminate discrimination against its citizens.  
 
International promotion of adherence to human rights standards in New 
Zealand  
It is recognised that, as a general rule, States parties are able to choose 
their method of implementation of international standards within their 
own territories. However, this general rule has been qualified by the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee which states:147 
... implementation does not depend solely on constitutional or legislative 
enactments, which in themselves are often not per se sufficient. The 
                                                 
147  United Nations Human Rights Committee, ―General Comment No.3 – Implementation 
at the National Level Article 2‖ (31 July 1981). 
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Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States parties to 
the fact that the obligation under the Covenant [ICCPR] is not confined to the 
respect of human rights, but that States parties have also undertaken to 
ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all individuals under their 
jurisdiction. This aspect calls for specific activities by the States parties to 
enable individuals to enjoy their rights. 
Specifically in relation to New Zealand, the Committee expressed its:148 
... regret that certain rights guaranteed under the Covenant are not reflected 
in the Bill of Rights, and that it does not repeal earlier inconsistent 
legislation, and has no higher status than ordinary legislation. The 
Committee notes that it is expressly possible, under the terms of the Bill of 
Rights, to enact legislation contrary to its provisions and regrets that this 
appears to have been done in a few cases. ... The Committee recommends 
that the Bill of Rights be revised in order to bring it into full consistency with 
the provisions of the Covenant and to give the courts the power as soon as 
possible to strike down or decline to give effect to legislation on the ground of 
inconsistency with Covenant rights and freedoms as affirmed in the Bill of 
Rights. 
By ratifying the ICCPR and the Option Protocol to the ICCPR, the New 
Zealand Parliament has accepted a range of obligations in relation to the 
implementation of human rights in New Zealand. Although New Zealand 
has moved forward in many respects, there is still obviously a great deal 
of work still to be done. 
 
Summary 
Elements of customary international law can be incorporated into 
domestic law without any further action by anyone. 
Even where a country becomes a signatory to an international treaty 
such as the ICCPR, the provisions of the treaty are not specifically 
applicable in that country‘s domestic law unless those provisions are 
expressly incorporated into domestic law. 
                                                 
148  United Nations Human Rights Committee, ―Comments on New Zealand, U.N.Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.47 (1995): Comments in response to ‗Human Rights in New 
Zealand: New Zealand's Third Report to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee on Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights‘ ‖, considered by the Committee on 23 and 24 March 1995. 
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However, ratification of an international treaty is a positive statement by 
the Executive Government of a country to the people of that country that 
the Executive Government of that country will act in accordance with the 
treaty, and will recognise, respect and promote human rights. 
That positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate 
expectation that administrative decision-makers will act in conformity 
with the convention unless there are express executive or statutory 
indications to the contrary. 
The international human rights community considers that New Zealand, 
by acceding to international human rights standards, has accepted an 
obligation to actively pursue equality for all individuals under its 
jurisdiction. 
The Government and Parliament of New Zealand continue to express its 
view that New Zealand is a firm believer in the value of adherence to 
human rights standards, and have negated neither the expectations of 
New Zealanders nor the expectations of the international communities 
that New Zealand will comply with its accepted human rights standards 
– both domestic and international. 
Same-sex couples can therefore reasonably expect that the New Zealand 
Government and Parliament will actively pursue legislative measures 
which recognise, respect and promote the rights of same-sex couples to 
full and equal treatment under New Zealand law, free from any 
discrimination. 
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Part III 
 
CHRONOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this Part, I show that New Zealand, once a leader in rights-based 
issues, in terms of equal treatment of same-sex couples, now lags behind 
many other countries. Initially, as Chapter 6 will show, New Zealand 
demonstrated a commitment to international human rights standards, 
and in the 1990s legislated for a strong domestic human rights legal 
framework. In the final analysis, however, as Chapters 8 and 9 will show 
in the context of same-sex marriage, that New Zealand has fallen behind 
many other countries in two main respects: 
• First, New Zealand still does not offer access to equal marriage 
rights, while 13 overseas jurisdictions do. 
• Second, New Zealand does not permit same-sex couples to apply to 
adopt children, whereas many overseas jurisdictions provide 
adoption rights. In many cases, these rights exist even where 
relationship recognition is by way of registered partnerships rather 
than marriage. 
This Part provides a commentary on, and an analysis of, progress 
towards equal recognition of same-sex relationships and associated 
family-related matters in New Zealand and a number of overseas 
jurisdictions. In dong this I consider the deliberations and outcomes of 
court cases in these various jurisdictions, and legislative changes which 
have enhanced or detracted from the provision of equal access to 
marriage. 
Chapter 6 (the period up to 1993) provides an historical background to 
the laws in New Zealand with regard to gays and lesbians as individuals, 
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how the notion of family is constructed in New Zealand law, and the 
introduction of human rights protections. I then look at early 
developments in Canada, the United States of America, and Denmark, 
and some introductory information about South Africa. Although this 
information may start at different times with regard to individual 
jurisdictions, by the time the reader commences Chapter 7 the 
information on all relevant jurisdictions will have reached the same point 
in time. This chapter will also show that, in comparison with the other 
jurisdictions referred to, New Zealand has a favourable human rights 
climate for progress on the equal marriage issue. 
Chapter 7 (the period from 1994 to 2000) provides information and 
analysis on the Quilter same-sex marriage case in New Zealand, the 
reticence of New Zealand Government in making positive change, and 
same-sex marriage court cases in Canada, and the United States of 
America.  
Chapter 8 (the period from 2001 to 2006) provides information and 
analysis on the Joslin Communication, and the significant developments 
in Canada, South Africa and Massachusetts with regard to the provision 
of equal access to marriage fort same-sex couples.   
Chapter 9 (the period from 2007 to the present) functions as a ‘post-
script’ only. I do not enter into an in-depth analysis of developments in 
New Zealand or any of the overseas jurisdictions in this chapter, but 
rather provide some summary information that the reader may choose to 
follow up in more detail for their own interest.  
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NEW ZEALAND 
Homosexuality and the law in New Zealand 
Historical origins 
In general terms, the laws inherited by New Zealand from England have 
perpetuated the ideology upon which they were based – the Canon Law 
origins of our current legal system. The laws, along with the attitudes 
inherent in the system which dealt with those laws, grew from the Christian 
ideals of the time and perpetuated this ideology. This was, of course, no 
different with regard to the laws relating to sexual behaviour. 
The foundation of modern legal attitudes towards sexual behaviour 
generally, and homosexuality specifically, lies in Christian Roman sources 
such as imperial legislation. In 390AD, the three Emperors of the time, 
Theodosius, Valentinian II and Arcadius, promulgated a law which 
prescribed the death penalty for anal intercourse. This law, it seems, was 
designed to eliminate male prostitution but appears to have been enforced 
very rarely.1 More significantly, the death penalty, for those who 
participated in “works of lewdness with their own sex”, was incorporated 
into the „Corpus juris civilis‟.2 Emperor Justinian ordered the 
development of a collection of various legal documents as part of which 
the Justinian Code was developed. As Emperor Justinian himself 
oversaw a raft of legal reforms, a revised version of the Code was 
promulgated in 534AD. The Code:3 
… flatly outlawed same-sex intimacy, placing it in the same category as 
divorce and adultery - all of which violated the Christian ideal of 
companionate different-sex marriage. 
                                                          
1 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 31. 
2  Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 32. Note, 
the Corpus juris civilis was a collection of fundamental jurisprudential works issued 
by, or under the order of, the Eastern Roman Emperor, Justinian I, between 529AD 
and 534AD. 
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Over time, various Novellae were added to the Code. In 538AD, Emperor 
Justinian added Novel 77 calling for the repentance of homosexuals and 
warning that “because of such crimes there are famines, earthquakes, 
and pestilences”.4 From this stemmed the concept of homosexuality 
causing (and therefore being blameworthy for) things that went wrong in 
society. This was further reinforced with Emperor Justinian's addition of 
Novell 141 in 544AD. This Novell arose out of a belief that the plague that 
devastated Constantinople occurred because God had been provoked by 
“the multitude of sins in the city” 5 such as “the defilement of males 
which some men sacrilegiously and impiously dare to attempt, 
perpetrating vile acts upon other men”.6 Subsequently, Emperor 
Justinian did not apply the death penalty; in practice offenders were 
castrated. However, the death penalty remained on the Byzantine law 
books and was periodically restated.7 
The „Corpus juris civilis‟ of sixth century Rome, promulgated by Emperor 
Justinian, formed the basis of canon law (the law of the Christian 
Church) and civil law in England and Europe.8 
In what remained of the Western Empire, the Visigoth state in Spain, 
same-sex intimacy was criminalised in about 650AD.9 
It appears that same-sex unions were sanctioned by the Roman Catholic 
and Greek Orthodox Churches for some years to come. However, the 
precise nature of the unions is unclear, perhaps because of increasing 
pressure for these relationships to be hidden or suppressed. What is 
clear is that the ceremonies for the „enfraternising‟ of missionaries and 
clerics were virtually identical to the liturgies which were later to be used 
by the Church for different-sex marriages.10 
                                                                                                                                                               
3 Eskridge, William N., Jnr, “A History Of Same-Sex Marriage” in [1993] 79 Virginia 
Law Review 1419: 1449. 
4 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 32. 
5 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 32. 
6 Novel 141 cited in: Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New 
York (1979): 32. 
7 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 33. 
8 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 32. 
9 Eskridge, William N., Jnr, “A History of Same-Sex Marriage” in [1993] 79 Virginia 
Law Review 1419: 1449. 
10 Eskridge, William N., Jnr, “A History of Same-Sex Marriage” in [1993] 79 Virginia 
Law Review 1419: 1451. 
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In the intervening period there was a vagueness about the exact nature of 
the laws of Emperor Justinian. In 1140, Gratian, a Camoldolese monk, 
put together a collection of canon laws pertaining to sexual prohibitions, 
and it was at this stage that much ambiguity was enshrined in the laws. 
Through an unwillingness to describe the sexual activities being 
outlawed, the canon lawyers of the time used broad terms. Consequently, 
the term “buggery” was equated with “sodomy”, and “sodomy” was 
equated with “homosexual activity”. In fact “bouggerie” (“buggery”) was a 
term originally applied to the heresy of the late-medieval groups known 
as Bulgars (also known as Albigensians or Cathars) 11 and had no 
connection to sexual activity. Later the term „buggery‟ came to be used 
interchangeably with „sodomy‟. 
During this time, same-sex relationships continued to be sanctioned by 
the Church, separate from the secular realm, with ceremonies being 
performed in the Church in the early Middle Ages.12 Indeed, Boswell 
maintains that the Church did not begin to celebrate different-sex 
marriages “at the Church altar” until the thirteenth century.  
In the sixteenth century Western Europe became divided into the 
Catholic and Protestant camps and much of the legislation of the Church 
became transferred to the State.  
 
England perpetuates the denial of homosexuality 
The earliest English secular legislation against homosexual acts dates 
from 1533 under Henry VIII. Prior to that, laws deriving from Roman 
Christian law had been incorporated into English Canon law. Henry VIII‟s 
laws classified buggery as a felony, the term “buggery” being used to 
include same-sex activity like mutual masturbation, anal intercourse, as 
well as bestiality. The penalty for breach of the laws included death, loss 
of goods, and loss of lands.13 The same statute was renewed by each 
succeeding Parliament before being made perpetual in 1540. It was from 
                                                          
11 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 34. 
12 Eskridge, William N., Jnr, “A History of Same-Sex Marriage” in [1993] 79 Virginia 
Law Review 1419: 1453. 
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the time of these laws that the systematic oppression of homosexuality, 
and homosexuals, in England began.14 
Legal commentators continued to express their abhorrence of 
homosexuality. In the seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke wrote 
vehemently against homosexuality as well as other forms of “detestable 
and abominable sins ... not to be named”.15 In the early 18th century:16  
… persecution aimed at male homosexuals because they were homosexuals, 
part of the new category of people being created, began on an 
unprecedented scale. Initially it took the form of raids which resulted in the 
arrest and prosecution of groups of men frequenting London's „Molly 
Houses‟. In place of trials of individual “deviants” – the old norm for cases of 
sodomy – whole groups of men were prosecuted in collective trials in 1699, 
1707 and 1726. Convictions resulted in the death penalty. And in the trials 
it became clear that these men were viewed as sinners who freely and 
knowingly chose to sin. Homosexuality was beginning to be seen as the 
activity peculiar to a group of people - homosexuals. 
In the 1760s, Blackstone continued the writings about the “crime against 
nature” and “a crime not fit to be named” in his „Commentaries on the 
Laws of England”.17 However, it was noticeable that convictions were 
difficult to achieve without the evidence of a third party (such as in the 
Molly House cases) because the evidence of a person consenting to a 
homosexual act announced them as an accomplice and therefore equally 
guilty of the crime. In spite of these difficulties, the laws remained on the 
books.18 
                                                                                                                                                               
13 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 34. 
14 In 1541, the Reverend Nicholas Udall, the then Headmaster of Eton was charged 
with committing buggery. He confessed his guilt, was committed to prison, and 
dismissed from his Headmastership: Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, 
Meridian Books, New York (1979): 34; 
 In 1631, the Earl of Castlehaven was charged with committing sodomy with one of 
his servants as well as raping his own wife and sodomising her. The charges were 
brought by his son, who was fearful that his father's lover would receive part of his 
father's estate. The Earl was found guilty and was executed: Bullough, V., 
Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 35. 
15 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 35. 
16 Workers' Power (Britain), Lesbian and Gay Liberation: A Trotskyist Strategy 
(Workers' Power (Britain), London, 1991): 10. 
17 Written between 1765 and 1769: Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian 
Books, New York (1979): 36. 
18 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 37. 
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In Britain homosexual acts between males remained punishable by death 
until 1861. But there was a change in the law in that year to make those 
involved in such activities liable merely to prison sentences.19  
It is ironic to note that “the first major change in the English laws 
relating to homosexuality came not from any deep philosophical 
commitment, however, but simply through accident”.20 In 1885, the 
English Parliament passed a series of laws, proposed by a Liberal MP, 
Henry Labouchere, designed to eliminate child prostitution. In draft, the 
legislation related only to sexual acts with girls. A last minute 
amendment was added, purportedly intended to include, in the 
legislation, sexual acts by men with boys. The legislation now provided 
that:21 
Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the 
commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any 
male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at 
the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding one 
year with or without hard labour. 
The effect of the amendment was to punish acts between consenting 
adult males (though not females), even if those acts took place in private. 
By this Act, sexual acts between adult males were criminalised for the 
first time in English law. This was also the first time that the concept of 
homosexuality was specifically separated out from the concept of 
sodomy. 
Although Labouchere claimed to have had only minors in mind, it is 
unclear whether the amendment was as lacking in deliberacy as may 
first appear to be the case. Victorian English attitudes were such that 
sexual behaviour was seen to be a male domain. Thus laws regulating 
“deviant” sexual behaviour pertained to males only. Queen Victoria 
herself is quoted as commenting that „women did not partake in sexual 
activity, only men‟, and that such activity was the “shadow-side of 
                                                          
19  Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  
20 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 39-40. 
21 Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979): 40. 
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marriage”.22 The result was that, at the time male homosexuality was 
criminalised, lesbianism was not.  
There have been two main effects stemming from all of the above. First, 
there has long been, and continues to be, a confusion regarding the laws 
against sodomy and the laws against homosexuality with the two often 
being equated. They were not, and are not, the same. The second effect 
was that anti-homosexual legislation in Britain was consolidated. 
As a result, male homosexuality has historically been seen by, and 
reflected in, the law as a criminal deviance from the sexual norms of 
society. It is for this reason that aspects of the life of the gay male have 
been dealt with either negatively or, at best, repressively. 
The conservative interpretation based in a Western Christian heritage 
has condemned homosexuality and homosexual relationships to, at best, 
a lesser level of recognition and acknowledgement than heterosexuality 
and heterosexual relationships and, at worst, to criminalisation and 
therefore, often, invisibility or hatred. Laws have therefore legitimated 
and perpetuated this condemnatory approach.  
 
The law and homosexuality in New Zealand 
Homosexuality, as a personal characteristic, has never been illegal in 
New Zealand for men or for women – that is, it has never been illegal to 
be homosexual. However, all homosexual behaviour between consenting 
adult males was made a criminal behaviour by the New Zealand Criminal 
Code Act 1893. As in England, lesbian sexual behaviour has never been 
classed as criminal behaviour.  
The New Zealand House of Representatives criminalised anal intercourse 
in the Offences Against the Person Act 1867 under the Part heading 
within the Act of “Unnatural Offences”. The 1867 Act followed the English 
reform of 1861 and mandated a sentence of life imprisonment rather 
                                                          
22 Pearsall, R., Public Purity, Private Shame: Victorian Sexual Hypocrisy Exposed, 
Weiderfield & Nicholson, London (1976): 37. 
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than death, as had been the prescribed sentence in England up to this 
time.23  
Sodomy and bestiality – Whosoever shall be convicted of the abominable 
crime of buggery committed either with mankind or any animal shall be 
liable at the discretion of the Court to be kept in penal servitude for life or for 
any term not less than ten years. 
The 1867 New Zealand legislation also provided for penalties of between 
three and ten years for any attempt to commit “an infamous crime” – 
attempted buggery, assault with intent to commit buggery, or indecent 
assault upon a male:24 
Attempt to commit an infamous crime – Whosoever shall attempt to commit 
the said abominable crime or shall be guilty of any assault with intent to 
commit the same or of any indecent assault upon any male person shall be 
liable at the discretion of the Court to be kept in penal servitude for any term 
not exceeding ten years and not less than three years or to be imprisoned for 
any term not exceeding two years with or without hard labour. 
English law was amended in 1885 to ensure specific criminalisation of all 
sexual activity between males. This included oral sex and mutual 
masturbation, as well as anal intercourse. New Zealand attempted to 
make a similar amendment through its Crimes Bill of 1888. The attempt 
failed.  
However, New Zealand did continue to treat buggery as a „crime against 
morality‟ within the Criminal Code Act 1893 s.136:25 
Everyone is liable to imprisonment with hard labour for life, and, according 
to his age, to be flogged or whipped once, twice or thrice, who commits 
buggery either with a human being or with any other living creature. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Offences Against the Person Act 1867 s.58. 
24 Offences Against the Person Act 1867 s.59. 
25 Criminal Code Act 1893 s.136. Note: The „shoulder‟ of the printed Act provides that 
this provision relates to an “Unnatural offence”. 
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The 1893 Act also provided, in s.137 that:26 
Every one is liable to ten years‟ imprisonment with hard labour, and, 
according to his age, to be flogged or whipped once, twice, or thrice, who –  
(1) Attempts to commit buggery; or 
(2) Assaults any person with intent to commit buggery; or 
(3) Who being a male indecently assaults any other male. 
It shall be no defence to an indictment for an indecent assault on a male of 
any age that he consented to the act of indecency. 
Up to this point, the laws relating to “unnatural offences” (the „buggery‟ 
laws) had been gender-neutral. Section 137 of the 1893 Act, for the first 
time, made express reference to male-to-male sexual activity, and 
prescribed such to be criminal activity. Only men could be charged with 
an indecent assault; the possibility of female-to-female sexual activity 
was a legal non-issue. 
In 1941, the penalty of flogging was repealed (although the penalty of life 
imprisonment remained in place until 1961),27 and the requirement for 
hard labour was repealed in 1954.28 Following the implementation of the 
Crimes Act 1961, “indecent assault on man or boy” carried a maximum 
penalty of five years imprisonment, and sodomy seven years. It is said 
that such offences were “taken seriously” until the 1980s, with numerous 
convictions for adult homosexual activity.29 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, social attitudes were generally changing. 
Historically, New Zealand had held itself out to be, and had been seen 
widely as, a leader in liberal reform in many social areas.30 It was not 
                                                          
26 Criminal Code Act 1893 s.137. Note: The „shoulder‟ of the printed Act provides that 
these provisions relate to any “Attempt to commit unnatural offence”. 
27 Crimes Amendment Act 1941 s.3(1). 
28 Criminal Justice Act 1954 s.54(1). 
29 Greg Newbold, Crime and Deviance, Oxford University Press, Auckland (1992): 68: 
(50 convictions and 14 prison sentences in 1973). 
30  For example, on 19 September 1893, New Zealand was the first country in the world 
to introduce the vote for women (Electoral Act 1893) and, in 1898 was the first 
country in the world to introduce a universal superannuation for persons over the 
age of 65 years (Old Age Pensions Act 1898). New Zealand has also been seen as a 
world leader in domestic race relations and in the international human rights arena. 
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extraordinary, therefore, when in 1967, Parliament was petitioned to 
decriminalise homosexual activity. The petition was unsuccessful,31 
however, there were soon to be further attempts. 
In 1974, Venn Young (National Party MP for Waitotara) introduced a 
Crimes Amendment Bill. This Bill proposed a decriminalisation of sexual 
activity between consensual adult males with an age of consent of 21 
years (the age of consent for heterosexuals being 16 years). This Bill was 
opposed, on the one hand, by those who described homosexuality as an 
“unnatural habit” 32 or who considered that by decriminalising 
homosexuality, Parliament would be “seen to condone or accept 
homosexuality”.33 On the other hand, the Bill was opposed by those who 
supported decriminalisation but did not support an unequal age of 
consent. In July 1975, the Bill was reported back to the House with the 
age of consent reduced from 21 to 20. However, the Bill was defeated in 
its Third Reading by 34 votes to 29 (23 abstentions).34 
In 1979, Warren Freer (Labour MP for Mt Albert) proposed a further 
Crimes Amendment Bill to decriminalise homosexuality with an age of 
consent of 20 years. The Bill did not receive widespread support and was 
later abandoned before being introduced to the House.35 
Alongside the proposals for decriminalisation, there had also been a 
proposal to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. Parliament 
never got to vote on this proposal either. MPs were lobbied by gay 
activists, but the proposal failed as a result of insufficient support for its 
inclusion.36 
Even though these reform proposals were unsuccessful, social change 
was evident. One of the noticeable changes was that, commencing in 
                                                          
31 Greg Newbold, Crime and Deviance, Oxford University Press, Auckland (1992): 69. 
32  Hon Michael Connelly, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, 1974, 392: 3167. 
33  Bill Birch (National Party MP for Franklin), NZPD, 1975, 399: 2821. 
34  Hugh Young, “A Chronicle of Homosexuality in New Zealand: Part 2” at 
http://www.gaynz.net.nz/history/Part2.html (Retrieved: 21 July 2009). 
35  Guy, Laurie, Worlds In Collision: The Gay Debate In New Zealand, 1960-1986, 
Victoria Press, Wellington (2002): 113. 
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about 1970, there was an increase in the number of gay groups, 
organisations and events not only in the main centres of New Zealand 
but also in the regional centres.37 The main significance of these 
organisations and the events in which they held is that for the first time 
in the history of New Zealand, there was beginning to be a co-ordinated 
voice for gay and lesbian issues and concerns. The invisibilisation of gays 
and lesbians was beginning to come to an end as gays and lesbians 
refused to remain silent. This was especially challenging for gay men – it 
meant not just publicly declaring oneself to be a member of a socially 
stigmatised group, it meant openly declaring oneself to be someone who 
participated in a criminalised activity within New Zealand society.38  
There were increasing examples of the gay and lesbian voice responding 
to homophobic expression.  
At 9:00pm on 1 February 1980, the Police raided the “Westside” Sauna 
and “Out!” magazine in Auckland, interviewed 30 men, and then arrested 
and charged 8 of them. Then, on 8 February 1980, 600 people 
participated in a march to protest at the Police raids.39 The establishment 
of the Auckland Gay Task Force was a direct response to the Police raid 
of the “Westside” Sauna. 
When, in September 1980, the Chief Human Rights Commissioner 
supported the rejection of the National Gay Rights Coalition‟s call for 
decriminalisation and an equal age of consent, stating that in some 
circumstances discrimination is justified, the response was a picket of 
the Human Rights Commission offices in Wellington and Auckland.40 
This was followed by the organised defacing of the March 1981 Census 
forms by writing across them “No rights – no responsibilities”.41 
                                                                                                                                                               
36  Guy, Laurie, Worlds In Collision: The Gay Debate In New Zealand, 1960-1986, 
Victoria Press, Wellington (2002): Note 93 to Chapter 4 (see p.264-265). 
37  For a complete list see: http://www.gaynz.net.nz/history/Chronolheads.html#direct 
(Retrieved: 10 May 2009). 
38  Remembering that no person was a criminal by virtue of being gay, but only by 
virtue of participating in “indecencies between males” – homosexual activity. 
39  Hugh Young, “A Chronicle of Homosexuality in New Zealand: Part 3” at 
http://www.gaynz.net.nz/history/Part3.html (Retrieved: 21 July 2009). 
40  Hugh Young, “A Chronicle of Homosexuality in New Zealand: Part 3” at 
http://www.gaynz.net.nz/history/Part3.html (Retrieved: 21 July 2009). 
41  Hugh Young, “A Chronicle of Homosexuality in New Zealand: Part 3” at 
http://www.gaynz.net.nz/history/Part3.html (Retrieved: 21 July 2009). 
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Gays and lesbians had begun to bring to notice the nature and extent of 
the inequalities in treatment which impacted on them in many facets of 
their everyday lives. They began to gain support from a range of quarters, 
and public reaction towards them became less negative and less actively 
aggressive. That is not to say that society at large was accepting or 
supportive of gay rights – only that, officially, less effort was being put 
into condemning them.  
Criminal prosecutions continued but lessened, and by the 1980s were 
“almost non-existent”.42  
Homosexuality was no longer seen, except by an insignificant minority, 
as a disease or a psychopathic disorder.43 It was now being seen as a 
difference in sexual identity, as part of a range of sexual norms. 
On 8 March 1985, the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was introduced into 
Parliament.44 The Bill, introduced and sponsored by Fran Wilde MP, 
sought the reform of the criminal law relating to homosexual behaviour 
and the introduction of protections for gay men and lesbian women 
against discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation.  As a 
result of this Bill, the preceding actions of the gay and lesbian 
communities, and the energy and commitment of Ms Wilde, homosexual 
activity was decriminalised in a Parliamentary conscience vote in July 
1986 – 49 votes in favour, 44 votes against – with an equal age of consent 
of 16 years.45 The anti-discrimination provisions accompanying the Bill 
were not enacted.  
                                                          
42 Greg Newbold, Crime and Deviance, Oxford University Press, Auckland (1992): 69. 
43  “The American Psychological Association supports the action taken on 15 December 
1973, by the American Psychiatric Association, removing homosexuality from that 
Association's official list of mental disorders. The American Psychological Association 
therefore adopts the following resolution: Homosexuality per se implies no 
impairment in judgement, stability, reliability, or general social and vocational 
capabilities; Further, the American Psychological Association urges all mental health 
professionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long 
been associated with homosexual orientations”, from Conger, J.J., “Proceedings of 
the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, for the year 1974: Minutes of 
the Annual Meeting of the Council of Representatives”, in (1975) 30 American 
Psychologist 620.  
44  Guy, Laurie, Worlds In Collision: The Gay Debate In New Zealand, 1960-1986, 
Victoria Press, Wellington (2002): 194. 
45  Guy, Laurie, Worlds In Collision: The Gay Debate In New Zealand, 1960-1986, 
Victoria Press, Wellington (2002): 218. 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, the New Zealand Parliament had also 
ratified international human rights conventions such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).46 In so doing, New 
Zealand accepted “a responsibility to strive for the promotion and 
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”.47 New 
Zealand also acceded to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant,48 meaning 
that the New Zealand Parliament had accepted the scrutiny of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee into the treatment of individuals 
within the domestic New Zealand jurisdiction, including under Acts of 
Parliament. 
Like many other jurisdictions, the focus up to this point had been on the 
statutory rights of individuals with an emphasis on liberalising the law 
relating to homosexuality and the associated treatment of homosexual 
persons as individuals within society. In other words, drawing once more 
on the analogy to Maslow‟s hierarchy, the focus had been on effective 
change at the most fundamental level, rather than attempting, in any 
real way, to address the higher-level issues such as prohibitions against 
discrimination.49 While the Homosexual Law Reform Bill had originally 
included anti-discrimination provisions, these had been „let go‟ with a 
focus on securing decriminalisation. However, the first hurdle had been 
overcome, and this set the platform for the debate on protections against 
discrimination to continue at a later time.50 
 
The concept of family in New Zealand law 
Judge Inglis in his treatise on family law states that:51 
… it is clear that the development of Family Law in New Zealand has had its 
origins and its impetus in the belief that the stability and security of family 
                                                          
46   The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 
16 December 1966, and entered into force on 23 March 1976. New Zealand ratified 
the ICCPR on 28 December 1978. 
47  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Preamble. 
48 New Zealand acceded to the Optional Protocol on 26 May 1989. 
49  See discussion on this in Chapter 3. 
50  See discussion on this in Chapter 6. 
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means the stability and security of society. As is the case in all social 
legislation, the legislature has never been slow to point out where family 
duties lie and to regulate family politics in a manner which it has considered 
best calculated to promote the general social interest. 
However, despite the presumed link between marriage and the 
constitution of a family, there is no express definition of “family” in New 
Zealand law. The actual definition can only be implied from a variety of 
sources including family law related statutes, case-law, Governmental 
administrative procedures, and various commentaries and social 
practices.  
 
English origins 
The current predominating legal concept of the nuclear family was 
brought to New Zealand with the (mainly English) settlers of the mid-
1800s. The family, in England, had become an established institution 
based around defined economic, psychological, domestic and social 
roles.52  
Economically, the family became a unit of production or earning power. 
In the former, production was important either directly for the family 
itself, or for bartering with other families. In the latter, wage-labour 
became important to enable families to increase their buying power. The 
family unit also ensured the production of a new generation to carry the 
family property, business and name. In England and in New Zealand, 
this patriarchal model generally meant that the oldest son would carry on 
the father's business, inherit the father's property, and inherit the 
father's name, as the family was very much the unit belonging to the 
father. This patriarchal concept suited the power-holders in society in 
that such a structured system meant stability and security by virtue of 
lines of control and predictability.  
                                                                                                                                                               
51 Inglis, B.D., Family Law, Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington (1960): 13. 
52  The categorisations which follow are modified from: Parker, Stephen, The Marriage 
Act 1753: A Case Study In Family Law-Making, Oxford University Press (1987): 138-
140. 
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Psychologically, the family provided a private haven for the husband 
away from the rigours of the public sphere. It allowed for the bond 
between husband and wife, and between children and parents. This 
created a sense of belonging for all, and in that way was also beneficial to 
society. 
Domestically, the requirements dictated by the patriarchal society, were 
catered for, with the breadwinner free to make the vital contact with the 
public world, safe in the knowledge that on the home front all was being 
seen to and that a comfortable home, a good supply of clothing, food, 
warmth would be provided for on his return. The family also provided the 
'mechanisms' by which children could be produced and nurtured in 
order to satisfy the husband's needs for heirs and successors. 
Socially, the family also ensured predictability within these clearly 
defined roles and a structure within which children would gain the 
knowledge perceived as necessary to function as valuable members of 
society. That is, through the family unit the children would absorb the 
culture and behaviours of their society and thereby perpetuate those 
values. 
It is this concept of family that came to New Zealand by virtue of the 
social, legal and religious imperatives carried from England before, 
during, and as a result of, the settler period. This was in spite of the 
quite contrary cultural notions of family which were apparent amongst 
the indigenous peoples of New Zealand and the fact that significant 
numbers of immigrant settlers coming to New Zealand were young single 
men. Of course, there were commonly acceptable exceptions to the 
nuclear family structure but, in general, it was taken for granted that 
young boys would grow up and marry young women, and young girls 
would grow up and marry young men. These couples would move in to 
their own home and raise children to carry the family name and to 
receive the family property. 
Thus, the nuclear family was established as the standard unit of social 
organisation in New Zealand and secured by virtue of the formalisation of 
the institution of marriage by Lord Hardwicke‟s Marriage Act 1753 (UK). 
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Lord Hardwicke‟s Act is significant in that it marked clearly the beginning 
of the civil state‟s intervention into the family and reflected a “growing 
desire for certainty in legal relations within civil society”,53 and led to the 
development of a New Zealand family law. 
The narrow notion of a nuclear family suited the goals and needs of the 
dominant power group. The wider definition of family (such as the 
extended family) was not an unknown concept but, once established, the 
nuclear family became accepted as that which best suits Western society 
generally. 
 
The reality of the non-nuclear family 
The nuclear family is a social and cultural anathema to various groups 
within New Zealand society. 
This is perhaps most clearly demonstrable in relation to Māori social and 
cultural family values and practices.  
For Māori, the family is the hapū – the extended family. Traditionally, 
Māori children view their parents and their uncles and aunties 
collectively as mātua. Their relationships with their cousins and whāngai 
brothers and sisters were seen in relation to the status of the respective 
mātua with some cousins being seen as tuakana, and others as teina. 
Children are the mokopuna of all their koroua and kuia, and they are 
supported by all their koroua and kuia. In turn, as the children grow up 
they would support their ageing kaumātua.54  
In the nuclear family, grandparents, aunts and uncles are generally not 
intimately involved in decision-making issues such as adoption, custody, 
guardianship, access, education and healthcare, in relation to the 
                                                          
53 Parker, Stephen, The Marriage Act 1753: A Case Study in Family Law-Making, 
Oxford University Press (1987): 149. 
54  Mātua – parents and all those caregivers of that generation; whāngai brothers and 
sisters – brothers and sisters adopted in accordance with tikanga Māori, Māori 
customary adoption; tuakana – older sibling; teina – younger sibling; mokopuna – 
grandchild(ren), grand nephew(s) and niece(s), and children of subsequent 
generations; koroua – grandfather(s) and grand uncle(s); kuia – grandmother(s) and 
grand aunt(s); kaumātua – elders, grandparents, grand uncles and aunts. 
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children in those families. However, in the extended family, 
grandparents, aunts and uncles generally do participate directly in 
matters relating to the everyday and the long-term care of the children of 
the family. 
Aside from Māori, where the extended family is the socially and culturally 
accepted norm, many other families do, in way or another, live as an 
extended family, and do not adhere strictly to the nuclear family 
straitjacket. I was brought up, for example, with a great deal of regular 
contact with my aunts and uncles, my cousins, and my grandparents. 
While we did not all live in the same house, we were very much a family 
on a great number of occasions. 
I am aware that there are many other cultures within New Zealand for 
whom the extended family is also the norm. Asian families, for example, 
generally have very strong inter-generational relationships, with 
grandparents and even great-grandparents being very much members of 
the family, living with the family. This could also be said of many other 
groups present within New Zealand. 
In terms of gay and lesbian family structures, prior to realising or coming 
to terms with their own sexuality, some gay men and lesbian women 
might enter into relationships with a partner of the opposite gender. 
There might be children resulting from these relationships. A number of 
gay men and lesbian women will, therefore, enter a same-sex relationship 
bringing with them children from a previous relationship. In this 
situation, the couple view themselves as a family but often the law does 
not. Alternatively, a same-sex couple may have a child or children of their 
own. There are increasing instances of artificial insemination, surrogacy, 
or adoption (whether formal or informal) through which same-sex couples 
are becoming parents. 
 
The family in New Zealand policy 
The traditional nuclear family model, defined almost exclusively in terms 
of marriage, is now a statistical minority. Even though there are many for 
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whom the myth of the “mother, father and 2.3 children” nuclear family 
does not accord with their personal reality, the nuclear family is still seen 
by the State as the norm, and it is this family structure which provides 
the basis for much Government policy. Historically, and to a large extent 
even now, other types of family tend to be defined with reference to that 
benchmark, and Government policy has been based on „massaging‟ 
families into the nuclear family shape.55 
In other words, “different” other family types are judged on the basis of 
how much they are consistent with the dominant view of family, and are 
construed as acceptable to the extent that they replicate that dominant 
type. At the same time, they are deemed to be inferior and unacceptable 
to the extent that they are inconsistent with the dominant type and do 
not replicate it. Families based around relationships other than 
heterosexual marriage relationships tend to be defined in terms of the 
latter relationship, and are seen as deviations from the marriage-based 
family. For example: 
• de facto relationships are described as unions like, or in the nature 
of, marriage; 
• same-sex relationships are described variously as same-sex 
relationships, de facto relationship, relationships in the nature of 
marriage;56 
• single parent families are defined in contrast to married couple 
families; 
• step families are defined in terms of the relationship between the 
parents (and possibly the children of those parents‟ prior 
relationships), and in terms of making up reconstituted families. 
 
                                                          
55   See further discussion on this point and supporting statistical information in the 
next section in this chapter. 
56  For example, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 s.3 includes same-sex partners “living 
in a relationship in the nature of marriage”, and the proposed Property 
(Relationships) Bill 2000, currently before a Parliamentary Select Committee uses 
this same terminology. This is by no means universal, however, and same-sex 
couples are still excluded from most relationship and family-related laws. 
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Family as a nuclear, patriarchal, heterosexual unit 
Statistics New Zealand states that:57 
The family is the most basic unit of organisation in New Zealand society. Its 
fundamental roles include care-giving and socialising family members, in 
addition to supporting those who are dependent on others. Most government 
social policy is administered on the basis of the family unit and families also 
provide a vital indicator of child welfare. 
It is worth considering whether or not the “reasonable man” perspective 
of what constitutes family accords with the reality of the family 
structures and types that actually exist in New Zealand. As O‟Donovan 
has stated:58 
... the word “family” has many meanings and many contexts ... people have 
different experiences of families. For some, these will be validated by law. 
For others, their experiences are ignored or stigmatised ... law privileges 
certain forms and denies recognition and benefits to others, while 
simultaneously denying that a coherent definition exists. 
In general terms, Statistics New Zealand views family as either, or both 
of: 
• a horizontal adult-adult relationship; or 
• a vertical adult-child relationship.59  
However, census data shows that the presumed standard nuclear family 
of Mum, Dad and children is in a distinct minority. New Zealand families 
are, in reality, constituted as follows:60 
• two adults with children – 42.1% (decrease from 48.0% in 1991) 
• one adult with children – 18.9%% (increase from 17.2% in 1991) 
• two adults with no children – 39.0% (increase from 34.8% in 1991) 
                                                          
57  Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Now: Families, Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington (1994): 1. 
58 O‟Donovan, K., Family Law Matters, Pluto Press, London (1993): 38. 
59  Statistics New Zealand, Families And Households: New Zealand Census Of 
Households And Dwellings 2001), Statistics New Zealand, Wellington (December 
2002): 11.  
60  Statistics New Zealand, Families And Households: New Zealand Census Of 
Households And Dwellings 2001), Statistics New Zealand, Wellington (December 
2002): 11. 
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The traditional ideal of the nuclear family is eroded even further if one 
examines the number of families which consist of Mum, Dad and 
children where Dad is the sole breadwinner. In relation to two-parent 
families with children (the 42.1% above), the statistics are as follows:61 
• Mothers working full-time – 36.8% (up from 31.4% in 1991) 
• Mothers working part-time – 30.9% (up from 26.9% in 1991) 
• Mother working (total) – 67.7% (up from 58.3 in 1991) 
What the census data shows, therefore, is that 15.5% of two-parent 
families with male and female partners fit the traditional model of father 
employed full-time and mother not in the labour force.62  
 
Human Rights legislation in New Zealand 
New Zealand does not have a constitution in the same way that we see in 
many other countries. 
• New Zealand does not have a single-document Constitution. 
• New Zealand does not have an entrenched Constitution. 
• New Zealand does not have a supreme Constitution. 
Over time, a number of documents have come to be seen as comprising 
New Zealand‟s multi-document Constitution. Some of the component 
documents are human rights statutes while others are statutes that 
provide for wider purposes but are rights-related. 
Some of the documents considered to be part of New Zealand‟s 
Constitution originate from well before the advent of modern 
                                                          
61  Statistics New Zealand, Families And Households: New Zealand Census Of 
Households And Dwellings 2001), Statistics New Zealand, Wellington (December 
2002): 12. 
62  Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Now: Families And Households, Statistics New 
Zealand, Wellington (1998): 13: an 11.5 percent drop since 1986. 
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international human rights – for example, the Magna Carta,63 and the 
New Zealand Constitution Act 1852,64 and the Maori Representation Act 
1867,65 amongst others. Some are more recent – for example, the 
Ombudsman Act 1975, the Constitution Act 1986, the Electoral Act 
1993,66 the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and the Human Rights 
Act 1993. 
In direct form, the presence of human rights laws within the New Zealand 
legal context began, in theory, when New Zealand voted for the adoption 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. This was 
New Zealand's first in a series of international human rights 
commitments. 
The first domestic legislation specifically dealing with the right not to be 
discriminated against was the Race Relations Act 1971. This was 
followed by the Human Rights Commission Act 1977. These were to be 
followed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human 
Rights Act 1993. 
The two key human rights statutes in New Zealand, which explicitly 
provide for protections against discrimination, are the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. However, even though 
these two statutes are key components of the New Zealand Constitution, 
both are ordinary statutes and do not enjoy any elevated status.  
 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 67 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was given Royal assent on 28 
August 1990 and came into effect on 25 September 1990,68 and has several 
key functions.  
                                                          
63 During the reign of Edward 1: “We well sell to no man, we will not deny nor defer to 
any man, either justice or right”: in Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994] 2 
NZLR 257: submissions of Counsel for the Respondent: 28. 
64 Which established internal self-government for the New Zealand Colony. 
65 Which allowed for four Maori Members of Parliament. 
66  And, formerly, its predecessors such as the Electoral Act 1952. 
67  Also, see earlier discussion relating to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in 
“Strengthening the status and role of our human rights legislation” in Chapter 5.  
68  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.1(2) provides: “This Act shall come into 
force on the 28th day after the date on which it receives the Royal assent”.  
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First, it provides a legislative affirmation of New Zealand‟s commitment to 
human rights standards:69 
An Act - 
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in New Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
Second, in contrast to the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (and the 
later Human Rights Act 1993), the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990  
regulates the relationship between the individual and Government rather 
than the relationships amongst individuals. Section 3 of the NZBORA 
provides that the Act: 
applies only to acts done –  
(a) by the legislative, executive or judicial branches of the government of 
New Zealand; or 
(b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law.  
Third, it provides for the protection of certain express rights,70 including: 
• life and liberty of the person; 
• democratic and civil rights; 
• non-discrimination and minority rights; and  
• rights associated with search, arrest and detention. 
It is s.19(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 that prescribes the 
grounds of protection against discrimination. When the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 came into effect, there were 6 grounds of prohibition 
included in that provision – colour, race, ethnic or national origins , sex, 
marital status, or religious or ethical belief. 
                                                          
69  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Long Title. 
70  The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 Part II. 
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The Human Rights Act 1993, when it was passed, included a 
consequential amendment to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
that resulted in s.19(1) being amended to read:71 
19. Freedom from Discrimination –  
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
the Human Rights Act 1993. 
The grounds of the Human Rights Act 1993 include: sex, marital status, 
religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, 
disability, age, political opinion, employment status, family status, and 
sexual orientation.  
Provisions regulating how the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was to 
be applied were contained within Part I and included, of particular 
relevance to the discussion on same-sex marriage, the following key 
provisions. 
The interaction of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ss.4 and 6 is 
somewhat complex.72 Cooke P, as President of the Court of Appeal, affirmed 
his “willingness to impose greater obligations on the executive to protect 
rights than the immediate legislation required”.73 He stated that:74 
…[t]he rights and freedoms in Part II are not constitutionally entrenched and 
may be overriden by an ordinary enactment, but in interpreting an 
enactment a consistent meaning (to the Bill of Rights) is to be preferred to 
any other meaning. 
Section 4 provides: 
4. Other enactments not affected – 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before 
or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), --  
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or          
                                                          
71  This section was substituted, as from 1 February 1994, by Human Rights Act 1993 
s.145.  
72  For an in-depth analysis of each of the provisions and the tensions between them, 
refer to Chapter 7 of: Butler, Andrew, and Butler, Petra, The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act: A Commentary, LexisNexis, Wellington (2005): 157. 
73 Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 257: submissions of Counsel 
for the Respondent: 26. 
74 MOT v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, at 272: cited in Coburn v Human Rights 
Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 257: submissions of the Counsel for the Respondent: 26. 
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revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment – 
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this 
Bill of Rights. 
The fact that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, as the result of a 
conscious decision-making process, was not enacted as supreme legislation 
means that it was not intended that courts be able to „strike down‟ 
legislation that was inconsistent with it. One of the key purposes of this 
provision, therefore, was to remove any doubt that may arise with regard to 
the potential for the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to over-ride other 
legislation:75 
Parliament (through s.4 of BORA) effectively took away the tolls by which 
precedence could be accorded to the BORA over inconsistent statutes in the 
case of an irreconcilable conflict. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.6, on the other hand, provides:  
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred – 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
preferred to any other meaning. 
The potential conflict that rests in this provision as compared with s.4 is 
that: 
• on the one hand, s.4 provides that the wording of a statute prevails 
even where it may be considered to be inconsistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990; whereas 
• on the other hand, s.6 provides that where the language of a statutory 
provision enables an interpretation that is consistent with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, that consistent interpretation is to be 
preferred. 
In the New Zealand same-sex marriage case, the Appellants submitted 
that s.4 required the Court to „strive‟ to interpret the Marriage Act 1955 
consistently with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The Court 
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responded by stating that this was only the case where such consistency 
could be attained through an interpretation based in the natural 
meaning of the language of the relevant provision(s); it does not require 
the court to strain the language or intent of the legislation at issue.76 
I agree that where a breach of a fundamental right or freedom enshrined in 
the Bill of Rights is found to exist in any statute the Court should 
conscientiously strive to arrive at a meaning which will avoid that breach. … 
Even adopting this approach in the present case, however, I am unable to 
interpret the Marriage Act in the manner sought by the appellants. … This 
Court has an interpretative role and while it must, in accordance with 
Parliament‟s direction prefer a meaning to any statutory provision which is 
consistent with the Bill of Rights, it cannot adopt a meaning which is clearly 
contrary to Parliament‟s intent.   
Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is the key provision 
relating to the assessment of different treatment and whether that 
different treatment constitutes discrimination or is lawfully justifiable. 
Section 5 provides: 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms contained 
in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed 
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
Essentially, this section provides that once different treatment (prima 
facie discrimination) has been identified, then it may only be justified, 
and therefore not be substantively discriminatory, by reference to the 
“justified limitations” test of s.5. In summary,77 a person claiming 
discrimination must show that: 
• they have been subject to different treatment; and 
• the different treatment is less favourable than that of other comparable 
groups; and 
• the less favourable, different treatment has resulted in a detriment; 
and 
• the different treatment is not justifiable.  
                                                                                                                                                               
75  Butler, Andrew, and Butler, Petra, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A 
Commentary, LexisNexis, Wellington (2005): 163. 
76  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 541 (per Thomas J). 
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The over-all impact of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 does not contain a definition of 
discrimination. Rather it provides for a process by which it can be 
established whether or not discrimination exists. To prove the existence 
of discrimination requires lawful justification of the limitation on the 
equal rights and freedoms of an individual or group on the basis of one of 
the relevant grounds - prima facie discrimination (different treatment) 
occurs whenever a person is disadvantaged by different treatment based 
in an irrelevant personal characteristic.78  
It was intended that, although the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was 
not supreme legislation, it would play an increasingly significant role in the 
way New Zealanders viewed human rights imperatives:79 
... The Bill of Rights Act is intended to be woven into the fabric of New Zealand 
law. To think of it as something standing apart from the general body of law 
would be to fail to appreciate its significance; the legal profession may be 
expected to become increasingly aware of this. Further it is important of course 
that the Bill of Rights be applied in a practical way. 
 
Human Rights Act 1993 
The original forerunner to the Human Rights Act 1993 was the Race 
Relations Act 1971. As well as directing itself to the specific issue of race 
discrimination, this was the first codification into New Zealand law of the 
link between domestic and international human rights laws. The long 
title read: 
An Act to affirm and promote racial equality in New Zealand and to 
implement the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of 
racial discrimination. 
                                                                                                                                                               
77  See further discussion on this in relation to the Quilter case in Chapter 7. 
78  From: Crown Law Office, “Discrimination in Terms of Section 19 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990”, Crown Law Office Seminar (14 February 2001). 
79 Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 257: submissions of Counsel 
for the Respondent: 57. 
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The Race Relations Act 1971 was followed by the Ombudsman Act 1975, 
which established the office of the Ombudsman, and the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977, which established the Human Rights 
Commission. As well as extending the areas where race discrimination 
was unlawful, the 1977 Act also extended the categories of prohibition 
against discrimination beyond that of race only,80 and consolidated New 
Zealand's commitment to international human rights law. The long title 
of this Act read: 
An Act to establish a Human Rights Commission and to promote the 
advancement of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with 
the United Nations International Covenants on Human Rights. 
The Human Rights Act 1993 was designed to further consolidate the 
provisions of the Race Relations Act 1971, and the Human Rights 
Commission Act 1977.81 In fact the long title of the 1993 Act states that it 
is: 
[a]n Act to consolidate and amend the Race Relations Act 1971 and the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and to provide better protection of 
human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with United Nations 
Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights. 
The goal of the Human Rights Act 1993 therefore is to regulate behaviour 
between citizens by prohibiting discrimination on a range of grounds. 
This is aimed at preventing discrimination from occurring 82 or, where 
                                                          
80  These now included: (a) Sex, which includes pregnancy and childbirth; (b) Marital 
status, which means the status of being (i) Single, or (ii) Married, or (iii) Married but 
separated, or (iv) A party to a marriage now dissolved, or (v) Widowed, or (vi) Living in 
a relationship in the nature of a marriage; (c) Religious belief; (d) Ethical belief, 
which means the lack of a religious belief, whether in respect of a particular religion 
or religions or all religions; (e) Colour; (f) Race; (g) Ethnic or national origins, which 
includes nationality or citizenship.   
81  The grounds were further added to include: (h) disability; (i) age; (j) political opinion; 
(k) employment status; (l) family status; and (m) sexual orientation, meaning “a 
heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation”. 
82  The grounds are: (a) Sex; (b) Marital status; (c) Religious belief:; (d) Ethical belief; (e) 
Colour; (f) Race; (g) Ethnic or national origins; (h) Disability; (i) Age; (j) Political 
opinion; (k) Employment status; (l) Family status; (m) Sexual orientation. Note that 
grounds (a) to (g) were included in the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 (the 
“old” grounds, and the grounds (h) to (m) were added by the Human Rights Act 1993 
(the “new” grounds). 
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discrimination has occurred, to provide access to remedies for persons 
who have been discriminated against. 
The Human Rights Commission was empowered to with deal complaints 
from individuals who allege discriminatory behaviour by other 
individuals.  
The Human Rights Act 1993 did not apply to actions of Government 
except in relation to areas where Government was acting in a similar 
manner to the private sector (employment, provision of accommodation, 
etc). However, it was intended that the sunset clause contained within 
the HRA would automatically expire as of 1 January 2000, and that the 
exemption to Government would cease. 
So long as the exemption remained in force, however, the Human Rights 
Act 1993 did not offer an immediate and direct solution to the issue of 
the right to same-sex marriage. However, there have been significant 
changes made to the Human Rights Act 1993 since that time. 
As was outlined in Chapter 6, New Zealand decriminalised consensual 
male-male sexual behaviour in 1986.83 The original Homosexual law 
Reform Bill had two main parts: 
• decriminalisation of male homosexual activity; and 
• anti-discrimination protections for gay men and lesbians. 
While the decriminalisation provisions were passed, the anti-
discrimination provisions were not. 
In 1993, Katherine O‟Regan MP successfully reintroduced anti-
discrimination provisions. As of 1 February 1994, it became illegal under 
the Human Rights Act 1993 to discriminate against any person on the 
basis of their sexual orientation in the areas of employment, housing, 
                                                                                                                                                               
The areas are: Employment; Access to Places, Vehicles, and Facilities; Provision of 
Goods and Services; Provision of Land, Housing, and Other Accommodation; Access 
to Educational Establishments. 
83  The Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 received Royal assent on 11-Jul-1986 and 
came into effect on 8 August 1986. The Short Title of the Act provides that its object 
was to amend the Crimes Act 1961 “by removing criminal sanctions against 
consensual homosexual conduct between males, and by consequentially amending 
the law relating to consensual anal intercourse”. 
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education, and the provision of goods and services.84 At the same time, 
by way of consequential amendment to section 19(1) of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, the prohibitions against discrimination were 
extended to the Legislative, Executive and Judicial branches of 
Government, as well as other persons or bodies performing public 
functions.85 “Sexual orientation” was thus included, from 1 January 
1994, in both the Human Rights Act 1993 and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 as an expressly prohibited ground of discrimination. 
With domestic human rights legislation in New Zealand being a 
comparatively recent phenomenon, it has been the subject of monitoring 
and review. There were several significant changes resulting from one 
such review that led to the passing of the Human Rights Amendment Act 
2001 (which came into effect on 1 January 2002). These included: 
• the exemption ceased to exist for the Government, government 
agencies, or anyone performing a public function, accountable for 
unlawful discrimination under the Human Rights Act 1993; 
• the New Zealand Bill of Rights standard was now applied to actions of 
Government (that is, the section 5 test that provides limitations to 
rights and freedoms can only be valid if they can be “demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society”); and, most significantly 
• where legislation is inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1993, that 
is, where legislation can be shown to be discriminatory (less favourable 
treatment without a lawful justification), the Human Rights Review 
Tribunal (and subsequent appeal courts) may make declaration that 
the legislation is inconsistent with the Human Rights Act – a 
Declaration of Inconsistency. The Tribunal cannot strike down an 
inconsistent law, but a Declaration of Inconsistency must be reported 
to Parliament by the responsible Minister, who must also report on how 
the Government intends to respond and rectify. 
 
                                                          
84  The Human Rights Act 1993 s.21, defines “sexual orientation” as “heterosexual, 
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation”. 
85  See discussion above. 
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Summary – Human Rights Act 1993 and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 
The roles of the Human Rights Act 1993 and the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 are interwoven and rather complicated. In the main, 
however, the HRA is designed to stop discrimination in the private sector, 
while the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is designed to protect the 
civil and political rights of citizens vis-à-vis the State.  
This has changed to some extent since the 2001 amendments to the 
Human Rights Act 1993 which opened up the ability of citizens to make a 
complaint to the Commission against any action in breach of the 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993 committed by members of the 
Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary, or any person or body 
performing any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on 
that person or body by or pursuant to law.86 Under Part 1A of the Human 
Rights Act 1993, this includes complaints against legislation that is 
inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1993 – Declarations of 
Inconsistency. As a result, the Human Rights Act 1993 has a significant 
role to play with regard to the relationships between private citizens and 
the State. 
In addition to the strictly domestic roles played by the Human Rights Act 
1993 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, New Zealand human 
rights legislation also serves to formalise and consolidate New Zealand's 
commitment to international human rights obligations. 
By 1993, because of New Zealand‟s domestic human rights legislation 
(and specifically because of the express inclusion of „sexual orientation‟ 
as a protected ground in that legislation) and because of New Zealand‟s 
accession to significant international human rights treaties (particularly 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), New Zealand 
seemed to have regained some of its status as one of the more advanced 
jurisdictions in relation to liberal law reforms.  
                                                          
86  Human Rights Act 1993 s.20J (as inserted by the Human Rights Amendment Act 
2001). 
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It is clear is that, by the end of this period, New Zealand was well placed, 
to recognise and uphold human rights, non-discrimination standards in 
relation to a number of grounds – including, relevant to the issue of 
same-sex marriage, the particular grounds of sexual orientation and sex 
(gender). Noteworthy at this point is the fact that while sexual orientation 
was included expressly in New Zealand‟s human rights legislation, it was 
not yet formally included in the Canadian “Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms”, nor constitutional documents in the United States of America 
(the Constitution of the United States or any of the State Constitutions) 
or the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
OVERSEAS JURIDICTIONS 
Canada 
Historic cases 
Christine Davies suggests that there are „four waves‟ of activity relating to 
seeking access to same-sex marriage in Canada.87  
As far back as 1974, two men in Winnipeg, Manitoba, married following 
the reading of the banns of marriage in their Church, and sought to have 
their marriage legally registered. Registration was refused, and the couple 
applied to the Court for a declaration that, because the marriage 
legislation in the province of Manitoba was gender-neutral and, because 
they had met all the procedural requirements (such as the publication of 
the banns, obtaining medical certificates, signatures of witnesses), the 
marriage must be registered. In this case, North v Matheson,88 the Court 
conceded that the legislation was indeed gender-neutral and there was 
no express statutory prohibition of marriage between members of the 
same sex. However, the Court ruled that the common law had provided a 
clear definition of marriage and that, on this basis, a prohibition against 
same-sex marriage did exist.  
                                                          
87  Davies, Christine, “Canadian Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: Individual rights, 
Community Strategy”, in (2008) 66:2 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 101: 105.  
88  North v Matheson (1974), 20 RFL 112, 53 DLR (3d) 280 (Man. Co. Ct.). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 274  
 
This „first wave‟ case was heard prior to the advent of the Charter.89 At 
the time the case was determined, the Court relied on two key 
determinants: 
• the concept of marriage as had been judicially defined (for example, 
in Hyde & Hyde v Woodmansee 90); and 
• the meaning of marriage as was “universally accepted by society”. 
The Court therefore held that marriage was, and could only be, a union 
between members of the opposite sex.91 Although the case was 
unsuccessful, it did signal that, should there be a shift in societal 
attitudes towards marriage, the notion of same-sex marriage could be a 
future possibility.  
This definitional approach predominates in early same-sex marriage 
cases, and indeed in cases related to entitlements sought by same-sex 
couples. It will be highlighted as a feature of the early cases in the United 
States,92 and again in the consideration of the Quilter same-sex marriage 
case in New Zealand.93 Notably, it has also constituted the core 
argument, along with the associated „procreation‟ argument,94 employed 
by opponents of same-sex marriage.  
The Canadian situation was about to change. The advent of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms would offer the possibility of new 
considerations for those seeking access to same-sex couples seeking 
equality in relationship status and entitlements. 
                                                          
89  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: s.15 (the equality provisions) came 
into effect on 17 April 1985, three years after the rest of the Charter. The delay was 
to enable governments to bring their laws into line with the equality rights in s.15. 
90  Hyde & Hyde v Woodmansee (1866) [1861-73] All ER 175: 177: Lord Penzance stated 
that "marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as 
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all 
others". Note that the issue in this case was bigamy - the gender of the parties was 
not at issue. 
91  North v Matheson (1974), 20 RFL 112, 53 DLR (3d) 280 (Man. Co. Ct.). 
92  Baker v Nelson 291 Minn. 310, at 311-312; 191 N.W.2d 185; 409 U.S. 810 (1971); 
Jones v Hallahan (1973) 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); and Singer v Hara 522 
P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.). 
93  Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430, in the High Court, Auckland, New 
Zealand in 1996; and Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 in the Court of 
Appeal, Wellington, New Zealand, in 1997. 
94  See also Layland v Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations (1993) 
104 D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Ont.Div.Ct). 
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The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect on 17 April 
1982 and forms part of the Canadian Constitution.95 The Constitution is a 
set of laws providing basic rules about the role and powers of federal 
Government and the provincial Governments, thereby regulating the 
relationships between the Government and the people of Canada.  
The Charter plays a key role within the Constitution in that it sets out the 
rights and freedoms that Canadians consider to be vital in a free and 
democratic society. Unlike the various laws which proceeded it, the Charter 
is part of the supreme laws of Canada with the effect that all other laws 
must be consistent with it. If they are not consistent with the Charter, they 
may be stuck down as invalid. 
The two key provisions of the Charter in relation to the issue of access to 
marriage by same-sex couples are the equality provisions (section 15) and 
the provisions that outline the circumstances in which, and the extent to 
which, equality rights may be limited (section 1).  
 
 
Equality provisions – Section 15 
The equality guarantees in section 15 of the Charter provide that:96 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
In the time period covered by this chapter, the grounds of discrimination 
did not include sexual orientation. 
                                                          
95  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.15 (the equality provisions) came into 
effect on 17 April 1985, three years after the rest of the Charter. The delay was to 
enable governments to bring their laws into line with the equality rights in s.15. 
96  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.15(1). 
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Reasonable limits – Section 1 
Section 1 recognises that the rights and freedoms contained in the 
Charter are not absolute and can be limited in specific circumstances, 
and states: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has stated that a limit on Charter rights is 
acceptable if: 
• the limit deals with a pressing and substantial social problem, and 
• the Government‟s response to the problem is reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. 
 
Over-all effect of the Charter provisions 
To establish a violation against them by the State of the rights and freedoms 
as guaranteed by the Charter, an individual must show (under section 15 of 
the Charter) that: 
(1) he / she has received different treatment from others; and 
(2) this different treatment has occurred on the basis of an irrelevant 
characteristic (such as sexual orientation). 
In order to escape the finding against it of a violation of an individual‟s rights 
and freedoms, the State must show (under section 1 of the Charter) that the 
different treatment is justified. 
 
Cases on issues other than marriage 
Prior to the more recent successful marriage cases (to be discussed 
below), there had been a number of cases seeking some level of 
recognition for same-sex couples. These cases met with varying degrees 
of success. 
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In 1990, Timothy Veysey challenged the refusal of prison authorities to 
allow his same-sex partner to visit him in prison under the Private 
Family Visiting Program.97 The Court held that the exclusion of same-sex 
partners from the programme, which was aimed at “the maintenance of 
family ties and the preparation of inmates for their return to life in the 
community outside the penitentiaries”,98 could not be justified under s.1 
of the Charter.  
In 1991, Rowles J of the British Columbia Supreme Court noted that, for 
a couple to be recognised under the Medical Services Act Regulations 
they must live together “as husband and wife”.99 He also noted that the 
Regulations did not require that the couple be husband and wife.100 The 
Court received expert testimony describing the type of emotional bond 
between homosexual couples as no different from that between 
heterosexual couples. The Court acknowledged that the couple did not 
separate when one partner became ill, and that each partner was named 
as the sole beneficiary in the other‟s Will. In fact, the two men were:101 
deeply committed to each other emotionally and sexually, exchanged vows 
and rings in a private ceremony, established a home together, pooled their 
finances, and shared bank accounts and credit cards. 
Consequently, the Court held that the wording of the Regulations was 
intended to include couples living in committed, emotionally and 
mutually supportive relationships regardless of the sex of the individuals, 
and to exclude those people living together, for example, as siblings or 
flatmates. 
In 1993, the Ontario Divisional Court heard a case in which two gay men 
in Ontario challenged the refusal of the City Clerk‟s Office to issue them 
with a marriage licence.102 Ultimately, the majority in Layland held that 
                                                          
97  Veysey v The Commissioner of Correctional Services (1990) 29 F.T.R. 64, later 
confirmed by the federal Appeals Court. 
98 Ryder, Bruce, “Equality Rights And Sexual Orientation: Confronting Heterosexual 
Family Privilege”, in [1990] 9 Canadian Journal of Family Law 39: 92. 
99  Medical Services Act Regulations 144/68 s.2.01. 
100 Knodel v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) [1991] 6 WWR 728. 
101 Bates, “When Is A Wife ...?” in [1993] 7 Australian Family Law Journal 274: 280. 
102  Layland v Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations (1993) 104 
D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Ont.Div.Ct). 
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there was no discrimination because discrimination is based on 
irrelevant personal characteristics, and in this case the two men were 
denied a marriage licence due to relevant capabilities. The court held that 
the main purpose of marriage is procreation, and that: 
that principle [sic] purpose of marriage cannot, as a general rule, be achieved in 
a homosexual union because of the biological limitations of such a union. 
This argument around procreation is one of the two most common 
arguments posited by opponents in all jurisdictions where same-sex 
couples have sought access to the right to marry (see North and Matheson 
above). 
 
United States Of America  
Historic cases 
Loving v Virginia,103 was not, in itself a same-sex marriage case, but is 
relevant and important to the same-sex marriage cases that were to come 
later in the United States of America (USA).  
In Loving v Virginia,104 the USA Supreme Court struck down the Virginia 
State anti-miscegenation laws finding that the law rested solely on racial 
distinctions. The trial court had denied the right for an inter-racial 
couple to marry, using definitional defects and tradition as its reasons. 
The Supreme Court reasoned that:105 
[b]ecause laws based on racial classifications were entitled to the “most rigid 
scrutiny” and because there was “patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious discrimination” to justify the classification, the 
Court had “no doubt” that restricting the freedom to marry based on race 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
                                                          
103  Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
104 Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967): cited in Friedman, “The Necessity For State 
Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements And Evolving 
Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 139. 
105 Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967), 11: cited in Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage And 
Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return 
Home?”, in [1994] 5 Wisconsin Law Review 1033: 1050. 
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In essence, the Court had found that it is not valid to use tradition as a 
justification to exclude inter-racial couples from marriage (justification 
must be based in something more than “invidious discrimination”), that 
individual states are bound by a functional definition of marriage, and 
that the right of couples in loving and intimate relationships to enter into 
marriage are protected, in this case, across cultural lines.106 
In spite of Loving v Virginia, however, Courts in early same-sex marriage 
cases in the United States of America continued to apply the traditional, 
formal and definitional reasoning that had been applied previously in the 
inter-racial marriage debate. 
In each of four early same-sex marriage cases, the courts held that to 
exclude same-sex couples from marriage was not discriminatory and that 
the traditional, historic definition of marriage (as being a between and man 
and a woman) prevailed over any contemporary challenge. 
In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Baker v Nelson,107 upheld the 
traditional definition of marriage and rejected the equal protection and 
due process arguments, saying:108 
These constitutional challenges have in common the assertion that the right 
to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all 
persons and that restricting marriage to only couples of the opposite sex is 
irrational and invidiously discriminatory ... This historic institution 
manifestly is more deeply founded than the asserted contemporary concept 
of marriage and societal interests for which the petitioners contend.  
 
                                                          
106 Friedman, “The Necessity For State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Constitutional Requirements And Evolving Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 139. 
107 Baker v Nelson (1971) 191 N.W.2d 185, 186. 
108 Friedman, “The Necessity For State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Constitutional Requirements And Evolving Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 138: It may be interesting to consider that if 
"marriage is as old as Adam and Eve" who was the marriage celebrant who 
performed their ceremony? 
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In 1973, in Jones v Hallahan,109 the Kentucky Appeals Court, ignored the 
constitutional issue by declaring that the statute's implied definition of 
marriage required that the parties be of opposite sex, stating that 
“Marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a 
woman”.110 The Court had reasoned that:111 
[i]n substance, the relationship proposed by the appellants does not 
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is 
not a marriage. 
In 1974, in Singer v Hara (1974),112 the Washington Court of Appeals also 
upheld the opposite-sex requirements. The Court spent considerable time 
addressing a very strong philosophical and constitutional argument. The 
thrust of the argument was as follows: 
1. Under the recently ratified state Equal Rights Amendment, men and 
women were entitled to be treated the same; 
 Therefore: 
2. Women should be entitled to the same rights as men;  
 and: 
3. Men should be entitled to the same rights as women.  
 Therefore: 
4. If women have the right to marry men, then so do men; 
 And: 
5. If men have the right to marry women, then so do women.  
                                                          
109 Jones v Hallahan (1973) 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973), at 590: cited in 
Friedman, “The Necessity For State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Constitutional Requirements And Evolving Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 139. 
110 Jones v Hallahan (1973) 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973), 589. 
111 Friedman, “The Necessity For State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Constitutional Requirements And Evolving Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 139. 
112 Singer v Hara 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.): cited in Friedman, “The Necessity For 
State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements And Evolving 
Notions Of Family”, in [1987-88] 3 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134: 139. 
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It seemed that the Court was finally on the verge of breaking away from 
the traditional definition of marriage. But this was not to be the case. In 
the final analysis, the Court did not accept this line of reasoning and 
found that:113 
… the state's statutes were not defective under either the United States 
Constitution or the Washington Constitution because: “Appellants were not 
denied a marriage license because of their sex; rather, they were denied a 
marriage license because of the nature of marriage itself”. 
In 1990, in Dean,114 the court refused to accept the validity of the right to 
same-sex marriage.  
 
Hawai‟i (Part 1)  
In December 1990, three same-sex couples in Hawai‟i renewed the battle 
for same-sex marriage in the United States of America by applying for 
marriage licences. They were declined. 
In May 1991, they filed a claim in the Hawai‟í First Circuit Court.115 The 
case was founded on an alleged violation of the applicants‟ rights to equal 
protection of the laws, and due process of the law pursuant to the 
Hawai'i State Constitution. The case was dismissed by the court 
After being denied at the trial court level, the couples appealed to the 
Hawai‟i State Supreme Court.116 In May 1993, Justice Levinson held that 
there is no fundamental right to same-sex “marriage,” but also held that 
claim of sex discrimination was subject to a strict scrutiny test, with the 
burden of proof on the state. The Court described as “circular and 
unpersuasive” the State‟s submission that “the right of persons of the same 
sex to marry one another does not exist because marriage, by definition 
                                                          
113 Singer v Hara 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App.), 1196: cited in Cox, “Same-Sex 
Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We 
Return Home?”, in [1994] 5 Wisconsin Law Review 1033: 1050. 
114  Craig Dean and Patrick Gill v District of Columbia No.90-C.A.-13892 (D.C. Super.Ct. 
filed 26 November 1990). 
115 Baehr v Lewin First Circuit Court, Hawai‟i (1991) [Full citation not known]. 
116  Baehr v Lewin 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 
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and usage, means a special relationship between a man and a woman”.117 
In rejecting this, the Court held that:118 
… the Hawaii marriage statute violated Hawaii's constitutional prohibition 
against sex discrimination and that the statute was presumably 
unconstitutional unless, upon remand, the State could establish that the 
statute was justified by a compelling state interest and was so narrowly 
drawn so as to avoid unnecessary abridgement of the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights. 
Hawai‟i‟s Supreme Court had issued the first ever decision that exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage constitutes discrimination, and went 
on to say that unless the State could provide a “compelling state interest” 
same-sex marriage must be allowed. The case was sent back to the lower 
court to be retried.119 
 
State initiatives against marriage 
At the same time that the same-sex marriage case was moving through 
its early stages in Hawai‟i, other States in the United States of America 
were working to negate the possibility of same-sex marriage within their 
own jurisdictions. In some cases, this was to prevent the solemnisation of 
same-sex marriages in those particular States, and in some cases it was 
to pre-emptively prevent the recognition in one State of same-sex 
marriages from any other State that enables such marriages. Two of the 
first to attempt such change were Oregon and Colorado. 
 
Oregon  
The initiative in Oregon, had it been successful, would not only have 
prohibited same-sex marriage, but would have gone even further. In 
                                                          
117  Baehr v Lewin 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993), 60: cited in Donald G. Casswell, 
“Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage” in: [2001] 80 La Revue du Barreau Canadien 
810: 837. 
118 Cox, “Same-Sex Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry In Hawaii, Are We Still 
Married When We Return Home?”, in [1994] 5 Wisconsin Law Review 1033: 1039. 
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1992, Oregon‟s Ballot Measure 9 would have added the following text to 
the Oregon Constitution: 
All governments in Oregon may not use their monies or properties to 
promote, encourage or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or 
masochism. All levels of government, including public education systems, 
must assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth which recognizes that 
these behaviors are abnormal, wrong, unnatural and perverse and they are 
to be discouraged and avoided. 
Oregon's 'Measure 9' not only would have had the effect of banning any 
extension of gay civil rights protection but also would have required 
government offices and public schools to actively discourage 
homosexuality.120 It was defeated in the 3 November 1992 general 
election with 638,527 votes in favour, 828,290 votes against.121 
 
Colorado  
On 11 November 1992, Colorado voters, with a vote of 53.4 percent, 
enacted “Amendment 2”, which read: 
Neither the state of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, 
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school 
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or 
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, 
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or 
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, 
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of 
the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.  
                                                                                                                                                               
119  Discussion on the Baehr cases continues in Chapter 7. 
120 Dunlap, Aklilu, “The Bellows Of Dying Elephants: Gay-, Lesbian-, And Bisexual-
Protective Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V. v City of St Paul”, in [1993] 12 Law and 
Inequality 205: 213: citing Cooper, M., “Queer Baiting In The Culture War”, in Village 
Voice (13 October 1992) 29: 29: “Gay organisations and individuals [could have been 
denied] use of public facilities such as parks and meeting rooms, state public 
broadcasting outlets [would have had] to ban pro-gay programming, state licensing 
boards [could have refused] those deemed 'perverse', libraries [would have had] to 
remove books with any positive references to homosexuality, school textbooks [would 
have been 'cleansed'], AIDS treatments centers [could have been] closed, and 
individual employers and landlords could [have kicked] out 'abnormal' employees 
and tenants”. 
121  Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995, 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21.htm (Retrieved: 8 August 
2009). 
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Colorado's Amendment 2 was passed and, at that time, made Colorado 
the only state in the USA to “grant the right to discriminate on the basis 
of sexual orientation”.122 Amendment 2 prohibited any municipality from 
protecting gay people against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. In so doing, it voided protective ordinances already in place 
in Denver, Aspen and Boulder,123 and prevented the possibility of any 
new protective provisions. 
On 15 January 1993, however, Judge Bayless of the 2nd District Court 
pf Colorado issued a temporary injunction preventing Amendment 2 from 
becoming part of the State Constitution. The grounds of the injunction 
were: 
• its possible unconstitutionality: and  
• the possible irreparable harm that would be caused by its 
implementation.  
The court scheduled a trial to consider the substantive issues. Before the 
trial could begin, however, the State appealed to the Colorado Supreme 
Court and on 19 July 1993, that court upheld the original injunction, on 
the grounds that Amendment 2 violated the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, insofar as 
Amendment 2 denied gays equal rights to normal political processes. 
Chief Justice Luis Rovera wrote: 
Were Amendment 2 in force ... the sole political avenue by which this class 
could seek such protection [against discrimination] would be through the 
constitutional amendment process.  
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado demanded that the 
legislation face "strict scrutiny" and prove that it advanced a "compelling 
state interest". The case was returned to the District Court for trial.  
                                                          
122 Dunlap, Aklilu, “The Bellows Of Dying Elephants: Gay-, Lesbian-, And Bisexual-
Protective Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V. v City of St Paul”, in [1993] 12 Law and 
Inequality 205: 213. 
123 Dunlap, Aklilu, “The Bellows Of Dying Elephants: Gay-, Lesbian-, And Bisexual-
Protective Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V. v City of St Paul”, in [1993] 12 Law and 
Inequality 205: 213. 
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On 14 December 1993, Judge Bayless found that the amendment failed 
the test, and ruled it unconstitutional. 
The State of Colorado appealed to the State Supreme Court which, on 11 
October 1994 confirmed the District Court's decision. The State further 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court heard the 
case on 10 October 1995 and on 20 May 1996, ruled 6-3 that Colorado's 
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional.  
 
South Africa 
I include the information in this section not because there had been any 
advancement in South Africa to this point with regard to same-sex 
marriage, but rather to set the scene for the discussion in later chapters. 
As will be seen in Chapter 8, in 2005, South Africa was to become one of 
the first countries to extend equal marriage rights to same-sex couples. 
In the period up to 1986, however, there was very little to suggest that 
this was a possibility.  
Apartheid laws had been enacted in South Africa in 1948. The 
segregationist apartheid regime was intended to maintain white racial 
domination over „blacks‟ (Africans) and „coloureds‟ (mixed race). The laws 
included, for example, prohibitions against marriage between whites and 
non-whites, and the sanctioning of „white-only‟ jobs.124 
There was considerable internal unrest in the 1980s and this, coupled 
with international pressure against the apartheid regime, led to attempts 
at reform. Initially, these attempts were unsuccessful, but eventually, in 
1994, multi-racial democratic elections were held, bringing the apartheid 
regime to an end. The political and constitutional changes arising from 
this dramatic change will be discussed in Chapter 7, along with the 
implications of this for the recognition of same-sex couples. Discussion 
on the South African same-sex marriage case and subsequent legislation 
will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
                                                          
124  “The History Of Apartheid In South Africa”, http://www-cs-
students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html (Retrieved: 27 July 2009). 
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Denmark 
Denmark was the first country in the world to offer registered 
partnerships, and was therefore the first country to offer broad legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships. Other Scandinavian countries 
followed,125 and more recently other European countries,126 some States 
in the USA,127 a province in Canada,128 and others.129 Other jurisdictions 
are either in the process of implementing, or considering the 
implementation of, registered partnerships.130 
The Danish Registration of Partnership Act was passed by the Danish 
Parliament on 1 June 1989, and signed by Queen Margrethe II of  
Denmark on 7 June 1989.131 It was to be this model of relationship 
recognition through registered partnerships that, subsequently, was to 
be used by many countries – either as a model to be followed, or as a 
model to be varied. 
The Act, which came into effect on 1 October 1989, was available to 
same-sex couples only, and was the first in the world to grant same-sex 
couples a legal status which could be compared in any way with 
heterosexual marriage. The legislation granted virtually the full range of 
protections, responsibilities and benefits offered through marriage. Not 
included in the original Act were provisions for custody, access and 
                                                          
125  For example, Norway (1993), Sweden (1995), Iceland (1996), Greenland (1996), 
Finland (2002). 
126  For example, The Netherlands (1998), France (1999), Germany (2001). 
127  For example, Vermont (2000), California (2000), Connecticut (2005). 
128  For example, Nova Scotia (2001), Quebec (2002), Manitoba (2002). 
129  For example, New Zealand (2005), United Kingdom (2005), Czech Republic (2006), 
Hungary (2007). 
130  For example, Hawai‟i, Illinois and Nevada in the United States of America. 
131  Danish Registration of Partnership Act, No.372 of 7 June 1989 (Lov om registreret 
partnerskab, nr. 372 af 7.6.1989, introduced registered partnerships („registreret 
partnerskab‟ to Denmark.  
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adoption, however, this has changed more recently and one partner to a 
registered partnership can now legally adopt the biological child of the 
other partner so that both are legal parents to the child.  
Under the Act, gays still cannot “marry”, however, if they wish to dissolve 
their “partnership” then they must go through divorce proceedings. 
Wherever other Danish law uses the words “marriage” or “spouse” 
registered partnerships are included. Where the terms “husband” and 
“wife” are used registered partnerships are excluded.132 
It seems that essentially the same arguments that are posited in the 
courts, or have been debated in legislatures in relation to marriage, were 
also were heard in relation to recognition of same-sex couples by 
registered partnerships. 
The debate leading to the Danish Act, for example, provided a platform 
for the opponents to present their „traditionalist‟ principles and views 
based on “God, nature and the family” and the proponents to present 
their „modern‟ principles and values based on “liberty, equality and 
justice”.133 
 
COMMENT 134 
In 1986, New Zealand decriminalised consensual homosexual activity 
between adult males, with the age of consent being set equal with that of 
consensual heterosexual activity. By 1993, New Zealand had enacted 
                                                          
132 Henson, "A Comparative Analysis Of Same-Sex Partnership Protections: 
Recommendations For American Reform", in [1993] 7 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 282: 285. 
133  Throckmorton, Warren, “What Can Denmark Tell Us About The Same-Sex Marriage 
Debate”, The American Daily (14 April 2004). 
134  The information contained in this section constitutes my comment based on 
information presented previously in this chapter. For that reason I have not directly 
referenced the source material for this section. 
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express legislative prohibitions against discrimination on the grounds of sex 
(gender) sexual orientation and marital status, amongst others. By virtue of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, these grounds were included in the Human 
Rights Act 1993 itself, and in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In 
essence, the Human Rights Act provided protections against discrimination 
in the private sector, and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provided 
protections against discrimination arising out of actions by, or on behalf of, 
Government. Furthermore, New Zealand had acceded to the United Nations‟ 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, amongst other 
international human rights treaties. In its totality, this gave a sense that New 
Zealand had strong human rights legislation, and was committed to full and 
equal treatment for all its citizens.  
In 1993, while Canada did have a strong, entrenched and supreme Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, sexual orientation had not been confirmed as a 
ground of discrimination covered by the provisions of the Charter. At this 
point in time, therefore, there was no prescribed ability for citizens of 
Canada to take direct court action against alleged discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.  
In 1993, South Africa was still in the midst of an apartheid regime, which 
was not to come to an end until the following year. On the basis that there 
were much broader issues being tested in South Africa in 1993, with 
domestic and international pressure mounting against apartheid, there was 
no room for consideration of equality issues relating to sexual orientation. 
Early same-sex marriage cases in the United States of America were 
unsuccessful essentially because the Courts generally adhered to a 
definitional reasoning when it came to marriage, stating that marriage, by 
definition must be between a man and a woman and that because this was 
the way it had traditionally been, this is the way it must remain.  
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During this time period, positive steps towards the legal recognition of same-
sex relationships began in two separate ways. First, Denmark, in 1989 had 
become the first country in the world to offer the recognition of same-sex 
couples by registered partnerships as an alternative to marriage. Denmark 
was followed by Norway in 1993. Second, with the filing of the same-sex 
marriage of Baehr v Lewin in Hawaii, what was later to be seen substantively 
as the commencement of the same-sex marriage movement began.  
By 1993, however, New Zealand seemingly had a favourable legislative 
human rights climate. With the passing of domestic human rights laws and 
agreement to international human rights treaties, it seemed that New 
Zealand might be in a strong position for positive consideration of same-sex 
marriage. 
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INTRODUCTON 
In terms of the same-sex marriage issue in New Zealand, the period from 
1994 to 2000 was a time when the main focus was on the presentation of 
the same-sex marriage case to the New Zealand courts. In 1996, the 
issue was placed before the High Court and, in 1997, the issue was 
placed before the Court of Appeal.1 
This chapter, therefore, focuses largely on developments in New Zealand 
at this time. The first section examines the Quilter same-sex marriage 
case. The second section examines what was happening (or what was not 
happening) elsewhere in New Zealand – for example, in Government 
administration and in the legislature. The chapter then moves on to 
consider what was happening at this time in other countries. 
 
NEW ZEALAND – THE QUILTER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASE 
Introduction 
Marriages between same-sex partners had made news headlines in New 
Zealand before the Quilter same-sex marriage case in the 1990s. 
In 1909, under the name Percy Redwood, Amy Bock planned to marry 
Agnes Ottaway in Dunedin. However, this marriage was not intended in 
any way as a political statement on behalf of same-sex couples. Amy 
Bock had previously been imprisoned on various occasions for forgery, 
larceny and false pretences, and was attempting to avoid the law on this 
instance. She was imprisoned for fraud after her ruse was discovered on 
the eve of the wedding.2 
                                                 
1  Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430 (High Court); [1998] 1 NZLR 523 
(Court of Appeal). 
2  Encyclopedia of New Zealand, (http://www.teara.govt.nz/en): “Notable Trials: The 
Notorious Amy Bock, 1909”, 
 http://www.teara.govt.nz/1966/T/TrialsNotable/TheNotoriousAmyBock1909/en 
(Retrieved: 10 August 2009). 
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In 1929, Deresley Morton, who left NZ early in the century, died in 
California and was found to have been a woman, though she had married 
a woman.3  
In September 1945, two women aged 30 and 18 were convicted of a 
criminal breach of the Marriage Act 1955. The older woman had 
undergone a mammectomy in order to “pass” as male so they could 
“marry” each other. The older woman was sentenced to three years‟ 
probation and psychiatric treatment.4  
None of these instances resulted in any attempt to formally challenge 
marriage law with a view to seek a change to enable same-sex couples to 
marry. Nor were there any challenges arising out of subsequent 
occasions on which same-sex couples have applied to the Registrar of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages for marriage certificates. 
However, in December 1995, in Wellington, Jenny Rowan and Jools 
Joslin (subsequently parties to the Quilter same-sex marriage case) 
applied for a marriage licence. The Acting Registrar of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages refused to issue them with one, stating:5 
Although the Marriage Act 1955 does not state that a female may not marry 
another female, such a marriage is not permissible under Common Law.  
The Deputy Registrar-General wrote to them confirming this stance:6 
The formalities of marriage in New Zealand are governed by the Marriage 
Act. That Act does not, as you observe, mention marriage of two people of 
the same sex. Same sex marriages are influenced by Common Law and at 
present in New Zealand are not acceptable. ... The Registrar of Marriages 
was acting properly in her interpretation of the Marriage Act in declining to 
provide you with a marriage licence. 
                                                 
3  Young, Hugh, “Before Stonewall and NZ Gay Liberation – Part 1”, 
http://www.queerhistory.net.nz/Part1.html (Retrieved: 10-Aug-2009). 
4  Young, Hugh, “Before Stonewall and NZ Gay Liberation – Part 1”, 
http://www.queerhistory.net.nz/Part1.html (Retrieved: 10 August 2009). 
5 Letter to Applicants (Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin) from Acting Registrar of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages, Wellington District Office, Wellington (December 1995). 
6 Letter to Applicants (Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin) from the Deputy Registrar-
General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Central Registry, Lower Hutt (15 December 
1995). 
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It is an accepted principle that the role of the Courts is to interpret 
legislation. The issue of same-sex marriage per se had never been before 
the Courts in New Zealand. Any mention of same-sex marriage, and any 
associated comment on the meaning of the Marriage Act, has been 
nothing more than obiter dicta within cases dealing with other issues. 
What occurred here was that the Office of the Registrar-General of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages was interpreting the legislation on the 
basis of obiter from judicial considerations of marriage in other 
jurisdictions, in other chronological contexts, and in relation to other 
marriage-related issues. The Office referred particularly to the case of 
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee, an English case of 1866 on the issue of 
bigamous marriages.  
In this sense, it is arguable that the administrative arm of Government 
had assumed, for itself, the role of the Courts – statutory interpretation. 
While it must be assumed that the administration is always seeking to 
establish the meaning of the legislation that it is required to administer, 
it can also be assumed that parties who disagree with that interpretation 
must also be free to seek the opinion of the court on that interpretation. 
The two women believed that the Human Rights Act 1993 protected them 
from being discriminated against. They also considered that if: 
(a) the Marriage Act 1955 could be viewed as being gender-neutral in 
terms of the language expressly used in the Act; and 
(b) the issuance of a marriage licence could be viewed as the provision 
of a service; then 
(c) it was possible to argue that the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths 
and Marriage was acting unlawfully (contrary to the Human Rights 
Act 1993) by not issuing a marriage licence to them. 
However, when a complaint was lodged with the Human Rights 
Commission on the same-sex marriage issue, the Commission responded 
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that it was unable to assist, saying:7 
Unfortunately, it appears that your complaint of discrimination falls outside 
the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission at this time. Section 151(2) 
of the Human Rights Act 1993 provides an exemption for anything done “by 
or on behalf of the government of New Zealand” … and this includes 
anything done by the Registrar-General under the powers of the Marriage 
Act 1955. 
Secondly, and also as a result of the sunset clause, it was not possible 
under the Human Rights Act 1993 to mount a substantive challenge to 
any existing statute that was prima facie discriminatory:8 
Except as expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall limit or 
affect the provisions of any other Act or regulation which is in force in New 
Zealand. 
The effect of this provision was that, until its expiry,9 when it was 
planned that all legislation would have been vetted for consistency with 
the prohibitions against discrimination, no statute which was 
inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1993 could be deemed to be 
unlawful. 
The issue therefore became whether or not the Marriage Act 1955 was, in 
fact, expressly discriminatory, and therefore protected by s.151(1), or 
whether the language was gender neutral, and therefore compliant with 
the Human Rights Act 1993, but being applied in a discriminatory 
fashion.  
In the final analysis, it was decided that, at that time, the Human Rights 
Act 1993 did not provide the applicants with a sufficiently clear path to 
achieving their goal. The Human Rights Act 1993 assisted in painting a 
picture of the human rights climate in New Zealand but, mainly because 
of the sunset clause in relation to Government actions, it did not provide 
an avenue for challenging the actions of officials. 
                                                 
7  Letter from the Human Rights Commission to Jools Joslin and Jenny Rowan in 
response to their complaint of discrimination by the Registrar-General of Births 
Deaths and Marriages on the grounds of sexual orientation (27 February 1996). 
8  Human Rights Act 1993 s.151(1). 
9  Under the Human Rights Act 1993, this was set at midnight on 31 December 1999, 
however, with the later passing of the Human Rights Amendment Act 1999, the 
expiry date became midnight on 31 December 2001. 
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Petitioning the Court for Marriage 
The New Zealand same-sex marriage case 10 was taken, not only because 
gays and lesbians are seeking the right to marry per se, but also because 
we are seeking recognition of the right to "full and equal treatment under 
the law". At the time the case was taken, as remains the current 
situation, same-sex couples did not have the same choice about whether 
or not to marry that was available to different-sex couples. In turn, this 
meant that same-sex couples did not have the same choice with regard 
to accessing or not accessing the raft of legal protections which opposite-
sex married couples take for granted.  
Having considered the general human rights climate in New Zealand, 
with a belief that New Zealand's domestic human rights law could 
require a favourable interpretation of a gender-neutral Marriage Act, and 
with a realistic recognition of the difficulties ahead, three couples went to 
Court seeking the right to marry. It was hoped that, by placing their 
stories within the context of the human rights climate of New Zealand, 
the judges involved might recognise that denying same-sex couples 
access to the Marriage Act, and therefore denying the right to marry, was 
discriminatory and therefore contrary to New Zealand law. 
On 24 April 1996 the three lesbian couples who were the named 
plaintiffs in Quilter (“the Plaintiffs”) appeared before the High Court in 
Auckland, seeking a declaration that the Registrar-General of Births, 
Deaths and Marriages was acting in breach of New Zealand law by not 
issuing marriage licences to same-sex couples who wished to get 
married:11 
The plaintiffs seek a declaration that, being same-sex couples, they are 
none the less entitled to obtain a marriage licence and marry pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act. 
The basic premise of their legal argument was that the Marriage Act 
1955 did not stipulate that parties to a marriage need be a man and a 
                                                 
10 Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430 (High Court); [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
11  Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430: 433. 
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woman and that officials had acted in breach of New Zealand human 
rights law by refusing to issue a marriage licence. 
The case was initially heard on 24 April 1996 before Justice Kerr of the 
High Court in Auckland. As a result of the hearing, Justice Kerr declined 
to issue the declaration sought, holding that, although the law as it 
stood was discriminatory, the Marriage Act 1955 could not be 
interpreted as including same-sex couples – any change to that law was 
a matter for Parliament. 
On 3 September 1997, an appeal was heard in the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal. The bench of five held unanimously that same-sex couples could 
not marry under existing New Zealand law. Two of the Justices, however, 
did state that the legislation was discriminatory, but held, like the High 
Court, that any change to permit same-sex couples to marry must be 
made by Parliament.12 
In December 1998, Communication No. 902/1999, Joslin v New Zealand 
was submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, under 
Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. The Communication urged the Committee to declare 
that the New Zealand Government, by excluding same-sex couples from 
the Marriage Act 1955, was in breach of its obligations under Covenant 
Articles 16, 17, 17 juncto 2.1, 23.1 juncto 2.1, and 23.2 juncto 2.1, and 
26.  
 
The Appellants’ Arguments Before the Courts 
In essence, the Appellants 13 submitted that the failure to issue marriage 
licences to them under the provisions of the Marriage Act 1955, as 
interpreted in light of the discrimination provision of the New Zealand 
                                                 
12 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: see judgments of Thomas and 
Tipping JJ. 
13  In general, this discussion relates to the Quilter appeal to the Court of Appeal. For 
this reason, the complainants are referred to as “the Appellants”. There may be some 
references to the High Court case and to the Communication to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee where the term “Appellant(s)” may not be appropriate, 
strictly speaking, but may be used for purposes of consistency and continuity. 
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Bill of Rights Act 1990, was in breach of New Zealand law. The Plaintiffs 
relied on reading together the relevant provisions of the Marriage Act 
1955 and sections 19, 6 and 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990. 
The argument was that: 
(a)  the eligibility provisions of the Marriage Act 1955 are gender 
neutral and 'marriage' is not defined by the Act; and 
(b)  the Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.19 provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right to freedom from discrimination on the grounds of 
discrimination in the Human Rights Act 1993”, which include “sex” 
and “sexual orientation”;14 and 
(c) the Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.6 provides that “[w]herever an 
enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights 
and freedoms contained the this Bill of Rights Act, that meaning 
shall be preferred to any other meaning"; and 
(d) to avoid unjustifiable discrimination on the grounds of sex or 
sexual orientation, the Marriage Act 1955 must be interpreted as 
extending eligibility for a marriage licence to same-sex couples; 
(e) a “male-female only” interpretation would not be a “reasonable 
limit” on the Plaintiffs‟ rights under the Bill of Rights Act s.19(1) 
that could be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society under the Bill of Rights Act s.5; 
(f) a gender-neutral, non-discriminatory interpretation of the Marriage 
Act 1955 was supported by obligations which New Zealand had 
accepted under international human rights instruments. 
The Appellants further argued that the Bill of Rights s.4 was not 
relevant, because none of the provisions of the Marriage Act 1955 is 
expressly or impliedly inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act 1990.15 
                                                 
14  Human Rights Act 1993 s.21(a) and s.21(m) respectively. 
15  4. Other enactments not affected – 
 No court shall in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or after 
the commencement of this Bill of Rights), – 
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Rather, the 1955 Act can, and must, be interpreted under the Bill of 
Rights Act s.6 in a way that is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act 
s.19(1). 
 
Gender neutrality and the Marriage Act 1955 
All provisions within the Marriage Act 1955 that deal with the eligibility 
of persons to marry are gender neutral. The Marriage Act 1955 itself 
does not define marriage in a manner which restricts marriage to being 
between a man and a woman. In general, the Act employs gender-neutral 
language such as “person” or “persons” and “party” or “parties”.16 In fact, 
there is nowhere in the body of the Act that categorically gender-specific 
language is used.  
There are two provisions which require further clarification, both of 
which, the Appellants argued, are insufficient to render the Marriage 
incapable of being interpreted to include same-sex couples. 
(1) Section 33(2) employs the words: “I call on the people present here 
to witness that I, A.B., take you, C.D., to be my legal wife (or 
husband), or words to similar effect”. The Plaintiffs argued that 
these provisions do not preclude a man from saying: “I take you to 
be my legal husband”, or a woman from saying “I take you to be 
my legal wife”. That is, by virtue of that phrase, the provision can 
be applied gender-neutrally. 
Conversely, if the phrase “or words to similar effect” were not 
included (which it is), these provisions could only be interpreted 
as being gender specific.  
(2) The Second Schedule to the Act outlines "Forbidden Marriages". 
The Schedule lists those persons whom a man may not marry 
                                                                                                                                     
(a)  hold any provisions of [an] enactment … in any way invalid; or 
(b)  decline to apply any provision of any enactment –  
 by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights”. 
16 Marriage Act 1966 s.3, for example, states: "The provisions of this Act, so far as they 
relate to the capacity to marry, shall apply to the marriage of any person domiciled 
in New Zealand at the time of the marriage, ...". (Emphasis added). 
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(twenty classes of female relatives), and those persons whom a 
woman may not marry (twenty classes of male relatives). It does 
not list relatives of the same sex. 
There is much legislation, dating from past decades, where gender 
specific language is used in a manner which is not deemed to be 
appropriate in modern times. Under the Interpretation Act 1999 s.31, 
where the masculine gender is used in any legislation prior to 1999, it 
can be interpreted to include the feminine.17 The Appellants argued that 
using this provision, it is possible to interpret the Schedule of forbidden 
marriages to read that a man may not marry his son, or his brother, etc, 
and that a woman may not marry her daughter, or her sister, etc. 
 
Gender neutrality and the Family Proceedings Act 1980 
The Family Proceedings Act 1980 is also gender neutral. Section 31(1)(a) 
of the Act lists the grounds on which a marriage may be declared void: 
(i)  one party is already married;  
(ii)  by reason of duress, mistake, insanity or other absence of consent; 
or 
(iii)  the parties to the marriage are within the prohibited degrees found 
in the Second Schedule to the Marriage Act.  
There is no statutory provision which expressly states that a marriage 
will be void where the parties to the marriage are of the same gender.  
 
Discrimination and Interpretation 
The plaintiffs submitted that it is necessary to address the issue of 
discrimination first. If prima facie discrimination exists, then it is 
necessary to consider whether or not that discrimination is objectively 
justifiable. If no discrimination exists, then there can be no case for the 
Attorney-General to answer.  
                                                 
17  31. Use of masculine gender in enactments passed or made before commencement of 
this Act – In an enactment passed or made before the commencement of this Act, 
words denoting the masculine gender include females. (Note that this 1999 provision 
replaced a similar earlier provision).  
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Discrimination 
Counsel for the Appellants had the following to say about 
discrimination:18 
Counsel for the appellants submit that discrimination can be defined as 
being, in essence, less favourable treatment of the complainant or a wider 
class of which he or she forms part, on one of the prohibited grounds. 
To establish less favourable treatment it is sufficient to show that the 
complainant or class is or are being deprived of a choice or opportunity 
valued by them personally, being so valued on reasonable grounds. 
Secondly, 'on the grounds of' does not require proof of motive or intent on the 
part of the respondent or any other person; the test as to the link between 
the unfavourable treatment and the prohibited grounds is objective, and 
intention and motive are irrelevant. 
Counsel for the Appellants then argued that denial of access to the 
Marriage Act 1955 was “less favourable treatment” on the prohibited 
grounds of “sex” 19 and / or “sexual orientation. 
 
Interpretation 
The Plaintiffs argued that a reading together of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 ss.3, 6 and 19 mandated the eligibility of same-sex 
couples to marry under the Marriage Act 1955.20 
It was contended that, because the Marriage Act is gender-neutral, it can 
be interpreted to include same-sex couples as required by the Bill of 
Rights Act s.6. It was further contended that s.6 required the Court to 
strive to interpret a statute consistently with the Bill of Rights Act – and 
to do so in the context of the late 1990s and the post Bill of Rights era, 
rather than step back to 1955. The Marriage Act could be, and therefore 
must be, interpreted to include same-sex couples.  
                                                 
18 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: Submission of Appellants: 20. 
19  Relying on Baehr v Lewin. 
20  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990:  
 Section 3: Application: “This Bill of Rights applies to Acts done (a) by the legislative, 
executive or judicial branches of government … or (b) by any person or body in the 
performance of any public function …”. 
 Section 6: Duty of consistent interpretation. 
 Section 19: Prohibition of sex and sexual orientation discrimination. 
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International Law 
In the submissions to the Court, there was some reliance on 
international law.21 Under international law, New Zealand has accepted 
obligations to accord its citizens equal protection under the law and to 
actively promote the removal of discrimination. Relevant international 
human rights treaties to which New Zealand has agreed include the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.22 
International obligations, even if not incorporated directly into the 
domestic law, are relevant to its interpretation when there are gaps or 
obscurities in the common law, or ambiguity in statute law.  
Counsel for the appellants submitted that the Government had assumed 
an obligation to ensure the protection of all citizens from all forms of 
arbitrary discrimination, and, where such discrimination is in existence, 
to positively act in such a way that this discrimination will be eliminated. 
 
High Court Judgment 
Introduction 
The Plaintiff couples applied to the High Court in Auckland for:23 
… a declaration that, being same-sex couples, the plaintiffs were none the 
less lawfully entitled to obtain a marriage licence and marry under the 
provisions of the Marriage Act 1955. 
                                                 
21  The role of international human rights law in relation to this issue will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
22  The Plaintiffs relied on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Art.23.2, read together with provisions in Convention for the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women relating to the right to marry and form a family; and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Art. 26 and 2.1, using the 
Toonen decision that “sex” is to be taken to include “sexual orientation” (Toonen v 
Australia, Communication No. 488/1992. 
.  
23  Quilter v Attorney-General (1996) 14 FRNZ 430: 432. 
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Essentially therefore, the issue before the courts was whether the 
Marriage Act 1955 can be read in such a manner that same-sex couples 
are permitted to marry under that Act. 
The six Justices involved in this case (one at High Court level, and five at 
Court of Appeal level, all approached the issue differently, although there 
were similarities amongst the reasonings of some of them. 
Justice Kerr (Kerr J), at the High Court in Auckland, approached the 
issue in the manner suggested by the plaintiffs, namely, commencing 
with a consideration of whether or not refusal to grant a marriage licence 
to same-sex couples was discriminatory, and then considering whether 
or not it is possible for same-sex couples to be included in marriage 
under the existing Marriage Act 1955. 
In relation to the discrimination question, Justice Kerr held that by not 
being permitted to marry, same-sex couples are being discriminated 
against. In relation to the interpretation question, he found that the 
meaning of marriage is clearly established and that, based on this clear 
meaning, Parliament is entitled to exclude of same-sex couples from the 
Marriage Act 1955 – this exclusion is therefore justified in terms of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. If there is to be any change to 
the meaning of the Marriage Act, he stated, it is not the place of the 
Court to make that change, but it is up to Parliament to respond by 
changing the law.  
There were some concerns for us in the reasoning, (discussed below) but 
at least the Court had declared that discrimination exists. We came away 
from Auckland with the Court having stated that, by being denied access 
to marriage, gays and lesbians were being treated less favourably than 
other New Zealanders, and that this treatment impacted on them 
detrimentally.  
In reaching his conclusion, Kerr J considered a range of matters related 
to the issue of same-sex marriage. The matters of concern within his 
considerations may appear, at first glance, to be comparatively 
insignificant, but their significance lies in the insight that they give to 
how the Court approached a gay and lesbian issue. 
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Justified limitations 
Having decided that, by being denied access to marriage, same-sex 
couples are being prima facie discriminated against, the Court did not 
require the Attorney-General to justify this denial, but went on to say:24 
Pursuant to s 5, Parliament is entitled to reasonably limit the persons able 
to marry so that couples of the same sex are not entitled to go through a 
marriage ceremony (Emphasis added]. 
Strictly-speaking, this approach is not correct. It is correct that 
limitations can be imposed, but Parliament is not “entitled” to impose 
limitations without reason. Any limitations must be “demonstrably 
justified",25 and the onus of proving demonstrable justification lies with 
the party asserting it – it does not fall to the group pleading protection 
from discrimination to prove that such limitations do not exist.26 In this 
case, therefore, the Court should have spelled out clearly that, in this 
case, it is the Crown which must prove any such justification.  
This is an extremely important distinction, and goes to the core of the 
rationale for human rights laws. 
 
Behaviour versus indecency 
Another element of concern in Kerr J‟s reasoning lies in his 
consideration of the issue of the decriminalisation of homosexuality. A 
legacy of prejudice lingers in his statement that:27  
It is no longer an offence for males of 16 years or over to commit 
indecencies with each other which are consensual, consent not being 
obtained by false or fraudulent representations (emphasis added).  
What the Court is implying here (incorrectly) is that, subsequent to the 
passing of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986, consensual sexual 
behaviour between two adult males has remained an indecent act. In 
                                                 
24 Quilter v Attorney-General [1996] 14 FRNZ 430: 454. 
25  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. 
26  See comments on Baehr v Lewin (Hawai‟i) in Chapter 8. 
27 Quilter v Attorney-General [1996] 14 FRNZ 430: 441. 
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fact, the primary effect of the 1986 Act was to declare that consensual 
adult homosexual behaviour was no longer to be considered indecent or 
criminal. In this statement, the Court illustrates its failure to understand 
that the underlying effect of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986. The 
implication of the Court‟s reasoning here is that homosexual behaviour 
is still seen as deviant, not normal, an indecency. This failure to 
understand the legal climate as it affects lesbians and gay men as 
individuals, and, by implication, our rights in relation to each other and 
the wider community must colour the approach of the Court with regard 
to any considerations about whether or not same-sex (homosexual, gay, 
lesbian, abnormal, deviant, aberrant) relationships should be recognised 
in the law in exactly the same way that different-sex (heterosexual, 
normal, conventional) relationships should be recognised.  
 
Gender 
After considering transgender cases (particularly cases relating to the 
marriage of transgender persons) 28 „Kerr J stated that:29 
… in New Zealand for a marriage to take place there must be parties who 
visually at least are male and female. 
Does this mean that one party to the marriage must wear a dress and 
the other must wear trousers? Does it mean that one party to the 
marriage must have male genitals and the other must have female 
genitals? What about other characteristics which are not “visually” 
ascertainable – chromosomes, personal identity? Where does that leave 
us with the situation where a hormonally transitioned male-to-female 
transsexual chooses not to change her birth certificate and therefore is 
able, as an “official” male (birth certificate) but “visual” female, to marry 
a female? Where does this leave us with a transitioned female-to-male 
transsexual (born female but visually male) who has chosen to change 
his birth certificate and therefore is able, as a “birth” female but as a 
“visual” male, to marry a female? 
                                                 
28  Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu (1994) 12 FRNZ 643; [1995] NZFLR 57 
(HC). 
29  Quilter v Attorney-General [1996] 14 FRNZ 434. 
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The case of Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu,30 established 
that, under New Zealand law, transsexuals can, in fact, choose to marry 
a person of either gender. A male-to-female transsexual can, by law, (a) 
choose not to register a change of gender and marry a female (both 
parties "visually" female), or (b) choose to register a change of gender and 
marry a male (both parties born male). It can be argued that this 
analysis supports same-sex marriage as opposed to denying it. However, 
Kerr J fell short of understanding the intricacies of issues of gender 
identity, biological / physical gender, legal gender, and sexual 
orientation. 
 
Court of Appeal judgments 
The decision of Kerr J was appealed to the Court of Appeal whose 
majority decision was that, because the meaning of marriage is so well 
understood to be between a man and a woman, the Marriage Act 1955 
cannot be interpreted to give same-sex couples access to marriage. They 
also concluded that, if there were to be any change made to the laws 
relating to the recognition of same-sex couples by way of the Marriage 
Act 1955, it was up to Parliament to consider and make those changes.  
However, in reaching this decision on the matter of whether the Marriage 
Act 1955 can be read in such a manner that same-sex couples are 
included within its ambit, the members of the bench of the Court of 
Appeal each approached the issue differently.  
 
President Richardson 
Justice Richardson, President of the Court of Appeal (Richardson P) at 
the time of its consideration of the Quilter case, presented a particularly 
brief written decision. It should be assumed that President Richardson 
turned his mind to the issues before the Court, and upon conferring with 
his colleagues and reading their formulation of their thoughts, he 
decided he had nothing further to add.  
                                                 
30  Quilter v Attorney-General [1996] 14 FRNZ 430. 
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At the same time, however, one of the litigants in the case took offence at 
what was perceived as the Richardson P failing to recognise the 
significance, for gays and lesbians, of the matter before the Court, and 
choosing not to apply his time to the issues. This perceived lack of 
consideration of the issues was described as “an insult to gays and 
lesbians in New Zealand”. It was stated that it could be reasonably 
expected of the President of the Court of Appeal that, in a case of such 
huge importance to gays and lesbians (and to human rights generally) he 
would do more than read the judgments of his peers, agree with them 
and, in some 220 words, dismiss the appeal.31 
 
Justice Gault 
Justice Gault (Gault J) gave the matter rather more consideration. 
Unfortunately, however, and with all due respect, I have some serious 
reservations about the efficacy of his reasoning, especially the manner in 
which he attempts to address the question of discrimination. The basis 
for his conclusion that in this case there is discrimination neither on the 
basis of sexual orientation nor on the basis of sex is unsustainable. He 
states:32 
There would have been no different reaction had the Plaintiffs been male or 
if they had been heterosexual and simply seeking a marriage relationship to 
take advantage of perceived civil benefits.  
His reasoning in simple terms:33 
(a)  There is no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
because the Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages would 
respond exactly the same if the application were made by two 
heterosexual men as he would if the application were made by two 
gay men. 
(b) There is no discrimination on the basis of sex because the Registrar 
of Births, Deaths and Marriages would respond exactly the same if 
                                                 
31  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 526. 
32  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 527. 
33  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 527. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 308  
 
the application were made by two women as he would if the 
application were made by two men (Quilter [1998] 1 NZLR 523, 
527). 
This analysis ignores indirect sexual orientation discrimination – that is, 
differentiation which, while it appears to treat everyone the same, in fact 
impacts on one group more adversely than another. Under the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights there is no actual distinction between direct and 
indirect discrimination, the term discrimination being employed for Bill 
of Rights purposes to cover both. This means that Justice Gault has in 
fact ignored discrimination.34 
Gault J then goes on to minimalise, marginalise, and invisibilise the 
reality of same-sex relationships and to undermine and deny their 
significance to the couples involved. His statement that denial of choice 
only affects those who wish to make the choice 35 gives rise to two 
concerns about his reasoning. 
First, he passes off the attraction between one gay man and another as 
mere choice. His reasoning denies a real and actual link between the fact 
that a gay male will seek to enter into a long term commitment with 
another male precisely because of the very nature of his sexual 
orientation. It is because he is a gay male that he will seek to enter into a 
relationship with another male. There is something illogical about 
expecting a gay male to “choose” to enter into a relationship with a 
woman if he wishes also to choose to get married. Alternatively, even 
following Gault J‟s own reasoning, the final effect of this must be that if 
a person makes a particular choice because of his / her sexual 
orientation and that choice is denied, sexual orientation discrimination 
must result in relation to the right to freedom of choice. 
Second, Gault J further minimalises the significance of the notion of 
objectively justifiable limitations which is so central to this case. Is there 
not a clear difference between, on the one hand, not allowing a marriage 
by one person to (a) another person who is already married, or (b) a child 
                                                 
34  There is a distinction between direct and indirect discrimination under the Human 
Rights Act 1993. 
35 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 527. 
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and, on the other hand, not allowing marriage by one person to another 
person on the sole basis that “we” (meaning certain members of society) 
don‟t like the idea? There are objectively justifiable reasons for not 
permitting a person to marry someone who is already married – 
essentially around undermining the existing family unit and effects on 
other parties (existing partner, children) – or someone who is not of a 
prescribed age – essentially around the ability to give freely of their 
consent to the relationship and thereby not be the victim of abuse, etc. 
Gault J gives himself the opportunity to give his justifications for 
allowing less favourable treatment of gay and lesbian couples, but does 
not do so. He merely states that “[j]ustification for differences will be 
found in social policy resting on community values”,36  but he does not 
explore this further. 
Essentially, Gault J finds that there is no discrimination (because gays 
and lesbians can choose to live as heterosexuals) and, even if there were 
discrimination, it would be justifiable (because that is the way it has 
been, and that is the way it is). 
 
Justice Keith 
Justice Keith (Keith J) found that the right to marry could not be decided 
by reference to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.19. He gave 
three key reasons for his view that s.19 did not “reach” the issue of 
same-sex marriage: 
1) The view that a ban on same-sex is discriminatory is not supported 
by overseas jurisprudence. Human rights should be “understood 
and applied in a pragmatic, functional way” with discrimination on 
some grounds being more suspect than others. 
2) The general language [of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act] would 
have been a remarkably indirect way to effect such a major change 
in a basic, social, religious, public and legal institution. 
                                                 
36  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 527. 
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3) There is a vast array of incidents attached to marriage which “all 
emphasise the extreme unlikelihood of a change in the basic 
elements of marriage being made in such a way as by way of 
enactment of section 19”. Parliament had, in fact, approached the 
matter of the legal treatment of same-sex couples in a 
particularistic manner. 
I respond to the above points are as follows: 
1) In New Zealand, there is very little adherence to the notion of 
suspect classes and non-suspect classes. Clearly, under our 
human rights legislation we have 14 grounds of prohibition against 
discrimination – and all are considered equal. To suggest that some 
classes are more suspect than others is to suggest a hierarchy of 
rights which is not appropriate in New Zealand and is not the 
intention of our human rights legislation.  
It must also be remembered that the issue here is not about 
whether or not the grounds of sex or sexual orientation are 
protected grounds under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 – 
they are expressly so without question. The issue here is about 
whether or not same-sex couples are being discriminated against 
by being denied recognition of their relationships by marriage.  
2) The New Zealand Parliament has directed, by way of its human 
rights legislation, that it is not acceptable for discrimination to exist 
in certain circumstances, and it is the courts‟ role to act in 
accordance with that direction. Furthermore, we have ample 
examples of human rights legislation being applied in such a way 
that new policy is being created. Human rights is based on broad, 
liberal, inclusive language and is designed to be a check against 
discriminatory practices. That does not make adherence to human 
rights standards an indirect means of effecting social change. 
3) It is interesting that Keith J mentions the particularistic approach 
adopted by Parliament.37 For me, such an approach causes real 
concerns. It implies that it is acceptable to work towards 
                                                 
37  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 560. 
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compliance with human rights standards over a period of time. This 
is not an acceptable response to the correction of discrimination or 
human rights legislation non-compliance. The incremental / 
progressive approach to human rights suggests that there is such a 
thing as partial equality – there is not. We either have equality or 
we do not. 
Keith J also gets caught in the same argument as Gault J, namely, that 
the refusals to issue marriage licences “were not on the grounds of the 
sexual orientation of each applicant” because the denial of marriage 
licences to the same-sex couples:38 
involved no breach of the right to freedom from discrimination on the 
grounds of the sex of each applicant, since each and every individual 
seeking to marry someone of the same sex would be equally refused. 
Keith J also puts forward an unusual argument in which he implies that 
if it is discriminatory to deny same-sex couples access to marriage, then 
it must also be discriminatory to deny others. His reasoning is as 
follows: 
If … 
to deny a couple access to marriage on the basis that both parties 
are male is discrimination on the basis of gender; and if … 
denying a couple access to marriage on the basis that one party is a 
gay man and therefore seeks a gay man as a marriage partner is 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; 
then … 
to deny a couple access to marriage because one partner is already 
married must be discrimination on the basis of marital status; and 
… 
to deny a couple access to marriage because one partner is not 
capable of giving his or her voluntary consent must be 
discrimination on the basis of disability; and … 
                                                 
38  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 557. 
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to deny a couple access to marriage because he or she has not 
reached the age of majority must be discrimination on the basis of 
age; and 
to deny a couple access to marriage because they are within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship must be discrimination on the 
basis of family status. 
It is true that, in each of these instances, there is prima facie 
discrimination, but Keith J fails to pursue the issue of “objective 
justification”. 
In each of the instances he cites, there is an objective reason why 
marriage has been denied. For example: 
۰ one party already married – stretching of financial and physical 
resources – not so beneficial for children especially; 
۰ mental capacity – the ability to give informed consent; 
۰ age of majority – ability to give informed consent; 
۰ prohibited degree of relationship (affinity / consanguinity) – damage 
to the gene pool. 
When it comes to granting access to marriage for same-sex couples, 
however, there is, to date, no proven objective justification. The usual 
attempts at objective justification (compelling reason in some overseas 
jurisdictions) against same-sex marriage are based in religion or social 
convention (tradition).  
The most common arguments against same-sex marriage tend to be 
those around procreation and the raising of children (the “best interests” 
of any children). But, these two arguments do not stand up to scrutiny. 
They have not been successful in the New Zealand Court of Appeal.39 Nor 
have they been successful in cases such as Baehr v Lewin in Hawai‟i 
(USA), Baker v Vermont in Vermont (USA), British Columbia (Canada) 
and Halpern et al v Canada (A-G) et al and MCC of Toronto v Canada (A-
G), Ontario (Canada).40 
                                                 
39  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
40  Halpern et al v Canada (A-G) et al, and MCC of Toronto v Canada (A-G) et al. 
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The State, in Baehr v Lewin, went to great lengths to argue a compelling 
State reason for denying same-sex marriage on the basis that it would be 
detrimental to children. One of the State‟s own expert witnesses was 
declared by the Court to be “not credible”, and the other three expert 
witnesses for the State gave evidence in support of same-sex marriage. 
These experts stated that there was no known detriment to children as a 
result of them having two parents of the same gender. They also gave 
evidence that, to the contrary, it was beneficial for children to live in a 
home where the parents were married, as marriage brings a social 
approval and status which in turn provides a security for the family. 
There are also, of course, the added legal protections that flow from 
marriage which are not available to couples who are not married, and 
their families. 
Perhaps the most disappointing element of Keith J's considerations, as a 
respected international jurist, lies in his blanket rejection of 
international developments of same-sex marriage. He relied on:41 
… the non-acceptance of the world community of any support for a right to 
same sex marriage based on the principle of equality or the prohibition on 
discrimination … 
This statement ignores the registered partnership laws of Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Iceland and the Netherlands as well as the Hawai‟i 
Supreme Court‟s preliminary ruling in Baehr v Lewin. There have been 
other developments since the Quilter case, but even at that time, there 
had been increased discussion of the topic, along with some major 
developments. There had been considerable movement towards 
marriage-like recognition of same-sex couples, as well as the Hawai‟i 
Supreme Court, in effect, granting marriage rights to same-sex couples, 
although this right was removed by a change to the Constitution of the 
State of Hawai‟i resulting from a public referendum. 
In short, while more comprehensive in terms of the amount of 
information contained in Keith J‟s judgment, there is a lack of 
information to show an in depth understanding either of the legal issues 
or the impact of exclusion on same-sex couples and their families. 
 
                                                 
41 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 563. 
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Justice Tipping 
Justice Tipping (Tipping J) agreed that there was no need to decide the 
discrimination issue, but added, in obiter dicta, that:42 
… the impact of the prohibition inherent in the Marriage Act against same-
sex marriages is much more significant for people with a same-sex 
orientation than it is for people of heterosexual orientation. … Prima facie … 
I see the inability of homosexual and lesbian couples to marry as involving 
discrimination against them on the grounds of their sexual orientation. 
In this analysis, Tipping J goes considerably further than Richardson P, 
Gault J or Keith J. Not only does he consider whether or not there is 
different treatment, but also he assesses the effect of that different 
treatment arriving at the conclusion that it affects a particular group of 
persons (that is, gays and lesbians) to greater detriment than other 
persons. Unfortunately, he did not go on to address the question of 
whether or not this discrimination is justifiable. 
He did go as far as saying that a consideration of whether or not the 
traditional concept of marriage is prima facie discriminatory cannot be 
influenced by historical and religious factors, but must be an objective 
assessment of the provision based upon correct processes of statutory 
interpretation.43 However, even if the Courts find that discrimination 
does exist, he appears to give Parliament a licence to retain the 
discriminatory definition of marriage if “society wishes nevertheless to 
maintain the traditional concept of marriage", rather than requiring the 
Crown to justify such different treatment. 
Essentially, Tipping J held that, if the Marriage Act 1955 is truly gender 
neutral and the Court is able to interpret it so as to include same-sex 
couples, then the Court is free to declare this to be the case. In this, 
Tipping J was saying that the meaning of the Marriage Act, as generally 
understood in the law, must be gender neutral, rather than the wording 
of the statute itself, and that the Court cannot employ the provisions of 
                                                 
42  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 575-576. 
43  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 572. 
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the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to change the meaning of 
marriage:44 
We may interpret, but we cannot rewrite or legislate. The Bill of Rights must 
be given its full effect in the necessary process of interpretation, but it may 
not be used as a concealed legislative tool. It is clearly implicit in what the 
Bill of Rights says, (s 4), and what it does not say, that Parliament has 
reserved to itself all legislative functions. 
At the same time, Tipping J also expresses his preference for defining a 
right, bearing in mind the purpose of anti-discrimination laws, and then 
to consider whether any limitation on that right is justified. He states 
that this preference is based in its accord with the spirit and purpose of 
the Bill of Rights (and, I would suggest, with the spirit and purpose of 
human rights legislation generally). It is better conceptually to start with 
a more widely defined right and legitimise or justify a restriction if 
appropriate, than to start with a more restricted right.45 
Tipping J holds that, because the meaning of marriage is so clearly 
understood, the Marriage Act 1955 is not capable of being interpreted to 
include same-sex couples. While not expressing disagreement with 
Tipping J‟s ultimate finding on the question of the interpretation of the 
Marriage Act 1955 and whether or not it is possible to interpret the Act 
inclusively of same-sex couples, there are a couple of technical points 
from Tipping J‟s judgment about which I would also like to make 
comment: 
(a) The Marriage Act 1955 provides that, during the marriage 
ceremony, each party to the marriage must say to the other: “I, AB, 
                                                 
44  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 572: The New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990: s.4 provides: 
 4. Other enactments not affected – No court shall, in relation to any enactment 
(whether passed or made before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights), –  
(a)  hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, or to be 
in any way invalid or ineffective; or  
(b)  decline to apply any provision of the enactment –  
 by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of 
Rights.  
45  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 576. 
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take you, CD, to be my legal wife (or husband), or words to similar 
effect)”.46 I disagree that the words “… or words to similar effect” 
cannot reasonably be interpreted to permit a male to say these 
words to a male partner. If Parliament were to legislate for the 
inclusion of same-sex couples within the provisions of the Marriage 
Act 1955, there would be no practical need to amend this section to 
cater for male-male marriages, or female-female marriages. This 
section of the Act is capable of being interpreted consistent with 
the Bill of Rights Act 1990 – it is the traditional meaning of the 
word “marriage” which is stopping it from being interpreted that 
way. 
(b) Tipping J also states that the intending parties to a marriage must 
make a statutory declaration in which they state that there are (1) 
no impediments under s.15, and (2) there is no other lawful 
impediment to their marriage. Tipping J then goes on to compare 
this with bigamous marriages, relying on the common law meaning 
of marriage to justify the exclusion from marriage of a person who 
is already married. In fact, there are two statutory provisions, in 
New Zealand law, relating to bigamy. Firstly, a person does not 
have the capacity to consent to a marriage if they were already 
married at the time of the second marriage ceremony, and any 
marriage where this is the case will be declared void ab initio.47 
Secondly, special provision is made for bigamous marriages from 
outside of New Zealand. This is a statutory provision which at least 
implies that bigamous marriages cannot be solemnised under New 
Zealand law.48 In this respect I submit that Tipping J‟s argument, 
on this specific point, is invalid. In fact, there is no similar 
provision excluding same-sex marriages, so this point could be 
interpreted to say the opposite to what Tipping J is attempting to 
say. That is, if there is an express exclusion of bigamous marriages 
                                                 
46  Marriage Act 1955 s.31(3). (Emphasis added). 
47  Family Proceedings Act 1980 s.31(1)(a). 
48  Family Proceedings Act 1980 s.2:  
 “Marriage” includes a union in the nature of marriage that – 
 (a)  Is entered into outside New Zealand; and  
 (b)  Is at any time polygamous, –  
 where the law of the country in which each of the parties is domiciled at the time of 
the union then permits polygamy. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 317  
 
under New Zealand law (on public policy grounds), but there is not 
an express exclusion of same-sex marriages, surely this would 
suggest that an inclusive interpretation of the Marriage Act would 
permit same-sex couples to marry.  
 
Justice Thomas 
The decision of Justice Thomas (Thomas J) is the most favourable for 
same-sex couples, and, of course, is that with which, as same-sex 
couples advocating access to marriage, we agree the most. Thomas J 
approaches the issue in a logical and coherent manner, addressing it in 
the following stages: 
(i) Is the denial of access by same-sex couples to the Marriage Act 
1955 prima facie discriminatory against gays and lesbians? 
(ii) If so, is that prima facie discrimination objectively justifiable? 
(iii) If yes, there is no need to consider this matter further. 
(iv) If no, is it possible to interpret the Marriage Act 1955 in a manner 
so as to include same-sex couples? 
(v) If yes, then the Court must declare this to be so. 
(vi) If no, what remedy can the Court grant? 
In following this process, Thomas J considered that: 
[h]aving regard … to the essential thrust of these appeals … it would be 
unduly legalistic to rest the Court‟s decision on the meaning of the marriage 
Act without squarely confronting the question of discrimination.  
Is the denial of access by same-sex couples to the Marriage Act 1955 prima 
facie discriminatory against gays and lesbians? 
Thomas J found that the exclusion of same-sex couples from access to 
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the Marriage Act 1055 is prima facie discrimination based both on sex 
and sexual orientation:49 
Whether one adopts the approach urged upon the Court by [the Plaintiffs‟ 
counsel, that the female applicant is discriminated against on the grounds 
of her sex because, being female, she is by law unable to marry another 
woman], or focuses on the [Plaintiffs‟ rights as a couple, the discrimination 
fairly can be said to be based on their sex. Whatever hesitation may exist to 
basing the discrimination on the grounds of sex, one cannot seriously resist 
the proposition that gays and lesbians are discriminated against on the 
ground of sexual orientation. Just as the sexual orientation of heterosexual 
men and women leads to the formation of heterosexual relationships, so too 
it is the sexual orientation of gays and lesbians which leads to the 
formation of homosexual relationship. Sexual orientation dictates their 
choice of partner in both cases. 
He went on to hold that this prima facie discrimination “cannot be 
qualified by reference to s.5”,50 the justification provision of the Bill of 
Rights Act. In particular, he rejected the view that “procreation is the 
sole or major purpose of marriage … [T]he essence of the marriage 
relationship [is instead] cohabitation, commitment, intimacy, and 
financial interdependence”.51 He also rejected the “circular and question-
begging” argument “that gay and lesbian persons are not discriminated 
against because they are free to marry persons of the opposite sex”,52 
and warned of “the danger of looking to the past to determine whether 
discrimination exists today”.53 
He concluded that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
“inescapably judges them less worthy of the respect, concern and 
consideration deriving from the fundamental concept of human dignity 
underlying all human rights legislation”.54  
 
                                                 
49  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 536-537. 
50 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5 contains the "justified limitations" 
provisions. 
51  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 547. 
52  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
53  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 550. 
54  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 555. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 319  
 
If it were not for his inability to strike down clear but discriminatory 
legislation, because of s.4 of the Bill of Rights Act, he might have found 
for the Plaintiffs. In the final analysis, he held that, despite having found 
that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is unjustifiably 
discriminatory, the Court cannot change the law, and must defer in this 
function to Parliament. 
 
The Reasoning 
From the time the decision from Quilter was handed down, it was clear 
that Thomas J had offered something positive and insightful. His 
decision is one of those pieces of writing that, every time it is read, offers 
up something new. After having read decisions from other overseas 
jurisdictions, I have come to appreciate the detail in the information, the 
intricacy of application, and the depth of understanding that is present 
within this judgment. It is quite remarkable that over ten years in the 
past, Thomas J was writing a legal dissertation about same-sex marriage 
that would hold its own as a judgment in a court to this day. What is 
exemplary about the judgment of Thomas J is that it does not merely 
address the issues in a formulistic and detached manner, but that it 
goes beyond the technical framework and examines the detail behind the 
issues of what is marriage as a fundamental right and what are the 
implications of exclusion for gays and lesbians, what is the purpose of 
having human rights laws and the anti-discrimination provisions, and he 
touches on what he considers to be the role of those involved in human 
rights law. 
Contained within the judgment are some points of wisdom which I list 
here in the hope that they continue to resonate in discussions on this 
topic. 
Thomas J addresses the question of discrimination by reference to 
General Comment 18 on Non-Discrimination (37th Session, 9 November 
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1989) by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. This tells us 
that:55 
„discrimination‟ …should be understood to mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, 
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. 
What does Thomas J himself say about discrimination? He raises a 
series of extremely pertinent points in relation to discrimination, as 
follows: 
1. Discrimination and international law – While cautioning that 
international human rights laws per se are not binding within New 
Zealand, Thomas J talks of the assistance that can be provided by 
them in the interpretation of domestic human rights law:56 
None of the principles … are binding on New Zealand Courts. They do, 
however, „paint a backdrop against which New Zealand‟s obligations 
and compliance can be placed‟. 
2. Concern, respect and consideration – Thomas J draws on Andrews 
v Law Society of British Columbia and the notion of persons being 
worthy of “concern, respect and consideration”.57 According to 
Thomas J, this notion is anchored in the ideal that everyone is 
equal before the law – entitled to equal treatment under the law 
and to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law – 
requiring:58 
the promotion of a society in which all individuals are secure in the 
knowledge that they are recognised in law as human rights equally 
deserving „of concern, respect and consideration‟, … and … a 
commitment to the recognition of each person‟s individual worth 
regardless of individual differences. 
                                                 
55  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 531. 
56  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 531: citing Cartwright J in Northern 
Regional Health Authority v Human Rights Commission (1997) 4 HRNZ 37: 56-59. 
57  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia and the notion of persons being worthy 
of “concern, respect and consideration”.(1989) 56 DLR (4th) 1: 15. 
58  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 531-532. 
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3. Idealism – The ideal (that everyone is deserving of equal treatment 
under the law) may never be achieved, but that is:59 
… no sound reason for not pursuing it. It remains the goal and serves 
to enlighten the laws enacted by Parliament and the interpretation of 
the law adopted buy the Courts.  
4. Tolerance – Thomas J also raises the issue of tolerance, and then 
discounts tolerance as being an insufficient level of recognition to 
avoid discrimination, stating that “much more than tolerance from 
the majority is needed”.60 He goes on to say that:61 
[d]iscrimination must be positively targeted by the law. It is for this 
reason that Parliament enacted the Human Rights Act and affirmed in 
the Bill of Rights that the right to freedom from discrimination is a 
fundamental right to be protected and promoted in this country. 
5. Discrimination and tradition – He also discusses the suggestion 
that, because different treatment may have an historic origin, this 
should not be used as a justification for its continuance. Rather, it 
illustrates, all the more, the reasons why that different treatment 
should cease.62 
6. Equality of treatment versus equality of result – Thomas J points 
out that, in some circumstances, there may be a need for unequal 
treatment in order to produce an equal result. A prime example of 
this is the sometime need for affirmative action. He goes on to quote 
Egan v Canada saying:63 
[t]he existence of discrimination or otherwise can only be determined 
by „assessing the prejudicial effect of the distinction against … the 
fundamental purpose of preventing the infringement of essential 
human dignity‟. 
 
                                                 
59  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 531. 
60  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 532. 
61  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 532. 
62  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 532. 
63  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 532: citing Egan v Canada (1995) 124 
DLR (4th) 609: 676. 
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7. Justification – Thomas J does not just find that there is no 
objective justification for the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage – he finds that there can be no objective justification:64  
Differentiations that are discriminatory cannot be reconciled with the 
democratic ideal of equality before and under the law. Discrimination 
in all its forms is odious. 
8. Effect of discrimination – He also states that discrimination against 
a person or a group of persons is not only detrimental to that 
person or group of persons, but also it is detrimental to society as a 
whole:65 
It is hurtful to those discriminated against and harmful to the health 
of the body politic. As such, it is or should be repugnant in a free and 
democratic society. 
9. Interpretation – Thomas J agrees with the Plaintiff that the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act s.6 places the onus on the Court to give, 
wherever at all possible, a meaning to legislation that is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights:66 
I agree that where a breach of a fundamental right or freedom 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights is found to exist in any statute the 
Court should conscientiously strive to arrive at a meaning which 
will avoid that breach. … this Court has constructed a comprehensive 
and far-reaching jurisprudence designed to protect the rights of those 
persons who are suspected of an offence or arrested and charged 
with a crime. It behoves the Court to demonstrate the same 
commitment to the promotion and protection of other rights and 
freedoms equally affirmed as fundamental in the Bill of Rights. 
10. Political pragmatism – This leads on to Thomas J considering the 
respective roles of the human rights lawyer and the politician. It is 
my strongly held belief that human rights lawyers can and must 
advocate full equality under the law. Human rights laws cannot 
permit such a thing as partial equality. Parliament, however, 
                                                 
64  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 540. 
65  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 540. 
66  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 541. 
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stands supreme and can establish its own processes and legislation 
which may subsequently be open to challenge through legal 
avenues. The processes that Parliament uses to achieve it law 
changes can only be decided upon by politicians, guided by jurists 
only to the extent that the law permits:67  
Inevitably the jurist is led into areas of policy such as the timing of 
any change to the law, the methods by which the law should be 
changed, and the general acceptance or receptiveness of the 
community to any such law change. At once the jurist will appreciate 
that he or she has strayed beyond the bounds of legal inquiry into the 
foreign territory of „political policy‟. 
11. Populist opinion – Another point about which I feel very strongly is 
that of the role of popular opinion in the decision-making process. 
If a core purpose for the existence of human rights laws is to 
protect minority / vulnerable groups against the majoritarian 
prejudice of the larger / more powerful group(s), why then would 
we seek the opinion of that larger / more powerful group about 
what rights and protections they think the protected group should 
have?:68 
Fundamental rights and freedoms are not a matter of consensus. A 
majoritarian notion of „morality‟ is not a sufficient basis to deny an 
unpopular minority the equal protection of the law. Indeed it is 
because they are a minority and likely to be politically powerless that 
they require the protection of the law and equal treatment under the 
law. The majoritarian approach was rejected by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Bowers v Hardwick … 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Thomas J‟s judgment is his 
awareness of the legal consequences to gays and lesbians of exclusion 
from marriage, and the effects of those legal consequences on the dignity 
of gays and lesbians as persons:69 
Based upon this personal characteristic, gays and lesbians are denied 
access to a central social institution and the resulting status of married 
                                                 
67  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 545. 
68  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 545. 
69 Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 324  
 
persons. They lose the rights and privileges, including the manifold legal 
consequences which marriage conveys. They are denied a basic civil right in 
that freedom to marry is rightly regarded as a basic civil right. They lose the 
opportunity to choose the partner of their choice as a marriage partner, 
many again viewing the right to choose as a basic civil right of all citizens. 
In a real sense, gays and lesbians are effectively excluded from full 
membership of society". (Emphasis added) 
 
Summary 
After being heard by the High Court and then by the Court of Appeal, the 
Quilter case established that, in the eyes of those Courts, the Marriage 
Act 1955 could not be interpreted to include same-sex couples.  
This was not necessarily because of the language of the Act itself, but 
because of the well-established meaning of the term “marriage”. The 
Courts considered that the meaning of marriage, confined to a 
partnership between a man and a woman, is the meaning that is widely 
accepted by society, and the meaning that was in the minds of 
Parliament at the time the Marriage Act 1955 became law. 
I would suggest that the Court of Appeal majority decision on this point 
(the issue of interpretation), is only correct by virtue of the existence of 
Schedule II to the Act which is sufficiently gender-specific in its language 
to negate the possibility of the seemingly gender-neutral language in the 
remainder of the Act. Without that Schedule, it would seem quite clear 
that the Marriage Act 1993 could be interpreted to include same-sex 
partners and therefore, in response to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1996, would have to be. 
We attempted to argue in Court that the Crown‟s arguments all related 
to the “tail-wagging-the-dog”. We responded with a range of counter-
arguments such as: 
1. We are only interested in the eligibility provisions of the Act – we 
need to get in before we can worry about the effect of procedures 
and restrictions. 
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2. Statutory interpretation dictates that you look first to the 
immediate provision, and only turn to other parts of the Act (such 
as a Schedule) where there is an ambiguity of language in that 
provision. 
3. Statutory interpretation dictates that you look first to the 
immediate provision, and only turn to other related statutes 
(statutes in pari materia) where there is an ambiguity of language 
in that provision. 
4. Even where there appears to be gender-specific language, it is 
possible to employ the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 s.4 to include 
female meaning where the language of the act related to the male 
meaning only, and vice versa.70 
We were unsuccessful on this issue, however, and the Court held that 
the meaning of the Marriage Act 1955 – based on the language of the 
Act, and the traditional and generally understood and accepted meaning 
of marriage within society – is clear and cannot be interpreted by the 
Court to include same-sex couples. They went on to say that any change 
to the Marriage Act must be made by Parliament. 
 
Postscript 
Putting the record straight: Court of Appeal and “discrimination”  
It is my contention that the matter of the Court of Appeal on 
discrimination has been widely misinterpreted. It has been said that the 
Court held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the Marriage Act 
1955 is not discriminatory. I do not accept that, in fact, this is what the 
Court found. If the tools of case-law reasoning are applied correctly to 
the decision, it is clear that the discussion of discrimination by three of 
the Justices involved falls into obiter dicta, at best.71 In fact, the three of 
                                                 
70  The Acts Interpretation Act 1924, in force at the time of Quilter, has subsequently 
been repealed and replaced by the Interpretation Act 1999. 
71  “Obiter dictum [Latin: a remark in passing] Something said by a judge while giving a 
judgment that was not essential to the decision in the case. It does not form part of 
the ratio decidendi of the case and therefore creates no binding precedent, but may 
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them essentially dismiss the discrimination issue as being irrelevant to 
the case. (They do not say that discrimination is irrelevant, only that 
because of their particular approach to the case, the need to consider 
the discrimination issue was circumvented).  
Richardson P, makes absolutely no determination as to whether or not 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is discriminatory, saying:72 
… it is unnecessary to determine the difficult and complex question of the 
meaning of discrimination under international human rights instruments 
and New Zealand law. However … I record that … I am not persuaded that 
the right under s 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to freedom 
from discrimination requires equal legislative recognition of heterosexual 
and same-sex marriages. 
After having considered the meaning of the Marriage Act 1955 and 
whether it is possible to interpret it to include same-sex couples, Gault J 
states:73 
The Marriage Act is clear and to give it such different meaning [to include 
same-sex couples] would not be to undertake interpretation but to assume 
the role of lawmaker which is for Parliament. … No further comment is 
necessary to dispose of the appeal … 
This is not to say that Gault J does not go on to discuss the notion of 
discrimination, but it is not a consideration in his decision. This means 
that the consideration of discrimination by Gault J can only be given the 
status of obiter dicta. 
Keith J, similarly, stated that the negative answer on the interpretation 
question made it unnecessary to decide the discrimination question: 
In this judgment I do no more than hint at possible positive elements of the 
right to freedom from discrimination, since I am principally concerned with 
the negative proposition, that s.19 does not reach the matter of same-sex 
marriages. 
                                                                                                                                     
be cited as persuasive authority in later cases”: A Concise Dictionary of Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford (1990).  
72  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 526. 
73  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 526. 
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Tipping J states:74 
I would not shrink from a firm decision on the issue of discrimination if such 
were necessary to decide this case, but it is not. However … I think it is 
appropriate to express my views. 
The relevant section of Thomas J‟s judgment for the purpose of this 
discussion is as follows:75 
It would be possible in deciding the appeals to leave the question of 
discrimination open and move directly to the terms of the Marriage Act 
1955. I cannot accept that such an approach is appropriate. The only reason 
these appeals have arisen is because the appellants contend that they are 
subject to discrimination contrary to s.19 of the Bill of Rights. Unless and 
until that issue is resolved the question of the interpretation of the Marriage 
Act does not arise at all. Having regard, therefore, to the essential thrust of 
these appeals I consider it would be unduly legalistic to rest the Court‟s 
decision on the meaning of the Marriage Act without squarely confronting 
the question of discrimination. 
It is possible to interpret this paragraph by Thomas J either way when 
trying to decide whether his considerations of discrimination amount to 
obiter or ratio.  On the one hand, with a sentence such as: “It would be 
possible [to] in deciding the appeals to leave the question of 
discrimination open and move directly to the terms of the Marriage Act 
1955”, it would appear that the considerations of discrimination are 
obiter. On the other hand, however, the sentence: “Unless and until that 
issue is resolved the question of the interpretation of the Marriage Act 
does not arise at all” indicates that the consideration of discrimination is 
an integral component of Thomas J‟s reasoning (part of the ratio).  
Over all, therefore we have two possible ways of viewing the final 
outcome of the case, which are as follows: 
1. There are five judgments in which the considerations with regard to 
the question of discrimination are classified as obiter. In each of 
these judgments, the deliberations could be used in future cases as 
                                                 
74  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 575. 
75  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 528. 
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persuasive argument. If each of these arguments were to be put 
forward, I would suggest that an argument based in the discussion 
by Thomas J, supported perhaps in part by that of Tipping J, would 
prevail over any argument derived from the discussions by Gault J 
and Keith J. 
2. The other way of viewing the judgments is that there are four in 
which the discussion about discrimination is classified as obiter, 
and one (that of Thomas J) which is classed as part of the ratio. 
However, in Thomas J‟s case, this would be part of the ratio of the 
dissenting judgment – so once again may only be classed as 
persuasive, albeit slightly more persuasive (by virtue of being part 
of the ratio) than the obiter of his colleagues. 
Whatever the preference of the above two possible scenarios, it is not 
possible to say that the Court of Appeal in Quilter found that there is no 
discrimination arising from the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage. However, if we follow the ratio of the case (as binding) and the 
obiter of the case (as persuasive), it is my contention that we have a 
Court which is saying: 
1. The meaning of the Marriage Act is clear; and 
2. that meaning does not include same-sex couples; and 
3. the Court is not able to change that meaning; because 
4. it is the role of Parliament to change legislation; however 
5. to exclude same-sex couples from marriage is discriminatory;76 
therefore 
6. the law should be changed; and 
7. it should be changed in such a way that same-sex couples are 
included in marriage.77 
 
                                                 
76  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 539 (per Thomas J). 
77  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 554: per Thomas J. 
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NEW ZEALAND – THE LEGISLATURE AND SAME-SEX COUPLES  
Introduction 
In terms of what was happening in New Zealand outside of the courts, in 
many ways, the period from 1993 to 2000 could be described as a period 
of inaction. 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 had been initiated by a Labour Government, but was 
subsequently passed during the time of a National Government. It is 
probably fair to say that, in general terms, the legislation had the support 
of both main parties within the House, but the National Government was 
much more reticent about giving the Act too much status and too much 
power.78 The legislation was not entrenched and was not supreme law – it 
was ordinary legislation. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which 
applied to actions by and on behalf of Government, did not, at the time of 
passing, include prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
The Human Rights Act 1993 had also come into effect during the term of 
a National Government. The Act was not entrenched and was not 
supreme law – it was ordinary legislation. The Human Rights Act 1993 
regulated relationships between citizens in their private lives and did 
include sexual orientation as an expressly prohibited ground of 
discrimination. The Human Rights Act 1993, by way of consequential 
amendment to the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1993, added to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act s.19 all „new‟ grounds now included in the 
Human Rights Act 1993.  
The National-led Government remained in power until 1999. 
Unfortunately, however, in spite of what appeared to be strong human 
rights legislation, this did not translate into a period of human right 
responsiveness. In fact, it appeared that there was a lack of 
Governmental and Parliamentary commitment to human rights 
                                                 
78 See discussion in Chapters 6 and 10 relating to the development and passing of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the original proposal to have a Bill of Rights 
which was entrenched and had superior power. 
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imperatives generally, and a clear reticence in relation to gay and lesbian 
issues in particular. 
In one sense, there seemed to be quite a lot happening, as will be shown 
in this section. However, a closer look will show that while there was 
considerable discussion of principles, there was very little movement in 
relation to substance. In fact, it would appear that the Government 
worked extremely hard to maintain the status quo in relation to gay and 
lesbian issues – in spite of some fine-sounding rhetoric. 
 
First steps 
Above all, the period from 1993 to 2000 seems to have demonstrated a 
reluctance on the part of Government and Parliament to increase the 
levels of protections to those minorities whom the human rights 
legislation now purported to protect. This translated into a seeming 
reluctance to increase the rights or entitlements of non-marriage 
partners (whether same-sex or different-sex). 
What has been apparent is that progressive Parliaments have found it 
easier, politically, to legislate in areas which result in an increase in 
Government revenue or a decrease in Government expenditure. Following 
an Australian case in February 1996 in which a lesbian co-parent was 
found liable for payment of child support for her former partner‟s two 
children, it was commented that:79  
The law will be much more willing to move on the obligations … as the rights 
are not where the revenue is. 
It took about three years longer than in Australia, but the obligation of 
liability for child-support payments by lesbian co-parents was confirmed 
in New Zealand in 1999, well before any formal recognition was granted 
to same-sex couples and before access rights were granted for on-going 
contact between children and their separated co-parents.80 Even prior to 
that, the very same lesbian parent who was to be held liable for child 
                                                 
79  “Woman And Wife”, Sarah Stuart, Sunday Star-Times (25 February 1996): quoting 
Ruth Busch (then) Senior Lecturer at University of Waikato School of Law. 
80  Liability, under the Child Support Act 1991, for same-sex partners to pay child 
support was confirmed in: A v R [1999] NZFLR 249. 
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support payments as a step-parent, had been denied the right to adopt 
one of the children she co-parented while she and the birth mother were 
a couple.81 
Parliaments also appear more willing to legislate to protect the rights of 
individuals in a relationship one against the other. For example, 
legislation is more likely to be passed where: 
(a)  it relates to financial matters, particularly with regard to the 
individual property rights of one partner vis-à-vis the other partner – 
as in property relationship or spousal maintenance legislation; or  
(b)  it serves to protect a more vulnerable partner from an abusive 
partner – as in domestic violence legislation or harassment 
legislation. 
Notably, however, at the point where there is a suggestion that legislation 
might provide a formal-legal recognition of the core relationship (in any 
sense approaching marriage), or the inclusion of children in same-sex 
families, the debate tends to turn to the potential of the legislation to 
undermine “sanctity” of marriage, and Parliament shies away from fully 
inclusive legislation. 
The earliest legislation in New Zealand containing provisions relating to 
same-sex couples included the Electricity Act 1992,82 the Domestic 
Violence Act 1995,83 the Harassment Act 1997,84 the Accident Insurance 
Act 1998 85 and the Housing Restructuring (Income-Related Rents) 
Amendment Act 2000.86  
                                                 
81  See further discussion on this matter later in this chapter. 
82  Electricity Act 1992 s.111 included same-sex partners under the definition of “near 
relative” and thereby enabled one partner to do certain electrical repairs to an 
appliance that might be used by their partner. 
83  Domestic Violence Act 1995 s.2 enabled partners in same-sex relationships to access 
the protections extended by this legislation. It should be noted that these protections 
were also extended to other individuals who were living in a range of domestic 
situations described as “close relationships”. 
84  Harassment Act 1997 s.2 extended to existing or past same-sex partners the rights 
of a victim of harassment to the protection of the law. Once again, however, the 
protections were also extended to a wide range of persons. 
85  Until 1998, same-sex couples were not included in accident insurance legislation as 
the definition of “spouse” in the Accident Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
included only partners “of the opposite sex” (married or de facto). The 1998 
legislation amended this definition to include same-sex partners. 
86  The Housing Restructuring (Income-Related Rents) Amendment Act 2000 provided 
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The “Consistency 2000” Project 
When the Human Rights Act 1993 came into effect, it contained „new‟ 
grounds for prohibition against discrimination that had not been present 
in the previous Human Rights Act, including sexual orientation.87  
The new Act also contained an exceptions provision enabling the 
Government, in relation to actions of Government, to continue to 
discriminate temporarily on any of the „new‟ grounds. A „sunset clause‟, 
however, provided that this exceptions provision would expire at the end 
of 1999.88  The Act also required the Human Rights Commission to report 
to the Government by the end of 1998 on all “Acts, regulations, policies, 
and practices” breaching the anti-discrimination provisions of the 
Human Rights Act.89  
By virtue of s.5(1)(i), (j) and (k), s.151 and s.152 of the Act, and the spirit 
and intent of the Act as expressed by Parliament prior its passage, the 
Human Rights Commission had been charged by Parliament to 
undertake an audit of all legislation, regulation, policy and practice of 
Government, and to report to the Minister of Justice, by January 2000, 
on which provisions were inconsistent with the non-discrimination 
provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993. Furthermore, the Minister was 
responsible for ensuring that Parliament was given the opportunity to 
remedy all these inconsistencies by either eliminating the inconsistency, 
or providing for a permanent exemption in respect of that inconsistency, 
by 1 January 2000. This exercise became known as the “Consistency 
2000” Project. 
On 27 June 1997, Paul East (Acting Minister of Justice) announced that 
the Government intended to call an end to the “Consistency 2000” 
Project, citing cost and time as reasons.90 The Government then 
                                                                                                                                     
that same-sex couples were to be treated in the same way as opposite-sex de facto 
and married couples for the purposes of eligibility assessments for income-assisted 
housing through Housing NZ – financial legislation, fiscally beneficial to Government 
rather than the couple. 
87  Human Rights Act 1993 s.21(1)(m). 
88   Human Rights Act 1993 ss.151-152. 
89   Human Rights Act 1993 s.5(1)(i), (j), (k). 
90  Harrison, Rodney, “State Planning To Exempt Itself From Laws On Rights”, New 
Zealand Herald (28 August 1997). 
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introduced the Human Rights Amendment Bill 1998 with the express 
intention of amending the Human Rights Act 1993 to exempt 
Government permanently from its anti-discrimination provisions, except 
in areas such as employment and access to buildings, where it would 
have to act in essentially the same manner as the private sector.  
There was an outcry from many affected groups,91 and individuals and, 
as a result of public pressure, and a failure to gain support in the House, 
the Bill was never passed.  
The Human Rights Commission went on to meet its existing statutory 
obligations by presenting a Report to Parliament.92 The Commission 
made it very clear in this Report that it was not satisfied with the attempt 
to stifle the work relating to the “Consistency 2000” Project.  
Subsequent to the failed Bill before the House, and thanks to vehement 
opposition from many quarters as part of “a huge public response”,93 the 
Government introduced a second Bill which passed in 1999. The Human 
Rights Amendment Act 1999 effectively extended the old “sunset clause” 
until the end of 2001. In the meantime, the work on consistency issues 
was seriously delayed. 
The failed Human Rights Amendment Bill 1998 was highly representative 
of Government‟s view, at that time, of the relative importance of human 
rights imperatives in the general legislative and constitutional schema of 
New Zealand. 
Above all, this further delay of human rights compliance in New Zealand 
for a period of two years, from 31 December 1999 to 31 December 2001, 
exemplified a lack of commitment to an adherence to human rights 
principles and standards for which its citizens had battled prior to 1993. 
While rhetoric supported human rights standards, these standards gave 
way to policies of cost-cutting within the public sector, the rolling back of 
the State and the greater emphasis on a free-market economy. Social 
                                                 
91  For example, Aged Concern, Disabled Persons‟ Advocacy, amongst others. 
92   http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1998/hrc_consistency/index.html 
(Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
93  Hansard, “Human Rights Amendment Bill (No.2)”, Second Reading (13 July 1999): 
Lianne Dalziel, New Zealand Labour, commenting that “If my mail was anything to 
go by, the public response was enormous”. 
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issues generally were failing to get traction, and this was illustrated quite 
clearly in this human rights area. 
This attempt to side-step human rights obligations also demonstrated 
two very important countervailing factors. 
On the one hand, because it is not entrenched, human rights legislation 
in New Zealand remains vulnerable to attack. When a Government is not 
committed to human rights protections for its citizens, and particularly 
when human rights legislation might be seen to come into conflict with, 
either actually or potentially, for example, a Government‟s free-market 
agenda, it is the human rights principles which will be called upon to 
give way. 
On the other hand, however, this also demonstrated the importance of 
the presence of checks upon the excesses of the Executive. In this case, 
the check provided by the separation of powers worked to protect the 
human rights values important to many. The Executive Government‟s 
attempt to remove its temporary exemption from the Act and replace it 
with a permanent exemption had been thwarted by the Legislature.94 
Government received only a temporary exemption for the Human rights Act 
because it agreed to an overt strict and detailed contract with the people of 
this nation. Parliament is the guardian of that contract. I was appalled that 
the National Government ever proposed to breach that contract. 
 
Relationship property legislation 
Partly because of, and partly in spite of, the delays in the “Consistency 
2000” Project, work was continued by various agencies in relation to 
various areas of the laws relating to same-sex couples. For example: 
• The New Zealand Law Commission and individual members of the 
Commission published several papers on issues such as succession, 
adoption, recognition of relationships, property protections, and 
domestic violence.  
                                                 
94  Hansard, “Human Rights Amendment Bill (No.2)”, Second Reading (13 July 1999): 
Tim Barnett, New Zealand Labour, Christchurch Central. 
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• The Ministry of Justice‟s Discussion Paper “Same-Sex Couples and 
the Law” was distributed and submissions received and analysed.95 A 
Report on the submissions was presented to Parliament. 
• The Ministry of Justice also commenced what was to become known 
as the “Compliance 2001” Programme (the replacement of the former 
“Consistency 2000” Project). 
• The Government revived earlier Bills relating to matrimonial and de 
facto property protections. 
• Individuals and groups within the gay and lesbian communities (and 
their opponents) recommenced lobbying on issues such as freedom of 
speech, immigration and relationship recognition. 
In August 1997, the New Zealand Law Commission published its Report 
“Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act”.96 The Commission 
envisaged that the proposed legislation should replace the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, the Family Protection Act 1955, and 
the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 (provisions relating to division of 
property upon death of a partner).97 Resulting from the considered work 
of the Commission, with “Consistency 2000” in mind, the Report 
recommended that the new legislation should provide for couples who are 
married, and couples who are not married but who are living together in 
a relationship “in the nature of marriage”.  
Although same-sex couples had previously turned to the courts for the 
resolution of relationship property issues in constructive trust cases,98 
neither same-sex couples nor de facto different-sex couples had been 
included in relationship property legislation.  
For the first time, serious consideration was now being given, firstly, to 
the inclusion of de facto opposite-sex couples and, secondly, to the 
                                                 
95  See discussion later in this Chapter. 
96  “Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act”, NZLC R39 (August 1997). 
97  Note that, although the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 had been passed into law, 
the provisions of the 1963 Act still applied with regard to division of property upon 
death. 
98  For example: Hamilton v Jurgens [1996] NZFLR 350; Julian v McWatt [1998] NZFLR 
257. 
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inclusion of same-sex couples in proposed legislation. The Law 
Commission had concluded that there was no practical reason why these 
relationships should be dealt with separately.99 Despite this, the Prime 
Minister at the time announced:100 
Legislation on both de facto property and matrimonial property will be 
introduced into the house in the next 2 or 3 weeks, and sent to a select 
committee. It will not deal with same-sex relationships. Any member or any 
political party is free to amend the legislation at the Committee stage. I will  
be very interested to see whether any political part is prepared to move in 
that way, and, indeed, which members of parliament will be prepared to 
support that legislation. I myself will not be supporting such an amendment. 
The Government persisted with the Matrimonial Property Amendment 
Bill 1998 which would apply to marital partners only, and the De Facto 
Property Bill 1998 which would codify the existing common law as it 
applied to de facto different-sex couples, and would not apply to same-
sex couples. In line with the Law Commission‟s reasoning, the Ministry of 
Justice had advised Government that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the relationship property legislation could raise issues under the 
Human Rights Act 1993, but both Bills were introduced on 24 March 
1998. 
One commentator wrote:101 
The law reform process … was marked by concerns to uphold the sanctity 
of marriage. Same-sex rights were rejected outright on moral grounds, and 
heterosexual de facto couples, especially those with children, were not to be 
encouraged when marriage was the preferred arrangement. Subsequently, 
a one-Act-fits-all approach was not adopted. 
Both Bills proceeded to consideration by a Select Committee and the 
receipt of public submissions. Submissions on the De Facto Property Bill 
                                                 
99  See “Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act”, NZLC R39 (August 1997): 
paras.19-25 and paras.66-67. 
100 Rt Hon Jenny Shipley, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates (24 February 1998). 
101  Parker, Wendy, (School of Social Policy and Social Work, Massey University, New 
Zealand) “New Zealand Property Rights Legislation: A Changing Landscape?”, paper 
presented at the  7th Australian Institute of Family Studies Conference: Family 
Futures : Issues in Research and Policy, Sydney (24-26 July 2000). 
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were overwhelmingly in favour of the inclusion of same-sex couples 102 
and, in response, a Supplementary Order Paper, prepared by the 
Opposition prior to the Bill‟s Second reading, proposed the inclusion of 
same-sex couples. 
Both the Matrimonial property Amendment Bill and the De Facto 
Property Bill languished before a Select Committee for some twelve 
months. Subsequently, all further progress on the Bill was halted when 
the Minister of Justice asked his Ministry to prepare a discussion 
document on the issue of “Same-Sex Couples and the Law” in order to 
consult the public on a range of issues affecting same-sex couples. 
The new Labour-led Government, elected in late 1999, was to progress 
this property legislation during 2000 and 2001 as an all inclusive 
amendment to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976.103 
 
Discussion Paper: “Same-Sex Couples and the Law” 
In February 1999, the then Prime Minister, Rt Hon Jenny Shipley 
attended the HERO Parade in Auckland. She described the Parade as “a 
lovely event”, and talked of the need for New Zealanders to celebrate their 
diversity. She then returned to Wellington where she confirmed that 
same-sex couples would not be included in the relationships property 
legislation about to be returned from Select Committee for consideration 
by the House. In a very telling way, she talked of considering the “issues 
surrounding the legal recognition of same-sex relationships”.104 This 
notion of „considering the issues surrounding‟ – taking about three steps 
back from the issue itself – is a very different matter from actually 
confronting the issue directly. 
                                                 
102 The Draft Report of the Select Committee states that, of the submissions received 
which mentioned this issue, 87% were in favour of the inclusion of same-sex 
couples. 
103  See discussion later in Chapter 8. 
104  Brockett, Matthew, “Shipley Supports Gay Rights – Except Marriage”, The Dominion 
(16 February 1999): 2. Same incident also referenced by Hon Phil Goff in Hansard (6 
May 1998), Second Reading of the De Facto Relationships (Property) Bill and 
Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill: “How can we talk about tolerance for diversity 
on the one hand, at a parade where many gay people are present, and at the same 
time come into this House and decide not to give those people equal rights …”. 
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In August 1999,105 the discussion paper “Same Sex Couples and the 
Law” was published and distributed by the Ministry of Justice. The paper 
essentially asked the public “what you think about the way our laws treat 
same-sex couples, and whether you think anything should change”.106  
In its introduction, the paper stated:107 
The Human Rights Act has outlawed discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation since 1993. However, the Human Rights Act does not 
override other legislation. … The Consistency 2000 project brought out a 
number of situations in which various New Zealand laws treated same-sex 
couples differently. … This is an opportunity to think about whether we 
want to keep or remove some or all of these inconsistencies. … Therefore, 
we seek your views to assist in providing advice that reflects the views of 
the community. Public discussion of the issues will also help Parliament 
decide how same-sex couples should be treated. 
However, the paper contained no discussion about what constitutes 
discrimination, nor any discussion about the concepts of equality or 
equity. The message being conveyed seemed to be that, rather than being 
committed to upholding human rights standards in New Zealand and 
ensuring equal rights to gays and lesbians, the Government was 
committed to proving (to itself in particular) that it had good reason to 
withhold those rights. It certainly became evident that the Government 
was eager not to take a positive lead on rights for same-sex couples.  
The Ministry‟s Discussion Paper was accompanied by a “Background 
Paper”,108 which did contain a brief section on “The Concept of 
                                                 
105  According to the Ministry of Justice mailing list, supplied to me by the Ministry 
(September 1999), a media release and the discussion paper were sent out to 36 
newspapers, 6 general magazines, 10 broadcast media organizations, all Government 
agencies, all District Courts, all Members of Parliament, the Human Rights 
Commission, all Law Societies and Law Centres, all Citizens‟ Advice Bureaux, all 
Public Libraries, and all Plunket Headquarters. Media releases were also sent to a 
further 55 media organizations, a further 16 community organizations and all 
church headquarters. Two gay media organizations and 7 gay groups received the 
media release and the discussion paper. 
106  Ministry of Justice, “Same-Sex Couples And The Law”, Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington (1999): 1. 
107  Ministry of Justice, “Same-Sex Couples And The Law”, Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington (1999): 1. 
108  It is interesting to note that the Background Paper was not distributed with the 
Discussion Paper, but was available from the Ministry of Justice and on their 
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Discrimination”. In general terms, the discussion gave the impression 
that different treatment does not constitute discrimination if people 
generally think that the different treatment (that is, less favourable 
treatment) is acceptable. In this context, that means that it would be 
permissible to treat gays and lesbians less favourably if respondents 
generally indicated that they thought that gays and lesbians should be 
treated differently:109 
Discussions about the legal treatment of same-sex couples often assume 
that different treatment equals discrimination. But it is generally accepted 
that, in New Zealand law and in that of comparable jurisdictions, not every 
difference amounts to discrimination. … The paper makes no judgement 
about whether particular instances of different treatment are discriminatory. 
Instead, it seeks your views on whether these differences are unjustified 
and so, discriminatory. (Emphasis added)  
The New Zealand Law Commission and the New Zealand Human Rights 
Commission each made submissions in response to the Discussion Paper 
also. I have previously outlined my concerns about these submissions on 
several fronts,110 and so merely reiterate my key concern that both these 
institutions recommended something less than full equality under the 
law. The Law Commission, by means of its Study Paper, recommended a 
registered partnerships regime separate from marriage, and the Human 
Rights Commission recommended a regime “akin to marriage”.  
The Law Commission recommended that, to avoid discrimination, 
registered partnerships should be available to same-sex couples and 
those different-sex couples who sought legal recognition of their 
                                                                                                                                     
website. It would be interesting to know how many of those who received the 
Discussion Paper went to the trouble to obtain and refer to a copy of the Background 
Paper. 
109  “The Concept Of Discrimination” in: Ministry of Justice, “Same-Sex Couples And The 
Law: Background Paper”, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (1999). 
110  See, for example: Christie, Nigel, “The New Zealand Same-Sex Marriage Case”, in: 
Wintemute, Robert, and Andenaes, Mads, (Eds), Legal Recognition Of Same-Sex 
Relationships: A Study Of National, European, And International Law, Oxford (2001) 
317: 332. 
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relationships but did not wish to marry. The Law Commission also stated 
that:111 
There should be no question of registered same-sex partnerships being 
regarded as in any way inferior to traditional marriage. If it be necessary to 
afford some hierarchic ranking to the two institutions, they should rank 
equally. 
However, the Law Commission also stated that its proposed registered 
partnerships regime could be seen as:112 
A legal code designed to avoid giving what may be seen as gratuitous 
offence to those for whom matrimony is a holy estate. 
From an equality perspective, this line of reasoning is wholly 
unacceptable and is offensive to the dignity of same-sex couples. 
The Human Rights Commission‟s response circumvented the 
fundamental premise of equality under the law. The Commission outlined 
a range of statements which seemed to be fully in support of the notion of 
equality, such as:113 
At this point the Commission wishes to refer again to what is seen as the 
guiding principle – equality before the law. Full equality favours the 
amendment of the Marriage Act so that same-sex couples can legally marry. 
Anything else can be seen as a compromise of the equality principle. 
The Commission went on, however, to advocate a regime which “in all 
respects is akin to that of marriage” rather than marriage itself. This 
would suggest that the Commission is guilty of its own sin of 
compromising “the equality principle”.114 
                                                 
111  “Recognising Same-Sex Relationships”, Study Paper 4, Law Commission, Wellington 
(NZLC SP4) (1999): 9: Recommendation in para.33.3. 
112  “Recognising Same-Sex Relationships”, Study Paper 4, Law Commission, Wellington 
(NZLC SP4) (1999): 8. 
113  Human Rights Commission, “Options for Law Reform In New Zealand: The Problem 
Of Inequality”, 
 http://hrc.co.nz/index.php?=13681&id=13688&wd0=samesex&wd1=same-
sex&format=  (Retrieved: 15 December 2004). 
114  Human Rights Commission, “Options for Law Reform In New Zealand: The Problem 
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In response to the Discussion Paper, the Ministry of Justice received 
some 3546 submissions representing the views of 8464 individuals and 
groups. In terms of submissions from groups or organisations, by far the 
greater number came from Church groups (about 70%),115 and it is my 
understanding that a similar pattern was followed by individual 
submissions, with a significant proportion of them coming as form-letters 
signed by persons with very strong religious affiliations.116 
In general, and unsurprisingly, the submissions did not favour changing 
the law to permit same-sex couples to marry (80% against). It is 
interesting to note that the main objections to same-sex couples being 
able to marry were founded in “social, moral and religious objections”. It 
is also interesting to note the terminology employed in reporting on those 
objections, namely, “the majority felt …” and “many believed …” – not 
seeming to reach the thresholds of objective justifications. 
On the other hand, amongst the 20% who supported a change to the law 
to permit same-sex couples to marry, there was a consensus based in 
equality and human rights law – equal rights and equal treatment as 
equal members of society. 
It is noticeable that there is a wide range of responses, and there is a 
high degree of contrast in the nature of many of the responses, 
confirming that this is a very complex area with a collection of very 
complex issues.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Of Inequality”, 
 http://hrc.co.nz/index.php?=13681&id=13688&wd0=samesex&wd1=same-
sex&format=,  (Retrieved: 15 December 2004). 
115  “Discussion Paper: Same-Sex Couples And The Law – Summary Of Responses”, 
Ministry of Justice, Wellington (28 July 2000): 2. 
116  Discussion with Ministry of Justice. 
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Comments were made along the following lines:117 
TABLE 6: CONTRASTING VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE 
Traditional Views Rights-Based Views 
۰ Marriage is a religious and 
spiritual institution rather than a 
secular one. 
۰ It is necessary to separate more 
clearly the religious and secular 
aspects of marriage. 
۰ Marriage is God ordained. ۰ Marriage is a civil legal estate 
conferred by the State. 
۰ The idea of same-sex marriage is 
objectionable from a religious 
standpoint.  
۰ Same-sex marriage would be 
morally or religiously acceptable, 
and some church groups and 
ministers expressed unconditional 
support for same-sex marriages. 
۰ Marriage is a moral issue. ۰ Marriage is a rights issue. 
۰ Marriage is, by definition, between 
a man and a woman.  
۰ The concept of marriage is wide 
enough to encompass relationships 
between same-sex couples 
۰ Same-sex relationships are 
contrary to tikanga Māori. 
۰ Same-sex relationships have been 
supported in the traditional and 
modern Māori societies. 
۰ Marriage is an outmoded and 
patriarchal institution. 
۰ I am not sure that I want to marry, 
but I am sure that I want to have 
the choice. 
۰ The State should not give its 
approval to same-sex 
relationships. 
۰ Same-sex couples should have 
equal rights and be treated as 
equal members of society. 
۰ It is not the business of the State 
to recognise same-sex 
relationships. 
۰ It is not the business of the State 
to deny the rights of same-sex 
relationships. 
۰ Registration of relationships would 
provide a suitable alternative. 
۰ If same-sex couples cannot marry, 
then registration is unacceptable 
as a B-grade option. 
۰ Would support registration only if 
it does not confer the same rights 
and responsibilities as marriage. 
۰ Would support registration only if 
it confers the same rights and 
responsibilities as marriage. 
۰ Registration should apply to same-
sex couples only. 
۰ Registration should be available for 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex 
couples. 
۰ Registration should not provide 
any parental rights. 
۰ Registration should provide for the 
same rights and responsibilities as 
marriage. 
                                                 
117  “Discussion Paper: Same-Sex Couples And The Law – Summary Of Responses”, 
Ministry of Justice, Wellington (28 July 2000). 
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All in all, therefore, the public consultation process through the Ministry 
of Justice discussion paper showed the divergence, rather than a 
convergence, of opinion on issue relating to the recognition of same-sex 
relationships.  
The promulgation of the Discussion Paper reinforced the danger of 
consultation on issues such as how same-sex couples should be treated 
before and under the law.118 On the basis that all citizens are entitled to 
equal treatment before the law, on what basis can it therefore be 
acceptable to seek the views of the majority on how a minority should be 
treated – especially in the face of the enactment and implementation of 
substantive human rights laws. 
In general terms, I would suggest, the Discussion Paper “Same-Sex 
Couples and the Law” was designed to gather as much public support as 
possible against legal recognition of same-sex relationships and their 
access to various entitlements. 
 
Child Support vis-à-vis Adoption 
In the 1990s, an interesting situation arose in two separate cases 
concerning the same lesbian family. The family consisted of a lesbian 
couple, who had been together since approximately 1979, and the three 
children, born to the relationship in about 1984, 1986 and 1988. All 
three children had been born to one of the partners as a result of 
artificial insemination.  
The first case related to an application for adoption, of one of the 
children, by the partner of the birth-mother. The second case related to 
liability for child-support payments by the partner to the birth-mother 
after the couple has subsequently separated. In both cases the sperm 
donor was the same person. 
 
The adoption application  
In 1992, the partner of the birth-mother appealed to the High Court 
                                                 
118  See earlier discussion on „Populist Decision-Making‟ in Chapter 5 above. 
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against an earlier refusal of the Family Court to allow her to adopt the 
youngest of the three children.119  
The adoption was intended to:120 
• achieve a degree of legal equality between the two partners; 
• equalisation of power between the two parents; 
• provide greater security in the child‟s family relationships; and 
• reduce the risk that the birth mother‟s family would try to secure 
custody of the child in the event that she died. 
The birth-mother had fully consented to the proposed adoption, and 
there was no objection from the birth-father / sperm donor. A social work 
report favoured the adoption stating that the applicant was a fit and 
proper person.121 
The court considered that there was no reason to suggest that the 
appellant would not be a fit and proper person to have the custody of the 
child, and that she was of sufficient ability to bring up, maintain and 
educate the child. There were no other impediments to her application. 
The court decided that the sole issue therefore was whether the welfare 
and interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption of his 
lesbian co-parent.122 
The court held that, on the balance, there was no significant advantage 
to be gained by the child, but that there would be significant 
disadvantage in that an adoption order would create confusion through 
an artificial legal relationship. Because of the effect of the Adoption Act 
1955 s.16:123 
• the child‟s birth-mother would not continue to be the legal mother; 
and 
                                                 
119  Re an Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769. 
120  Re an Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769: 770. 
121  Re an Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769: 770. 
122  Re an Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769: 771. 
123  In the case, the Judge stated that it would be artificial for a child to have “two 
mothers”, but (1) that is not an artificial concept in the Māori culture (and similarly 
in other cultures) where the term “whaea” is a term used to encompass mother. 
aunts, co-parents, etc, and (2) all adoptions have the same legal fiction. At least in 
this case, it was a guaranteed open adoption. Also, step-parent adoptions are very 
common and do not even need a Social Worker‟s Report (in this instance, despite not 
being required, a favourable Social Worker‟s Report was provided). 
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• the child‟s legal mother would not be the birth-mother. 
The Court also considered that much of what was being sought through 
adoption could be achieved through guardianship orders. The appeal was 
dismissed, upholding the Family Court‟s refusal of the application. 
 
The child support application 
Subsequently, the relationship between the couple came to an end. In 
1998, after the couple had separated, the birth mother made an 
application under the Child Support Act 1991 for payment of child 
support from her former partner. The Family Court held that, for the 
purposes of the Child Support Act 1991, the former partner was a step-
parent of the three children and, on that basis, was liable for child 
support payments. This was the case in spite of the former partner not 
being defined as a step-parent under the (the) Guardianship Act 1968. 
The matter was appealed to the High Court.124 
Under the Child Support Act 1991, a “child” for whom child support 
payments are due, is defined in relation to the parents who are, in turn, 
defined in terms of their relationship to each other. The provisions extend 
to parents who are (or were) in a legal marriage when the child was born 
or conceived, or to whom adoption rights were granted, or natural 
parents of the child whose parentage is registered under the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1951.125 The sperm donor (father) in this case 
could not be a liable parent under the Act because of the Child Support 
Act 1991 s.7(d) which exempts sperm donors from liability when children 
are conceived pursuant to a medical procedure. 
As the Court emphasised, the Child Support Act quite clearly relates to 
the financial aspects of child support. The Act is not about the personal 
relationship between the couple, but is about: 
• affirming the right of children to be maintained by their parents;126 
                                                 
124  A v R [1999] NZFLR 249. 
125  Child Support Act 1991 s.7. 
126  Child Support Act 1991 s.4(a). 
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• ensuring that equity exists between custodial and non-custodial 
parents in respect of the costs of supporting the children;127 and 
• ensuring that the costs to the State of providing an adequate level of 
financial support for children and their custodians is offset by the 
collection of a fair contribution from non-custodial parents.128 
In this sense, the Act is about the rights of the child, and the 
maintenance of the financial relationship between the liable parent and 
the child.  
At the same time, the Court held that the Child Support Act was to be 
interpreted inclusively of same-sex couples, citing the following 
reasons:129   
The first reason is that on the proper construction of the statute, any 
relationship in the nature of marriage between two persons is capable of 
generating the status of a step parent. … 
The second reasons is that a statute should also be read as gender neutral, 
unless there is clear Parliamentary language to which a Court must defer. … 
The third reason for reading the statute in an inclusive manner is that the 
overall scheme of the Act is strongly protective of the right of children to be 
maintained. 
The High Court held that the former partner of the children‟s birth 
mother was liable for child support payments and dismissed the appeal. 
 
Summary 
Therefore, the lesbian former partner was defined as a “step-parent” 
under the Child Support Act s.99, but would not be defined as a “step-
parent” under the (then) Guardianship Act 1968. So, she was 
                                                 
127  Child Support Act 1991 s.4(h). 
128  Child Support Act 1991 s.4(j). 
129  A v R [1999] NZFLR 249: 255. It should be noted that at the time of this decision, the 
Child Support Act 1991 s.2 defined „married person‟ as “a person who is living with 
another person and who, although not legally married to the other person , has 
entered into a relationship in the nature of marriage with the other person”. This 
definition no longer applies with the definition section now stating “Definition 
omitted”. 
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jurisdictionally barred from seeking access for a child to whom she was 
paying child support. This has, of course, been changed under the Care 
of Children Act 2004. 
What has not changed, however, is the ability of same-sex couples to 
adopt as a couple. That is, in the instance above, if the applicant mother 
had been successful in adopting the child she sought to adopt, the legal 
tie between the child and the birth-mother would have been severed. 
There is no provision in New Zealand, as there is in some other 
countries,130 for one partner to become the parent of the child of the 
other partner through adoption – without severing the legal ties with the 
first parent. Nor is there any ability for same-sex couples to adopt jointly. 
 
The messages 
There are three key messages here – not all of which are consistent with 
each other. 
First, the Court is saying that the Child Support Act 1991 has been 
crafted by Parliament in such a way that it is inclusive of same-sex 
relationships. That is, to some degree, this case is about the recognition 
of same-sex relationships and the recognition of same-sex families and 
the interdependencies of members of those families. As Hammond J 
states:131 
Thus, although the adult populace may well be left to differ sharply on what 
kind of interpersonal relationship will be sanctioned, and to what extent, as 
marriages, Parliament has clearly chosen in this statute to solidly endorse 
the notion that the parties to a “relationship in the nature marriage” 
(however, constituted) have an unequivocal obligation to materially support 
the children of such an enterprise.  
Second, the Court is saying that a same-sex partner will be liable for 
child support payments when a relationship between partners who have 
been parenting children together comes to an end.  
                                                 
130  For example, in Denmark, Sweden, Iceland (as a result of registered partnerships / 
civil union), and Canada (as a result of equal marriage), amongst others. 
131  A v R [1999] NZFLR 249: 255. 
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This approach coincides with the view expressed above that Parliaments 
tend to legislate obligations before entitlements, and for issues relating to 
revenue rather than expenditure, unless there is some overriding 
principled policy at stake.  
Thus, the obligation for a liable parent to pay child support can be seen 
as a conscious acknowledgement by our Parliament of the existence of 
same-sex families for acknowledgement sake. Or, it can be seen as 
Parliament extending the net with which it will capture some of the funds 
that will assist in offsetting the cost of providing financial support to 
single parent households. As Hammond J states:132 
The economic “costs” of the lack of adequate material support for, and 
undersocialisation of, a distinct segment of the nation‟s children is very high. 
Amongst other things it is reflected in the demand for social services, 
psychiatric assistance, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, crime prevention, 
law enforcement, and like matters. These costs are rising, in some cases 
sharply.  
In this same vein, the Court goes on to state: 
There is too, the moral concern that individuals should take responsibility – 
where they can properly be asked to do so – for the burden of supporting 
“their” children. 
There can be no issue with the expectation that “individuals should take 
responsibility for the burden of supporting „their‟ children”. In my view, 
however, issue can be taken with the expectation that individuals (and 
couples) should take responsibility for their burdens, but not receive 
access to the same level of recognition and privilege that is available to 
others. That is, same-sex couples should not be expected to accept all the 
obligations that are applied to different-sex couples unless they too are 
provided with access to the same status and entitlements, at least the 
right to apply for access to the child for whom you are paying child 
support.  
 
                                                 
132  A v R [1999] NZFLR 249: 256. 
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Third, the Court is saying, on the one hand: 
• we will not, in the best interests of the child(ren), respect your desire 
to cement your legal parental relationship with your child in the 
manner you, as a same-sex family, consider to be most beneficial to 
yourselves and your children – that is, by way of adoption. 
But, on the other hand, a second Court is saying: 
• we will declare you to be a step parent of the children, and enforce 
your obligations to pay, as a liable parent, the child support 
payments that are due as a result of the Child Support Act 1991.  
The Judge clearly sees this as a “win” for the recognition of diverse family 
units. But, in the context of the decision under the Adoption Act 1955 
(discussed later in this chapter) and the jurisdiction bar that existed 
under the Guardianship Act 1968, do these proceedings represent a 
“win” for same-sex individuals or relationship, or is it merely a further 
decision placing obligations on same-sex partners? What is even worse 
here is that the co-parent‟s application for adoption and her 
Guardianship Order (which was subsequently vacated) were used by the 
Court to decide that she was a “step-parent” under the Child Support Act 
1991. 
 
Summary 
There are some areas where I consider that the New Zealand Parliament 
has conveyed mixed messages to society generally about the worth of 
gays and lesbians, and of same-sex couples. 
On the one hand, we are told that gays and lesbians are treated very well 
under New Zealand law – and maybe this is a justifiable view in some 
respects. On the other hand, however, it can be argued that our 
Parliament sets different standards for the citizens of New Zealand in 
relation to their behaviour towards gays and lesbians than it is prepared 
to adhere to itself.  
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This can be viewed a little like the adage with regard to parents who 
demonstrate behaviour different from that they expect from their children 
– “Do as I say, not as I do!”.  This adage is demonstrated in reality with 
regard to the inherent contradictions in the above issues. 
In 1990 and 1993, the New Zealand Parliament passed the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. These two pieces 
of legislation together provided for the protection to citizens of New 
Zealand from discrimination in both the public and private spheres – that 
is, between the individual and the State, and between individuals. 
In the face of that seemingly strong human rights climate, however, 
Governments have failed to respond with act. 
First, there was an attempt by the Government to step away from its 
commitments with regard to “Consistency 2000”. It was suggested that 
the Government should be permanently exempted from compliance with 
non-discrimination standards except where the State operated in the 
same way as the private sector. 
Second, the Government demonstrated a great deal of resistance with 
regard to extending equal relationship property rights. The Government 
expressed its preference that matrimonial property should be dealt with 
separately from de facto property, “marked by concerns to uphold the 
sanctity of marriage”.133 Further, the Government declared that, while it 
would propose separate legislation for de facto (different-sex) couples, 
same-sex couples would not be included in that legislation.  
Third, the Government entered into a phase of public consultation – a 
flawed approach, in my view, to human rights issues. Apart from the fact 
that the Discussion Document issued by Government for public 
consultation ruled out the possibility of marriage as a form of 
relationship recognition, the notion of seeking majority opinion on the 
treatment of minority groups is an anathema to the principles of human 
rights. 
                                                 
133  Parker, Wendy, (School of Social Policy and Social Work, Massey University, New 
Zealand) “New Zealand Property Rights Legislation: A Changing Landscape?”, paper 
presented at the 7th Australian Institute of Family Studies Conference: Family 
Futures : Issues in Research and Policy, Sydney (24-26 July 2000). 
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Mixed messages are also conveyed through the above cases relating to 
adoption and child-support. While it is pleasing that, since those cases, 
there have been significant changes aspects of guardianship through the 
Care of Children Act 2004, there have still been no changes to the 
Adoption Act 1955.134 The fact that different legislation on related issues 
(family, parenting, guardianship) can be interpreted in such contrary 
manner suggests that they are not based in consistent principle. 
 
Conclusion 
As stated above, while it appeared that there was a reasonable amount 
happening in the period from 1993 to 2000, closer examination suggests 
that there was more resistance than forward movement. 
On the one hand, the same-sex marriage case brought the issue of 
recognition of same-sex couples to public attention and into public 
debate. On the other hand, in the final analysis, the case before the 
courts was unsuccessful. 
On the one hand, „Consistency 2000‟ brought public attention to the 
changes to human rights legislation and the comfort of New Zealand‟s 
now express commitment to equality and fairness. On the other hand, 
Government: 
• sought the means of releasing itself from its consistency and 
compliance obligations; 
• sought the opinion of the majority of New Zealanders about how gay 
and lesbians (as a minority) should be treated by the law; and 
• sought ways of not providing the same level of relationship property 
protections for married, different-sex de facto couples and same-sex 
couples 
 
 
                                                 
134  See further discussion on the Adoption Act 1955 in Chapter 8. 
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OVERSEAS JURISDICTIONS 
Canada 
Contrary to the New Zealand situation, there were some major steps 
forward in Canada stemming from the outcome of some key cases. The 
early cases were not about same-sex marriage itself, but it was the 
outcome of these cases that enabled the cases on marriage to be taken to 
the courts, and for the courts to make the decisions they did. 
 
Sexual orientation included in the Charter  
In 1995, Egan v Canada, was heard by the federal Court of Appeal.135 
Egan and his partner had lived together as a couple for 45 years, and the 
case related to a claim for superannuation payments to Egan, as a 
retiring employee, and his same-sex “spouse”.  
The outcome of this case was of general significance for same-sex couples 
across Canada as the Court held that same-sex couples are protected by 
the non-discrimination provisions of s.15 of the Charter.  
The outcome of the case was of particular significance to Egan and his 
partner as the Court held that the different treatment in this instance did 
not infringe upon the s.15 requirements, but even if it had, such 
infringement would be justifiable in terms of s.1 of the Charter. For these 
reasons, the right to be recognised as spouses did not extend to same-sex 
couples. 
The first element of the case was significant because, prior to this point, 
sexual orientation was not a protected ground under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, Egan v Canada,  the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that sexual orientation is an analogous ground 
under s.15(1) and that, as a result of that, discrimination on the ground 
of sexual orientation is unconstitutional.136 The inclusion of sexual 
                                                 
135 Egan v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513. 
136  Note that, in 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada had confirmed that the term “in 
particular” is the crucial term permitting the inclusion of grounds other than those 
listed expressly in the section, but had not confirmed „sexual orientation‟ as an 
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orientation as has been affirmed subsequently in other cases,137 and 
there is now no doubt that sexual orientation is a prohibited ground 
under the Charter and the federal Human Rights Act, and provincial 
human rights legislation.  
The advantage for same-sex couples in Canada, and for the future of 
litigation for access to marriage, Canada now not only had supreme 
constitutional law, but also had supreme constitutional law that included 
protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  
 
Entitlements associated with marriage – M v H 
Perhaps the most resounding „pre-marriage‟ success came on 20 May 
1999 when, in M v H, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the earlier 
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeals that Ontario‟s Family Law Act 
(FLA) s.290 was unconstitutional and that, unless the legislation was 
amended within a year, the Court would:138 
(a) make a declaration that the definition of spouse contained in s.29 of 
the FLA is of no force or effect to the extent that it excludes same-sex 
couples; 
(b) make a declaration that the words “a man and woman” be severed 
from the definition of “spouse” in s.29 of the FLA; and 
(c) make an order reading in the words “two persons” instead of “a man 
and woman” into the definition of “spouse” contained in s.29 of the 
FLA. 
As a consequence of this decision, on 27 October 1999, the Ontario 
legislature enacted the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act: 
 An Act to amend certain statutes because of the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in M v H.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
analogous ground: Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143. 
137  Veysey v The Commissioner of Correctional Services (1990) 29 F.T.R. 64; Knodel v 
British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1991) 58 BCLR (2d) 356 (S.C.), 
371; Haig v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (1992) 16 C.H.R.R. D/226; 
Layland v Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations (1993) 104 
D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Ont.Div.Ct). 
138  M v H (1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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The effect of the Act was to grant to same-sex couples living in 
relationships, the same rights as those enjoyed by different-sex common 
law (de facto) spouses in relation to 67 Ontario statutes. 
Quite suddenly, there was a substantial change in Canada. M v H had 
raised doubts about the legality of refusing marriage licences to same-sex 
couple applicants and the reactions of officials – firstly in Ontario and, 
secondly, in British Columbia – were somewhat more guarded.  
While the majority of the Court in M v H had emphasised that the case 
had “nothing to do with marriage per se”,139 and did not “challenge 
traditional conceptions of marriage”,140 the Court also stated that its 
decision “[might] well affect numerous other statutes that rely upon a 
similar definition of the term 'spouse' ”.141 
On 8 June 1999, the Canadian House of Commons resolved that:142 
in the opinion of this House, it is necessary in light of public debate around 
recent court decisions, to state that marriage is and should remain the union 
of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others, and that 
Parliament will take all necessary steps within the jurisdiction of the 
Parliament of Canada to preserve this definition of marriage in Canada. 
The resolution had no formal effect, and it could be said that the 
Parliament of Canada did not take all the necessary steps to preserve the 
traditional definition of marriage. Above all, it did not invoke section 33 of 
the Charter.143  
                                                 
139  M v H (1999), 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.): Cory J, para.52. 
140 M v H (1999), 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.): Iacobucci J, para.134. 
141   M v H (1999), 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.): Cory J, para.147. 
142  Parliament of Canada, House Of Common Debates, 8 June 1999, Hansard, 1st 
Session, 36th Parliament, No.240, 
 (http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/240_1999-06-
08/han240-e.htm). 
143  The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.33 reads: 
(1)  Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision 
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or 
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.  
(2)  An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under 
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the 
provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration.  
(3)  A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years 
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the 
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This meant that the common law, restrictive definition of “marriage” was 
still open to Charter-based scrutiny – a fact that left the door open for 
further challenge. And, it was not long before that challenge was taken 
up in three of the most populous provinces of Canada, and perhaps three 
of the most liberal. 
 
Ontario (Part 1) 
There were two separate series of events in the Province of Ontario, 
Canada, leading to the ultimate success of the demand before the courts 
for access to marriage by same-sex couples. 
First, in 2000, when several same-sex couples approached the City of 
Toronto for marriage licences, city officials decided not to simply reject 
the marriage licence applications, but rather to put them in abeyance 
and seek direction from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.144 Six 
same-sex couples joined the City of Toronto in its application and the 
Court transferred the case to the Ontario Divisional Court. 
Second, on 10 December 2000, Reverend Brent Hawkes of Toronto‟s 
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) stood in the church to publish 
the banns of marriage between Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell, and 
between Elaine and Anne Vautour.145   
Under a centuries-old tradition, the “reading the banns” took place in the 
Church for three successive weeks after which time the couples were 
issued with a marriage licence enabling the marriage ceremonies to take 
place in the Church.146  
                                                                                                                                     
declaration.  
(4)  Parliament or a legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made 
under subsection (1).  
(5)  Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).  
144  Casswell, Donald G., “Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2001] 80 La Revue 
du Barreau Canadien 810: 811. 
145  “First Gay Banns Read in Toronto”, PlanetOut News (11 December 2000). 
146  Csillag, Ron, “A Man And A Woman, Period: Holy Matrimony Excludes Same-Sex 
Unions, Interfaith Coalition Says”, TheStar.Com (17 February 2000),  
 http://thestar.com/apps/A…/Article_PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid=98225099230 
(Retrieved: 18 February 2000). 
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The tradition of marrying by the reading of the banns is recognised in 
Ontario‟s provincial gender-neutral Marriage Act. When the banns are 
read, members of the congregation are invited to state any objections to 
the planned marriage. The grounds for objections, being that: 
(a) either party is below the legal age;  
(b) either party has been married before and has not obtained a 
divorce; or  
(c) that the two are too closely related to legally marry. 
None of these grounds applied to the two couples in Toronto.147 
 
British Columbia (Part 1)  
In 2000, when a couple in British Columbia applied for a marriage 
licence, the Director of Vital Statistics sought direction from the Attorney-
General of the Province of British Columbia. The Attorney-General 
petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia for declaratory relief 
recognising the legal validity of same-sex marriages. This was remarkable 
– there had never previously been a provincial Government in Canada 
which had taken a stance in support of same-sex marriage. 
The statement, issued on 26 May 2000, was as follows:148 
Earlier today, a same sex couple made application to the B.C. Executive 
Director of Vital Statistics for a marriage licence. 
The Executive Director deferred his decision and asked for a legal opinion 
from the Ministry of Attorney General. 
My Ministry will provide that opinion as soon as possible. 
It is unfortunate that the law in this area is uncertain.  
The federal Marriage Act is ambiguous but has traditionally been interpreted 
in light of common law principles that have not allowed same sex marriages.  
                                                 
147  The discussion the Ontario same-sex marriage cases continues in Chapter 8. 
148  “B.C. Makes History: Supports Same-Sex Couples‟ Right To Marry”, EGALE, Press 
Release, Canada (29 May 2000). 
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Recently, however, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that equality 
rights under section 15 of the Charter protect against discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.  
As yet, there has not been a definitive court determination on the application 
of section 15 with respect to the Marriage Act.  
This area of the law requires clarity. This is a question of dignity and 
fundamental human rights for a number of Canadians, and an issue of 
fairness for all.  
While it is possible to leave the issue of same sex marriages to be 
determined through years of litigation, it would be far better in my view for 
the federal government to resolve the matter by clarifying its legislation and 
offering same sex couples the same opportunity to marry as is available to 
heterosexual couples. 
In a modern society there is no justification for denying same sex couples the 
same option to form marital bonds as are afforded to opposite sex couples. 
Rather than waiting for the courts to determine this issue, the federal 
government should change the federal law to allow for equality for all 
couples who are in a committed relationship. 
As a province, we have taken action to eliminate discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation within our areas of competence. We are continuing to 
remove legislative barriers that discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
Over the past 5 years we have amended more than 20 pieces of provincial 
legislation to eliminate this form of discrimination, and we will continue with 
our legislative initiatives in the near future. 
We have taken these steps because it is the right and the fair thing to do.  
On 29 July 2000, EGALE announced that the Government of British 
Columbia and EGALE were issuing separate legal proceedings against 
the federal Government challenging the restrictions on the right of same-
sex couples to marry, the provincial Government claiming that “the 
restriction of marriage to heterosexuals violates the right to equality 
enshrined in the Charter of Rights”.149  
                                                 
149  “British Columbia Supreme Court to Hear Landmark Same-Sex Marriage Challenge”, 
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A newly formed British Columbia Liberal Government subsequently 
withdrew its legal action, but two more petitions to the Court were filed – 
one from five couples, and another from a further three couples.  
In November of 2000, the B.C. Supreme Court made an order that all 
proceedings would be heard as one, and that evidence in any one 
proceeding, as initially filed, would be evidence in the others. The case 
was heard over several days between 23 July and 3 August 2001, and 
the decision of the Court was released on 3 October 2001.  
In essence, the Court held that: 
1) the restriction against permitting same-sex couples to marry was 
prima facie discriminatory and contrary to the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms; but 
2) it is legally acceptable on the basis that Section 1 of the Charter 
provides that, where the Government can show that such a breach 
of the Charter is demonstrably justifiable, the discriminatory law 
can stand.  
The Court stated that it was “common sense” to restrict marriage to 
different-sex couples:150 151 
The legitimacy of the state‟s interest in marriage is beyond question. There is 
no need for scientific evidence. The importance of the essential character of 
marriage to Canadian society is a matter of common sense understanding 
and observation.  
 
United States Of America 
Hawaii (Part 2) 
As outlined previously, the Hawai‟i Supreme Court returned the same-
sex marriage case in that State to the trial court. In 1996, the State of 
                                                                                                                                     
EGALE, Press Release, Canada (July 2001).  
150  EGALE Canada Inc et al v Attorney-General of Canada et al 2001 B.C.S.C. 1365: 
Pitfield J, para.209. 
151  Note that the discussion on the Canadian same-sex marriage cases continues in 
Chapter 8. 
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Hawai‟i attempted to prove, as per the admonition of the Supreme Court, 
that there were compelling State reasons to deny same-sex couples 
access to marriage.152 The State relied heavily on the arguments that 
same-sex marriage would undermine family and, particularly, that it 
would be detrimental for children to be brought up in same-sex families. 
However, the State failed in its bid and, in fact, the Court expressed the 
clear view that the State‟s expert witnesses assisted in demonstrating 
that there were no compelling State reasons why same-sex couples 
should not be permitted to marry. The Court rejected the tautological 
argument that tradition and the contemporary socially constructed 
meaning of marriage are sufficient justification for denying same-sex 
couples access to legal marriage.  
As a result, on 3 December 1996, Circuit Court Judge Chang held that 
that the State had failed to convince the Court sufficiently to justify 
withholding from same-sex couples the right to marry, that Hawai‟i‟s 
marriage laws therefore violated the State‟s Equal Rights Amendment 
and ordered the Sate to permit same-sex couples to marry. In particular, 
he held that the state had failed to present evidence to demonstrate:153 
(a)  that the public interest in the well-being of children and families, or 
the optimal development of children, would be adversely affected by 
same-sex marriage; and 
(b) how same-sex marriage would adversely affect: 
 the public purse; 
 the state interest in assuring the recognition of  Hawai‟i 
marriage in other states; 
 the institution of traditional marriage;  
 any other important public or governmental interest. 
In essence, same-sex couples had successfully argued for the right to 
legally marry in the State of Hawai‟i. But, unfortunately, this was not the 
conclusion of this case.  
                                                 
152  Baehr v Miike, No.91-1394, First Circuit Court, Hawaii (1996). 
153  Donald G. Casswell, “Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2001] 80 La Revue du 
Barreau Canadien 810: 837. 
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For 24 hours same-sex marriage was legal in Hawaii. The next day, 
however, Judge Chang, on submission from the State of Hawai‟i, put a 
stay on the order pending appeal. 
 
Vermont (Part 1) 
On 22 July 1997, three couples 154 filed suit in the Chittenden Superior 
Court in Vermont, USA, seeking the right marry.155 The suit alleged that 
the state‟s refusal to issue marriage licences to same-sex couples was a 
violation of the Vermont marriage statutes, and the Common Benefits 
Clause of the Vermont State Constitution.156  
The couples appealed to the Supreme Court of Vermont.157 but their 
appeal was dismissed. 
While the Court did not declare that same-sex couples should be 
permitted to marry under existing State marriage legislation, on the basis 
that the incidents of marriage to same-sex couples was “simply, when all 
is said and done, a recognition of our common humanity”,158 it did make 
                                                 
154  Stan Baker and Peter Harrigan: had been together as a couple for four years and 
wanted to marry for the same mix of reasons that other couples choose to marry – 
they love each other and they wanted to make a public commitment to one another 
as well as seeking the legal protections and obligations of civil marriage; Lois 
Farnham and Holly Puterbaugh: had lived together as a couple for twenty-five years, 
but Farnham was not entitled to receive Puterbaugh‟s social security benefits, nor 
were they granted the right go make necessary medical decisions or act as each 
other‟s guardian in their old age; Nina Beck and Stacy Jolles: had been together for 
seven years. They declared their lifetime commitment to one another in a religious 
wedding ceremony, although that ceremony did not confer on them the protections 
and supports of a legal, civil marriage. Nina and Stacy had a son, Noah, who died in 
August 1997 of a heart condition. They believed that it was important not only that 
both his parents should have a legal connection to each other, but also that he 
deserved to have a legal connection to both his parents. 
155  Baker & Harrigan v State of Vermont, Chittenden Superior Court, Docket No. 1009-
97-CnC (1997). 
156  The Common Benefits Clause (Chapter 1, Article 7) of the Vermont Constitution 
states “[t]hat government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people, nation or community”. 
157  Baker v Vermont Supreme Court of Vermont, Docket No. 98-032 (1999). 
158  Donald G. Casswell, “Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2001] 80 La Revue du 
Barreau Canadien 810: 840. 
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the following statement:159 
Thus, viewed in the light of history, logic, and experience, we conclude that 
none of the interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just 
basis for the continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits 
incident to a civil marriage license under Vermont law. Accordingly, in the 
faith that a case beyond the imagining of the framers of our Constitution 
may, nevertheless, be safely anchored in the values that infused it, we find 
a constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, 
protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married 
couples. It remains only to determine the appropriate means and scope of 
relief compelled by this constitutional mandate.  
And the Court held that:160 161 
The judgment of the superior court upholding the constitutionality of the 
Vermont marriage statutes under Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont 
Constitution is reversed. The effect of the Court‟s decision is suspended, and 
jurisdiction is retained in this Court, to permit the Legislature to consider and 
enact legislation consistent with the constitutional mandate described 
herein. 
 
Alaska 
On 27 February 1998, the court in Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics 
162 ruled that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marriage. 
The court ruled that Alaska‟s marriage laws violated the right to privacy, 
the fundamental right to marry, and constituted sex discrimination.  
Somewhat hidden in the latter stages of the progression of Baehr, what 
was effectively a streamlined version of the Hawai‟i case entered the 
Alaskan courts.163  
                                                 
159 Baker v Vermont Supreme Court of Vermont, Docket No. 98-032 (1999): (no 
paragraph or page numbers).  
160 Baker v Vermont Supreme Court of Vermont, Docket No. 98-032 (1999): (no 
paragraph or page numbers). 
161  See discussion in Chapter 8 on subsequent actions by the Vermont legislature in 
providing for civil union legislation. 
162  Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics No.3 AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Superior Ct., 27 February 1998). 
163  Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics No.3 AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Superior Ct. 27 February 1998). 
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The Alaska Marriage Code expressly defines marriage as “a civil contract 
entered into by one man and one woman that requires both a licence and 
a solemnization”.164  
In Brause, the Court held that the denial of marriage to same-sex couples 
was in violation of the equal protection provisions of the Alaskan State 
Constitution, and directed the State to establish a “compelling State 
reason” why same-sex couples should not be permitted to marry. 
Later in 1998, however, in a public referendum, an amendment to the 
Constitution was approved by voters and, as a consequence, marriage 
was expressly limited to a man and a woman, effectively overruling the 
previous Court‟s decision.165 
Once again, a technical victory had been achieved, but popular prejudice 
became the tool for achieving a Constitutional reversal of that victory. 
 
Hawaii (Part 3) 
Finally, in November 1998, the people of the State of Hawai‟i voted for a 
constitutional amendment that permitted (although did not require) the 
legislature to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples. As a result of the 
voter referendum, Article 1, Section 23 of the Hawai‟i Constitution read: 
The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.  
The legislature further proposed an amendment to the marriage 
legislation, alongside legislation providing a range of rights and benefits 
through a Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act. 
On 9 December 1999, the Hawai‟i Supreme Court ruled that judgment 
now be entered in favour of the State, and that the prior judgment in 
favour of the Plaintiffs be rendered moot.166 
                                                 
164  Alaska Marriage Code A.S.25.05.011(a). 
165  Alaska Constitution, Article I, § 23 (1998). 
166  Baehr v Miike 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (1999) 
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In effect, this was the first successful same-sex marriage case although, 
in the final analysis, the positive result achieved through the courts was 
negated constitutional amendment. 
This sequence of Hawai‟i cases was significant for several different 
reasons: 
• This constituted the initiation of a renewed effort by same-sex 
couples to seek access to marriage – an effort that was, ultimately, to 
prove successful, although not in Hawai‟i. 
• This was the first case in which a court had held that exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage was discriminatory. 
• This was to be the catalyst for the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
and, directly or indirectly, for the passing of defense of marriage 
legislation or constitutional amendments in a number of other States 
in the United States of America. 
• It also provides persuasive contrary argument for a number of „public 
policy‟ reasons propounded for denying same-sex couples access to 
marriage – for example, the procreation argument, the argument that 
it is detrimental for children to be raised in same-sex families. 
The State found a means of using the State Constitution to protect 
majoritarian public prejudice rather than using it to protect minority 
rights with the effect that what was a huge legal victory for same-sex 
couples in Hawai‟i had become a technical victory only.  
 
Vermont (Part 2) 
Although, in July 1997, three same-sex couples had been unsuccessful 
in their bid for marriage, Vermont was still destined to become the first 
state within the USA to offer “full” civil unions (registered partnerships). 
Vermont‟s Civil Unions legislation came into effect on 1 July 2000. This 
legislation arose out of a directive of the Vermont Supreme Court which 
had held that the State of Vermont was in breach of the Common 
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Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution 167 by not offering the same 
rights and freedoms to same-sex couples as it offers to opposite-sex 
couples. The Court, however, stopped short of striking down the existing 
marriage legislation as being unconstitutional and instead directed that 
the State must act to grant rights equivalent to those of marriage. 
The absence of the word “marriage” is significant – the unions aren‟t 
recognised outside the state of Vermont. Federal marriage rights (such 
as social security survivor‟s benefits) do not apply.  
Even so, Vermont‟s civil union legislation is reasonably comprehensive in 
that, in addition to the usual provisions relating to matters such as 
eligibility to register and procedures for dissolution, it provides a range of 
legal benefits, protections and responsibilities including (but not limited 
to): 
• relationship property rights during life or upon death; 
• causes of action relating to spousal status, such as wrongful death, 
emotional distress; spousal immunities 
• adoption of children; 
• financial matters, such as insurances, benefits, taxation; 
• next-of-kinship in relation to hospital visitation, medical decision-
making, anatomical gifts; and  
• prohibitions against discrimination on ground of spousal status. 
 
The Defense of Marriage Act (Federal USA) 
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), effective at federal level in the 
United States of America, was passed by the Senate on 11 September 
1996 with a vote of 85 to 14 and signed into effect by President Bill 
Clinton on 21 September 1996.168 
                                                 
167  The Vermont Constitution Ch.1, Art.7 provides: That government is, or ought to be, 
instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or 
community, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, 
family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that community; and that the 
community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform or 
alter government, in such manner as shall be, by that community, judged most 
conducive to the public weal. 
168  Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (21 September 
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This statute has two major effects: 
(1) It means that all States within the US have a free choice as to 
whether or not they are going to recognise any marriage from 
another State. 
(2) It prohibits social security and other federal benefits for spouses in 
same-sex marriages. 
The key catalyst for the DOMA was the possibility of success in the 
Hawai‟i same-sex marriage case, Baehr v Lewin,169 and the perceived 
need to „protect‟ other States from having to, potentially, recognised 
same-sex marriages that could become valid in Hawai‟i. Thus, this was a 
pre-emptive move which meant that if same-sex marriage became legal 
in any State, no other State would be obliged to recognise those 
marriages. The DOMA did not prevent any State from passing legislation 
to clarify that it would recognise same-sex marriage from other States.  
In reality, the federal Defense of Marriage Act has little impact on 
whether individual States may or may not recognise same-sex marriages. 
Rather, the real effect of the Act is to disallow those benefits under 
federal law to which married couples would normally have access.170  
The constitutionality of the DOMA has never been tested. It has been 
argued that, following Romer v Evans reasoning,171 the DOMA might be 
struck down. In Romer the Court struck down Amendment 2 of the 
Colorado Constitution which prohibited enactment of legislation 
specifically protecting homosexuals on the basis that this violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Under the reasoning in Bowers v Hardwick,172 
however, it seems unlikely that a court would strike down the DOMA 
legislation as, in that case, the Court did not deem homosexuality to be a 
fundamental right, and therefore would not be likely to view same-sex 
                                                                                                                                     
1996). 
169  Baehr v Lewin First Circuit Court, Hawaii (1991) [Full citation not known]; Baehr v 
Lewin 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993); Baehr v Miike No.91-1394, First Circuit 
Court, Hawaii (1996); and Baehr v Miike 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, (1999): See 
discussion on the Hawai‟i case(s) in Chapter 6 and earlier in this chapter.  
170  Feather, Nancy J., “Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State Constitutional 
Law”, in [1997] 70 Temple Law Review 1017: 1032. 
171  Romer v Evans 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996). 
172  Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986). 
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marriage as a fundamental right. It is probably for this reason that a 
constitutional challenge has not been made against the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act. 
 
Have other countries done anything like this? 
This seems to be a more prevalent occurrence in the United States than 
elsewhere in the world, although some other countries have similar laws.  
The Marriage Act 1961 of the Commonwealth of Australia was not clearly 
gender-specific. In 2004, the Commonwealth Parliament passed its 
Marriage Legislation Amendment Act 2004 which inserted a definition 
into s5(1) of the Marriage Act 1961 that provides: 
Marriage, means the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others, voluntarily entered into for life. 
 
California (Part 1) 
In 2000, as a result of the Proposition 22 process, California State passed 
its own California Defense of Marriage Act. There were two elements to 
the Proposition 22 amendment process. The first part related to the 
definition of marriage within California, and the second to the recognition 
within California of marriages from outside the State. 
Prior to amendment, the California Civil Code 4100 defined marriage, in 
a gender-neutral manner, as:173  
"a personal relation arising out of a civil contract, to which consent of the 
parties making that contract is necessary."  
While related sections in the Code made used gender-specific terms, it 
was unclear whether or not the legislation would allow or prohibit access 
to marriage by same-sex couples. On this point, as a result of the 
Proposition 22 process, the California Family Code s.300, which now 
                                                 
173  California Civil Code s.4100 (predecessor to what is now codified at California Family 
Code s.300). 
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replaced the  was changed to read: 
a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a 
woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that 
contract is necessary. [Emphasis added] 
The second issue that arose was that opponents of same-sex marriage 
had realised that, even though the definition governing who may marry 
would now explicitly preclude contracting a same-sex marriage in 
California, a separate provision might still require California to recognise 
out-of-state same-sex marriages:174 
A marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid by the laws of 
the jurisdiction in which the marriage was contracted is valid in this state. 
This provision was also amended by the insertion of the words: 
Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California 
The citizens of California were asked to vote on whether or not marriage 
should be reserved for opposite-sex couples. A particularly bitter battle 
ensued, fuelled by the tensions between, on the one hand, the high gay 
and lesbian populations in some areas within California and, on the 
other hand, strong Mormon and Catholic and fundamentalist Christian 
organisations which invested many millions of dollars in the campaign.  
Even though some considered that, under California state law marriage 
could only be between a man and a woman,175 and that „Proposition 22‟ 
was therefore unnecessary, the initiative was passed. 
In effect, therefore, the referendum was broader than the legal-technical 
provisions of the legislation. It was more about a public debate on 
Californian‟s views on the desirability of same-sex marriage,176 and a 
public display of strength of the conservative groups, both within 
California and from outside, and their opposition to the “gay agenda”.177 
                                                 
174  California Family Code s.300 and s.308. 
175  Wald, Michael S., et al, “An Analysis Of Proposition 22: The Knight Initiative”, (The 
Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender / The Stanford Center on 
Adolescence (December 1999). 
176  Wald, Michael S., et al, “An Analysis Of Proposition 22: The Knight Initiative”, The 
Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender / The Stanford Center on 
Adolescence (December 1999). 
177  It is interesting to note that: (a) only 34% of eligible Californian population voted (6.8 
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South Africa 
In 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected President of the Republic of South 
Africa. He was to remain President from May 1994 until June 1999. 
During his term as President, a new Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa was drafted. The Constitution was approved by the 
Constitutional Court on 4 December 1996, and took effect on 4 February 
1997.178  
The constitutional shift in South Africa in a very short period of time had 
been remarkable, and this was to be reflected in the Constitution that 
was to make South Africa the first country in the world to expressly, 
constitutionally prohibit discrimination on the ground of sexual 
orientation. The Constitution also included an express reference to the 
“inherent dignity” of the person.179 
9. Equality  
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law.  
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative 
and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination may be taken.  
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, 
gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, 
                                                                                                                                     
million voters); (b) 61% of those who voted, voted “Yes” to Proposition 22 (4.2 million 
voters, or 21% of eligible Californian population); (c) 29% of those who voted, voted 
“No” to Proposition 22 (2.6 million voters, or 13% of eligible Californian population); 
(d) 66% of eligible Californian population did not vote (13.2 million voters). That 
means that a „majority‟ vote on a minority rights issue was carried with a vote of 21% 
of eligible population: “California Proposition 22: The Limit on Marriage Initiative 
Archive”; http://www.prop22.org/ (Retrieved: 28 June 2000). 
178  South African Government Information; 
 http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/index.htm (Retrieved: 14 August 
2009). 
179  Constitution of South Africa Art.9 and Art.10. 
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colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
belief, culture, language and birth.  
10. Human dignity  
Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected 
and protected.  
This was to have significant implications for the issue of same-sex 
marriage in South Africa, as will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands has historically been a strongly religious nation and 
until 1994 had had a strong religious presence in its Parliament. 
However, following the decline of the religious political parties, 1994 saw 
the first wholly secular coalition Government. However, on 17 December 
1997, this Government passed the legislation enabling registered 
partnerships („geregistreerd partnerschap‟) for both same-sex and 
different-sex couples. The legislation came into effect on 1 January 
1998.180 
Dutch registered partnerships provide almost all of the entitlements of 
marriage. There were initially some restrictions around residence 
requirements and the ability to adopt, but these have largely now been 
made equivalent to those associated with marriage. In recognition of the 
strictly secular nature of the registered partnerships, the legislation 
provides that they may not be blessed in a Church, although the 
legislation does now provide that a registered partnership may be 
converted into a marriage.181 
 
                                                 
180  “Dutch Law Allows Same-Sex Marriages”, Associated Press (31 March 2001); see 
also:  
 http://www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/issues/lgbt_families/marriage_and_partnership_rights_for_same
_sex_partners_country_by_country (Retrieved: 13 August 2009). 
181  http://hollandsouth.angloinfo.com/countries/holland/gaymarriage.asp (Retrieved: 
22 July 2009). 
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COMMENT 182 
In this period (1994 through 2000), there was a great deal of progress 
across a number of jurisdictions in the area of the legal recognition of 
same-sex relationships. This was especially so with registered 
partnerships with Greenland, Sweden, Iceland, The Netherlands, 
Belgium, and France all following the lead of Denmark and passing 
legislation to allow for partnership registration.  
In Canada, the Supreme Court confirmed sexual orientation as an 
analogous ground of prohibited discrimination under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. With the Charter being supreme legislation this 
provided a more realistic possibility of the unequal treatment of same-
sex couples as compared with different-sex couples being found to be in 
breach of the Charter protections. In 1999, the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from being able to 
access the entitlements available to different-sex couples was 
discriminatory. Although the original point of reference for this case was 
the laws of the Province of Ontario, this case was to have implications for 
family law across all Canadian provinces. And, in 2000, both Ontario 
and British Columbia entered into the same-sex marriage debate with 
court cases being filed in both provinces. The inclusion of “sexual 
orientation” in the Charter had made an immediate and substantive 
difference to the same-sex couples of Canada and their fight to equal 
rights.  
In 1994, South Africa stepped out of the apartheid regime. In that year, 
Nelson Mandela became President of the republic of South Africa. By 
early 1997, South Africa was to have a new Constitution which, as a first 
for any country in the world, included sexual orientation as an expressly 
protected ground of discrimination. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, this was to set the scene for further developments with regard 
to access to marriage for same-sex couples within the next few years. 
                                                 
182  The information contained in this section constitutes my comment based on 
information presented previously in this chapter. For that reason I have not directly 
referenced the source material for this section. 
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In the United States of America, between 1996 and 1999, the States of 
Hawai‟i and Alaska both got marriage and then lost it again. The success 
came in the courts – the reversal cam by way of populist referenda 
resulting in Constitutional amendment. These cases prompted the 
Federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and amendments across a 
number of States to ban the solemnisation of same-sex marriages within 
their States, or the recognition in some States of same-sex marriages 
from any other State. This, in spite of the fact that no State actually had 
same-sex marriage yet. In 1997, civil unions came to Vermont, enacted 
by the legislature, but subsequent to a same-sex marriage case that had 
failed before the courts. 
The period from 1994 to 2000 provided mixed results in New Zealand. 
The Quilter same-sex marriage case went before the High Court (April 
1996) and, on appeal, to the Court of Appeal (in September 1997). The 
action failed in that it was not successful in securing equal access to 
marriage for same-sex couples in New Zealand, and was a 
disappointment with regard to some of the Judicial reasoning. On the 
other hand, there were some highlights. For a period of time, the same-
sex marriage issue was widely debated across New Zealand – giving the 
issue profile. The judgment of Justice Thomas, however, remains as one 
of the key highlights of the case. Although he was in a minority of one in 
holding unequivocally that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
was (is) discriminatory, the integrity of his judgment still holds today – 
alongside the judgments of Justices in overseas jurisdictions whose 
judgments have been instrumental in bringing same-sex marriage to 
those countries. 
The action or reaction of the Government and Parliament in New Zealand 
during this time was more concerning. On several occasions, it seemed 
that the Government was consciously seeking to impart the message 
that it was not interested in human rights or equality. First, the 
Government proposed legislation to cancel Consistency 2000 Project – 
the work programme mandated by the Human Rights Act 1993 whereby 
Government must assess all legislation for compliance with New 
Zealand‟s human rights standards. Second, the Government made it 
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clear that it did would not include de facto couples within the same 
relationship property legislation as married couples, but rather it would 
create separate „de facto property‟ legislation; and, it made it clear that 
same-sex couples would not be included in property legislation at all. 
Third, the Government, in the wake of the failed Quilter case, and the 
debate about the protection of same-sex couples‟ relationship property 
rights and, in the face of human rights legislation protecting the rights of 
minorities, issued a Discussion Paper seeking public (majoritarian) 
comment on how same-sex couples should be treated by the law. As if to 
rub salt into the wounds, the Government also declared that same-sex 
marriage was not „on the table‟ for debate. These actions all seem to be 
symbolic of a Government that really did not want to face the issues of 
the rights of same-sex couples.  
In contrast with progress made overseas, there were no significant 
advances made in New Zealand during this time. Where New Zealand 
had previously been seen to be in a favourable position with regard to 
the recognition of the rights of same-sex couples, now we were getting 
the sense that we were watching other countries coming from behind 
and moving slightly ahead of us. 
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NEW ZEALAND  
Introduction 
The latter part of the 1990s had been a period of great disappointment 
for those interested in the rights of minority groups in New Zealand. 
Those of us engaged in seeking access to marriage for same-sex couples 
felt it keenly, as the right to equal treatment before and under the law, 
that we thought had been fought for in relation to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993, failed to materialise. 
The Quilter case, for example, was cited by some as a demonstration of 
the weakness, the “lack of teeth” of our Bill of Rights.1 
Social and human rights issues gave way to fiscal constraints and free-
market economics in the public sector. We were told that all would be 
cured by way of the “trickle-down”. It is true that a healthy community 
will be less reliant on active supports and protections through welfarism 
or rights-based agencies. But, the danger was, that while New Zealand 
was waiting for community health to thrive, much of the social stability 
of our communities could be undermined.  
As it happened, by the time the Labour-led coalition came into office after 
the November 1999 General Election, New Zealand was at least 
(statutorily) two years behind in our human rights compliance 
programme, and, because of the cancellation of the “Consistency 2000” 
Project and the subsequent wrangling over the amendment Bills, in a 
practical sense, the real time lost was considerably more. 
However, there was some reason for optimism. There were a number of 
reasons to expect, or at least hope, that the new Government would 
initiate a catch-up period. Furthermore, it was expected that this catch-
up would be rather swift.  
                                                 
1  Comment by Jenny Rowan and Jools Joslin following the decision, on 17 December 
1997, of the Court of Appeal in Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
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First, much was made of the fact that amongst the new Labour 
Government were Chris Carter (New Zealand‟s first “out” gay MP, and 
New Zealand‟s first “out” gay Cabinet Minister), Tim Barnett (the first 
New Zealand MP to be elected as an “out” gay man), and Georgina Beyer 
(the world‟s first known transsexual MP). This does speak volumes for the 
acceptance of diversity within the party, which had also been conveyed 
by the Party‟s support for gay and lesbian rights issues through a 
number of other MPs, including the Prime Minister. 
Second, Labour MPs had been very outspoken with regard to the 
previous Government‟s attempts to stifle Government‟s compliance with 
human rights laws in New Zealand.2  
We will be the Government in just a few months – one that will be proud to 
be judged on its human rights record. 
We were placed in this position by the unilateral decision of the Government, 
not endorsed by Parliament … At least I can have confidence that the 
change of Government later this year will bring about a far greater 
commitment to human rights than we have seen today. 
In fact, Tim Barnett had put great effort into ensuring that the attempt to 
provide for a permanent exemption for Government from human rights 
compliance did not happen, and was largely instrumental in ensuring the 
introduction and passing of the Human Rights Amendment Bill (No.2) 
which successfully preserved the consistency programme, albeit in a new 
form.3 
It could be said that the first-term Labour Government of the three years 
from1999 to 2002 was the most gay-friendly, and perhaps the most gay-
progressive, that we have had. On the other hand, there was no room for 
                                                 
2  (1) Hansard, “Human Rights Amendment Bill (No.2)”, Second Reading, (3 July 1999): 
Tim Barnett, New Zealand Labour, Christchurch Central; (2) Hansard, “Human 
Rights Amendment Bill (No.2)”, Second Reading (13 July 1999): Lianne Dalziel, New 
Zealand Labour. 
3  Upon passing, the Human Rights Amendment Bill (No.2) 1998 became the Human 
Rights Amendment Act 1999. 
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complacency. For example, the compliance programme, which should 
have been completed by 31 December 2001, remained incomplete.4 The 
new Government initiated its programme of policy and legislative review, 
including its proposal to legislate for civil unions, a move that those of us 
seeking the right to marriage did not see as satisfying the equality 
principles.  
 
New Zealand Goes To The United Nations Human Rights Committee 
Introduction 
Following the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal not to make a 
declaration that same-sex couples are permitted to marry under the 
Marriage Act 1955, two lesbian couples who decided to take the case to 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC).5 The 
Communication (complaint) was made in reliance upon the procedural 
provisions of the First Optional Protocol to the International Convention 
on Civil and Political Rights. These provisions enable citizens of a State 
Party to forward a Communication to the UNHRC. Article 1 of the 
Convention provides:6 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a Party to the present Protocol 
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
                                                 
4  This was subsequently remedied to a larger extent by the omnibus Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2005 and other specific legislation which resulted in 
legislative amendments to many statutes in order to provide equally for married 
(different-sex) couples, for different-sex and same-sex couples in civil unions or de 
facto relationships, full compliance of all legislation in New Zealand with domestic 
human rights standards has not yet been realised. Aside from the Marriage Act 
1995, a prime example of this non-compliance is the Adoption Act 1955. For more 
detail on this, see discussion in Chapter 6. 
5  Jools Joslin and Jenny Rowan, and Marg and Lindsay Quilter were two of the 
couples who had been parties to the Quilter same-sex marriage cases: Quilter v 
Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430 (High Court); [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (Court of 
Appeal). 
6  New Zealand had ratified and acceded to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on 26 
May 1989.  
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victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant. No communication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol.  
The substantive complaint was made in reliance on a number of 
provisions in the Convention itself.7 
 
The Communication 
The issue 
The Joslin Communication,8 first and foremost, was about the right to 
equal treatment before the law.  
The authors presented the marriage issue (the right to marry – Article 
23.2 of the ICCPR) in the context of the right to equal treatment before 
the law (Article 26 of the ICCPR) and the requirement of the State to 
ensure the provision of all rights in the Covenant without distinction on 
prescribed grounds (Article 2 of the ICCPR). The authors did not present 
the marriage issue in isolation. 
In other words, the authors argued that New Zealand (as a State Party to 
the Covenant) must not act in a discriminatory manner by denying same-
sex couples access to marriage, rather than arguing specifically that 
same-sex couples must have the right to marry under New Zealand law. 
Article 26 is a fundamental provision of the Covenant in that it: 
• advocates equality before the law and equal protection of the law;  
• prohibits any distinction the effect of which is to prevent all persons 
from being treated on an equal footing;  
• requires that legislation enacted by a State party not be 
discriminatory;  
                                                 
7  In addition to the information presented in the following section, a commentary on 
each of the provisions of international human rights law relied on by New Zealand is 
contained in Chapter 4.  
8  Joslin v New Zealand Communication No. 902/1999. 
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• is autonomous (that is, a stand-alone right); and  
• covers direct and indirect discrimination.  
Not only is discrimination clearly prohibited by Article 26, but also the 
UNHRC itself has stated that:9 
Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law without discrimination, constitutes a basic and general principle 
relating to the protection of human rights. 
Freedom from discrimination is therefore an overarching freedom which, 
in my view, impacts upon other provisions within this (the ICCPR) and 
other Covenants, and dictates how those other provisions must be 
interpreted. 
 
Discrimination 
The only situation in which it may be acceptable to treat persons 
differently on the basis of a particular personal characteristic (such as 
"sex" or "sexual orientation") is where that different treatment is 
reasonable and objective, and is aimed at achieving a legitimate purpose 
under the Covenant. In circumstances where these criteria are not met, 
different treatment will amount to discrimination. 
Thus a consideration of whether or not a particular provision, in this 
case marriage, is discriminatory would flow as follows:  
• Does the exclusion from marriage result in different treatment for 
same-sex couples (based on, for example, their “sex” or “sexual 
orientation”)?;  
• Does this different treatment result in a detriment to same-sex 
couples?;  
• Is there a reasonable, objective and legitimate purpose for this 
different treatment?  
                                                 
9  United Nations, General Comment No.18 (9 November 1989). 
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The Views of the Committee 10 
The main part of the Views of the UNHRC reads as follows:
11
 
8.1 - The Human Rights Committee has considered the present 
communication in the light of all the information made available to it by the 
parties, as provided in article 5, paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol. 
8.2 - The author's essential claim is that the Covenant obligates States 
parties to confer upon homosexual couples the capacity to marry and that 
by denying the authors this capacity the State party violates their rights 
under articles 16, 17, 23, paragraphs 1 and 2, and 26 of the Covenant. The 
Committee notes that article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant expressly 
addresses the issue of the right to marry. Given the existence of a specific 
provision in the Covenant on the right to marriage, any claim that this right 
has been violated must be considered in the light of this provision. Article 
23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is the only substantive provision in the 
Covenant which defined a right by using the term "men and women", rather 
than "every human being", "everyone" and "all persons". Use of the term 
"men and women", rather than the general terms used elsewhere in Part III 
of the Covenant, has been consistently and uniformly understood as 
indicating that the treaty obligation of the States parties stemming from 
article 23, paragraph 2, of the Covenant is to recognize as marriage only the 
union between a man and a woman wishing to marry each other. 
8.3 - In light of the scope of the right to marry under article 23, paragraph 2, 
of the Covenant, the Committee cannot find that by mere refusal to provide 
for marriage between homosexual couples, the State party has violated the 
rights of the authors under articles 16, 17, 23, paragraphs 1 and 2, or 26 of 
the Covenant. 
9. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the 
Optional Protocol, is of the view that the facts before it do not disclose a 
violation of any provision of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
                                                 
10  The “Views” of the Human Rights Committee in response to any Communication 
(complaint) to it are, essentially, its decision. However, unlike the results of court 
decisions under domestic law, the Views of the Committee are not binding on the 
State party and constitute recommendations only.  
11  The "Views of the Human Rights Committee" in relation to Joslin v New Zealand 
Communication No 902/1999, New Zealand (30 July 2002), 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/e44ccf85efc1669ac1256c370
02b96c9?Opendocument (Retrieved: 3 September 2002). The joint individual opinion 
of Committee Members (Mr Rajsoomer Lallah and Mr Martin Scheinin) is well worth 
reading. 
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Comment on the Decision 
When I read the Views of the Committee, I was extremely disappointed. 
The Committee's substantive response seemed somewhat brief and, in 
my analysis did not seem to address, in a proper and logical manner, the 
key issues placed before the Committee. In fact, in many ways, the 
Committee approached the Joslin Communication in very much the 
same way that the majority of the Court of Appeal in New Zealand had 
approached Quilter:12 
… the Committee delivered its views, rejecting the complaint on the basis 
that the ICCPR affirmation in article 23 of the right to marry envisaged 
different-sex marriage only. The plaintiffs therefore lost for the same 
reasons as they had in the New Zealand courts; the ICCPR (like New 
Zealand‟s Marriage Act) affirmed a heterosexual conception of marriage. On 
that basis the true merits of the question were not reached in Joslin”.  
The similarities between the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Quilter and 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee in Joslin can be 
summarised as follows: 
TABLE 7: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN QUILTER AND JOSLIN 
Court In Quilter Committee In Joslin 
Court does not directly address the 
issue whether or not denial of access 
to marriage is discriminatory. 
Committee does not directly address 
the issue whether or not denial of 
access to marriage is discriminatory. 
Court focuses on the definition / 
meaning of the word „marriage‟ (as 
intended by the Parliament of New 
Zealand in 1955). 
Committee focuses on definition / 
meaning of the word „marriage‟ (as 
interpreted by them in relation to the 
Convention). 
The Court defers to the sovereignty of 
Parliament 
The Committee defers to the sovereign 
State 
The Court accepts tradition, and 
therefore the traditional meaning of 
marriage, as dominant. 
The Committee accepts tradition, and 
therefore the traditional meaning of 
marriage, as dominant. 
                                                 
12  Rishworth, Paul, “Changing Times, Changing Minds, Changing Laws – Sexual 
Orientation And New Zealand Law, 1960 to 2005”, in [2007] 11 The International 
Journal of Human Rights 85: 97.  
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On the other hand, there are some obvious differences. The differences 
between Quilter and Joslin can be summarised as follows: 
TABLE 8: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN QUILTER AND JOSLIN 
Court In Quilter Committee In Joslin 
Issue considered in the context of 
domestic human rights laws 
Issue considered in the context of 
international human rights laws 
The issue relates to and the outcome 
applies to the domestic jurisdiction 
only 
The Committee had to be mindful of 
international forum and the 
implications of its Views for 
jurisdictions across the international 
community 
Domestic considerations only Regional considerations and the 
margin of appreciation 
Sets binding precedent on inferior 
courts 
View of the Committee are not binding 
Deference to Parliament Deference to sovereign State 
Court interprets the contested 
legislation, almost without looking at 
the human rights that were invoked. 
Committee looks at the human rights 
invoked, almost without looking at the 
contested legislation. 
Court looks at the meaning of 
„marriage‟ – that is, the right to 
marry. 
Committee looks at the meaning of 
„men and women‟ in the formulation of 
the right to marry - that is, the right 
to marry. 
 
In Broeks v Netherlands,13 the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
responded directly to the claim of discrimination. Broeks had been 
employed as a nurse but, after becoming ill, had received support 
                                                 
13  Broeks v Netherlands, Communication No 172/1984, The Netherlands (9 April 
1987). 
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through Netherlands social security. After a period of time, in accordance 
with the relevant laws, her benefits were stopped. She complained to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee that: 
• had she been a man (married or unmarried) she would have been 
able to continue on the benefit; and 
• the Unemployment Benefits Act violated her right under Article 26 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law. 
The State argued that the entitlement to social security arose under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
therefore the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights did not apply:14 
The Netherlands Government takes the view that article 26 of the Covenant 
does entail an obligation to avoid discrimination, but that this article can 
only be invoked under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant in the sphere of 
civil and political rights … 
In response, the Committee expressed its view that the issue did come 
under the Article 26 protections:15  
Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it 
does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to the matters that may 
be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for example, require any 
State to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such 
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State‟s sovereign power, then such 
legislation must comply with article 26 of the Covenant. 
The Committee went on to decide that, because she was a woman, Mrs 
Broeks had suffered different and disadvantageous treatment in 
comparison with the treatment she would have received had she been a 
man. The different treatment to which Broeks had been exposed, 
therefore, constituted discrimination on the ground of gender.  
                                                 
14  The “Views of the Human Rights Committee” in relation to: Broeks v Netherlands, 
Communication No 172/1984, The Netherlands (9 April 1987): para.8.3. 
15  The “Views of the Human Rights Committee” in relation to: Broeks v Netherlands, 
Communication No 172/1984, The Netherlands (9 April 1987): para.12.4. 
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In Joslin, the Committee avoided a full consideration of whether or not 
denial of access to marriage was discriminatory by relying on the view 
that the term “marriage” in international conventions is, by definition, 
heterosexual marriage.  
The Committee did not address the issue of discrimination. It did not 
consider the impact of Articles 26 and 2.1 on Article 23.2. Instead of 
considering the primary and fundamental issue of the right of persons to 
be free from discrimination, the Committee presented a response on the 
secondary, narrower and singular issue of the right to marry. Further, it 
allowed its response to be led by a definition of marriage based in 
tradition, employing that narrow meaning to justify a narrow meaning for 
the term marriage in the Covenant. And, if marriage is, by definition, the 
union of a man and a woman, the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage cannot, because of that definition, be discriminatory. 
It was this reasoning that enabled the Committee to state:16 
The Human Rights Committee … is of the view that the facts before it do not 
disclose a violation of any provision of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
In this, the Committee used the same circular argument that has been 
used by the courts in several domestic jurisdictions, including New 
Zealand, in the past. The argument fails. 
If the Committee had applied the same reasoning that it had applied in 
Broeks, the reasoning would have been along the lines: 
• The State is arguably under no obligation to provide a legal regime for 
the formal recognition of relationships. 
• However, if the State does enact legislation for this purpose, then 
“such legislation must comply with article 26 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.17 
                                                 
16  The "Views of the Human Rights Committee" in relation to: Joslin v New Zealand, 
Communication No 902/1999, New Zealand (30 July 2002): para.9. 
17  The “Views of the Human Rights Committee” in relation to: Broeks v Netherlands, 
Communication No 172/1984, The Netherlands (9 April 1987): para.12.4. 
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• New Zealand has enacted legislation for the recognition of 
relationships (the Marriage Act 1955) and therefore, the Marriage Act 
1955 “must comply with article 26 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights”.18 
• In New Zealand some couples, on the basis of their sex (gender) and 
sexual orientation, are excluded from marriage and suffer 
disadvantage because of that exclusion. 
• The exclusion of those couples from marriage, therefore, constitutes 
discrimination. 
As suggested by Rishworth,19 nothing in this decision stops any country 
from extending marriage to same-sex couples. Correctly also, the View 
leaves this decision, in this case, to the State party. However, a full 
consideration of the issue of discrimination could have been forthcoming 
from the Committee. By adopting and perpetuating this singular meaning 
the Committee has side-stepped the fundamental issue of discrimination. 
 
Summary 
I do not believe it is possible to consider Article 23.2 in isolation, as the 
Committee has done. Article 23.2 must be considered in the context of 
whether or not it complies with Article 26 and Article 2.1. The 
consideration of the Committee in Broeks supports this view. 
The reasoning by the UNHRC merely raises again the same question that 
was raised by Quilter in the New Zealand courts, and by other cases in 
overseas jurisdictions where the same “solution” has been promulgated. 
Namely, can past discrimination (by definition, less favourable treatment 
that is not justifiable) be used to justify current discrimination? I would 
suggest that it is difficult to find a situation where current practice can 
be justified solely on the basis of past practice. Conversely, there are 
many instances where the development of new practices can be justified 
on the basis that the old, traditional practices are no longer acceptable.20 
                                                 
18  The “Views of the Human Rights Committee” in relation to: Broeks v Netherlands, 
Communication No 172/1984, The Netherlands (9 April 1987): para.12.4. 
19  Rishworth, Paul, “Human Rights”, in [2003] NZLRev. 261: 267. 
20  See earlier discussion on „Tradition‟ in Chapter 3. 
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In both Quilter and Joslin, the decision-makers have failed to ask, first of 
all, whether the denial of access to marriage constitutes discrimination 
against same-sex couples. It is the issue of discrimination that must be 
considered the primary issue, and not what constitutes the traditional 
(that is, 1950s) definition of marriage. 
 
Post Script 
After receiving the final Views of the UNHRC in response to the Joslin 
Communication, the Authors prepared a submission seeking a 
reconsideration of the issue by the Committee. The basis of this request 
was that the Committee had failed to take into consideration the results 
of a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights. In essence, 
the case (Goodwin v United Kingdom) held that "the right of men and 
women to marry" can no longer be confined to persons of “opposite 
biological sex”.  
We ultimately received a negative response, however, stating: 
The Committee, acting through its Special Rapporteur on New 
Communications, has taken note of your submissions, and considers that, on 
the arguments presented, it would not be an appropriate use of any 
exceptional power to reconsider its adopted Views in this instance. 
So ... the original “Final Views” of the Committee still stand. 
 
Meanwhile … Back in the Legislature 
Re-Evaluation of the Human Rights Protections 
The policies of both partners to the new coalition Government (Labour 
and Alliance) made a clear commitment to a review of human rights 
legislation and the structures which implement it. In April 2000 the 
Government commissioned a Team of four experts in human rights to 
conduct an independent ministerial re-evaluation of human rights 
protections in New Zealand.  
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The tasks for the ministerial re-evaluation Team were (in summary):21 
1. to re-evaluate, and if necessary recommend changes to, the nature 
and scope of the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993; 
2. to develop recommendations for the relationship of our domestic 
human rights laws to other legislation, including a consideration of 
the primacy or otherwise of human rights laws; 
3. to re-evaluate, and if necessary recommend changes, to ensure that 
international human rights obligations are taken into account in the 
development and implementation of Government policy and New 
Zealand legislation; 
4. to re-evaluate the internal structure and operation of the various 
components of the Human Rights Commission and its relationship 
with other human rights agencies; and 
5. to consider the possible implementation of a National Plan of Action 
for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights as recommended 
by the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. 
The Team travelled throughout New Zealand conducting meetings for 
public consultation with stakeholders, including Governmental agencies, 
non-Governmental community groups, and individuals with a particular 
interest in human rights. 
After a concentrated time of consulting and writing, the Team produced 
its Report “Discussion Paper: Re-Evaluation of the Human Rights 
Protections in New Zealand” in October 2000. In general terms, the 
Report found that:22 
1. the existing domestic Human Rights institutions in New Zealand 
were fragmented in nature; 
                                                 
21 For the full Terms of Reference see: Ministry of Justice, "Discussion Paper: Re-
Evaluation Of The Human Rights Protections In New Zealand”, a Paper prepared by 
the Ministerial Re-Evaluation Team for the Associate Minister of Justice (October 
2000): 16-17. 
22 Memorandum for Cabinet Policy Committee, "Re-Evaluation Of Human Rights 
Protections In New Zealand - Strategic Overview Decisions”, (Paper One) (5 October 
2000). 
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2. New Zealand's human rights obligations, and in particular the 
relationship between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
the Human Rights Act 1993, were not well understood by the 
public, politicians or many government departments; and 
3. there was a need for greater public education and debate regarding 
New Zealand's domestic and international human rights obligations 
so that they could be better considered and more realistically 
applied in both the public and private sector. 
Key amongst the Team‟s recommendations were proposals to:23 
1. repeal section 151 of the Human Rights Act 1993;24 
2. amend the Human Rights Act 1993 so that legislation and 
Government policy and practice would be assessed against the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 rather than the Human Rights Act 
1993; 
3. the promotion of, and education about, human rights generally; and 
4. early consideration of human rights issues and obligations in the 
policy-making process, rather than waiting for cases to be taken to 
complaint or prosecuted in the courts in order to establish or 
confirm the level of human rights protection the State is obliged to 
provide for its citizens. 
In response to the Report, the Human Rights Amendment Bill 2001 was 
introduced to Parliament on 16 August 2001. The Bill contained some 
very positive elements in relation to human rights generally in New 
Zealand. However, as a response to the “Compliance 2001” Programme, 
and as a signal of the Government‟s commitment to equality under the 
                                                 
23 For the full list of recommendations see: Ministry of Justice, "Discussion Paper: Re-
Evaluation Of The Human Rights Protections In New Zealand”, a Paper prepared by 
the Ministerial Re-Evaluation Team for the Associate Minister of Justice (October 
2000): 94-106. 
24  The Human Rights Act 1993 s.151 was a „sunset clause‟ that would automatically 
expire at midnight 31 December 1999. It was anticipated that all New Zealand 
statutes would be reviewed by this date and that, by this time, all would be amended 
to be compliant with domestic human rights provisions, or would be non-compliant 
only where that was justifiable. 
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law for gays and lesbians (and same-sex couples) the new legislation, 
which came into effect on 1 January 2002, was disappointing. 
The positive attributes of the legislation included that: 
• it did not extend the life of the sunset clause and, as a consequence, 
Government became subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, and could be held liable for any 
breaches of these provisions in the public sector; 
• this Government liability was now to be tested against the anti-
discrimination standard set out in Part 1A of the Act, namely, the Bill 
of Rights standard;25 
• the Human Rights Review Tribunal would not have the power to 
declare a legislative provision to be inconsistent with the Human 
Rights Act – that is, make a „declaration of inconsistency‟.26 
Not so positive, however, was the fact that prior to the Human Rights 
Amendment Act 2001, of the 140 statutes which contain provisions 
which constitute entitlements for legally married couples,27 nine also 
applied to same-sex couples. The Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 
increased that number by 11. This meant that, although the temporary 
exemption from liability for discrimination by or on behalf of Government 
had expired, only 20 out of a possible 140 statutes could be said to be 
compliant. 
As of 1 January 2002, therefore, the Government of New Zealand entered 
into a situation where it was in breach of New Zealand human rights law. 
Some 120 out of a possible 140 statutes remained inconsistent with the 
Human Rights Act 1993, and none of them had been granted a 
permanent exemption from compliance.28 
                                                 
25  That is, different treatment may occur only where that different treatment can be 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”: New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990: s.5. 
26  The Tribunal does not have the power to strike down or overturn an inconsistent 
provision, but a Declaration of Inconsistency by the Human Rights Review Tribunal 
must be reported to the responsible Minister along with suggestions on what the 
Government‟s response(s) should or might be. 
27  Note, that this reference is to statutes only, and does not refer to the additional 
number of regulations or Government practices and procedures. 
28  This figure does not take account of any regulations promulgated under statute, nor 
any Government practices and procedures that should also have been the subject of 
consideration under the “Compliance 2001” Programme. 
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When asked about past delays and future plans relating to addressing 
these inconsistencies, the Ministry of Justice responded:29 
There was not time to do this work for inclusion in the Human rights 
Amendment Bill as the timeframe was driven by the need to address the 
expiry on 31 December 2001 of Government‟s partial exemption from the 
Human rights Act (section 151). 
Consequently, Government agreed that only those references to “spouse” 
and associated words that were relatively simple and non-controversial to 
change would be done as part of the Human Rights Amendment Bill by 31 
December 2001. 
The Ministry of Justice is undertaking work to assess other instances of 
legislative provisions that may treat de facto and same-sex couples 
differently from legally married couples and their families. This assessment 
includes the appropriateness of changing a provision to include same-sex 
couples and de facto heterosexual couples, and the development of options 
for how to give effect to such changes. A timetable for progressing this 
work is currently under consideration. As noted above there is also a 
process underway to audit and address Government policies and practices. 
(Emphasis added) 
This consistency / compliance process began with passing of the Human 
Rights Act 1993. To claim that there had been insufficient time, and to 
state that the Government was „considering a timetable‟ for progressing 
this work some 8½ years later was indicative of a lack of commitment to 
human rights compliance in practice, and demonstrated that the driving 
force for human rights compliance in New Zealand was not, in fact, the 
legislative imperatives of the Human Rights Act but, rather, the politics of 
being in Government. 
 
Property (Relationships) Bill 2000 
In early 2000, the new Government revived the relationship property 
debate when it announced a proposal to include same-sex couples in the 
                                                 
29  New Zealand Ministry of Justice letter to Nigel Christie on 22 November 2001 in 
response to a request under the Official Information Act 1982 for information on 
progress on the “Compliance 2001” Programme as it relates to same-sex couples. 
Note that the term “a number of” applies to the 11 statues previously mentioned. 
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property legislation, and to combine the Matrimonial Property 
Amendment Bill and the De Facto Relationships Property Bill into one 
piece of legislation (Supplementary Order Paper No.25).30 The proposed 
legislation provided for: 
• the division of property upon the break down of a relationship – by 
amendment to the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 and the inclusion 
of provisions for de facto different-sex and same-sex relationships; 
• the division of property upon the death of one partner – by way of 
amendment to the Matrimonial Property Act 1963, the Family 
Protection Act 1955 and the Administration Act 1969; and 
• matters relating to spousal maintenance – by amendment to the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980. 
On 4 May 2000, in spite of an initial outcry from the opposition parties 
about the process, the House voted 64-54 in favour of allowing SOP 25 
(renamed the Property (Relationships) Bill 2000) to proceed. Further 
lobbying by opposition parties resulted in the Bill being referred back to 
the Justice and Electoral Reform Select Committee for further 
submissions. Parliamentary Select Committees are appointed from 
among MPs. Different Committees are responsible for considering a range 
of issues, including proposals for new legislation, which they can do in 
more detail than is possible in the House.31 The Committees will take into 
account the research, analysis and advice of officials but, unless the 
commitment to human rights standards is robust, there are three key 
ways in which the outcome of a Select Committee process will tend to 
result in support of a majority view rather than minority protection: 
• The process enables members of the public to have direct input by 
way of written and / or oral submissions. 
                                                 
30  See earlier discussion on the former Government‟s initial work on separate 
matrimonial and de facto relationship property legislation in the previous chapter. 
31  New Zealand Parliament website, “How Parliament Works: Fact Sheets: Select 
Committees”:  
 http://www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/AboutParl/HowPWorks/FactSheets/3/f/a/3faad934f46f4612ad8180cb294638fd
.htm#_Toc144018583 (Retrieved: 13 August 2009). 
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• By their very definition, MPs are the representatives of their 
constituents and may, therefore, tend to reflect the views of the 
people they represent.  
• The decisions of Select Committees, like decisions of the House, are 
made on a majority-vote basis.  
Disappointingly in this case, there were several changes made to the Bill 
by the Select Committee. These changes were not made on a principled 
basis to enhance the Bill and its future operation, but rather to appease 
conservative critics of the Bill.32  
Firstly, the Bill, as originally drafted, used the generic term “partnered 
relationship” to cover marriage, de facto heterosexual, and same-sex 
relationships,33 and defined a person as another person's “partner” if “(a) 
they are married to each other; or (b) they have a de facto relationship 
with one another”.  
However, the fact that two persons married to each other should be 
described as “partners” in the same way as two persons in a de facto 
relationship or a same-sex relationship created some consternation 
amongst opponents. As a consequence of lobbying both within 
Parliament from opposition parties and from outside by conservative 
groups, the Select Committee reintroduced the terms “husband” and 
“wife” in relation to married couples only. This change stemmed from a 
fear that the inclusion of same-sex couples in relationship property 
legislation was a threat to the sanctity of marriage. One of the key 
advocates of this change was Rt Hon Jenny Shipley, Leader of the 
Opposition, who stated:34 
I do believe that there is a significant difference in the characteristics and 
the uniqueness of each of these relationships. [Married people] make a 
commitment, and it is an obvious commitment – a higher level of commitment 
– than people who enter other relationships. 
                                                 
32 The following is based on: Supplementary Order Paper No.25, as drafted prior to 
Select Committee deliberations; Supplementary Order Paper No.25, as reported from 
the Justice and Electoral Select Committee. 
33 Supplementary Order Paper No.25 cl.4. 
34  New Zealand National Party, Press Release (3 March 2000). 
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But, the reintroduction of these specific terms effectively reintroduced an 
element of discrimination into the legislation by recreating the separation 
between “marriage” and “relationships in the nature of marriage”. 
Fortunately, the substantive treatment within the legislation of 
“partners”, or a “husband” or “wife”, remained the same in all instances 
with the eventual effect that all relationships were still to be treated the 
same way under the new legislation. 
A second change resulted in the insertion of a definition of a „de facto‟ 
relationship. The original draft of the Bill defined a de facto relationship 
as one in which “two people (whether a man and a woman, or a man and 
a man, or a woman and a woman) are living together in a relationship in 
the nature of marriage although not married to each other”.35 This “open” 
definition had its flaws. The term „de facto‟ is short-hand for de facto 
marriage (as compared with de jure marriage). If same-sex couples 
cannot marry de jure, then nor can they be in a de facto marriage.  
However, the Select Committee responded to a call to insert an express 
definition. This express definition also has its flaws. 
The Court of Appeal in Thompson v Department of Social Welfare 36 listed 
a range of “characteristics” of a “relationship in the nature of marriage” (a 
de facto relationship). What Justice Tipping did in that definition was to 
quite clearly state that there are two fundamentally different categories of 
characteristics of any relationship.  
First, he referred to the “mental” (emotional and psychological) 
characteristics such as commitment to each other, including the notions 
of loving, sharing and caring.  
Second, he referred to the “physical” characteristics such as whether or 
not the couple share a home, whether they own property together, 
whether they have joint bank accounts, whether they hold themselves 
out to family and friends as a couple, and so on. 
For those of us who seek legal recognition of same-sex relationships 
through marriage this distinction is central. It is the core elements of the 
relationship that are paramount in our considerations – the “mental” 
                                                 
35  Supplementary Order Paper No.25 clause 2A(2). 
36  Thompson v Department of Social Welfare [1994] 2 NZLR 369: 373. 
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characteristics. The relationship commences with the love, sharing and 
commitment. It is those which are the relationship. It is those that give 
the relationship its status in the eyes of family and friends. 
The “physical” characteristics are the incidents and, generally, the 
indicators of that relationship. They are not the essence of that 
relationship. 
It was disappointing therefore, to see “the degree of mutual commitment 
to a shared life” being included within the definition as the only 
indication of the “mental” element of the relationship, and being listed as 
merely the sixth in a list of nine characteristics 
The Select Committee reported to the House on 14 November 2000. In 
spite of these shortcomings, the legislation was arguably the first family-
related legislation in New Zealand which was truly compliant with our 
human rights laws.37 
 
Acknowledgement compared with recognition 
Until the advent of the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2005, all legislation which contained some 
provisions relevant to same-sex partners could be described in terms of 
the obligations, and conversely the rights, of one partner of the 
relationship vis-à-vis the other partner (as in relationship property 
legislation, domestic violence), or to the State (as in income tax 
legislation), or in relation to the rights of a third party (as in the rights of 
a child to be supported). In many instances, the statutes related to the 
rights of individuals in a relationship when something went wrong 
(domestic violence), or when a relationship came to an end (property).  
It is argued that the inclusion of provisions relating to same-sex partners 
in various pieces of legislation should be seen as an acknowledgement of 
                                                 
37 The only statutes which had previously included same-sex couples were: Electricity 
Act 1992 s.111 (definition of a “near relative”); Domestic Violence Act 1995 s.2 
(definition of “partner”); Harassment Act 1997 s.2 (definition of “partner”); Accident 
Insurance Act 1998 s.25 (definition of “spouse”); Housing Restructuring (Income-
Related Rents) Amendment Act 2000 s.5 (definition of “partner”). 
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these relationships and the individuals within them, rather than as a 
recognition of the relationship per se.  
While it may be tempting at times to celebrate the inclusion of same-sex 
couples in the law (either expressly in statute, or through an inclusive 
interpretation by case-law), that inclusion may not always be as positive 
as first seems.  
There is generally no issue with the expectation that gays and lesbians 
should be required to respond to any and all obligations and 
responsibilities flowing from the law, but there is some resentment to 
having to respond to the obligations when not receiving the rights, 
benefits and protections that other couples receive (and take for granted) 
from the State.  
 
Relationship recognition 
On 9 December 2004, Parliament passed the Civil Union Act 2004. On 15 
March 2005, Parliament passed the Relationships (Statutory References) 
Act 2005. The Civil Union Act enables same-sex couples and different-sex 
couples to register their relationships with the State by way of a process 
that is similar to, but different from, that for marriage under the 
Marriage Act 1955. The Statutory References Act, by a series of 
consequential amendments, extended a range of legislation which 
previously applied to either married couples (or, in some cases, to 
married and de facto different-sex couples) to apply to couples who 
entered into a civil union. 
In the midst of the promotion of the Civil Union Act, we were led to 
believe that, by registering a relationship under the Civil Union Act 2004, 
same-sex couples can now gain access to all the essential obligations, 
protections, benefits which flow from marriage. However, this is clearly 
not the case. 
Leaving aside the Marriage Act, of approximately 150 statutes, there are 
about 15 statutes the provisions of which have not been extended to 
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couples who enter a civil union. There are exclusions which may not be 
hugely significant in the wider scheme of things. However, the significant 
impact of some of these exclusions is unquestionable and, arguably, 
these exclusions constitute continued discrimination against same-sex 
couples.  
 
Legislation from which same-sex couples remain excluded 
The most obvious and significant example of legislation from which 
same-sex partners are prima facie excluded (whether in a civil union or 
not) is the Adoption Act 1955. Under that Act and, until very recently at 
least, the case-law has held that, only married couples were able to make 
a joint application for adoption.38  
My analysis of legislation affecting relationships or partners to a 
relationship identified the following are examples of legislation which 
continues to exclude same-sex couples because of the case-law definition 
of the term “spouse”:39 
• Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 s.2 – provides that, where one 
person adopts a child as a sole applicant, their spouse will not 
become a parent of that child by reason only of having consented to 
the adoption and, that a person who becomes the spouse of a sole 
applicant adoptive parent after the adoption has taken place will not, 
by virtue of that relationship, become a parent of the child.  
                                                 
38  See detailed discussion in relation to the Adoption Act 1955 later in this Chapter. 
39  I compiled this list by analysing the statutes held in the online database at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/default.aspx (Retrieved: 13 August 2009). I do not 
claim that the list is exhaustive, but suggest that it captures most of the statutes 
that have not been amended to include same-sex couples. Those statutes referred to 
in the main text are those that are perhaps more likely to remain of some 
consequence to same-sex partners. Some of the statutes identified may be of little 
consequence for same-sex partners and I have included these in this footnote only, 
merely to assist in pointing out that full compliance still has not been reached. These 
include: Cook Islands Act 1915 (relating to adoptions); Land Transfer Act 1952; 
Mortgagors and Lessees Rehabilitation Act 1936; Family Benefits (Home Ownership) 
Act 1964 s.16; Farm Ownership Savings Act 1974 s.5 and s.6; Fishing Vessel 
Ownership Savings Act 1977 s.6; Home Ownership Savings Act 1974 s.2; National 
Expenditure Adjustment Act 1932 s.42. 
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• Commerce Act 1986 s.106 – provides for the inadmissibility, in 
criminal proceedings against an individual or that individual‟s 
spouse, of evidence adduced for proceedings before the Commerce 
Commission.  
• Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 s.19 – provides for 
exemptions from certain taxes, duties, levies and fees for specified 
individuals and members of their family, with family defined as being 
spouse or any dependent children of the individual concerned. 
• Domicile Act 1976 s.5 – abolishes the „rule of domicile‟ whereby, 
upon marriage, the wife acquired her husband‟s domicile, and 
provides that every married person is capable of having an 
independent domicile. 
• Joint Family Homes Act 1964 s.12A – provides that where a husband 
and wife purchase a property as a joint family home and one of them 
dies within 6 months of purchase, the land may be transferred into 
the sole ownership of the surviving spouse. 
• Life Insurance Act 1908 s.67 – provides that a parent or guardian or 
both together, or a (separated) parent or guardian with their spouse, 
may take out a life insurance policy on the life of a minor child. 
 
Care of Children Act 2004 and Status of Children Act 
On 21 November 2004, the Guardianship Act 1968 was replaced with the 
new Care of Children Act 2004. The Guardianship Act was based on “a 
traditional nuclear family model that does not reflect the diversity of 
family arrangements that now exist in New Zealand”,40 and the need for 
new, more responsive, legislation was recognised. Key drivers for the new 
legislation were that: 
• legislation needed to ensure a stronger focus on the rights of 
children; 
                                                 
40  Ministry of Justice, “Briefing On The Care Of Children Bill”, (2003), 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2003/care-of-children/briefing.html 
(Retrieved: 7 January 2004). 
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• legislation needed to emphasise parental responsibilities rather than 
parental rights; however 
• legislation needed to ensure that all types of family arrangements are 
recognised and catered for; 
As a result, the new legislation brought in key changes to include same-
sex partners and families within the ambit of the Act. The changes, 
potentially, relate to situations where a child of one parent comes into a 
reconstituted family arrangement with that parent, or where a child is 
born to one partner during the same-sex relationship by way of assisted 
reproduction.   
 
Children brought to the relationship 
Under the Guardianship Act, where one partner to a same-sex 
relationship brings a child to that relationship, their former partner 
retained legal guardianship. This continues under the Care of Children 
Act.  
Under the Guardianship Act, the new partner of the birth parent needed 
to apply to the court to be appointed an additional guardian.41 This also 
continues under the Care of Children Act, however, there is a difference 
in the way in which these provisions are to be applied. Previously, courts 
were reluctant to acknowledge a same-sex partner to a parent of a child 
as an additional guardian. Essentially, in order to do this, the court 
required the consent of the former partner – which was not generally 
forthcoming. 
Previously, also, in order to gain a legal connection to the child as an 
additional guardian, the eligible partner had to apply to the court for, 
and be granted, additional guardianship. The granting of parental 
connection to the child therefore lay with the court‟s discretionary 
assessment of whether or not the best interests of the child would be 
served by granting additional guardianship to a same-sex partner.42 
                                                 
41  Guardianship Act 1968 s.8. 
42  Guardianship Act 1968 s.8. 
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While the former partner still retains guardianship rights under the Care 
of Children Act 2004 and has a right / responsibility to be involved in 
decisions relating to the welfare of the child,43 the new legislation also 
makes it clear that same-sex partners must not be excluded solely on the 
basis that they are of the same gender as the child‟s parent. 
The new legislation is quite clear that an “eligible partner” can be 
appointed as an additional guardian.44 It is also clear that a partner is an 
eligible partner of a parent if “the parent making the appointment shares 
responsibility for the child‟s day-to-day care, and has done so for not less 
than 1 year”.45 The legislation is also clear that a partner can be a partner 
of the same gender.46 Thus, a gay male partner of a male parent, or the 
lesbian female partner of a female parent can more easily become a 
guardian to a child who is brought to the relationship by his or her 
parent. 
Additionally, under the Care of Children Act 2004, a same-sex partner of 
a parent of a child is enabled to apply, as of right, for a parenting order in 
relation to their partner‟s child.47 This was not the case under the 
equivalent provision of the Guardianship Act 1968 under which the 
partner needed to apply to the Court for leave to apply for a custody 
order.48 This application as of right persists even if the same-sex partner 
is not a guardian of the child. 
                                                 
43  Guardianship Act 1968. 
44  Care of Children Act 2004 s. 23(1)(a). 
45  Care of Children Act 2004 s.23. Note that there are disqualifying criteria also, 
including: never having been involved in proceedings under the Care of Children Act 
2004 or the Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989; never been a 
respondent in Domestic Violence Proceedings; and never been convicted of and 
offence involving harm to a child. 
46  Care of Children Act 2004 s.8 and s.9: Section 8 provides that “a partner of a parent 
means a person who is not also a parent of the child but who shares responsibility 
for the child‟s day-to-day care with the parent and … is living or has lived with the 
parent as his or her de facto partner”; Section 9 provides that “a de facto relationship 
is a relationship between 2 persons (whether a man and a woman, or a man and a 
man, or a woman and a woman)”, in accordance with other prescribed criteria.   
47  Care of Children Act 2004 s.47(1)(c). Persons able to apply under this provision, as of 
right, include: (a) a parent of the child ; (b) a guardian of the child: (c) a spouse or 
partner of a parent of the child. Persons able to apply under this provision, with 
leave of the Court, include: (d) any other person who is a member of the child‟s 
family, whanau, or other culturally recognised family group; and (e) any other 
person. 
48  Guardianship Act 1968 s.11(1)(b). 
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Children born to the relationship 
Assisted reproductive technology means that a number of same-sex 
couples are now having children within their relationships. This is much 
more common with lesbian women who can conceive by way of donor 
insemination, than with gay men who, in order to have a biological child, 
must rely on surrogacy.  
Formerly, as the result of the interface of the Guardianship Act 1968, the 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995, and the Status of 
Children Act 1969, a male partner to a woman who conceived by artificial 
insemination (the male partner not being the sperm donor) could be 
named on the child‟s birth certificate and be a guardian to the child 
providing he was married to, or living in a marriage-like relationship 
with, the mother at the time of the birth of the child. In fact, his consent 
to the birth technology was presumed; he was legally the parent / 
guardian of the child unless he could rebut the presumption of his 
consent to the procedure. However, the female partner of the mother of 
children born to the relationship by artificial insemination was not 
presumed to be a parent or guardian of the child even if she had been 
living with the birth mother throughout the period from conception to 
birth and fully consented to the procedure.  
This meant that a birth mother‟s lesbian partner (as a co-caregiver and 
de facto custodial parent of a child) was considered legally to be in a 
position secondary to that of an absentee father (who may in some 
instances demonstrate no desire to be involved in the day-to-day care of 
the child) when it comes to decisions in relation to that child‟s up-
bringing. 
Under the Status of Children Act 1969 (as amended by the Status of 
Children Amendment Act 2004): 
• An ovum donor for a woman with whom she was not a partner at the 
time of conception is not, purely by virtue of a biological link, a 
guardian of the child whether or not the woman is in a relationship 
with another person;49 however 
                                                 
49  Status of Children Act 1969 s.19. 
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• the ovum donor becomes a guardian of the child if she subsequently 
becomes a partner to the child‟s mother.50 
• If the birth mother is in a de facto relationship with another woman 
at any time during her pregnancy, her de facto partner can become a 
guardian and parent of the child upon appointment by the birth-
mother.51 The de facto partner‟s name can be registered on the child‟s 
birth certificate.52  
• A sperm donor for a woman with whom he is not a partner at the 
time of conception is not, purely by virtue of a biological link, a 
guardian of the child whether or not the woman is in a relationship 
with another person;53 however 
• the sperm donor becomes a guardian of the child if he subsequently 
becomes a partner to the child‟s mother.54 
• If the woman is in a relationship with another man (not the sperm 
donor) at any time during her pregnancy, that man becomes a 
guardian and parent of the child, whether or not he is the genetic 
father of the child.55 The partner‟s name can be registered on the 
child‟s birth certificate as a parent.56 
Thus, the law has changed from recognising the donor biological father 
ahead of the birth mother‟s same-sex partner (if anyone is to be officially 
recognised), to recognising the partner of the birth mother rather than 
the sperm donor biological father. 
                                                 
50  Status of Children Act 1969 s.20. 
51  Care of Children Act 2004 s.23.  
52  Information on ability of a „de facto‟ same-sex step-parent to be registered on a 
child‟s birth certificate was provided by the Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages, 
Department of Internal Affairs by telephone conversation (Matthew) (19 January 
2006). 
53  Status of Children Act 1969 s.21. 
54  Status of Children Act 1969 s.22. 
55  Care of Children Act 2004 s.17. 
56  Status of Children Act 1969 s.18: When a woman in a relationship with a male 
partner becomes pregnant as a result of an AHR procedure, and the semen used for 
the procedure was produced by a man who is not the woman‟s partner, and 
the woman has undergone the procedure with her partner's consent, the woman‟s 
partner is, for all purposes, a parent of any child of the pregnancy.  
 Status of Children Act 1969 s.27: The consent of the birth mother‟s partner is 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
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It should be noted that the key difference that remains is that the Care of 
Children Act 2004 does not enable a same-sex partner of a birth mother 
to automatically become a guardian of the child upon its birth (although 
the birth mother has the ability as a sole parent, to appoint her partner 
as an additional guardian), whereas a different-sex partner of the birth 
mother automatically becomes a guardian so long as he has been living 
in a relationship with her for all or part of the period between conception 
and birth.  
 
Summary 
These changes from the provisions under the now repealed Guardianship 
Act 1968 to the current Care of Children Act 2004, while similar with 
regard to most of their procedural requirements, signify a move away 
from the former adherence to the nuclear family structure, either directly 
or by implication, and greater recognition of alternative family forms. In 
the main, the provisions cater for a similar degree of acknowledgement 
and recognition for same-sex families as compared with different-sex 
families. Generally, the provisions reflect the reality of the family as 
constituted through birth or through alternative reproductive technology, 
rather than adhering to, or giving prominence to, birth relationships 
ahead of functional relationships.   
 
Surrogacy 
The potential for becoming a parent by way of surrogacy also creates its 
own complications. Surrogacy is an informal arrangement and is not 
enforceable under New Zealand law. Rather, the relationship of the birth-
mother and the intended parents to the child is established by way of 
guardianship or adoption. Whether or not the surrogate birth-mother is a 
genetic parent to the child to whom she gives birth is inconsequential to 
her status as a legal parent of the child. She will be a legal parent and 
guardian of the child until such time as that relationship is formally and 
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legally severed. The legal possibilities for the intended family are as 
follows:57 
• If they are a married couple, they may adopt the child, in which case 
the birth-mother will cease to be a legal parent of the child. 
• If they are a female same-sex (lesbian) couple, subject to the 
agreement of the birth partner and the approval of the Family Court, 
either: 
- both partners could be granted additional guardianship and 
parenting orders; or 
- one partner could adopt and the other partner could become an 
additional guardian. 
• If they are a male same-sex (gay) couple, and if the child is a boy, 
subject to the agreement of the birth partner and the approval of the 
Family Court, either: 
- both partners could be granted additional guardianship and 
parenting orders; or 
- one partner could adopt and the other partner could become an 
additional guardian. 
While the Status of Children Act 2004 provides mechanisms for the legal 
parenting arrangements where one partner to a relationship is the birth 
mother by donor, parenting by surrogacy again relies on the Adoption Act 
1955 and / or the Care of Children Act 2004 (or, alternatively, the 
Children, Young persons and Their Families Act 1989 which contains 
provisions relating to guardianship). 
 
                                                 
57  Information from: Ministry of Social Development, and Whitireia Community Law 
Centre, “About Us: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and the Law in New Zealand” 
(October 2008), 
 http://www.communitylaw.org.nz/fileadmin/documents/About_Us_27Aug08V2.pdf 
(Retrieved: 22 August 2009); and with reference to the Adoption Act 1955, Status of 
Children Act 2004, Care of Children Act 2004, and Children, Young Persons and 
Their Families Act 1989. 
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Regaining Momentum? 
Hate crimes legislation 
On 1 May 2001, Parliament passed the Sentencing Act 2002. The Act 
introduced hate crimes legislation into New Zealand for the first time. 
Prior to the passing of this legislation, the closest New Zealand had to 
hate crimes legislation was the Harassment Act 1997, and the inclusion 
in the Human Rights Act 993 s.131 of provisions such as those relating 
to the incitement of racial disharmony. 
Under the new legislation, the fact that a crime is deemed to be a hate 
crime can act as an aggravating factor in relation to sentencing. Section 
9(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides: 
In sentencing or otherwise dealing with an offender the court must take into 
account the following aggravating factors to the extent that they are 
applicable in the case: … 
(h)  that the offender committed the offence partly or wholly because of 
hostility towards a group of persons who have an enduring common 
characteristic such as race, colour, nationality, religion, gender identity, 
sexual orientation, age, or disability; and 
(i)  the hostility is because of the common characteristic; and 
(ii)  the offender believed that the victim has that characteristic: 
Hate crimes are essentially crimes against an individual that are 
motivated by a hatred towards a group to which the individual belongs, 
or is thought to belong. A hate crime, therefore, is an attack on the 
individual and the individual‟s identity. It is more than just a physical 
attack, and is a “message” crime, designed to instil fear into the victim 
by:58 
sending a message to members of a given group that they are unwelcome 
and unsafe in a particular neighbourhood, community, school, workplace, or 
other environment. 
                                                 
58  American Psychological Association, “The Psychology Of Hate Crimes” (2009), 
http://www.apa.org/ppo/pi/hate-crimes-faq.pdf (Retrieved: 19 August 2009). 
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Gays and Lesbians are still facing issues as individuals, couples and 
communities in New Zealand society. The place of gays and lesbians 
today society can be gauged in different ways, depending on the 
questions asked. 
 
The fantasy 
If asked about whether or not they believe that, during their lifetimes, 
social attitudes have changed positively towards homosexuality and 
towards gays as persons, most gay men would probably have to answer 
in the affirmative. This would be more likely be true of older gay men – 
especially those who remember the pre law reform days. I have had 
conversations with gay men who have recounted stories, when 
homosexual acts between consenting male adults were still criminal acts, 
about being asleep with their partner in their home and being awoken by 
a knock on the door. One partner might answer the door to find a 
policeman standing there asking whether any disturbance had been 
overheard from the house next door which had been broken into. For the 
person answering the door, the immediate fear would be the possibility of 
the police discovering the presence of a male partner in his bed. Once the 
door is closed, there might be a big sigh of relief, and the resolution to be 
even more secretive about the relationship. 
In this sense, clearly things have improved. In most instances, providing 
we live quiet lives behind our garden fences, society is not really 
interested in what happens in our private lives. 
 
The reality 
However, another way of assessing the extent to which things have 
„improved‟ for gays in New Zealand is to consider the worst case scenario. 
That is, gays and lesbians either being killed or subjected to serious 
violence because of their sexual orientation. Such an assessment paints 
quite a different picture. However much the “improvements”, we still have 
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the reality of gay men being attacked and killed for no reason other than 
their sexuality.  
There have been sufficient examples in recent years for us to know that 
New Zealand is not safe – that homophobia is alive and well (and 
sometimes legitimised by juries and judges):59 
• Jeff Whittington, aged 14 years, killed in Wellington (May 1999). 
Whittington‟s two attackers assaulted him by punching and kicking 
him, causing severe facial and head injuries, and abdominal injuries 
causing a perforated bowel. Boot marks were found on his skulls 
after one of the attackers had jumped on his head. The attackers 
later declared that they had “fucked up a faggot and left him for 
dead” and that “The faggot was bleeding out of places I have never 
seen before”. The attackers sought manslaughter verdicts, based in a 
homosexual panic defence, but were convicted of murder and, in 
December 1999, were sentenced to life imprisonment.  
• Peter Kitchen killed in Napier (April 2001). Kitchen and a friend were 
attacked by three young men (aged about 20). Kitchen later died in 
hospital. The attackers were heard saying “Let‟s fuck these gay guys 
up”. In May 2002, one of the attackers received a prison sentence of 
three and a half years. The other two attackers received a sentence of 
1 year each in prison. 
• Jason Johnson killed at Whakamaru (July 2001). Johnson had been 
“killed in an extremely violent attack” and his body subsequently 
found submerged in Lake Whakamaru near Mangakino. His 
convicted killer did plead the homosexual panic defence but, in June 
2002, was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. 
• Colin Hart killed in Mangere (October 2003). Hart‟s attacker stabbed 
him repeatedly. After successfully pleading the homosexual panic 
defence the attacker was convicted of manslaughter rather than 
murder and, in August 2004, was sentenced to three years‟ 
imprisonment. 
                                                 
59  Information from: Bennachie, Calum, “Anti-Gay Hate Crimes 1990-2001” 
(www.gaynz.com/archives/hate_crimes.asp) (Retrieved: 10 July 2004); and Sensible 
Sentencing Website (www.safe-nz.org.nz/Data/vodb.htm) (Retrieved: 10 July 2004). 
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• David McNee killed in Auckland (July 2003). McNee‟s attacker had 
hit him in the head up to 50 times, and left him to die. After pleading 
the homosexual panic defence, the attacker was found not guilty of 
murder but of manslaughter and, in September 2004, was sentenced 
to 9 years in prison (with a minimum term of 4½ years); 
• James Bamborough killed on the West Coast of the South Island 
(1999). Bamborough‟s attackers took him by car from Westport to the 
Buller River. One of the attackers dragged him from the car into the 
river, held him under the water and strangled him. The two 
attackers, self-confessed white supremacists, despised non-whites 
and homosexuals. Before the attack, the men had been overheard 
saying they were going to get Bamborough because they didn‟t like 
„faggots‟, and afterwards one of the attackers (McKenzie) joked about 
having “killed a faggot”. Bamborough was described to the Court as a 
„flamboyant homosexual‟. In June 2005, the two men were sentenced 
to life imprisonment. 
• Robert Hunt killed in Auckland (July 2004). His attacker held him by 
the throat and stabbed him 42 times. The attacker attempted to use 
the homosexual panic offence but evidence showed that he had 
visited Hunt numerous times for sex. He had a history of engaging in 
sexual encounters for money and, on this occasion, had left the 
scene taking money and his victim‟s car. He was found guilty of 
murder and, in October 2005, was sentenced to prison for a 
minimum of 17 years. 
• Robert Greene murdered in Kaikohe (August 2004). The dairy farmer, 
who worked for Greene, said that he had put up with sexual 
advances from Greene for years but, on the day of the killing he had 
woken up to find Greene in his bed with him, naked from the waist 
down. The jury denied the homosexual panic defence and, in October 
2005, the attacker was sentenced to 17 years non-parole 
imprisonment for murder. 
• Stanley Waipouri killed in Palmerston North (22 December 2006). On 
22 July 2008, a High Court jury in Palmerston North found Andre 
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Gilling, aged 18, guilty of the murder of Stanley Waipouri. Another 
youth, Ashley Arnopp, had already pleaded guilty to the murder. The 
victim, a gay man aged 39, died from head and neck injuries after 
being kicked, punched and stomped to death for over an hour. The 
tip of his penis and an earlobe were also missing. A close friend of the 
victim said that it had been hard listening to the indignities his friend 
had suffered, and: “If people want the definition of hate, read about 
the death of Stanley Waipouri”.60 
• Ronald Brown killed in Auckland (December 2007). The victim had 
been assaulted and had a large blood clot inside the left side of his 
skull, a 6cm laceration on the top of the skull, a 3cm laceration 
above the left eye and an 8cm neck wound. The wounds were 
consistent with being hit with a blunt instrument "with considerable 
force”. The victim died two days after the attack when his life support 
was switched off. On 9 July 2009, Ferdinand Ambach, 32, was found 
not guilty of murdering Ronald Brown, 69, but guilty of 
manslaughter. Ambach used provocation as a defence, saying that 
Brown came close to him and touched his thigh and fondled him. 
Giving such detail in these examples may appear somewhat sensational, 
but they, and the fear of serious assault, do constitute part of the reality 
of what it is to be a gay man, or even to be perceived to be a gay man, 
living in New Zealand today. It should be noted that all of the killings 
listed above have happened in a „tolerant‟ New Zealand within the period 
of the last 10 years.61  
Unfortunately, when these homicides have come before the Police and the 
courts, the response has often been to refuse to believe that the homicide 
is linked to the fact or perception that the victim is gay,62 or to imply that 
                                                 
60  The Dominion-Post, “Family Relief As Teen Found Guilty Of Murder”: 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/544390 (Retrieved: 22 July 2008). 
61  It should also be noted that the list is non-exhaustive in that it does not include 
every homicide resulting from a hate-motivated attack in New Zealand during this 
time.   
62  As was the case with the Whittington murder, with the family and the Police not 
acknowledging in the early stages of the investigation that Whittington was gay or 
that he was attacked because he was gay, or even that he was attacked because he 
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that the victim somehow brought the attack on himself.63 In many 
instances the attacker pleads the “homosexual panic defence” 64 as 
means of “excusing” himself from some of the blame.65  
It must be remembered also that, while the examples above may 
represent the extreme cases (because they have resulted in death to the 
victims), there is evidence that there are many other attacks on gays and 
lesbians, physical or non-physical, reported or unreported, which result 
in non-fatal injury or trauma to the victim.66 These other less sensational 
and less visible examples of how society acts towards gays occur with a 
much greater frequency and affect a greater number of people. Many of 
these examples remain less visible because they are perceived to be less 
significant in their impact on the individual. Many remain totally 
invisible, because the individuals affected do not take action, either 
because they are not “out” and do not want to be doubly victimised by 
homophobic reactions when their friends and families discover that they 
are gay or because they do not feel assured that they will get a favourable 
response from investigating authorities. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
was perceived by his attackers to be gay. 
63  As was the case in the Johnson murder, Johnson being described by the Police as a 
“known and promiscuous homosexual”. 
64  “Homosexual Panic Defence” is the term used when a heterosexual male attacker 
claims that he attacked his victim because the victim made homosexual advances 
towards him. The defence is one that suggests that the attacker was provoked by the 
homosexual advance and therefore has a defence for the attack. It also serves to 
redefine the attacker as the victim and the victim as the attacker. 
65  As was the case in the David McNee homicide, where Philip Edwards was found 
guilty of manslaughter rather than murder because he pleaded the homosexual 
panic defence. It is interesting to note that the defendants in more recent cases 
appear to have been unsuccessful in pleading the homosexual panic defence. While 
the hate crime provisions included in the Sentencing Act 2002 may have an indirect 
influence on perceptions towards hate motivated crime, the level of impact remains 
to be seen. 
66  For example, Inside-OUT, “A Report on the Experiences of Lesbians, Gays and 
Bisexuals in America and the Public‟s Views on Issues and Policies Related to Sexual 
Orientation”, (c.2002), found that of the gay, lesbian and bisexual participants, 
“About one third (32%) say they have been the target of physical violence, either 
against their person or property, because someone believed they were gay or 
lesbian”; and “More than one third (39%) report being “very” or “somewhat” worried 
that they may be physically assaulted or beaten by someone who does not like gay 
people”. 
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The messages 
In general, there is good purpose to be served by hate crimes legislation. 
There is a need to establish tolerance levels, and this is one way of doing 
that:67 
Most of us agree that hate crimes represent the point at which we want the 
law to say „we simply will not tolerate this kind of behaviour‟. At this point, 
it is important for the court to send a real message on fundamental values. 
There is a different moral quality and a different risk to society which we 
should be reflecting. 
I have no desire, therefore, to suggest that this legislation is not 
worthwhile, or does not have a role to play. It is important to send a 
message that there is a zero tolerance for hate-motivated crime.  
However, hate crimes legislation, by its very definition, is reactive in 
character. It is about taking action against a person in relation to an 
event that has already happened – the “ambulance at the bottom of the 
cliff”. It is about what action we can take if all else has failed – if the 
messages that we have attempted to impart (or should be imparting) have 
failed and, as a result, some persons choose to act contrary to the 
principles of respect and concern for the dignity of their fellow citizens. 
However, it is of little direct and immediate benefit to a victim of such a 
crime that the perpetrator has been punished more severely than might 
have been the case if it were not a hate crime.68 Such legislation is of little 
assistance to the victim of a gay-bashing unless it provides a remedy in 
relation to any disadvantage suffered by the victim, or it causes the 
victim to feel that the crime has been dealt to appropriately and 
satisfactorily. Of course, if the victim suffers permanent physical or 
                                                 
67  Justice and Electoral Select Committee “Report On The Sentencing And Parole 
Reform Bill”. 
68  This in the same way that a law against murder is of very little use to the person who 
has been killed; or a law against assault, or grievous bodily harm, is of limited use to 
the person who is severely disabled, physically or mentally, from an attack; or a law 
against harassment is of limited use to a victim of harassment if that person‟s self-
esteem has been shattered to the extent that they are not able to function properly in 
the work-place. Domestic violence protections are of little use to partners in gay or 
lesbian relationships if the Police and the courts are not able to recognise when that 
law should be applied and how to apply it in an even-handed and meaningful way. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009  Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 
 410  
 
psychological injury, or even death, hate crimes legislation can never 
produce a result that will satisfactorily remedy the situation. In this 
sense, hate crimes legislation is absolutely not enough. 
Surely, it is more sensible and more beneficial to all concerned to create 
a climate of acceptance in the expectation and hope that the hate crime 
will not be committed in the first place. That is, it is about much more 
than being reactive and having the right legislation in place to deal with 
the aftermath of abuse. It is about being proactive and making good use 
of the tools available to us to change the perceptions behind those victim 
crimes. It is about working proactively to remove the need for victims to 
report offences against themselves by preventing the offences from 
happening in the first place. 
In the context of this thesis, it is not just about: 
• ensuring that appropriate information is readily available to those 
who might need it about protections that are available; 
• ensuring that appropriate information is readily available about how 
to access and employ those protections pre-emptively to prevent 
threats from being realised; and 
• ensuring that support and enforcement agencies are not only free 
from homophobia but are perceived to be so by members of the gay 
and lesbian communities. 
It is also about sending the right messages to society at large about 
acceptance of diversity and difference, and respect for fellow citizens. In 
relation to the treatment of gays and lesbians under New Zealand law, 
and again in the context of this thesis, it is about conveying the message 
that gays and lesbians as individuals and in their relationship, must be 
treated with equal dignity and respect. Parliament, by virtue of the 
legislation it passes, and by virtue of the legislation it does not pass, is 
conveying particular messages to the New Zealand and international 
communities. 
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On the one hand, Parliament is telling society that: 
• it is not okay for individuals in New Zealand society to treat gays and 
lesbians less favourably than others on the basis of their actual or 
perceived sexual orientation; and 
• it is prepared to punish more severely those who do demonstrate a 
lack of respect towards gays and lesbians through the perpetration of 
crimes against them.  
But, on the other hand, Parliament is telling society that: 
• despite the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.19, it is legitimate 
for Parliament to continue to treat gays and lesbians less favourably 
by denying full and equal relationship recognition through marriage 
for committed same-sex relationships; and 
• it is prepared to declare gays and lesbians less worthy of equal 
recognition and respect than their heterosexual counterparts by 
denying full and equal relationship recognition through marriage. 
Parliament is saying “we care about the way gays and lesbians are 
treated”, but we only care to the extent that we will grant them an 
inferior and discriminatory form of recognition through civil unions. A 
classic case of “do as I say, not as I do”. 
 
The Adoption Act 1955 
The changes to the Care of Children Act 2004 are of obvious benefit to 
lesbian parents, and their partners and children, in those situations 
where one partner brings a child to the relationship, or where one 
partner has a child by way of assisted reproduction. The Act also benefits 
gay men and their partners and children, where one partner brings a 
child to the relationship. The Care of Children Act 2004 along with the 
Status of Children Act also enables better legal relationships between 
male same-sex parents where a child is born to their relationship as a 
result of a surrogacy arrangement. 
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Another potential option for gay male partners who wish to have children 
and currently, obviously, cannot biologically have children of their own is 
the adoption of children.69 However, adoption legislation in New Zealand 
has not undergone the same evolution as has the Care of Children Act 
2004. 
In summary, the Adoption Act 1955 provides: 
• that joint applications for adoption can be made by spouses only 70 – 
with the term spouse currently being interpreted to mean married 
partners only;71 
• for sole applications, in specified circumstances 72 - one of the 
specified circumstances being that a sole applicant who is male may 
only adopt a male child.73 
The Adoption Act 1955 does not provide for second-parent adoption. If 
adoption is decided in favour of joint applicants or a sole applicant, the 
result is the severance of all legal ties with previous legal parents. No 
person may become an adoptive parent in addition to an existing 
parent.74 
For a period of time, the Family Court did extend the term “spouse” to 
include different-sex de facto partners on two occasions.75 Subsequently, 
however, the Family Court has retracted the inclusion of different-sex de 
facto couples within the term “spouse”.76 These later decisions were post 
the Quilter same-sex marriage case, but neither Judge cited the Quilter 
case as influencing their interpretation of “spouse”.  
                                                 
69  Although this may change in the future. Scientists have discovered a method of 
creating an embryo using the DNA from two parents of the same gender. In the case 
of an embryo created from the DNA of two males, of course, a surrogate mother 
would still be required: The Guardian, “Embryo From Same-Sex Parents Tested” (10 
September 2006).  
70  Adoption Act 1955 s.2 and s.3. 
71  However, see discussion on recent development on this later in this section. 
72  Adoption Act 1955 s.4. 
73  Adoption Act 1955 s.4(2). 
74  Adoption Act 1955 s.16. 
75  Re Adoption by Paul and Hauraki [1993] NZFLR 266; and In the Matter of J 
(Adoption) [1998] NZFLR 961. 
76  In the Matter of R [1999], and Re D (Adoption) [2000] NZFLR 529. 
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In 2000, the Complaints Review Tribunal (now known as the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal) held that only married couples could jointly 
adopt a child.77 At that time, because of Human Rights Act s.151, the 
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make a finding of unlawful 
discrimination, it stated that this provision “discriminates against other 
prospective joint applicants for adoption orders who are not married to 
each other”.78 
The Adoption Act 1995 was not included within the range of statutes 
amended by the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005. It has 
been stated that:79 
It is surprising that neither the Civil Union Act 2004, nor the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2005 amends s.3 Adoption Act to allow couples 
who have  entered a civil union to jointly adopt a child. The General Policy 
Statement which prefaces the latter Bill states that “As a result of the Bill, 
the same legal rights and responsibilities will apply to married, de facto 
(whether opposite or same sex, and civil union relationships”. In relation to 
eligibility to adopt a child this does not state the correct position. 
On the one hand, this exclusion from the Relationships (Statutory 
References) Act 2005 is seen as entirely appropriate. Proposals such as 
the inclusion of same-sex couples within the Adoption Act constitute a 
significant shift in public policy, and should rightly be subject to 
substantive consideration in their own right. It would generally not be 
seen as appropriate to make such changes by way of consequential 
amendment through other legislation. 
The cumulative effect of the above is that de facto couples (whether of the 
same or different sex) are not able to jointly adopt children. It is possible 
for one partner to adopt a child and for the other partner to obtain a legal 
                                                 
77  Black v A-G (2000) 6 HRNZ 257. 
78  Crown Law Office opinion ATT114/1196(50);JUS043/530 (3 September 2004), in 
relation to a complaint to the Human Rights Commission: para.10. 
79  Brookers Online, (Eds), “Adoption by Same-Sex Partners”, in section PA2.6 of Child 
Law: Principles of Adoption, a Brookers Online publication of Family Law principles, 
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz/databases/modus/family/childlaw/DISC-
CHILD!41~GRP1.PA2?si=57359&sid=65i7lhb65ux2374bejjmdp3ohe2a3pgi&hli=0&s
p=childlaw&p=4 (Retrieved: 8 May 2009). 
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relationship through guardianship but not for both partners to adopt 
jointly. 
It has been accepted by the Ministry of Justice that the inability of same-
sex couples to make a joint application for adoption constitutes prima 
facie discrimination:80  
The Ministry acknowledges that if the term "spouse" is interpreted … to 
exclude de facto couples from jointly adopting a child, then this raises a 
prima facie issues of discrimination on the ground of marital status and 
indirect discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. 
The Crown Law Office also reported that the Ministry of Justice:81 
… accepts that restricting people from being eligible to adopt solely on the 
basis of their relationship status does raise prima facie issues of 
discrimination under the Human Rights Act 1993 and s.19 BORA. In the 
Ministry‟s view the appropriate ground is marital status (section 21(1)(l)(iii) 
of the Human Rights Act)”. 
And, in relation to the requirement that joint adoptions be made only by 
spouses, the Crown Law Office said:82 
… what is clear is that the most current interpretation of the provisions is 
one that has an arguable discriminatory effect. 
In light of these restrictions applying to de facto couples (different- and 
same sex) with regard to adoption, and in light of legislative prohibitions 
against discrimination on the ground of sex (gender), sexual orientation 
and marital status, it has also been stated that the fact that there is:83  
… an urgent need  for statutory reform. … The law is in an unsatisfactory 
state and the uncertainty places same-sex partners in a difficult position. 
                                                 
80  Crown Law Office opinion ATT114/1196(50); JUS043/530 (3 September 2004), in 
relation to a complaint to the Human Rights Commission: para.21. 
81 Crown Law Office opinion ATT114/1196(50); JUS043/530 (3 September 2004), in 
relation to a complaint to the Human Rights Commission, para.16. 
82  Crown Law Office opinion ATT114/1196(50); JUS043/530 (3 September 2004), in 
relation to a complaint to the Human Rights Commission, para.15.  
83  Discriminatory Nature of Bar on Applications by Same-Sex Partners”, section 
PA2.6.02 of Child Law: Principles of Adoption, an on-line publication of Family Law 
principles. 
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Options for reform 
In its September 2000 Report, the Law Commission recommended that 
there should be no generic (arbitrary) restriction on the basis of sexual 
orientation, gender (sex) or marital status, in terms of who can apply to 
adopt a child. It was the view of the Commission that the important 
component of the process should be the assessment of the suitability of 
the applicant(s) based on the best interests of the child(ren).84  
The Law Commission accordingly posited that there are essentially two 
main considerations in relation to adoption law, these being eligibility 
and suitability. The Commission contended that there is no justifiable 
impediment to eligibility for adoption of children by de facto opposite-sex 
couples or by same-sex couples. The courts should be free to decide on 
the basis of the best interests of the child(ren) concerned, whether or not 
the particular applicant parents for adoption of a child are seen to be 
suitable prospective parents. The sexual orientation of a prospective 
parent should not be considered an issue of suitability. 
Subsequently, the Government Administration Select Committee held an 
inquiry into adoption laws. The Committee, however, was unable to reach 
a decision on which direction adoption law in New Zealand should take. 
The Committee tabled its 1½-page Report in Parliament, stating:85 
While the committee conducted this inquiry into New Zealand‟s adoption 
laws, and spent time considering the issues raised by submitters, it is 
unable to provide the House with a substantive final report, which details 
the committee‟ considerations and conclusions. 
It was hoped that further work would be undertaken with a view to 
reviewing the Adoption Act 1955 but, in September 2005, the Ministry of 
                                                 
84  New Zealand Law Commission, “Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach 
and a New Framework”, NZLC R65 (September 2000): paras.350-360. 
85  “Inquiry Into New Zealand‟s Adoption Laws”, the Report of the Government 
Administration Committee (August 2001): 2. 
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Justice stated that, subsequent to the inclusive report of the Select 
Committee:86 
• an officials working group, led by the Ministry of Justice, was 
established to consider adoption law reform; 
• to date, no Cabinet decisions have been made in relation to adoption 
laws; 
• a review of the Adoption Act was not on the Ministry of Justice work 
programme for 2005/06; and 
• no decisions had been made on whether a review of the Adoption act 
will be undertaken at any specific future time. 
In the absence of any policy or legislative change, the onus therefore falls 
to same-sex couples who wish to see this matter progressed, to allocate 
their time and energy to the issue. 
 
A recent development 
On 5 November 2007, a judgment was issued, from the Family Court in 
Christchurch, relating to an application by a de facto (different-sex) 
couple seeking to adopt a child born as a result of in vitro fertilisation 
and surrogacy.87 Both applicants were the biological parents of the baby. 
Walsh J held that, in this case, the couple were permitted to adopt jointly 
as spouses. 
He based this decision on the fact that the term „spouse‟ is not expressly 
defined in the Act, and that the definition of the term „spouse‟ had not 
been expressly settled upon by the courts: 
• From about 1993, it was judicially accepted that the term „spouse‟ 
was not defined in the Adoption Act 1955 and that, on the basis that 
such a definition was not expressly excluded, „spouse‟ could mean a 
de facto partner.88  
                                                 
86  Letter from Ministry of Justice to Nigel Christie (21 September 2005). 
87  In the matter of C [Adoption] [2008] NZFLR 141(Judge Walsh). 
88  Adoption by Paul and Hauraki [1993] NZFLR 266 (Judge Boshier); Re T W [Adoption] 
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• Conversely, in a judgment issued on 24 November Judge Inglis held 
that, in s.7(2)(b) of the Act, the term „spouse‟ can only mean a 
husband or wife in a marriage stating.89 
The matter has never been considered on appeal to the High Court, and 
Judge Walsh therefore considered that:90 
The situation therefore is that the authorities are divided as to whether 
„spouse‟ in the Adoption Act 1955, includes couples living in a relationship 
in the nature of marriage or is limited to married couples. 
Judge Walsh also considered: 
• the fact that the Adoption Act 1955 is outdated;91 
• calls for reform from the Law Commission, in particular;92 and 
• the effect of human rights laws.93 
In the final analysis, Judge Walsh held that the de facto couple in this 
case were permitted to adopt jointly as „spouses‟. He did, however, point 
out that the circumstances of this case were unique in that, while there 
had been a surrogacy arrangement, the couple seeking to adopt the child 
were both the child‟s genetic parents.  
It should be noted that this case was not been appealed.94 This case does 
open the possibility of joint applications for adoption being filed by de 
                                                                                                                                     
(1998) 17 FRNZ 349 (Judge von Dadelszen). 
89  In the matter of R [Adoption] [1998] NZFLR 145: 149: “The persons whose consents 
to any such order in respect of any child are required as aforesaid, unless they are 
dispensed with by the Court under section 8 of this Act, shall be … [t]he spouse of 
the applicant in any case where the application is made by either a husband or a 
wife alone”. 
90  In the matter of C [Adoption] [2008] NZFLR 141(Judge Walsh): 146. 
91  Judge Walsh cites the fact that “since 1979 there have been at least six reviews of 
adoption laws” but none of these have resulted in significant reform: In the matter of 
C [Adoption] [2008] NZFLR 141(Judge Walsh): 149. 
92  Law Commission, “Adoption And Its Alternatives: A Different Approach And A New 
Framework”, NZLC R65 (September 2000): Through points made by the Law 
Commission, in particular, Judge Walsh suggests that the Act does not respond to 
current requirements of different family types and matters such as artificial birth 
technology 
93  Referring to the Human Rights Act 1993, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child to support his view 
that the Adoption Act 1955 can, and should, be interpreted to include de facto 
couples as spouses. 
94  The time period within which an appeal must be lodged is now well passed. 
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facto couples – whether different- or same-sex. The issue then would 
become whether or not the agreement of the court rests on a generally 
inclusive interpretation of the term „spouse‟ in the Adoption Act 1955, or 
whether the court would require a „special circumstance‟,95 to exist before 
allowing such an interpretation. A matter yet to be tested.  
 
Civil Unions and Statutory References 
A Civil Union Bill 
In late 2000, Tim Barnett, a Member of Parliament for the governing 
Labour Party, formed a committee to consider a proposal for the 
recognition of same-sex relationships. I was a member of what was to 
become known as the „Civil Union Bill‟ or CUB Committee. 
Initially, the Committee considered the possibility of progressing in 
tandem, a proposal for legislation to provide for civil unions, and a 
proposal to provide for amendment to the Marriage Act 1955 to include 
same-sex couples. 
As the work of the Committee progressed, however, any intention to 
amend the Marriage Act faded, and the focus of attention became the 
drafting of a Civil Union Bill.  
In April 2001, I formally resigned from the CUB Committee, stating to the 
Committee:96 
If there is a place for civil union legislation for same-sex and different-sex 
couples, it can only be as an additional alternative to marriage (the exercise 
of choice being with the couples themselves). I do not believe that civil 
unions should be introduced with the cost of denying equality under the law 
for same-sex couples (entitlement and status)  – and perhaps even at the 
risk of cementing inequality under the law for same-sex couples (entitlement 
and status). … I continue to have a great deal of difficulty in working 
towards a regime which would continue to tell me, my partner, and other 
                                                 
95  Such as the genetic parentage in In the matter of C considered by Judge Walsh, or 
cultural imperatives as considered by Judge Boshier in Adoption by Paul and 
Hauraki. 
96  Letter of resignation from Nigel Christie to the CUB Committee (11 April 2001). 
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persons with whom I interact on a daily basis, that my relationship and 
those of other same-sex couples are not as valid as those of different-sex 
couples. 
For this reason, I wish to … withdraw from further participation in the work 
towards a Civil Union Bill in New Zealand. 
Tim Barnett MP, however, remained adamant that the work being 
undertaken towards civil unions was not indicative of a lack of his, or the 
Labour Government‟s support for same-sex marriage. Civil unions were 
on the agenda of the Labour party in the shorter term because they were 
„politically‟ achievable. However, in early 2005, Mr Barnett wrote a 
column for a gay news magazine and expressed what seems to be a clear 
view that the achievement of civil unions would mean the essential 
attainment of equality:97  
What will be left to do? 
Accepting that the aim is equal rights, what will be left after the second bill 
goes through are a series of laws which are currently being reformed (or on 
which reviews are being undertaken). They include guardianship (in the 
Care of Children Bill, which should be law by the end of this year); adoption 
(a bill is being worked on) and some minor areas. Most should be dealt with 
for good by General Election 2005. The only other matter which might lead 
to law change is that of hate speech / vilification, which is being looked at 
by the Ministry of Justice following real uncertainty about what the current 
law was intended to do, and how it should best be enforced. 
After all that comes, in a sense, the harder job, making sure that 
Government agencies and others in society do their duty in delivering on the 
promises in our laws. That is the task of a lifetime. We all have a role in 
that. 
I now want to throw a question back to you. What will you answer when a 
friend asks you in a few years time: 
“And what did you do in the fight for equal rights – the Civil Union Bill? 
                                                 
97  “Big Events In Parliament”, Tim Barnett, Out!, Issue 181 (June-July 2004). Note 
that, although Mr Barnett reports that an Adoption Amendment Bill was being 
worked on, this work did not lead to any legislative amendment. 
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I want you to be able to say: 
“I did my bit. I wrote to my MP and I helped out with the campaign”. 
This is an historic campaign and the struggle will be hard. Keen to do your 
bit? 
In 2004, the Government introduced to the House, its Civil Union Bill. 
The Bill provided for the legal status of civil union (or registered 
partnerships) and it was intended to provide the same, or as equal as 
possible to the same, legal entitlements that marriage provides. 
Apart from the substantive issues raised and discussed at length 
previously, the lead up to and debate on the Civil Union Bill raised some 
additional specific process concerns for me. 
First, I have stated previously that I believe the publicity for the Civil 
Union Bill was misleading. I must say, it was very clever of the advocates 
of the Bill to garner support by persuading sufficient numbers of gays 
and lesbians (in particular) that the legislation would provide them with 
equality with those who marry while also persuading sufficient numbers 
of potential detractors that marriage would remain untouched. The Civil 
Union Committee stated in its supporting material that:98 
The starting point and fundamental framework for the proposed Civil Union 
Bill is the principle of equal treatment as expressed by Justice Thomas in 
the Court of Appeal decision on same-sex marriage. 
However, the bottom line is that the Civil Union Act 2004 (coupled with 
the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005) does not provide 
same-sex couples or other couples who enter into a civil union, with the 
same legal entitlements or the same status as those who marry. Civil 
unions are therefore not equal to marriage. 
Second, it was stated that there was insufficient demand (in fact it was 
said that there was no demand) amongst gays and lesbians for same-sex 
marriage, but that many gays and lesbians preferred the option of civil 
unions. Leaving aside the vexed issue of whether or not it is possible to 
                                                 
98  Information prepared by Civil Union Committee, April 2001. 
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choose not to marry if marriage is not a choice,99 it is simply neither 
correct nor appropriate to state that there is insufficient demand for 
marriage. To suggest this is: 
• to fail to recognise that compliance with human rights standards is 
not a matter of numbers – the very purpose of human rights is to 
protect minorities from discrimination regardless of influence; 
• to fail to recognise that this is not an „either / or‟ situation – human 
rights principles dictate that a preference by some for civil unions 
does not mandate registration over marriage but rather that whatever 
forms of legal recognition is available for different-sex couples must 
also be available for same-sex couples; and 
• to ignore those of the gay and lesbian community who have presented 
themselves in our courts to seek access to marriage, and who have 
provided funding for various projects related to the same-sex 
marriage issue. 
Third, there has been no comprehensive survey undertaken in New 
Zealand to establish the numbers of gays and lesbians who would prefer 
to register their relationships by way of civil unions rather than to marry.  
The Civil Union Committee (an ad hoc consultative committee working 
with an individual Member of Parliament) conducted its own “survey”. 
This survey was, I would suggest, far from robust. Publicity on the Civil 
Union web-page indicated that the Committee had received 75 group 
responses, representing over 2,200 people. In order to attain this level of 
support, they drew the assumption that where a group indicated its 
agreement to the notion of civil unions in preference to marriage, 100% of 
the members of each group had agreed. This is an unreasonable 
assumption to make.  
It was also stated that: “Despite problems in how people answered the 
„ranking‟ question, we recorded a 57% preference for civil unions before 
                                                 
99  See earlier discussion in Chapter 3. 
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same-sex marriage”.100 However, there is no indication about what the 
problems were in relation to the ranking question, or how those problems 
might have affected the outcome. 
I am aware that the Civil Union Committee provided information about 
their proposal for civil unions for participants to read, and that this 
information presented civil unions as New Zealand‟s preferred model. The 
participants were invited to read the information and complete the 
survey. I would suggest that on this basis alone the responses would 
therefore be skewed – even if the information were 100% accurate. On 
the basis that I believe the information is misleading, at least to the 
degree that it sells the Civil Union Bill on the false premise of “equality”, 
then I would suggest that the response was even more skewed. 
The processes employed to bring the Civil Union Act to fruition exemplify 
the fact that the principles being applied to the issue of relationships 
recognition for same-sex couples were those of political pragmatism 
rather than the dignity of the person and an adherence to well-
articulated principles. 
It also supports the comment made in its Report of 2001 by the Team 
that carried out the review of human rights in New Zealand, that New 
Zealand's human rights obligations, and in particular the relationship 
between the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights 
Act 1993, are not well understood by the public, politicians or many 
government departments.101 
Finally, it is always disappointing to listen to the response of Members of 
Parliament to issues such as the legal recognition of same-sex 
relationships. As gay and lesbian couples, it is difficult to reconcile our 
day-to-day lives with the comments contained within the records of the 
House. In respect of the recognition of same-sex relationships, the key 
themes seem to hover around same-sex couples seeking special rights, 
same-sex couples seeking to access something that is inherently 
                                                 
100  E-Mail from CUB Committee Member (14 August 2001). 
101  "Discussion Paper: Re-Evaluation Of The Human Rights Protections In New 
Zealand”, a Paper prepared by the Ministerial Re-Evaluation Team for the Associate 
Minister of Justice (October 2000): 94-106; see also, comment earlier in this chapter. 
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heterosexual, same-sex couples seeking to upset a traditional 
cornerstone of society, and the despoliation of marriage. 
 
Civil unions  
While this section is essentially about anomalies that arise 
jurisdictionally in relation to marriage, I consider it worthwhile to 
mention some further anomalies that arise between the marriage and 
civil union. 
First, when civil unions were introduced in New Zealand, as a measure of 
(purported) compliance with our domestic human rights imperatives, civil 
unions were made available to same-sex couples and to different-sex 
couples. It was stated at the time, that to create civil unions for same-sex 
couples only, would have been discriminatory.102  
If this is the case, the obvious question is „why is it not discriminatory, 
therefore, to not make marriage available to same-sex couples‟? The only 
answers given to date rely on the 1955 definition of marriage and the 
intent of the Marriage Act at that time, and religious sensitivities. 
Arguably, there has been no truly objective justification provided – but 
that issue is explored throughout this thesis.  
Another issue is that, different-sex couples have a choice of relationship 
types – de facto, civil union, or marriage. This same range of choices is 
not extended to same-sex couples who have the choice only of de facto or 
civil union – marriage not included. One of the indicators of true equality 
is having true choice about the preferred form of relationship status.103  
What is more concerning is that the introduction of civil unions into New 
Zealand has, arguably, introduced new instances of discrimination into 
New Zealand law. For example, different-sex couples who are married 
and wish to convert their marriage to a civil union may do so; different-
sex couples who enter into a civil union and wish to convert that civil 
                                                 
102  Draft “Proposal for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in New Zealand”, 
March 2001, prepared by the Civil Union Committee chaired by Tim Barnett MP.  
103  See brief discussion on „freedom of choice‟ above. 
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union to a marriage may do so. These choices are denied same-sex 
couples because same-sex couples are unable to marry.  
When New Zealand Bills are scrutinised for Bill of Rights compliance, this 
is tested „internally‟.104 In the case of the Civil Union Act 2004, there may 
well have been provisions within the draft legislation that provided for 
different treatment but were not considered discriminatory „under New 
Zealand law‟ because they had effect outside of the New Zealand 
domestic jurisdiction.  
• New Zealand recognises registered partnerships from five overseas 
jurisdictions as civil unions in New Zealand.105 However, the list is 
very limited. For example, New Zealand does recognise registered 
partnerships of Finland, but not those of Denmark or Belgium; and 
does recognise a Lebenpartnerschaft (life partnership) of Germany, 
but not a Pacte Civil de Solidarité (civil solidarity pact) of France.  
• Furthermore, while New Zealand recognises the civil partnerships of 
the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom does not recognise civil 
unions from New Zealand.106 
• In some jurisdictions, a same-sex marriage from one country is 
recognised as a registered partnership in another country. Based on 
the premise (and what is becoming a more widely agreed principle)107 
that registered partnerships provide a lesser status than marriage, 
this is a legislated reduction in the status of that relationship.  
• There is a general principle which assists in the interaction and 
recognition of laws across jurisdictional boundaries. The principle of 
comity of nations (courtesy between nations that obligates their 
                                                 
104  That is, because New Zealand legislation applies only within the New Zealand 
jurisdiction, it cannot be considered in terms of  Bill of Rights compliance is tested in 
the New Zealand context only, as the law is intended to app 
105  Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 2005 cl.3: see 
discussion above also. 
106  See earlier discussion on this, and other relationships expressly recognised by New 
Zealand, in Chapter 3. 
107  See for example, the discussion on the Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts to the legislature in which it rejects civil unions as being 
effective in providing equality with marriage. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009  Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 
 425  
 
mutual recognition of each other's laws)108 constitutes a set of 
conventions whereby one country recognises the laws of another. 
With regard to marriage, the comity rules are particularly strong 
with high levels of acceptance in New Zealand of the validity of 
marriages solemnised in overseas jurisdictions.  
 
Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2005 
Substantively, the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005, is 
much more beneficial to same-sex couples (and de facto different-sex 
couples) than the Civil Union Act 2004. 
Entering into a civil union is a matter of formality – the formality of 
registration. It is the Statutory References Act that provides couples with 
access to the legal incidents that flow from that act of registration.  
In some instances these entitlements are substantively significant.109 In 
other instances they are relatively insignificant.110 It must be realised, of 
course, that even seemingly insignificant provisions can be extremely 
significant to particular individuals and particular times. 
What is disappointing about the Statutory References Act is that, in 
similar fashion to the Civil Union Act, the impression was given that, 
                                                 
108  “The body of rules developed in international law by which the courts of a state 
demonstrate respect for the rules, customs, and laws of another state. Non-
observance of comity does not give rise to strict legal consequences; however, the 
state affected by the non-observance may reciprocate by retracting its own courteous 
practices. A doctrine of comity was developed by Ultricus Huber, and Paulus and 
Johannes Voet, stating that a host state, while retaining sovereignty, could accord 
the laws of another state validity within its territory out of respect for the other 
state”: in: Nygh, Hon Dr Peter E., and Butt, Peter, Australian Legal Dictionary, 
Butterworths, Canberra (1997): 212. 
109  For example: the Burial and Cremation Act 1964 and the Human Tissues Act 1964, 
enabling a civil union partner a decision-making role in relation to the disposal of 
the body or body parts of a deceased partner; the Crimes Act 1961, in relation to 
immunity for a civil union partner from being charged as an accessory after the fact, 
etc. 
110  For example: Construction Contracts Act 2002, in relation to a person being an 
associate to a party to a contract – not issues that the average person is likely to 
come in contact with very often, if at all. 
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with the express exception of a couple of pieces of legislation,111 same-sex 
couples would gain access to all the same legal entitlements as different-
sex couples. Unfortunately, this is not the case. 
 
OVERSEAS 
Canada 
British Columbia (Part 2) 
On 23 July 2001, eight couples took their challenge for same-sex 
marriage to the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The couples were 
joined by EGALE, the Canadian federal lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender equality-rights organisation. 
Although some of the couples had been refused marriage licences by the 
British Columbia Director of Vital Statistics, the British Columbia 
provincial Government had issued a written statement expressing its 
support for same-sex marriage, and called upon the federal Government 
to enact laws explicitly permitting same-sex couples to marry. 
 
Ontario (Part 2) 
With the reading of the banns having taken place for three successive 
weeks in the Metropolitan Community Church in Toronto,112 the marriage 
ceremonies of Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell, and Elaine and Anne 
Vautour, took place in the Church on 14 January 2001.113 
 
                                                 
111  It was made clear that same-sex couples would not be able to get married, and 
therefore would not be able to convert civil unions to marriage. It was also common 
knowledge that the legislative rules relating to adoption of children would not change 
by virtue of the Civil Union Act or the Relationships (Statutory References) Act.  
112  See earlier discussion in Chapter 7. 
113  These marriages were eventually to be confirmed as the world‟s first (modern) legally-
valid same-sex marriages. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009  Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 
 427  
 
However, the Ontario Government refused to recognise the validity of the 
marriage:114 
Ontario Unable to Register Same-Sex Marriages  
“Whether the marriage is solemnized following the issuance of a licence or 
the publication of banns, it must comply with all applicable provincial and 
federal laws governing marriage in this province,” said Robert Runciman, 
Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations, responding to news media 
questions about same-sex marriage in Ontario.  
In order to be legally married, following either the publication of banns or the 
issuance of a marriage licence, a couple must have the legal capacity to 
marry. The capacity to marry is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the federal government. The federal common law as confirmed by recent 
federal legislation defines marriage as the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others. Provincial law cannot 
alter the federal common law or confer capacity to marry.  
In mid-2000, seven couples had applied for marriage licences from the 
City of Toronto.115 Their applications had been refused.  
On 5 November 2001, the seven couples,116 the Metropolitan Church of 
Toronto,117 EGALE Canada Inc,118 and others,119 filed in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice seeking to have all marriages validated in law. 
In essence, the couples argued that: 
• marriage was being interpreted incorrectly by a restrictive adherence 
to common-law and tradition thereby not allowing for the definition 
to change with the times; 
                                                 
114  Press Release issued by the Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Business Services on 
15 January 2001, the day after Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell sought to register 
their marriage.  
115  See earlier discussion in Chapter 7 on this point also. 
116  Hedy Halpern and Colleen Rogers, Michael Leshner and Michael Stark, Aloysius 
Pittman and Thomas Allworth, Dawn Onishenko and Julie Erbland, Carolyn Rowe 
and Carolyn Moffatt, Barbara McDowall and Gail Donnelly, and Alison Kemper and 
Joyce Barnett. 
117  On behalf of Kevin Bourassa and Joe Varnell, and Elaine and Anne Vautour who had 
married in accordance with the practices of the Church. 
118  EGALE Canada is “a national organization that advances equality and justice for 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans-identified people and their families across Canada”, 
http://www.egale.ca/ (Retrieved: 14 August 2009). 
119  The Interfaith Coalition On Marriage And Family, the Association for Marriage and 
the Family in Ontario, the Canadian Coalition of Liberal Rabbis for Same-Sex 
Marriage, and the Canadian Human Rights Commission. 
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• such interpretations are unconstitutional and should be changed; 
• the consequences of not permitting same-sex couples to marry are 
severe; and 
• the restriction against access to marriage for same-sex couples 
should be removed and the issuance of marriage licences to same-sex 
couples should be ordered.120 
On 12 July 2002, the judgment of the trial Court was issued, and Blair 
RSJ, in what has come to be viewed as the majority decision of the Court, 
stated:121 
(a) I declare the common law defining marriage as “the lawful and 
voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others” to be constitutionally invalid and inoperative. 
(b) I suspend the operation of the foregoing declaration for a period of 24 
months to enable Parliament (and, where applicable, the Legislatures) 
to bring the law respecting marriage into line with the requirements of 
the Constitution Act 1982 and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms contained therein. 
(c) But, should Parliament (and, where applicable, the Legislatures) not 
act accordingly prior to the expiration of 24 months, I declare in that 
event that the common law of marriage – that is, “the lawful and 
voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others” – is to be reformulated by replacing the words “one man and 
one woman” with the words “two persons”. 
In addition, the Court stated that:122 
The problem must be addressed and resolved, however, and this must be 
done in a manner that accords to same-sex couples a recognition that is full 
and equal to that enjoyed by opposite-sex couples.  
                                                 
120  Submissions of the Appellants, “Toronto Equal Marriage Challenge Legal 
Backgrounder”, EGALE, http://www.egale.ca/documents/TO_Backgropunder.htm 
(Retrieved: 14 January 2002). 
121  Halpern v Canada (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 321: File No 684/00 (First Action) and 
39/2001 (Second Action)): Judgment of Blair RSJ, para.145. 
122  Halpern v Canada (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 321: File No 684/00 (First Action) and 
39/2001 (Second Action)): Judgment of Blair RSJ, para.138. 
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The Court also provided comment on whether or not a “separate but 
equal” regime would suffice, and indicated that:123 
equality of benefits and protection are not necessarily the same things as 
full and equal recognition.  
On 29 July 2002, the federal Government announced its decision to 
appeal the Ontario decision. However, the Appeal Court found that:124  
1) the existing common law definition of marriage is “the voluntary union 
for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others”; 
2) the courts have jurisdiction to alter the common law definition of 
marriage; resort to constitutional amendment procedures is not 
required; 
3) the existing common law definition of marriage does not infringe 
MCCT‟s freedom of religion rights under s.2(a) of the Charter or its 
equality rights on the basis of religion under s.15(1) of the Charter; 
4) the existing common law definition of marriage violates the Couples‟ 
equality rights on the basis of sexual orientation under s.15(1) of the 
Charter; 
5) the violation of the Couple‟s equality rights under s.15(1) of the Charter 
cannot be justified in a free and democratic society under s.1 of the 
Charter. 
In response to their findings, and as a remedy to the violation of the 
rights, on 10 June 2003 the Court:125 
1) declared the existing common law definition of marriage to be invalid 
to the extent that it refers to “one man and one woman”; 
2) reformulated the common law definition of marriage as “the voluntary 
union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others”, 
3) ordered the declaration of invalidity in (1) and the reformulated 
definition in (2) to have immediate effect; 
                                                 
123  Halpern v Canada (2002) 60 O.R. (3d) 321: File No 684/00 (First Action) and 
39/2001 (Second Action)): Judgment of Blair RSJ, para.130. 
124  Halpern v Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161: para.155. 
125  Halpern v Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161: para.156. 
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4) ordered the Clerk of the City of Toronto to issue marriage licenses to 
the Couples; and 
5) ordered the Registrar General of the Province of Ontario to accept for 
registration the marriage certificates of Kevin Bourassa and Joe 
Varnell and of Elaine and Anne Vautour. 
In effect, the Court had held that same-sex couples in Canada have a 
constitutional right to marriage under existing marriage law, and that 
that right should be given immediate effect. The Court also affirmed that 
providing access to marriage for same-sex couples does not limit religious 
freedom.126  
In reaching these conclusions, the Court had confirmed that same-sex 
marriage in Canada was a reality. Attention now turned to the 
consideration of which other provinces, if any, would follow Ontario‟s 
example and provide access to marriage for same-sex couples? 
The Court had seen fit to link its decision with the trial Court decision in 
Ontario. But, on 10 June 2003, soon after the release of this decision, 
the Court of Appeals in Ontario effectively removed the time bar on its 
decision. 
The province of Ontario became the first provincial jurisdiction in Canada 
to allow access to equal marriage for same-sex couples.  
 
British Columbia (Part 3) 
The Court‟s decision in Barbeau, based on the definitional argument, was 
appealed to the British Columbia Court of Appeal which, on 1 May 2003, 
released a unanimous decision reversing the Supreme Court decision. 
This was to be the first decision on the issue of same-sex marriage to be 
issued by a provincial Court of Appeal. Its significance could not be 
                                                 
126  Halpern v Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161: para.138. 
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underestimated. In providing the judgment of the Court, Prowse J stated 
that the Court would:127 
(a) grant a declaration pursuant to s.52 of the Constitution Act 1867 that 
the common law bar against same-sex marriage is of no force or effect 
because it violates rights and freedoms guaranteed by s.15 of the 
Charter and does not constitute a reasonable and demonstrably 
justified limit on those rights and freedoms within the meaning of s.1 
of the Charter; 
(b) reformulate the common law definition of marriage to mean “the lawful 
union of two persons to the exclusion of all others”; and 
(c) suspend the relief … until July 12, 2004, solely to give the federal and 
provincial government time to review and revise legislation to bring it 
into accord with this decision. 
Subsequently, at the request of the litigant couples, on 8 July 2003, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal followed the lead of Ontario and 
ordered the Province of British Columbia to immediately begin issuing 
marriage licences to same-sex couples.128   
British Columbia became the second Canadian province to provide equal 
access to marriage for same-sex couples. 
 
Quebec  
On 8 – 15 November 2001, a challenge to Quebec‟s marriage statutes 
have been heard by the Superior Court of the District of Montreal in the 
Province of Quebec.129 The Quebec Civil Code restricted marriage to 
different-sex couples and the petitioners, Michael Hendricks and Rene 
Leboeuf were joined by the Quebec Coalition for Same-Sex Relationship 
                                                 
127  Barbeau et al v Canada (Attorney-General) et al 2003 BCCA 251: Prowse J, 
paras.158-161. 
128  EGALE, “Same-Sex Marriage Now Legal In BC!”, EGALE, Press Release, Canada (08 
July 2003). 
129  Quebec had already passed legislation which provided partnership registration.  
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Recognition (an Intervenor), in arguing that the denial of marriage to 
same-sex couples was:130 
• a denial of their “equal dignity and respect”; 
• a denial of equal recognition of conjugal status; 
• a denial of their right to full citizenship; and 
• a denial to children of same-sex families of the rights enjoyed by 
children in different-sex families. 
The arguments were based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the Quebec Provincial Charter and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. It was argued that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage has resulted not from the “institution” of marriage itself, 
but rather from the recent laws of a secular state.131 
The Court issued its decision on 6 September 2002. In a manner similar 
to the previous decisions of the trial courts in Ontario and British 
Columbia, the Quebec Court of Appeal lifted the time-bar that had been 
imposed by the Quebec Superior Court.132 Quebec suddenly became the 
third province in Canada to allow same-sex couples to marry. 
 
United States Of America 
Vermont (Part 3) 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont had held that same-sex couples 
did not have equal access to marriage in the State of Vermont. At the 
same time, the Court did state that there was “a constitutional obligation 
to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, protection, and security that 
                                                 
130  “First Step In Struggle For State Recognition Of Same- Sex Couples‟ Right To Civil 
Marriage”, Quebec Coalition for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition, Press Release 
(02-Oct-2001). 
131  Hendricks & Leboeuf v Attorney-General of Quebec & Attorney-General of Canada et 
al (Superior Court, Montreal, Quebec, N.500-05-059656-007 (08-15 November 
2001)): Petitioner‟s Plan of Argument: para.17. 
132  EGALE, “Quebec Becomes Third Province To Allow Same-Sex Couples To Marry”, 
EGALE, Press Release, Canada (19 March 2004). 
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Vermont law provides opposite-sex married couples” and that it was up 
to the legislature “to determine the appropriate means and scope of relief 
compelled by this constitutional mandate”.133  
The Vermont Legislature responded by enacting new legislation, which 
came into effect on 1 September 2000 making made civil unions available 
to same-sex couples. With this, Vermont became the first state in the 
United States of America to enable same-sex couples “to acquire a legal 
status with all the consequences incidental to marriage”.134 
Further court challenges followed. Pro-marriage lobbyists argued that 
civil union legislation did not respond adequately to the Court‟s directive 
in that civil unions, by their very definition, cannot give the same 
incidents of marriage in all respects.135  
Conservatives challenged the validity of the civil unions legislation 
forecasting the breakdown of marriage and the family and arguing that 
the Court had gone to far. These challenges were rejected and in early 
2002, same-sex couples in Vermont were able to register their 
partnerships by way of civil unions but not marriage. Once again, the 
Legislature had to find a means of avoiding extending marriage to same-
sex couples. The couples had won a technical victory only. 
After the passing of legislation for civil unions in Vermont, a group calling 
themselves “Take Back Vermont” emerged and almost upended 
Vermont‟s politics during the 2000 elections. They forged an 
unsuccessful campaign to block Governor Dean‟s return as Governor of 
the state – in the hope that a new Governor would initiate a repeal of the 
civil union legislation. 
Subsequently, another lobby group, “Take It To The People (TIP)” led a 
campaign to have civil union legislation repealed and replaced with a 
reciprocal partnerships Bill. Such a Bill would have offered limited 
                                                 
133  Baker v Vermont Supreme Court of Vermont, Docket No. 98-032 (1999) (no 
paragraph or page numbers). 
134  Donald G. Casswell, “Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2001] 80 La Revue du 
Barreau Canadien 810: 841. 
135  For example, marriages solemnised in one state are recognised in all other states – 
civil unions are recognised only in Vermont. 
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financial protections to a range of sexual and non-sexual relationships, 
but would not confer on them a “quasi marital status”. 
Also, a group of taxpayers, legislators and town clerks filed an 
application in Vermont‟s Supreme Court challenging the civil union 
legislation, stating that: 
• it was invalid because 14 House members who supported the 
legislation had bet on the outcome of a preliminary House vote; and 
• it was unconstitutional because it forced town clerks to violate their 
religious beliefs that homosexuality is wrong by issuing civil union 
licences to couples. 
The Court rejected the challenges stating that the matter of the bet on 
voting was a matter for the House, and that, in relation to the 
constitutional rights of the clerks, a person could retain a public office 
while refusing to perform a generally applicable duty of that office, 
besides which, the law accommodates the clerks‟ personal concerns by 
explicitly permitting them to appoint an assistant to issue the licences.136 
 
Massachusetts (Part 1) 
In 2003, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered the 
marriage case Goodridge & others v Department of Public Health & 
another.137 It was to be this case that would result in Massachusetts 
being the first State in the United States of America to provide equal 
access to marriage for same-sex couples.  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered that its role 
was not only to interpret statutes to carry out the legislature‟s intent, but 
also to protect the rights guaranteed to citizens under the Constitution.  
 
                                                 
136  “Vermont Rejects Civil Unions Challenge”, Associated Press (3 January 2002). 
137  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003). 
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The Court established that the definition of marriage in Massachusetts 
(as in New Zealand) has been derived from common law. The common 
law definition must stand unless either the legislature has demonstrated 
an alternative intent by way of express statutory provision, or the 
definition is in conflict with (in this case) the State Constitution. That is, 
there would need to be a balancing of the “ordinary and approved” 
meaning of the term marriage with the need to protect the constitutional 
rights of citizens.138 
The Court also considered the nature of marriage and concluded that 
civil marriage is “a wholly secular institution”,139 created by Government, 
regulated by statute, and that there has never been a requirement that a 
marriage be validated by a religious ceremony. The Court described 
marriage as a “social institution of the highest importance” which 
“without question … enhances the „welfare of the community‟ … by 
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones”.140  
 
Key themes from Goodridge 
The Court also considered the key arguments put forward by the State 
and by Amici to the Court for prohibiting same-sex couples from 
marriage. These are the equivalent of the “justifiable limitations” in the 
New Zealand situation”. 
 
Procreation 
The State argued that marriage provides a “favourable setting for 
procreation”. 
                                                 
138  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 319. 
139  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 321. 
140  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 322. 
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The Court responded to this by saying that:141  
Our laws of civil marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual 
intercourse between married people above every other form of adult intimacy 
and every other means of creating a family. General Laws c.207 contains no 
requirement that applicants for a marriage licence attest to the ability or 
intention to conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a condition of 
marriage, nor is it grounds for divorce. 
 
Childrearing 
The State also argued that marriage ensures the optimal setting for child-
rearing describing the optimal family as “a two-parent family with one 
parent of each sex”. 
The Court responded to this by saying that:142  
Protecting the welfare of children is a paramount State policy. Restricting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples, however, cannot plausibly further this 
policy. … The “best interests of the child” standard does not turn on a 
parent‟s sexual orientation or marital status. … [Same-sex] couples have 
children for the same reasons others do – to care for them, to nurture them. 
But the task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made infinitely harder 
by the status as outliers to the marriage laws. … It cannot be rational under 
our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving 
them of State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents‟ sexual 
orientation. 
 
Financial Resources 
The State argued that marriage preserves scarce State and private 
financial resources. 
                                                 
141  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 333. 
142  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 333-336. 
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The Court responded to this by saying that:143  
an absolute statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational 
relationship to the goal of [State] economy; 
 
Destruction of marriage 
Amici argued that broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples 
will trivialise or destroy the institution of marriage as it has historically 
been fashioned. 
The Court responded to this by saying that:144  
The plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution of civil 
marriage. They do not want to abolish marriage, they do not attack the 
binary nature of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any other gate-
keeping provisions of the marriage licensing law. Recognizing the right of an 
individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or 
dignity of opposite-sex marriage … If anything, extending civil marriage to 
same-sex couples reinforces the importance of marriage to individuals and 
communities. 
That same-sex couples are willing to embrace marriage‟s solemn obligations 
of exclusivity, mutual support, and commitment to one another is a 
testament to the enduring place of marriage in our laws and in the human 
spirit. 
 
Interstate conflict 
Amici also argued that expanding the institution of civil marriage in 
Massachusetts to include same-sex couples will lead to interstate 
conflict. 
                                                 
143  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 336. 
144  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 337. 
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The Court responded to this by saying that:145  
we would not presume to dictate how another State should respond to [our] 
decision, but neither should considerations of comity prevent us from 
according Massachusetts residents the full measure of protection available 
under the Massachusetts Constitution.  
 
Summary 
In summary, the Court rejected all arguments and in November 2003, 
Marshall CJ, wrote for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
saying:146 
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, a 
person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with another of the 
same sex is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our community‟s 
most rewarding and cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible 
with the constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and 
equality under the law. 
Although the Court had found that the restriction from marriage was 
unconstitutional, the Court, in a similar manner to the Courts in 
Canada, deferred to the Legislature for a period of 180 days (up to about 
17 May 2004) the decision as to how the issue of marriage rights for 
same-sex couples should be dealt with.  
 
Advisory Opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts  
The Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts subsequently 
returned to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts with a 
                                                 
145  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 340. 
146  Goodridge & Others v Department of Public Health & Another, 440 Mass. 309, 798 
N.E.2d 941 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 4 March 2003 / 18 
November 2003): 313. 
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reference for an advisory opinion in relation to a Civil Union Bill (Senate, 
No.2175) and asked the question:147 
Does Senate, No. 2175, which prohibits same-sex couples from entering into 
marriage but allows them to form civil unions with all „benefits, protections, 
rights and responsibilities‟ of marriage, comply with the equal protection and 
due process requirements of the Constitution of the Commonwealth and 
articles 1, 6, 7, 10, 12 and 16 of the Declaration of Rights? 
The response of the Court, on 3 February 2004, was:148 
The answer to the question is “No”. 
In support of this response, however, the Court did provide some 
interesting discussion:149 
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples 
entry into civil marriage, it continues to relegate same-sex couples to a 
different status … The history of our nation has demonstrated that separate 
is seldom, if ever, equal. 
The bill‟s absolute prohibition of the use of the word “marriage” by 
“spouses” who are the same sex is more than semantic … it is a considered 
choice of language that reflects a demonstrable assigning of same-sex, 
largely homosexual, couples to second-class status … no amount of tinkering 
with language will eradicate that stain. 
But the question the Court considered in Goodridge was not only whether it 
was proper to withhold tangible benefits from same-sex couples, but also 
whether it was constitutional to create a separate class of citizens by status 
discrimination, and withhold from that class the right to participate in the 
institution of civil marriage, along with its concomitant tangible and 
intangible protections, benefits, rights, and responsibilities. Maintaining a 
second-class citizen status for same-sex couples by excluding them from the 
institution of civil marriage is the constitutional infirmity at issue. 
                                                 
147  Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “Opinions of the Justices to the Senate”, 
SJC-09163 (3 February 2004): Introduction. 
148  Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “Opinions of the Justices to the Senate”, 
SJC-09163 (3 February 2004): Section 4, Conclusion. 
149  Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, “Opinions of the Justices to the Senate”, 
SJC-09163 (3 February 2004): Section 3, Analysis. 
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The conclusion of the Court was that:150 
We are of the opinion that Senate 2175 violates the equal protection and due 
process requirements of the Constitution of the Commonwealth and the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights … The Bill maintains an 
unconstitutional, inferior and discriminatory status for same-sex couples … 
As a result of the above, on 19 November 2003 the legislature of the State 
of Massachusetts passed legislation providing same-sex couples in that 
State with equal access to marriage. The law came into effect on 17 May 
2004. 
 
South Africa 
Introduction 
Post-apartheid South Africa was the first nation in the world to expressly 
and constitutionally protect against discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation.151 This paved the way for a series of court cases 
relating to the rights of same-sex couples and eventually leading to a 
case in which same-sex couples sought access to civil-legal marriage. 
Previous cases had been successful in securing for same-sex couples the 
same immigration rights as for married partners,152 the same financial 
benefits as for different-sex couples,153 the right to adopt children,154 and 
the same rights relating to the status of children born as a result of 
artificial birth technology as those born to different-sex couples.155 
                                                 
150  Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “Opinions of the Justices to the Senate”, 
SJC-09163 (3 February 2004): Section 4, Conclusion. 
151  See earlier discussion in previous chapter. 
152  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Quality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 
and Others (2 December 1999). 
153  Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (High Court: 25 
July 2002); confirmed by Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another (Constitutional Court: 17 March 2003). 
154  Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others 
(10 September 2002). 
155  J and B v Director General, Department of Home Affairs, and Others (28 March 
2003). 
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The Fourie court case 
On 17 May 2005, the joined cases of lesbian couple Marie Fourie and 
Cecelia Bonthuys, and the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project of South 
Africa and 18 others was heard by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa. The Court hears cases under the Constitution of South Africa, 
and in this instance was specifically interested in section 9(1) which 
reads “Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law”, and section 9(3) which reads “The 
state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds including … sexual orientation …”. 
In essence, the Court needed to answer the question: Does the fact that 
no provision is made for the applicants, and all those in like situation, to 
marry each other, amount to (a) denial of equal protection of the law, and 
(b) unfair discrimination by the state against them, because of their 
sexual orientation?  
The Court stated that:156 
Equality means concern and respect across difference. Respect for human 
rights requires the affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality 
therefore does not imply a leveling or homogenisation of behaviour or 
extolling one form as supreme, and another as inferior, but an 
acknowledgement and acceptance of difference. At the very least, it affirms 
that difference should not be the basis for exclusion, marginalisation and 
stigma. At best, it celebrates the vitality that difference brings to any society. 
The Court was to hold that it was unconstitutional to deny access to 
marriage by same-sex couples and that such access must be provided. In 
                                                 
156  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.60. 
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conveying this decision the Court said:157 
… there can only be one answer to the question as to whether or not such 
couples are denied equal protection and subjected to unfair discrimination. 
Clearly, they are, and in no small degree. The effect has been wounding and 
the scars are evident in our society to this day. 
If heterosexual couples have the option of deciding whether to marry or not, 
so should same-sex couples have the choice as whether to seek to achieve a 
status and a set of entitlements and responsibilities on a par with those 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples. It follows that, given the centrality 
attributed to marriage and its consequences in our culture, to deny same-sex 
couples a choice in this respect is to negate their right to self-definition in a 
most profound way. 
On 1 December 2005, South Africa became the fifth country in the world 
to extend civil-legal marriage to same-sex couples. 
 
Key themes from Fourie 
The Court considered four main arguments posited to it by the 
Government in support of the Government‟s proposition that whatever 
the decision to be reached by the Court it must acknowledge the need to 
leave traditional marriage intact. These arguments can be summarized as 
follows: 
1) procreation; 
2) the need to respect religion; 
3) recognition given by international law to heterosexual marriage; and 
4) the necessity to have recourse to diverse family law systems 
contained in section 15 of the Constitution.  
The following sections outline the Court‟s response to each of the 
arguments posited by the Government of South Africa. 
                                                 
157  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.78 and 
para.72. 
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Procreation 
The Court was not convinced by the procreation argument stating that, 
from a legal and constitutional point of view, while procreation may be an 
indicator of the existence of a conjugal relationship is it not a defining 
characteristic. The Court further stated:158 
To hold otherwise would be deeply demeaning to couples (whether married 
or not) who, for whatever reason, are incapable of procreating when they 
commence such a relationship or become so at any time thereafter. It is 
likewise demeaning to couples who commence such a relationship at an age 
when they no longer have the desire for sexual relations or the capacity to 
conceive. It is demeaning to adoptive parents to suggest that their family is 
any less a family and any less entitled to respect and concern than a family 
with procreated children. It is even demeaning of a couple who voluntarily 
decide not to have children or sexual relationship with one another, this 
being a decision entirely within their protected sphere of freedom and 
privacy. 
 
Respect for religion 
The Court went to great lengths to emphasise the fact that what the 
couples were seeking in this instance was access to civil-legal marriage 
and not religious marriage. In the process of dealing with this issue, the 
Court made a series of very strong statements about the difference 
between the civil-legal aspects of this issue and the religious. The Court 
stressed that: 
• in the open and democratic society contemplated by the Constitution 
there must be a respectful co-existence between the secular and the 
sacred – “the role of the Court is to recognise the sphere which each 
inhabits, not to force the one into the sphere of the other”;159 
                                                 
158  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.78 and 
para.86, citing Ackermann J in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 
(CC): para.51. 
159  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
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• the couples were not seeking to upset the religious beliefs and views 
of any other persons; 
• the Constitution requires that the religious views of other persons be 
respected, but that this includes being able to be free from the 
imposition of those other persons upon oneself (that is, the right to 
freedom of religion also includes the right to freedom from religion); 
• no Minister of religion could be compelled to solemnize a marriage 
between same-sex partners if such a marriage would be contrary to 
the doctrines of the religion concerned;160 and 
• majoritarian opinion can often be harsh to minorities that exist 
outside the mainstream and cannot therefore prevail purely on the 
basis of its status as a majority view, because there must be no 
prejudice to basic rights.161 
In conclusion on this issue, the Court said:162 
… acknowledgement by the state of the right of same-sex couples to enjoy 
the same status, entitlements and responsibilities of marriage law accords to 
heterosexual couples is in no way inconsistent with the rights of religious 
organisations to continue to refuse to celebrate same-sex marriages. The 
constitutional claims of same-sex couples can accordingly not be negated by 
invoking the rights of believers to have their religious freedom respected.  
The two sets of interests involved to not collide, they co-exist in a 
constitutional realm based on accommodation of diversity [and mutual 
respect (my addition)]. 
                                                                                                                                     
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.93. 
160  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.97. 
161  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.94. 
162  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.98. 
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International recognition 
The Court dealt with this very briefly stating:163 
I conclude that while it is true that international law expressly protects 
heterosexual marriage it is not true that it does so in any way that 
necessarily excludes equal recognition being given now or in the future to the 
right of same-sex couples to enjoy the status, entitlements, and 
responsibilities accorded by marriage to heterosexual couples. 
 
Family law pluralism 
The State and the Amici relied on s.15(3) of the Constitution as a means 
of supporting their contention that the traditional definition of marriage 
must prevail.164 The Court refuted this argument, suggesting instead that 
the provision established that:165 
… there is no hegemonic model of marriage inexorably and automatically 
applicable to all South Africans … The section “does not prevent” legislation 
recognising marriages or systems of family or personal law established by 
religion or tradition. It is not peremptory or even directive, but permissive. 
The Court also suggested that the diversity of marriage might be 
enhanced by the inclusion of same-sex couples and that it could 
certainly not be argued that inclusion of same-sex couples would devalue 
the institution of marriage:166 
The express or implied assertion that bringing same-sex couples under the 
umbrella of marriage law would taint those already within its protection can 
                                                 
163  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.105. 
164  Section 15(3) states that: “This section does not prevent legislation recognising (i) 
marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family 
law; or (ii) systems of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion. … 
165  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.107 and 
para.108. 
166  Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister of 
Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005): para.113 and 
para.112. 
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only be based on a prejudgement, or prejudice against homosexuality. That 
is exactly what section 9 of the Constitution guards against. … The ubiquity 
of a prejudice cannot support its legitimacy. … Whatever its origin, 
objectively speaking this argument is in fact profoundly demeaning to same-
sex couples, and inconsistent with the constitutional requirement that 
everyone be treated with equal concern and respect. 
 
The Netherlands 
On 1 April 2001, The Netherlands became the first country in the world 
to grant access for same-sex couples to marriage under existing marriage 
legislation on effectively the same terms as different-sex couples. As a 
result, the Netherlands was the only country to offer same-sex couples 
“equality under the law”.167 
Although the marriage legislation was debated for years, it seems that it 
eventually went through quite smoothly. The original Bill was passed by 
the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament on 12 September 2000, and 
subsequently by the Senate on 21 December 2000. Both Houses of the 
Dutch Parliament passed the Bill with overwhelming majorities, and only 
the religious parties opposed the final vote. The law came into effect on 1 
April 2001.168  
At midnight the Mayor of Amsterdam officiated at the first full civil 
marriage in the Council Chamber of City Hall in Amsterdam. Eight men 
and women became (as of that time) the world‟s first legally married gay 
and lesbian couples.169 At the time of these first marriages “[a] handful of 
                                                 
167  Note that registered partnerships have been available for both different-sex and 
same-sex couples since 1998. 
168  http://hollandsouth.angloinfo.com/countries/holland/gaymarriage.asp (Retrieved: 
22 July 2009);  
 http://www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/issues/lgbt_families/marriage_and_partnership_rights_for_same_
sex_partners_country_by_country )Retrieved: 14 August 2009);  and,  
 “Dutch Women Plan Same-Sex Wedding”, Associated Press (30 March 2001). 
169  “Amsterdam to Celebrate „Gay Marriage”, Gay.com UK (27 March 2001) (downloaded 
on 27 March 2001 from: http://uk.gay.com/news/2790). Note that Kevin Bourassa 
and Joe Varnell, and Elaine and Anne Vautour, of Toronto, Canada, subsequently 
became the world‟s first legally married same-sex couples, by virtue of retrospective 
recognition of their marriage which took place on 14 January 2001. 
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demonstrators protested outside City Hall, calling the unions 
„unnatural‟.170 
Access to marriage for same-sex couples was provided by amending the 
existing Dutch Marriage Act to provide that the legislation should apply 
to same-sex couples in the same way that it applies to different-sex 
couples. As a result, in relation to the contracting of a marriage, there is 
no difference in the treatment of same-sex couples who marry as 
compared with different-sex couples. Initially there were some 
restrictions for same-sex couples in relation to rights to adopt but, as of 
1 January 2009, these restrictions were removed. Marriage for same-sex 
and different-sex couples is now conducted on precisely the same terms 
with precisely the same consequences. 
 
The United Kingdom 
On 10 January 2002, Lord Lester introduced, to the House of Lords, a 
Civil Partnerships Bill. The Bill was designed to provide for different-sex 
and same-sex couples, and included procedural provisions relating to 
registration and dissolution of the formal relationship, as well as a range 
of legal consequences. It proposed to recognise property rights 
(inheritance, pensions, bereavement-related damages), and to cater for 
health and welfare decision-making in relation to a partner without 
capacity to act. It did not provide for family-related issues such as 
adoption of children, access to artificial birth technology, or matters 
relating to guardianship and parenting. 
As has been the case with registered partnership regimes generally, one 
of the selling points of the Bill was that:171 
[i]t is not a threat to marriage; it is an alternative which allows couples who 
cannot, or would not, marry to base their common life on a firm legal 
foundation. 
                                                 
170  “Dutch Law Allows Same-Sex Marriages”, Associated Press (31 March 2001). 
171  “It Is Time That Unmarried Couples Were United In The Eyes Of The Law”, The 
Times, London (10 January 2002): article written by Lord Lester of Herne Hill, QC 
and Liberal Democrat peer, and who introduced the Bill to the House of Lords. 
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Lord Lester withdrew this Bill before it went forward for full 
consideration.  
However, more recently, the Bill was revived and on 18 November 2004 it 
received Royal Assent after having been passed by the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords. It came into effect on 5 December 
2005 and the first couples who so wished were able to register their 
partnerships from 20 December 2005 (after the statutory 15-day waiting 
period). 
The legislation does not provide all the same entitlements, protections 
and obligations that flow from marriage, but does include: 
• a duty to provide reasonable maintenance for a partner and any 
children of the family; 
• assessment in the same way as spouses for child support; 
• access to the protections relating to domestic violence; 
• exemption from testifying against each other in court; 
• next-of-kin rights 
• equitable treatment for the purposes of life insurance; 
• employment and pension benefits; 
• recognition under intestacy rules; 
• access to fatal accidents compensation; 
• recognition for immigration and nationality purposes; 
• exemption from inheritance tax on a partner‟s home; and 
• formal, court-based process for dissolution of partnerships. 
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The legislation also provides for the recognition, as civil partnerships in 
the UK, of specified legally recognised overseas partnerships.172  
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK) s.214 also allows for a couple to 
„prove‟ that their relationship meets the general conditions for a Civil 
Partnership and thereby qualifies to be recognised as such in the United 
Kingdom. 
What is particularly interesting, however, and in my view somewhat 
concerning, is that the United Kingdom legislation expressly recognises 
same-sex marriages of Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, 
Massachusetts and Spain as civil partnerships in the United Kingdom, as 
would be same-sex marriages from those countries where same-sex 
marriage has become possible since 5 December 2005. Different-sex 
marriage from those countries are recognised in the United Kingdom as 
marriages. With regard to same-sex marriages, this constitutes a 
diminution of the status of those relationships, as compared with their 
status in their home country, and as compared with their status with 
different-sex couples who come to the United Kingdom in identical 
circumstances. The efficacy of this in human rights terms would seem 
somewhat questionable. Certainly, it raises issues with regard to 
recognising the inherent dignity of the persons affected.   
 
Belgium 
The drive for access to marriage for same-sex couples in Belgium was led 
by Holebifederatie, Belgium's largest gay and lesbian federation and the 
                                                 
172  See Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK) Schedule 20. Overseas relationships recognised 
include as at 5 December 2005): Andorra (Stable Partnership Union); Tasmania, 
Australia (Significant Relationship); Belgium (Marriage and Statutory Cohabitation); 
Canada (Marriage); Nova Scotia, Canada (Domestic Partnerships); Quebec, Canada 
(Civil Unions); Denmark (Registered Partnerships); Finland (Registered Partnerships); 
France (Civil Solidarity Pacts); Germany (Life Partnerships); Iceland (Confirmed 
Cohabitation); Luxembourg (Registered Partnership); The Netherlands (Marriage and 
Registered Partnerships); New Zealand (Civil Unions); Norway (Registered 
Partnerships); Spain (Marriage); Sweden (Registered Partnerships); and in the USA, 
California (Domestic Partnership), Connecticut (Civil Union), Maine (Domestic 
Partnership), Massachusetts (Marriage), New Jersey (Domestic Partnership), Vermont 
(Civil Union).  
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campaign lasted for more than five years. Gay and lesbian groups did not 
want the recognition of same-sex relationships singled out into a 
separate law and for this reason much of the work was done directly with 
Parliamentary Representatives.  
Success became a real possibility when the Social Christians, a 
conservative party with strong Catholic roots, lost the 1999 election after 
40 years in power. 
By the time the matter came to Parliament, only a handful of Social 
Christians voted against it. Philippe Verdonck, a civil law expert in the 
office of Belgium's Justice Minister said, “By then, it was not possible to 
say, „I'm against it‟. It had simply become politically incorrect to do so”. 
So, in January 2003, without holding public hearings, the coalition 
government of the Liberal, Socialist and Green parties amended the 1830 
Civil Code to change the definition of marriage from a union between 
husband and wife, to one between spouses. 
As for the rest of the country, what the gay and lesbian community sees 
as a major victory for equal rights caused little reaction after the initial 
flurry of media stories. Verdonck says that the lesson for countries that 
intend similar legislation is that the change is not nearly as revolutionary 
as some make it out to be: “You wake up the next morning and everyone 
realizes that nothing dramatic has happened”.173 
On 1 June 2003, Belgium became the second country in the world to 
offer same-sex couples access to marriage under existing marriage 
legislation. The Bill was first approved by the Belgian Senate and then 
succeeded before the House of Representatives with a 91-22 vote (9 
abstentions). As a result, the Belgian Civil Code was amended to provide 
that the legislation should apply to same-sex couples in the same way 
that it applies to different-sex couples, except with regard to rights of 
adoption and paternity. These differences were removed in 2005.174 
                                                 
173  Information in the previous few paragraphs from “June Weddings A First For Gays In 
Belgium: Couples Savour Their „Perfect Day‟ - Event Causes Little Fuss Elsewhere”, 
Toronto Star (23 June 2003). 
174  Partners task Force For Gay And Lesbian Couples, “Registered Partnerships: The 
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Spain 
On 29 June 2005, Spain became the fourth jurisdiction in the world to 
offer marriage to same-sex couples subsequent to the Belgian legislation 
(remembering that Canada had achieved marriage for same-sex couples 
as a legislative consequence of Court cases). 
Like The Netherlands and Belgium, the extension of marriage to same-
sex couples in Spain occurred by opening up existing marriage law. In 
the Congress of Deputies prior to the vote on the legislation, Prime 
Minister Zapatero told the chamber:175 
… a small change in wording that means an immense change in the lives of 
thousands of citizens. We are not legislating, ladies and gentlemen, for 
remote unknown people. We are expanding opportunities for the happiness 
of our neighbours, our work colleagues, our friends, our relatives. Today 
Spanish society is giving an answer to a group of people who for years have 
been humiliated, whose rights have been ignored, whose dignity has been 
offended.  
The legislation was passed by a 187-147 majority (4 abstentions) in the 
House of Congress, with the minority government receiving support from 
several small regional parties. The Senate (the Upper House) had rejected 
the Bill a week prior to the final vote, but the Senate is an advisory body 
only and so its vote had no binding effect on the House of Congress.  
The amended Marriage Act enables same-sex couples to marry on the 
same terms as different-sex couples and attracts almost all the 
entitlements of marriage, including adoption rights.176 
What is somewhat remarkable about this legislation is that it proceeded 
relatively smoothly despite the fact that Spain is a strongly religious 
Roman Catholic country. The Catholic Church had launched a series of 
                                                                                                                                     
Scandinavian Approach” (3 June 2009), (http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-
scan.html (Retrieved: 22 July 2009). 
175  Speech by Prime Minister José Luis Rodrigues Zapatero during the final reading of 
the Bill in the Congress of Deputies (29 June 2005). 
176  Partners task Force For Gay And Lesbian Couples, “Registered Partnerships: The 
Scandinavian Approach” (3 June 2009), (http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-
scan.html (Retrieved: 22 July 2009). 
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writings against the legislation, and there were a number of protests by 
religious groups.177 Late in 2004, the spokesman for the Spanish Bishops 
Conference, Antonio Martinez Camino, described the passage of the Bill 
as “imposing a virus on society. Something false that will have negative 
consequences for society”. Prior to his death, Pope John Paul had urged 
Spain to remember its Catholic roots and, subsequently, Pope Benedict 
has condemned marriage for same-sex couples as an expression of 
anarchic freedom.178 In response to this, “[t]he Spanish population has 
indicated that it not only supports the gay marriage measure, but also 
thinks the church is out of touch with modern society”.179 A survey 
undertaken in May 2005 found that 62% of Spaniards supported same-
sex couples being able to marry with only 30% against.180 
 
COMMENT 181 
In 1999, two lesbian couples forwarded a complaint to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee. Joslin v New Zealand alleged that the 
Government of New Zealand was in breach of its human rights 
obligations by denying access to marriage for same-sex couples. The 
complaint was to be unsuccessful. 
Back in New Zealand, a new „gay-friendly‟ Government looked as though 
it was going to produce some progressive changes. They had revived the 
earlier relationship property legislation, and proposed a Bill that would 
treat absolutely identically, in name and substance, partners to a 
marriage or a de facto relationship (whether different-sex or same-sex). In 
the final analysis, however, the legislation was amended so that married 
couples could reserve for themselves, within the legislation, the terms 
                                                 
177  “Spain Bishops March Against Gay Marriage”, PlanetOut Network (17 June 2005). 
178  “Spain Defies Church to Legalise Gay Marriage”, Reuters (30 June 2005). 
179  “Spain Bishops March Against Gay Marriage”, PlanetOut Network (17 June 2005). 
180  Poll undertaken by Institutio Opina with a margin of error of 3%: Partners Task 
Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, “Spain Offers Legal Marriage” (27 September 
2006), http://www.buddybuddy.com/mar-spai.html (Retrieved: 21 December 2005). 
181  The information contained in this section constitutes my comment based on 
information presented previously in this chapter. For that reason I have not directly 
referenced the source material for this section. 
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„husband‟ and „wife‟, while those in other relationships would be referred 
to as partners. At least the substance of the legislation remained the 
same in the resulting Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the changes 
were made as amendments to the previously existing Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976). 
A further step forward was made with changes to the Human Rights Act 
1993 (by verdure of the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001) which 
came into effect on 1 January 2002. The key changes of interest and 
importance were that: 
• Government liability under the Human Rights Act 1993 was to be 
tested against the Bill of Rights standard, essentially meaning that 
detrimental different treatment constituted (unlawful) discrimination 
unless it could be „demonstrably justified‟; and 
• the Human Rights Review Tribunal (and courts on subsequent 
appeal) would have the power to make Declarations of Inconsistency, 
meaning that they could declare legislation to be inconsistent with 
New Zealand‟s human rights standards. 
The Civil Union Act 2004 came into effect on 26 April 2005. In March 
2005, Parliament passed the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 
2005 which amended a wide range of other statutes to include references 
to civil union and de facto partners.  
But, while the New Zealand Parliament was passing into law, statutes 
that provided same-sex couples with the ability to register their 
partnerships, the number of overseas countries granting equal access to 
marriage for same-sex couples was increasing    
By the time New Zealand couples (same-sex and different-sex) were able 
to enter into civil unions, marriage had come to The Netherlands (2001) 
Belgium (2003), Canada (2003) with retrospective effect as far back as 
February 2001 for some couples who had married in Ontario at that 
time), Massachusetts (2004), and Spain (2005). And, more countries were 
to follow over the next few years, as will be seen in the next (postscript) 
chapter. 
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New Zealand, a country that had once held itself out to be, and was seen 
by other countries to be, a world leader in human rights issues, was now 
providing us with a relationships recognition regime that was seen by 
many to be passé. Countries that had previously provided same-sex 
couples with registered partnerships were now moving to providing 
access to equal marriage either as well as, or instead of registered 
partnerships – for example, The Netherlands. Others were moving 
directly to providing access to equal marriage.  
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I highlighted the importance of respecting the 
dignity of persons, the importance of the full acceptance of gays and 
lesbians (whether individuals, couples and families) within society, and 
the importance of being able to participate fully within the society in 
which we live. To see these principles being applied, it is necessary only 
to take a glance towards: 
• The Netherlands – where equal marriage rights stemmed from  
legislative action and did not follow on from court action; and 
• Canada – where the Courts leant heavily on the concept of personal 
dignity, and the federal Government played a proactive role in 
bringing same-sex marriage to reality by choosing not to appeal court 
decisions, and by submitting its proposed gender-neutral legislation 
to the Supreme Court for „approval‟; and 
• Massachusetts – where the Legislature sought an advisory opinion 
from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as to whether or 
not civil unions would be an adequate response to the constitutional 
requirements outlined by the Court in its decision on the same-sex 
marriage case. When the Court responded “No”, that civil unions 
would not suffice, the Legislature approved equal access to marriage; 
and 
• South Africa – where the legislature, having only put behind it a few 
years previously an oppressive racial apartheid regime, took the 
decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and turned it 
into access to equal marriage rights for same-sex couples. 
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While the New Zealand Government, at the time of the passing of the 
Civil Union Act 2004, maintained that this was a pragmatic approach 
that would later lead to same-sex marriage, there has, to this point at 
least, been no indication that access to marriage for same-sex couples is 
likely to result from a Government-led initiative. If there is to be any 
progress on this issue in New Zealand in the near future, it seems that 
the onus falls to those same-sex couples who might wish to marry in New 
Zealand to take the initiative again.  
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2007 ONWARDS  
Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis has a cut-off point as at the end of 
2006. For this reason, I do not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of 
the events and progress made in New Zealand or any overseas countries 
from this date onwards. 
This chapter is designed to, at a very high level: 
• highlight some of the further developments and progress towards 
equal access to marriage for same-sex couples that have occurred 
since the beginning of 2007; and 
• provide a brief commentary on how these changes might impact on 
the discussion of this thesis 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
My intention is that, in light of the discussions presented in this thesis, 
if the reader finds any of these areas of particular interest that they will 
take the time to follow up and find out more about them. 
In some jurisdictions there have been significant changes since the 
beginning of 2007. These will be outlined briefly below. 
In other jurisdictions that I have examined quite closely in this thesis, 
there has been further consolidation of the recognition regimes and the 
entitlements they attract. This has included, for example, greater access 
to adoption rights and access to artificial birth technology in a number of 
countries. 
 
New Zealand 
General Comment 
There has been no significant progress since the passing of the Civil 
Union Act 2004 and the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2004. 
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There have been some further changes, for example:  
• The Wills Act 1837 (UK), which was still effective in New Zealand 
until recently, has now been replaced by a new Wills Act 2007. The 
new Act provides for civil union partners. 
• There have been some changes with regard to citizenship, taking 
account of civil union partners. 
However, the two most significant pieces of legislation – the Marriage Act 
1955 and the Adoption Act 1955 – remain untouched and every 
indication to date is that the possibility of any change being initiated 
through policy or legislative means is very slim. 
It appears that, in New Zealand, unless those same-sex couples who 
wish to gain access to equal marriage rights, or wish to gain access to 
equal adoption rights initiate further action, there will be no further 
progress on these issues. 
 
Adoption 
Within the last few days of finalising this thesis, the Adoption Act 1955 
made it back into the news. There are several interesting features of the 
recent discussion – many of which reiterate and support points made in 
this thesis. I consider it pertinent, therefore, to make reference to these 
key points. 
Judge Paul von Dadelszen, Acting Principal Family Court Judge, has 
stated that:1 
• the 2004 Civil Union Act placed people in de facto relationships and 
same-sex couples on the same legal footing as married couples, 
except in the area of adoption; 
• the fact that the law does not permit unmarried people or same-sex 
couples to apply to adopt is inconsistent with Bill of Rights 
                                                 
1  Radio New Zealand, “ „Checkpoint With Mary Wilson‟: Top Judge Says De Facto And 
Gay Couples Should Be Able To Adopt”, 5:15pm on 19 August 2009 (including 
sound recording of Judge von Dadelszen), 
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legislation and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child; 
• the prime consideration in relation to adoption should be the 
“welfare and paramount interests of the child”; 
• “New Zealand is lagging behind” overseas countries on this issue. 
• the laws on adoption in New Zealand need to be amended; 
A contrary view was expressed by Wellington Roman Catholic 
Archbishop, John Dew, who said:2 
• “I think this is coming from the point of view of the same-sex couples 
and what they think are their rights”.  
• “Here we‟re concerned about what the rights of a child are, and they 
have a right to be raised in a loving, stable and committed 
relationship which, we as a church would say, are best in a marriage 
situation”. 
An in a further interview on Radio New Zealand, Judge von Dadelszen 
said:3 
• “The Adoption Act 1955, obviously from the date of its passing, is 
well over 50 years old. It was passed at a time that … in accordance 
with the Anglo-Saxon values of the 1950s. We‟ve now moved on from 
that”. 
• “What I said in my paper, one of the quotes in my paper, simply was 
this, and I‟ll quote it: „The psychological research does not support 
any scientific basis for discrimination against homosexuals with 
regard to fitness to parent. The fitness and suitability of gay and 
                                                                                                                                     
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint (Retrieved and 
transcribed: 20 August 2009: Nigel Christie). 
2  Radio New Zealand, “ „Checkpoint With Mary Wilson‟: Top Judge Says De Facto And 
Gay Couples Should Be Able To Adopt”, 5:15pm on 19 August 2009 (including 
sound recording of Archbishop Dew), 
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint (Retrieved and 
transcribed: 20 August 2009: Nigel Christie). 
3  Radio New Zealand, “ „Nine-To-Noon‟: Same-Sex Couple Adoption”, 9:05am on 20 
August 2009, Judge von Dadelszen interviewed by Kathryn Ryan, 
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/20090820 (Retrieved 
and transcribed: 21 August 2009: Nigel Christie).   
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lesbian parents or foster parents needs to be considered on a case-
by-case basis as it is for heterosexual parents‟ ”. 
• And, when asked whether or not practical problems are created one 
partner can adopt but their life partner has no legal attachment or 
recognition with the child, Judge von Dadelszen responded: “I am 
not so sure that it is important to talk about practical problems”. he 
then went on to comment that, although there can be practical 
issues, this was also a matter of discrimination and a matter of 
principle. 
• And, when asked about whether there should be a social debate on 
whether or not same-sex couples should be able to adopt, Judge von 
Dadelszen responded: “Of course there has to be a debate. I am not 
for one moment pretending that there shouldn‟t be, but my belief is 
that New Zealand society, in this day and age, should accept that 
there are all sorts and conditions of men and women and that 
nobody should be discriminated against”. 
And from a political point of view, the following comments have been 
made: 
• Metiria Turei, Green Party MP, says: “If the debate had happened at 
the time that other pieces of legislation 4 were being amended we 
would have been able to have that discussion in context. As it 
happens, leaving it out means that the discussion is highlighted and 
out of the context of ensuring that gay and lesbian people have 
exactly the same legal rights, entitlements and responsibilities as 
every other citizen”.5 
• But the Lianne Dalziel, Justice spokesperson for the Labour Party, 
says the Care of Children Act 2004 covers the guardianship rights of 
same-sex couples. She says the 1955 Adoption Act was left out of 
that process of law reform because it needs to be totally overhauled. 
                                                 
4  Metiria Turei is here referring to the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2004. 
5  Radio New Zealand, “ „Checkpoint With Mary Wilson‟: Top Judge Says De Facto And 
Gay Couples Should Be Able To Adopt”, 5:15pm on 19 August 2009 (including 
sound recording of Metiria Turei), 
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint (Retrieved and 
transcribed: 20 August 2009: Nigel Christie). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 9 
 
 
 
 
  462 
  
“There was certainly a view that it was inappropriate to make a 
change to it when so much of that law is now completely and utterly 
irrelevant and out of date”.6 
• Hon Simon Power, Minister of Justice, says a review of the Adoption 
Act is not on the Government‟s work programme.7 
The revived adoption debate therefore revives a number of issues already 
discussed in this thesis, including: 
• State discrimination against same-sex couples; 
• the failure of the Civil Union Act 2004 and the Relationships 
(Statutory References) Act 2004 to equal legal entitlements and 
status to same-sex couples; 
• New Zealand‟s place, in comparison with overseas jurisdictions with 
regard to the treatment of same-sex couples;  
• the conservative view that the only „stable‟ family is the family 
founded on marriage, and the suggestion that same-sex couples are 
not capable of forming stable, loving and committed relationships; 
• The current views lean on tradition for justification and society has 
now „moved on‟ from this old values. 
• There is no evidence to suggest that children are disadvantaged by 
being brought up in same-sex families.  
• The fact that this is not just a „practical‟ issue, but is a matter of 
human rights principle and equal treatment. 
• The question of the appropriateness of public consultation on rights 
issues in the face of the view that “New Zealand society, in this day 
and age, should accept … that nobody should be discriminated 
against”. 
                                                 
6  Radio New Zealand, “ „Checkpoint With Mary Wilson‟: Top Judge Says De Facto And 
Gay Couples Should Be Able To Adopt”, 5:15pm on 19 August 2009 (including 
sound recording of Lianne Dalziel), 
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint (Retrieved and 
transcribed: 20 August 2009: Nigel Christie).  
7  Radio New Zealand, “ „Checkpoint With Mary Wilson‟: Top Judge Says De Facto And 
Gay Couples Should Be Able To Adopt”, 5:15pm on 19 August 2009, 
 http://www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/checkpoint (Retrieved and 
trianscribed: 20 August 2009: Nigel Christie). 
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On 20 August 2009, an Adoption Amendment Bill, previously prepared 
and place in the Members‟ ballot by Metiria Turei, was returned to the 
ballot as a Bill sponsored by her fellow Green MP, Kevin Hague. Any 
progress of this Bill, and the debate it generates, will be watched with 
extreme interest. 
 
OVERSEAS 
Norway 
Norway became the sixth country to provide equal access to marriage for 
same-sex couples.  
Equal marriage was passed into law on 11 June 2008 and came into 
effect on 1 January 2009. 
 
Sweden 
Sweden became the seventh country to provide equal access to marriage 
for same-sex couples.  
Equal marriage was passed into law on 1 April 2009 and came into effect 
on 1 May 2009. 
 
United States of America 
The country that has seen the most activity, since the beginning of 2007 
up to the present, is the United States of America, with access to 
marriage being provided in 6 new States during this time (that is, in 
addition to Massachusetts where equal marriage became a reality in 
2004). The United States of America has also seen more activity related 
to the passing of constitutional amendments or defense of marriage 
legislation in some States to prevent the recognition of same-sex 
marriages. 
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States where access to marriage for same-sex couples has been achieved 
include: 
TABLE 9: EQUAL MARRIAGE – 2007 to PRESENT 
State Passed / Decided Effective 
California – see note below 15-May-2008 16-Jun-2008 
Connecticut 8 10-Oct-2008 28-Oct-2008 
Iowa 9  27-Apr-2009 
Maine – see note below 06-May-2009 14-Sep-2009 
Vermont 10 07-Apr-2009 01-Sep-2009 
New Hampshire 11  01-Jan-10 
 
California (Part 2) 
On 15 May 2008, the Supreme Court of California overturned the 
California State ban on access to marriage for same-sex couples.12 As 
from 16 June 2008, same-sex couples could marry. Marriage had come 
to California as a result of a court decision. However, it was to be 
overturned in a manner somewhat similar to what had earlier happened 
in Hawai‟i and Alaska.  
On 4 November 2008, citizens of California voted on Proposition 8 and, 
as a result, Section 7.5 was added to Article I of the California 
Constitution, so that it now read: 
Section 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or 
recognized in California. 
                                                 
8  Kerrigan v Commissioner of Public Health 289 Conn. 135, 957 A.2d 407 (2008). 
9  Varnum v Brien 763 N.W.2d 862, (Iowa 2009). 
10  State of Vermont Bill S.115: “An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize 
Equality in Civil Marriage”. Passed by General Assembly on 7 April 2009 and 
effective from 1 September 2009.  
11  State of New Hampshire Bill HB.73: “An Act affirming religious freedom protections 
with regard to marriage and prohibiting the establishment of civil unions on or after 
January 1, 2010”.  
12  In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384]. 
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The estimated 18,000 same-sex marriages that were solemnised in 
California between 16 June 2008 and 4 November 2008 remain extant. 
Further court challenges are expected, with a view to overturning the 
State ban and reinstating same-sex marriage. 
 
Maine  
On 6 May 2009, Maine Governor John Baldacci signed legislation 
allowing same-sex marriage in Maine. Maine became the 5th State in the 
United States of America to offer same-sex marriage.13 
In July 2009, however, opponents of Maine‟s new law allowing same-sex 
marriage submitted petitions seeking a referendum on the issue. If 
sufficient signatures are certified (the number required being 55,087) by 
4 September 2009, a referendum will be held in November. The marriage 
law, that was to come into effect on 12 September has be put on hold 
pending the outcome.14 
 
Massachusetts (Part 2) 
In July 2009, the State of Massachusetts file a suit against the 
Government of the United States with regard to the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act. The suit argues that the Defense of Marriage Act 
“constitutes an overreaching and discriminatory federal law”, and 
unfairly denies federal benefits to the 16,000 or so same-sex couples sho 
have married in Massachusetts.15 
                                                 
13  “Gay Marriage Becomes Law In Maine”, 365Gay.com (6 May 2009), 
http://www.365gay.com/news/gay-marriage-becomes-law-in-maine/, (Retrieved: 7 
May 2009). 
14  “Maine Gay Marriage Opponents Submit Challenges”, 365Gay.com (31 July 2009), 
http://www.365gay.com/news/maine-gay-marriage-opponents-submit-challenges/, 
(Retrieved: 1 August 2009). 
15  “Mass. Sues Feds Over Definition Of Marriage”, 365Gay.com (8 July 2009), 
http://www.365gay.com/news/mass-sues-feds-over-definition-of-marriage/y, 
(Retrieved: 09 July 2009). 
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Louisiana  
On 2 April 2009, a Louisiana couple was refused a marriage licence by 
the Orleans Parish marriage license office. They have filed a lawsuit 
claiming that the New Orleans‟ constitutional amendment against gay 
marriage violates their constitutional rights under the U.S. 
Constitution.16 
 
Pennsylvania 
A Marriage Equality Bill has been introduced into the Pennsylvania 
Senate. The Bill is awaiting further consideration.17 
 
Other States 
While progress towards same-sex marriage is made in some States, and 
while California has received much attention with regard to the 
Proposition 8 negation of same-sex marriage, there are on-going 
challenges, both reactive and pre-emptive, to same-sex marriage in 
various States. For example, on 4 November 2008, the same day that 
marriage was overturned in California by Constitutional Referendum, 
similar referenda were also held in response to „initiatives‟ in other 
States.18  
 
                                                 
16  “Louisiana Gay Couple Sues For Marriage License”,  365Gay.com (1 July 2009), 
http://www.365gay.com/news/louisiana-gay-couple-sues-for-marriage-license/,. 
(Retrieved: 02 July 2009). 
17  “Pennsylvania Senators introduce Marriage Equality Bill”, 265Gay.com (10 July 
2009), http://www.365gay.com/news/pennsylvania-senators-introduce-marriage-
equality-bill/ (Retrieved: 11 July 2009). 
18  The term „initiative‟ is used to describe a proposal for Constitutional amendment that 
is voted on by eligible voters in the relevant State by way of a State-wide referendum. 
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As a result of these referenda, the following constitutional amendments 
also occurred:19 
TABLE 10: FURTHER STATE INITIATIVES (USA) 
State Initiative Vote In Favour 
Florida marriage limited to different-sex couples 62% 
Arizona marriage limited to different-sex couples 56% 
Arkansas 20 adoption and fostering of children limited 
to couples who are legally married 
57% 
 
COMMENT 
Increase in demand for marriage 
In the period from the beginning of 2007 to the present, there have been 
two countries that have enabled equal access to marriage for same-sex 
couples (Norway and Sweden) – making 7 countries in all (Canada, The 
Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, South Africa, Norway and Sweden). 
In that same period, six States within the United States of America have 
enabled access to marriage for same-sex couples (California, 
Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Vermont and New Hampshire). One of these 
(California) was subsequently overturned by constitutional referendum, 
and in one State (Maine) a challenge to same-sex marriage is still 
pending. However, currently, there are seven States in the United States 
that provide access to marriage for same-sex couples. 
However, it is important to emphasise that, although I have not analysed 
these cases or legislative developments in detail, I do not consider that 
the message of my thesis is compromised in any way. 
 
                                                 
19  Results downloaded from “CNN Election Centre 2008: Ballot Measures”, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/ballot.measures/ (Retrieved: 5 
November 2008). 
20  Note that Arkansas already had a constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage. 
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The fact that these developments continue overseas gives further weight 
to my key points that: 
• there is a strong demand for access to marriage amongst same-sex 
couples whether this be driven: 
- by a desire for access to the entitlements that flow from 
marriage, or 
- by a desire to be treated equally before and under the law; 
• registered partnerships, while once seen as a progressive alternative 
to marriage, are now seen as inadequate in terms of equality and 
dignity; 
• in the international context, New Zealand is falling behind and 
increasing number of countries in terms of full and equal recognition 
of same-sex couples. 
 
Uptake of Civil Unions 
Another factor worth considering briefly is the uptake of registered 
partnerships. 
In this thesis, I have made the claim that there is a demand for marriage 
amongst a significant number of same-sex couples. I have also made the 
claim that registered partnerships do not provide everything that 
marriage provides, and that there is also a significant number of same-
sex couples who do not wish to avail themselves of registration. 
I have selected as an indication of the measure of uptake of registered 
partnerships: 
• Vermont, which was the first State in the United States of America to 
offer their form of registered partnerships; and 
• New Zealand, which has had registered partnerships since April 
2005. 
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Vermont 
Being a relatively small State, Vermont has a population of 621,270.21 
The statistics provided here relate to Vermont residents only and do not 
include marriages or civil unions, in Vermont, of persons from out of 
State. 
It should be noted that, differently from New Zealand, civil unions in 
Vermont were available only to same-sex couples. Different-sex couples 
have not been able to enter into civil unions. 
The following table shows that, with the advent of civil unions in 2000, 
there was a reasonably significant uptake initially. This dropped quickly 
from 17%, as compared with the number of marriages, in the first year to 
only 6.7% in the second year. From 2003 to 2005 the percentage settled 
to a figure of about between 3.3% and 4%.22   
TABLE 11: MARRIAGES AND CIVIL UNIONS IN VERMONT 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Marriages 4189 3784 3937 3958 3910 3812 
Civil Unions 375 252 171 140 157 126 
Percent Civil 
Unions cf 
Marriage 
17.0% 6.7% 4.4% 3.5% 4.0% 3.3% 
 
In general terms, the number of civil unions in Vermont shows a steady 
decline over the six-year period. One reason for this might be that 
nearby Massachusetts had been successful in attaining equal marriage 
rights by this time, as had Canada across the northern border. Perhaps 
same-sex couples in Vermont saw marriage as a viable option, rather 
than civil unions, either by travelling to those jurisdictions or by waiting 
until marriage came to Vermont (which it subsequently did). 
                                                 
21 As at 1 July 2008. Population information from the United States Census Bureau, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/50000.html (Retrieved: 22 August 2009. 
22  All statistical information relating to Vermont from the Vermont Department of 
Health, http://healthvermont.gov/research/index.aspx (Retrieved 21 August 2009). 
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New Zealand 
New Zealand has a population of 4,315,800.23 The statistics provided 
here relate to marriages and civil unions of New Zealand residents and 
overseas citizens who marry or enter into a civil union in New Zealand.24 
It should be remembered also that, unlike Vermont, in New Zealand both 
same-sex and different-sex couples can enter into a civil union. Of 
course, marriage is reserved for different-sex couples only. 
Table 12 provides information on the number of marriages solemnised in 
New Zealand. 
MARRIAGES IN NEW ZEALAND 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Marriage NZ 
Resident 
20470 21423 21494 21948 
Marriage OS 
Resident 
2046 2021 1953 2000 
Marriage Total 22516 23444 23447 23948 
 
Table 15 provides the number of all civil unions registered in New 
Zealand by same-sex or different-sex couples, or by overseas citizens 
temporarily in New Zealand.  
It is interesting to note that the civil union was made available to 
different-sex couples for two reasons: 
• it was considered that it would be discriminatory to exclude same-
sex couples from the Civil Union Act 2004; and 
• it was suggested that there was a demand from different-sex couples 
to be able to have a civil union rather than marriage.  
                                                 
23  As at 1 July 2009. Population information from Statistics New Zealand, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/top-20-statistics.aspx (Retrieved: 22 August 2009). 
24  All statistical information relating to New Zealand from Statistics New Zealand, 
http://search.stats.govt.nz/search?w=marriage&af=ctype%3Astatistics   (Retrieved: 
3 June 2009). 
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TABLE 13: CIVIL UNIONS IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
CU NZ Resident 
Male Same-Sex 
98 115 103 111 
CU NZ Resident 
Female Same-Sex 
105 182 150 145 
CU NZ Resident 
Different-Sex 
44 77 63 71 
Marriage Converted 
to CU 
2 0 0 0 
CU NZ Resident 
Total 
249 374 316 327 
CU Overseas 
Resident 
29 56 77 78 
Total Civil Union 278 430 393 405 
 
TABLE 14: NEW ZEALAND CIVIL UNIONS COMPARED WITH MARRIAGES 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
% NZ Resident 
Civil Unions cf 
Marriage 
1.21 1.75 1.47 1.49 
% Overseas CU cf 
Overseas Marriages 
1.42 2.77 3.94 3.90 
% All Civil Unions 
cf Marriage 
1.20 1.83 1.67 1.69 
% NZ Residents 
Different-Sex Civil 
Unions cf Marriage 
0.22 0.35 0.29 0.32 
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Interesting points that arise from these statistics include the following: 
1. The Civil Union Act 2004 s.18 enables different-sex couples to 
convert a civil union into a marriage, or a marriage into a civil 
union. It is noticeable that over a period of four years, only two 
different-sex couples have chosen to convert from marriage to civil 
unions(see Table 13). 
2. The percentage of all New Zealanders who enter into civil unions as 
compared with marriages rises from 1.21 (2005) to 1.79 (2006) and 
then falls to 1.47 and 1.49 (2007 and 2008 respectively). These 
figures are lower than those for Vermont (the lowest percent in 
Vermont being 3.3 in 2005) (see Table 14). 
3. The percentage of overseas persons temporarily in New Zealand 
who enter into civil unions as compared with marriages shows a 
year-by-year increase from 1.42 (2005) to 3.90 (2008). Based on 
these percentages, we could be seen to be providing a „civil union 
service‟ to overseas citizens (see Table 14). 
In general, the uptake of registered partnerships by same-sex couples 
has not been overwhelming. Insufficient research has been done on the 
reasons for this, but I would like to think that it is because, although 
there are some practical advantages from entering into a registered 
partnership, full dignity and acceptance can be attained only by equal 
access to marriage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Again, while I have not dealt with any of the developments in this 
chapter in any detail, my intention is that the information given is 
sufficient to prompt the interested reader in following up further on 
these and any subsequent developments. 
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PART IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Part IV consists of one chapter that constitutes the Summary and 
Conclusion for this thesis. 
First, subsequent to an introductory section, I summarise what I 
consider to be the key themes of this thesis. This, for me, include some 
of the key contextual issues that must be kept in mind by all persons 
considering the issue of access to equal, civil-legal marriage for same-sex 
couples. 
Second, I present a range of options for possible future actions towards 
equal recognition of the relationships of same-sex couples. There are, of 
course, two key avenues for change – the legislature, and the courts. 
Options are provided for placing the issue before either of these fora, 
with an assessment needing to be undertaken with regard to the 
appropriateness of each.  
Third, I outline some points for consideration with regard to increasing 
the chance of success if we, as same-sex couples, decide to take further 
action towards seeking equal recognition of our relationships. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is my thesis that there is no valid impediment to marriage for same-
sex couples in New Zealand. 
This is not to say that, currently, same-sex couples are not debarred 
from marrying in New Zealand. Rather, what it is saying is that it is my 
considered opinion that there is no reasonable and lawful impediment, 
and that under a reasoned, logical and proper assessment in accordance 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5, same-sex couples 
should be entitled to marry under existing marriage legislation. 
Furthermore, it is my view that the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in 
1998, did not hold that there is no discrimination resulting from the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from the Marriage Act 1995.1 What the 
Court did say was that, regardless of whether or not discrimination 
existed, any change to the Marriage Act would need to result from the 
actions of Parliament.  
Unfortunately, what has prevailed in New Zealand with regard to the 
issue of same-sex marriage is political pragmatism and majority rule in 
the face of purported human rights protections.  
There are essentially two types of arguments that can be presented in 
relation to the issue of same-sex marriage: 
• Those based in a principled human rights argument – human rights 
legislation being part of the social, legal, justice and constitutional 
framework of New Zealand. 
• Those based in emotive and morality-based arguments – which do 
not reach the level of objective justification required by that human 
rights law. 
This chapter reviews the key themes of this thesis, examines options for 
progressing the issue of same-sex marriage, and what changes there 
might need to be to enhance the possibility of success for any of these 
options. 
                                                 
1  See detailed discussion on this point in Chapter 7. 
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KEY THEMES 
Dignity 
In Chapter 3, I provided a consideration of the concept of „dignity‟ and 
the dignity of the person. 
In essence, an understanding and acceptance of the concept of human 
dignity is a fundamental element of human rights law. Dignity is about 
equality, equal treatment before and under the law, and concern respect 
and consideration. 
The concept of dignity has been a core component of modern human 
rights laws since the drafting in the mid-1900s of the early United 
Nations documents and more latterly in the international covenants.  
It has been notable that the cases on same-sex marriage have evolved 
from cases where the concept of dignity was essentially absent, such as: 
• Jones v Hallahan,2 a case that hinged on the traditional meaning of 
marriage without reference to the rights of the persons concerned; or  
• Quilter v Attorney-General,3 where Gault J declared (in obiter) that 
he considered that: 
-  there was no discrimination on the basis of gender because the 
marriage licence would have been declined regardless of whether 
the parties were two men or two women; and 
-  there was no discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
because the marriage licence would have been declined to two 
men, for example, regardless of whether they were homosexual 
or heterosexual. 
In more recent times, the courts have moved to a substantive 
                                                 
2  Jones v Hallahan (1973) 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). 
3  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523. 
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consideration of issues such as the care and concern, respect and 
dignity of the person. This has been particularly apparent in the 
Canadian cases and the cases in South Africa and in Massachusetts.  
It has also been noticeable, in a number of jurisdictions, that the State 
has taken a lead role in extending equal marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. This has been demonstrated in Canada, where the Government 
has chosen not to appeal decisions of the court, or where the 
Government has sought to clarify the efficacy of proposed legislation and 
its compliance with the earlier decision of the Court.4 Similarly, the 
legislature in Massachusetts sought an Advisory Opinion from the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts on whether or not registered 
partnerships would provide an appropriate response to the State 
Constitution and the earlier decision of the Court in Goodridge.5 In other 
jurisdictions, such as The Netherlands, Belgium, Maine and New 
Hampshire (amongst others), the equal marriage initiatives have been 
driven through the legislature.  
It is this act of shifting the onus for driving change away from the 
affected minority group that is demonstrative of an enhanced recognition 
of the dignity of the person. There is nothing dignity-enhancing for a 
minority group in needing to shout louder and louder, and to „stamp 
their feet‟ to draw attention to themselves, in order to be heard. But, 
where the State takes responsibility for providing protections and 
entitlements to its citizens rather than expecting its citizens to fight for 
the protections and entitlements to which they are due, the dignity of 
those persons is enhanced and preserved. 
Different jurisdictions have approached the issue of access to equal 
marriage for same-sex couples in very different ways. These can be 
                                                 
4  The Canadian Government, by way of reference to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
sought comment on its proposed marriage legislation and its compliance with the 
decision of the Court in the marriage case and, therefore, its compliance with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
5  Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “Opinions Of The Justices To The 
Senate”, 440 Mass. 1201, 802 N.E.2d565 (3 February 2004). 
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categorised loosely into 4 main groupings, as follows: 
TABLE 15: APPROACHES TO ATTAINING EQUAL MARRIAGE RIGHTS 
Approach Jurisdiction 
Example 
Result  / Effect 
Process initiated through 
legislature – no need for 
affected persons to seek access 
to their rights through the 
courts 
Netherlands Respecting, enhancing, 
promoting dignity of the 
person – full and equal 
citizenship 
Citizens initiate the process 
through the courts, but 
legislature follows up 
proactively 
Canada Respecting, enhancing, 
promoting dignity of the 
person – full and equal 
citizenship 
Citizens initiate the process 
through the courts, but 
legislature follows up 
reactively  
Massachusetts Reluctantly respecting the 
dignity of the person and 
providing full and equal 
citizenship 
Citizens initiate the process 
through the courts – no 
response from legislature 
New Zealand Demeaning of the dignity of 
the person and not 
providing full and equal 
citizenship 
 
Tolerance or acceptance? 
It is my view that, in order for us, as gays and lesbians, to be full citizens 
of the country in which we live, we must enjoy full acceptance as 
individuals, as couples and as families. 
To limit our participation in society by circumscribing those rights to 
which we may have access is to deny us our humanity and our dignity 
and our freedom. 
To permit us access to only some of those rights which are available to 
others is to utilise the power of majority rule to control the extent to 
which we can realise our full potential as members of society. 
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To place these limitations upon us, whether lawfully or otherwise, is to 
tolerate our presence. To remove those limitations and provide us with 
the same autonomy that non-gay and non-lesbian citizens enjoy is to 
accept us as equal citizens.  
While it is accepted that a change to inclusive legislation, as in equal 
access to marriage, will not automatically and immediately bring about a 
change in attitudes, it is acknowledged that legislative change will allow 
such a shift in attitudes to occur. Conversely, if legislation does not 
change it will serve to impede attitudinal change.  
Similarly, where societal attitudes move ahead of those of the legislature, 
we cannot guarantee that the legislature will follow the views of society. 
But hopefully, the views expressed by society at large will have some 
level of influence on our legislators.  
During the Third Reading of the Civil Union Bill, Russell Fairbrother MP, 
a proponent of the Bill, responded to Winston Peters‟ suggestion that the 
Civil Union Bill is a “sop to the gay community” by saying:6 
… this bill is a sop to the gay community, but it is one that many of its 
members welcome with open arms, and some of them reject because they 
still feel as though they are being treated as second-class citizens. It is a sop 
because we are not offering the gay community and others, those who cannot 
marry in this country but want to have legal relationships, the equality of 
society. We are not offering them the warmth of humanity. We are offering 
them the cold face of legal equality. The cold face of legal equality is only 
that. 
 
Objective reasoning 
Most of the arguments that are promulgated to justify the different 
treatment of same-sex couples fail the objectivity test. To reach the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights 1990 s.5 standard, limitations on the prohibitions 
                                                 
6  Russell Fairbrother, MP, Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Third reading of the Civil 
Union Bill (9 December 2004). This statement is along similar lines to the statement 
of the Chief Justice of Canada who talked of the “formal” equality that arises from 
regimes such as civil unions, as opposed to the full equality that would be achieved 
through access to marriage. 
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against discrimination as outlined in New Zealand human rights laws, 
must be “reasonable limits (prescribed by law)” that can be 
“demonstrably justified”. 
An analogy often cited is that, in New Zealand, we do not permit persons 
under the age of 15 years to obtain a licence to drive a car. This, it is 
said, is a limitation on young persons that could be seen as being akin to 
not permitting same-sex couples to obtain a licence to marry. What is left 
out of that argument, however, is that the decision not to permit young 
persons to drive has been based on a reasoned consideration of the 
relevant issues such as maturity and public safety. There is a requisite 
age for two persons to obtain a marriage licence, but that is not the 
issue. The issue here is that we do not prevent all gay and lesbian 
persons, or all women, or all men, or all Maori, from obtaining a driving 
licence on the basis that to permit any one of those groups to have a 
driving licence would undermine the efficacy of driving licences 
generally. It is the arbitrariness of the exclusion and the fact that it is 
related to a particular class of persons rather than the exclusion itself. 
Therefore, just as it can be proven objectively (rationally, based in 
reason, without prejudice, not subjectively) that to enable persons of too 
young an age to have a licence to drive a car could be dangerous to that 
young person or to society at large, so must it be proven that to provide 
same-sex couples with the ability to marry will be dangerous to the 
couples concerned or society at large. 
Moral argument, religious argument, and personal opinion, do not 
constitute rational, objective reasoning.7 Although tradition and social 
values are important, they cannot be given so much weight that they 
alone will justify a discriminatory statutory classification. When tradition 
is the guise under which prejudice or animosity hides, it is not a 
legitimate state interest. Similarly, expressing a moral disapproval of a 
class is not sufficient to sustain a classification where there is no other 
legitimate state interest. 
It is my contention that none of the arguments put forward as “justified 
limitations” reach the required threshold. 
                                                 
7  Deane et al v Conaway et al (unreported, Circuit Court, Balitmore City, Case No. 24-
C-04-005390: 19 January 2006): citing Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35, 116 
S.Ct. 120, 1628 (1996); and Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-583, 123 S.Ct. 
2472, 2486 (2003). 
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The failure of incrementalism 
With regard to the issue of access to marriage for same-sex couples, an 
extremely significant principle of human rights implementation and 
application is that civil and political rights are immediately enforceable. 
Because of the nature of civil and political rights – essentially to do with 
what constitutes acceptable treatment of an individual – there is no room 
for half measures.  
The policy of Government to realise civil and political rights – the rights 
associated with prohibitions against discrimination – on an incremental 
basis is a fundamentally flawed policy, and is offensive to those seeking 
access to those rights. 
It is not logical to say that we are partly or nearly equal to others. For 
example, to say that civil unions are almost equal to marriage is 
oxymoronic. Something is either equal or it is not.  
Nor is it logical to say that we are more equal now than we have been 
previously. Once again, to say that civil unions provides us with a 
greater degree of equality than we had previously is oxymoronic. 
I recall that, during the Conference Dinner for the Conference in Turin 
2002,8 one of the delegates from Quebec, Canada, announced that she 
had just received a phone call telling her that the legislature of Quebec 
had approved same-sex marriage. She then added that, actually, it was 
just like marriage except it was not called marriage – it was called civil 
partnerships. Also, it was just like marriage except there were some 
entitlements that flowed from marriage that were not going to be 
attached to these civil partnerships. Another delegate then stood and 
urged everyone in the room not to call these arrangements – civil unions, 
registered partnerships, civil partnerships and the like – marriage. He 
added: “The moment we have to add the word „except‟, we have 
discrimination”.  
                                                 
8  “Marriage, Partnerships And Parenting In The 21st Century. The Current 
International Situation And New Perspectives For Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual And 
Transgendered People And Their Families – A Comparative Approach”, International 
Conference, Turin, Italy (5- 8 June 2002). 
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New Zealand human rights climate 
New Zealand has long enjoyed an international reputation as a 
“champion” of human rights standards and the observance of those 
standards. This reputation began many decades ago with issues of 
enfranchisement, the most well-known being the granting to women in 
1893 of the right to vote – New Zealand being the first country in the 
world to do this. Similarly, New Zealand was relatively quick, in terms of 
colonial settler governments, to grant the right to vote to the “native” 
people. 
New Zealand‟s lead on nuclear issues has been noticed internationally. 
New Zealanders‟ active opposition to the apartheid regime in South 
Africa, particularly in the 1980s, drew world-wide attention. Over the 
decades New Zealand has played a visible role in human rights matters, 
with peace-keeping support in East Timor and the middle-East, a 
presence on the United Nations Security Council, and an active role in 
the United Nations generally. 
In the early 1990s, New Zealand passed into law the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. There have also been 
subsequent amendments that have served to strengthen both statues. 
However, there is a seeming reticence of New Zealand‟s Parliament to 
utilise these human rights standards consistently, particularly in 
relation to issues that might be controversial, and a sense that 
preservation of New Zealand‟s international reputation is rates higher 
than attention to detail at home. I would suggest that New Zealand has a 
human rights climate that favours ensuring that all its citizens are 
treated with the equal dignity, care and concern to which they are 
entitled.  
There is potential within the current legislative framework for enhanced 
compliance with human rights standards and enhanced recognition of 
the rights of protected groups. While human rights laws in New Zealand 
are not entrenched and not supreme, adherence to them is not reliant on 
them being so. If we as a community – individuals, groups, 
representatives, power-holders, and power-brokers – have a practical 
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commitment to the human rights standards we have adopted, and if we 
have the courage to advocate for those rights for ourselves and for 
others, the current human rights rules adopted by New Zealand should 
prove perfectly adequate. 
Furthermore, when we consider the matters mentioned above in relation 
to which New Zealand has set standards to be followed internationally, it 
is clear that, when New Zealand and New Zealanders have the will, they 
can demand, promote and protect those rights they value. 
It is useful, I think, to view the role of human rights legislation through a 
similar lens to that which Justice Chilwell employed in his consideration 
of the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. To paraphrase 
Justice Chilwell:9 
there can be no doubt that human rights legislation (domestic and 
international) is part of the fabric of New Zealand Society. 
 
OPTIONS FOR PROGRESS 
At this stage, rightly or wrongly, the onus has fallen to same-sex couples 
in New Zealand, as the aggrieved party, to initiate the process of change. 
The key issue is therefore related to what might be the possible options 
for taking further action. 
As has been discussed in some detail, the Quilter same-sex marriage 
case focused on seeking a declaration from the courts that same-sex 
couples should be able to marry under the existing Marriage Act 1955. It 
was submitted that the Marriage Act 1955 was, in its very essence, silent 
as to the gender of the parties to a marriage, and could therefore be 
interpreted to include same-sex couples. The Court of Appeal held that 
the definition of marriage was so clear – as being between a man and a 
woman only – that it was not possible for the Court to expand the 
meaning to allow same-sex couples to marry. Any such change would 
have to come from the legislature. 
                                                 
9  Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 1 NZLR 641 (per 
Chilwell J): “There can be no doubt that the Treaty is part of the fabric of New 
Zealand society.”  
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In broad terms, we have two possibilities: 
• place the issue before the courts; and / or 
• take the issue back into the legislature. 
It is my view that, if we are to make progress, the most likely course of 
action is to place the matter of same-sex marriage back before the 
courts. However, in doing so, we must ensure that the issue we place 
before the courts should be different from that in Quilter.  
In summary, the possible actions could be any or all of the following:  
TABLE 16: OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Change Through Legislature 
1.  Repeal the Civil Union Act 2004 
2.  Amend the Marriage Act 1955 
3.  Entrench the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act as supreme law 
Change Through Courts 
4.  Declaration of Inconsistency – directly, in relation to the Marriage Act 
5.  Declaration of Inconsistency - indirectly, in relation to the Adoption Act 
6.  Declaration that same-sex marriages performed in Canada are legally 
recognised in New Zealand 
7.  Couple married in Canada challenge New Zealand law by seeking access 
to legal provisions (eg joint adoption) that require the couple to be 
„spouses‟ 
 
I will discuss each of these briefly, and then draw from the thesis, some 
of the issues identified that would need to change in order to ensure 
success with any of these initiatives. 
 
Repeal the Civil Union Act 2004 
On the basis that the Civil Union Act 2004 does not provide full and 
equal treatment to same-sex couples and, on the basis that the uptake of 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 10 
 
 
 
 
 486 
 
civil unions has been exceedingly low, it is worth considering repealing 
the Civil Union Act 2004. 
If there were to be a successful amendment to the Marriage Act 1955, as 
suggested in the next section, existing civil unions could be converted to 
marriages. 
 
Amend the Marriage Act 1955 
In light of the degree of attitudinal shift across many jurisdictions, it 
could be worth seeking an amendment to the marriage Act 1955 to 
enable equal access to marriage for same-sex couples.  
While this was previously discounted on the basis that it would not be 
politically achievable or politically pragmatic, I consider that, with a good 
argument based in human rights principles and leaning on overseas 
developments in recent years, such a change could be possible. 
 
Entrench the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
As we saw in Chapter 6, it was the original intention that the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act should be entrenched legislation.  
With some 20 years since the passing of that Act, consideration should 
be given to the possibility of entrenching the legislation and making it 
supreme law. This would enable more than the existing Declarations of 
Inconsistency under the Human Rights Act 1993, it would enable 
legislation to be declared invalid, or „struck down‟. 
 
Declaration of Inconsistency – The Marriage Act 1955 
In placing the marriage issue before the courts anew, it is important to 
maximise the benefit of the changes to the Human Rights Act 1993 
which have enabled the Human Rights Review Tribunal and the courts, 
should the matter be appealed from the Tribunal, to issue a Declaration 
of Inconsistency.10  
                                                 
10  Application under the Human Rights Act 1993: Part 1A which would, if successful, 
lead to a Declaration of Inconsistency in accordance with the Human Rights Act 
s.92J. 
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A well-crafted submission will ensure the transfer of the onus back to 
the Crown to demonstrate a lawful and objective justification for denying 
access by same-sex couples to marriage.11 
However, even success in obtaining a Declaration of Inconsistency will 
not resolve the issue for us. Because our human rights legislation is not 
supreme, such Declarations do not serve to strike down legislation that 
is non-compliant with human rights legislation. The result of this will be, 
therefore, that the issue will need to be placed before the Legislature.  
Although Parliament is supreme in the making of laws in New Zealand, 
and, technically, is able to legislate in the face of a Declaration of 
Inconsistency, the message that we would be able to take with us from 
the courts to the Legislature would be very strong. This message must be 
that, although the Judiciary defers to Parliament with regard to the 
making of the law, the Judiciary has autonomous jurisdiction to 
interpret the laws of Parliament. Under those laws, it is our view, and it 
would be with this that we seek to persuade the courts, the principle 
which Parliament has itself propounded mandates that, notwithstanding 
the Civil Union Act 2004: 
• the current exclusion of same-sex couples from the ambit of the 
Marriage Act 1955 is discriminatory; and 
• same-sex couples must be included within the ambit of the Marriage 
Act 1955 in order to eliminate that current discrimination. 
 
Declaration of Inconsistency – The Adoption Act 1955 
In parallel with any action seeking a declaration of inconsistency in 
relation to the Marriage Act 1955, it would be worth seeking a 
declaration of inconsistency in relation to the Adoption Act also. 
Although this is a discrete issue, it is an issue closely related to marriage 
(with only married spouses being eligible to file a joint application for 
adoption currently). 
                                                 
11  Using the standard laid down by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s.5. 
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To establish that a couple is being discriminated against because they 
need to be married in order to jointly apply to adopt, and yet they are not 
able to marry because they are in a same-sex relationship, must serve to 
emphasise the inadequacy of the laws in question. 
 
Overseas marriages 
Another issue that we must place before the courts relates to the validity 
of same-sex marriages solemnised in jurisdictions where such marriages 
are legally valid and in accordance with the marriage laws of those 
jurisdictions.12 There are New Zealand same-sex couples who have 
married overseas and how have marriage certificates that prove that they 
are partners to a legally valid marriage. It is assumed that New Zealand 
would recognise the marriage as being legally valid in the country in 
which it was solemnised. However, whether or not that marriage is 
recognised by New Zealand as being legally valid in New Zealand has not 
yet been tested. 
It is possible to apply for a Declaration of Validity by way of an 
application to the Family Court in New Zealand in accordance with the 
Family Proceedings Act 1980: s.27. It should be noted that, in this 
instance, the Family Court has an unfettered discretion to refuse to 
make any such declaration and has no accompanying obligation to 
explain that refusal. 
It is also possible to apply for a Declaration of validity though the High 
Court in accordance with the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908: s.3.  
It is my view that, if we take into account the matters raised in Chapter 
9, with regard to the anomalies that arise with regard to cross-
jurisdictional recognition, and consider seriously the overarching 
principle of comity of laws, particular of marriage laws, a good case can 
be made for recognition. 
 
                                                 
12  Same-sex couples from new Zealand can, for example, enter into a valid legal 
marriage in Canada. The question then becomes whether that marriage is legally 
valid in New Zealand in the same way that a different-sex marriage would be. 
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Overseas marriages – New Zealand entitlements 
It would be possible for a New Zealand same-sex couple who has married 
overseas to test the validity of their marriage in New Zealand by seeking 
access to an entitlement associated with marriage. A prime candidate for 
this test would be for such a couples to seek to adopt in New Zealand, 
relying on the fact that they are legally married overseas and are 
therefore spouses in accordance with the requirements of the Adoption 
Act 1955. 
Once again, I consider that a well-argued case based in human rights 
principles and leaning on developments overseas, would have a 
significant chance of success. 
 
CHANGES TO INCREASE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS 
Declarations of inconsistency 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Human Rights Amendment 
Act 2001 was the introduction into the Human Rights Act 1993 of a 
procedure for making complaints against legislation that is alleged to be 
discriminatory. Under Part 1A of the Human Rights Act, individuals may 
seek a Declaration of Inconsistency in relation to existing legislation. 
To date, the issue of whether or not the Marriage Act 1955 is consistent 
with the Human Rights Act 1955 has not been placed before the courts 
under this provision. It is possible that, notwithstanding Quilter, this 
avenue could now be used to test the status of the Marriage Act. 
In essence, as discussed above, the Quilter case was not about the issue 
of discrimination. The issue in Quilter was whether or not the High 
Court could issue a declaration, as requested by the couples, that same-
sex couples were able to marry under the provisions of the existing 
Marriage Act 1955.  
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A Part 1A case would focus on the issue of discrimination,13 and would 
focus on whether, by being denied access to the Marriage Act 1955, 
same-sex couples are being treated unfairly without reasonable and 
lawful justification. 
If such an application were to be successful, a very strong message 
would be sent to Parliament about which direction it would need to take 
with regard to amending the Marriage Act. 
 
Separation of civil-legal marriage and religious marriage 
One of the key factors inhibiting our progress towards marriage for 
same-sex couples is the inability of some to separate civil-legal marriage 
from sacramental marriage. 
As same-sex couples, we are seeking access to the civil-legal institution 
of marriage. I have no concern over whether or not I am able to marry in 
a church – that concern is the concern of the churches themselves. 
It is worth noting that the Roman Catholic Church currently has the 
ability to decline to celebrate the marriage of a couple who openly 
declare that they do not intend to have children – because this is 
contrary to the tenets of their religion. The Catholic Church and the 
Church of England may also decline to celebrate the marriage of a couple 
where one or both have previously divorced – because divorce is contrary 
to the tenets of their respective religions. Personally, I have no objection 
to any Church declining to celebrate the marriage of a same-sex couple 
where that Church considers that to do so is in conflict with their 
religious beliefs. 
Recent statistics show that fewer different-sex couples are getting 
married in church ceremonies.14 Increasing numbers of marriages are 
occurring in non-religious settings whether these be formal (as in 
„registry offices‟ weddings) or informal settings (such as the family garden 
or on the beach). 
                                                 
13  Under the Human Rights Act 1993 Part 1A, an application made be made to the 
Human Rights Review Tribunal for a Declaration of Inconsistency – essentially, a 
declaration from the Tribunal that a particular statute is discriminatory and is 
inconsistent with New Zealand‟s human rights legislation. 
14  In 2002-2003, 35 per cent of marriages were conducted in churches, 18 per cent in 
a registry office, and 47 per cent were civil services. 
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In France, for example, couples have a civil-legal marriage at the local 
town hall. It is this ceremony that confers upon them the status of 
marriage in the eyes of the law and the community at large. The couple 
may then choose to have this marriage blessed by ceremony at the 
church. It is this ceremony that confers upon them the status of 
marriage in the eyes of the Church. It is interesting to note that Prince 
Charles and Lady Camilla Parker-Bowles, in effect, also married in a 
civil-legal ceremony at the Guildhall in Windsor (the „actual‟ marriage) 
that was followed by a separate religious ceremony at Windsor Chapel 
(the blessing). 
Essentially, in New Zealand, a couple has had the ability to make the 
same choice. However, when the couple has chosen to have a Church 
wedding the two ceremonies – the civil-legal and the religious – occur 
simultaneously. The Minister conducts the civil-legal components of the 
marriage as an accredited marriage celebrant by law, and conducts the 
religious components of the marriage as a Minister of the Church. 
The emphasis here is that we are not seeking to undermine the religious 
marriage ceremony or any specific church‟s right to step aside from 
marrying same-sex couples. We respect their right, on religious grounds, 
to disengage themselves from this process.  
However, we seek access to civil-legal marriage and ask that those 
religions respect our right, on religious grounds, to engage ourselves in 
this process.15 
To me, this is perhaps the key issue facing us at present. It is not the 
idea of recognising same-sex couples and extending relationship 
protections and benefits to them that will stop us from attaining access 
to marriage. It is the “baggage” that goes with the term marriage itself. So 
long as there is an insufficient separation between secular and religious 
concepts of marriage, we will have difficulty in selling the idea of same-
sex couples being able to enter into marriage to some people. Clarifying 
this separation will assist in getting people to think about the proper 
legal issues – equal treatment under the law for same-sex couples – 
rather than the emotive issues of protecting „traditional‟ marriage.  
                                                 
15  Remembering that freedom of religion, by definition, means freedom from religion. 
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The myth of ‘traditional’ marriage 
In my view, there is no such thing as the one and only form of 
„traditional‟ marriage. 
The „traditional‟ marriage that is generally referred to is that between 
husband and wife, and is that which is the foundation of the „traditional‟ 
family. 
First, this „traditional‟ family is one that stems from comparatively recent 
times, and from a narrow cultural perspective.  
The nuclear family based on the marriage relationship stems from Lord 
Hardwicke‟s Act of 1753. Prior to this there were various informal forms 
of marriage – “jumping the broom”,16 marriages in accordance with 
tikanga Maori in New Zealand,17 for example. 
Second, some of the key characteristics of the nuclear family have been 
decried for various (good) reasons. Under the early (strict) nuclear family 
structure, males held power over women, and older males held power 
over younger males. Essentially, married women were the property of 
their husbands, and unmarried women and children were the property of 
their fathers. Women and children could not own property in their own 
right. Women had no decision-making power within the household or 
within wider society. When a young woman married, her father „gave her 
away‟ to her husband. 
However, the „traditional‟ face of marriage has changed – marriage, as an 
institution, has not remained static. To hold on to this „traditional‟ 
institution is to hold on to a myth. Generally, marriage is much more 
likely to be a partnership of equals. Certainly, women are no longer seen 
                                                 
16  “Jumping the broom” is a tradition of African origin. The couple getting married 
jumps over a broom that is laid on the floor. “Jumping the Broom" is a symbol of 
sweeping away the old and welcoming the new, or a symbol of new beginnings, 
http://www.african-weddings.com/jumping_the_broom (Retrieved: 14 August 2009). 
17  Marriages in accordance with tikanga Maori are centrally concerned with 
whakapapa (genealogy). The marriage ceremony essentially consisted of a process 
along the lines of the following: a hui (gathering) of the relatives of each party to the 
marriage including a recitation of the whakapapa of both parties to the marriage, a 
tohunga (Priest) “repeats a prayer or invocation over the twain to preserve them in 
health and prosperity”, a kai kotore (marriage feast) and a whakangahau 
(celebration) were held, after which the „bride‟ and „groom‟ slept together for the first 
time in the wharemoe (sleeping house), 
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as the property of their husbands but are contributors to the intangibles 
of the marriage (the relationship and the family), and the tangibles of the 
marriage (the relationship assets). 
Thirdly, even if the „traditional‟ concept of family were to have been 
adopted (in the „Hyde and Hyde‟ sense)18 it has long since been broken 
down: 
• Civil-legal marriage is not for life – divorce is available.  
• Civil-legal marriage is not dissolved if the exclusivity is broken. And, 
with the availability of divorce, one person may legally have more 
than one partner in marriage during their lifetime – serial 
monogamy. 
Different-sex couples do not have a monopoly on monogamy. I am aware 
of many different-sex couples who have not remained faithful to their 
husband, wife or partner. Conversely, I am aware of many same-sex 
relationships where the partners have been unfailingly monogamous. 
Different-sex couples do not have a monopoly on enduring relationships. 
Currently, about one-third of New Zealand (different-sex) marriages end 
in divorce.19 Conversely, I am aware of many same-sex relationships 
where the partners have been together (in monogamous relationships) 
for more than 10 years – some extending to 40 years plus.20 
If tradition, in and of itself, were sufficient justification, slavery could be 
justified, as could be the subservience of women in marital relationships, 
the inability of women to vote, and interracial marriages would still be 
outlawed (in the United States of America, at least). 
                                                                                                                                     
 http://rsnz.natlib.govt.nz/volume/rsnz_36/rsnz_36_00_000280.pdf, (Retrieved: 14 
August 2009). 
18  “… the voluntary union of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others for 
life”. 
19  In 2002, there were 20, 690 marriages and 10,292 orders for dissolution of 
marriage. About one quarter of the dissolutions were for couples who had been 
married for between 5 and 9 years. Almost one-third of couples who married in 1977 
had divorced (note, not merely separated) before they reached their 25th wedding 
anniversary in 2002: Statistics New Zealand, “Marriage and Divorce”, 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/analytical-reports/dem-trends-03/dem-trends-2003-part-
3-marriage-and-divorce.htm (Retrieved: 26 January 2006). 
20  It must be remembered also that relationships longer than 20 years in duration 
extend back before the days of the Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 to a time when 
the partners faced a much less friendly, and often rather hostile, social climate. 
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In relation to marriage, an adherence to tradition would not allow for 
divorce, and the law would retain severe penalties for adultery. 
Adherence to tradition is not a demonstrable justification for the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. 
There needs to be an understanding that the fact that a particular action 
or state of affairs has traditionally been the case is not a sufficient 
justification for that action or state of affairs to continue.  
 
Religious belief 
The fact that some (or even many) people experience personal discomfort 
with the notion of homosexuality on the basis of their religious beliefs, is 
not sufficient reason to deny access to marriage for same-sex couples. 
Firstly, gays and lesbians have the right to hold their own religious 
beliefs. Secondly, freedom of religious belief means the right to hold any 
religious belief including no religious belief. 
In the civil-legal sense, New Zealand is a secular society. The impacts of 
this are two-fold also. Firstly, no one religious belief has a prevailing 
status over another. Secondly, society at large cannot be bound by the 
religious beliefs of any one religion or any grouping of religions. The right 
to freedom of religious expression, by definition, includes the right to 
freedom from the religious expression of others. 
I suggest that most gays and lesbians would fight for the right of any 
New Zealander to hold and express their disagreement with access to 
marriage for same-sex couples. At the same time, however, we expect the 
same right to express our views on the same issue and the protection of 
our civil-legal right to be freed from discrimination based on our sexual 
orientation. 
There needs to be an understanding that, no matter how genuinely a 
religious belief may be held, and as much as the right of any individual 
to hold a particular religious belief must be respected at all times, that 
religious belief cannot, in New Zealand society, be a basis for the 
formulation of a particular law which follows the tenets of that religion. 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 10 
 
 
 
 
 495 
 
Legitimate expectation 
There are a number of signs that we should reasonably expect that our 
Government and our Parliament will ensure that legislation it passes, 
and the actions of Government, will be free from discrimination. In 
respect of access to marriage for same-sex couples, I would suggest that 
we should reasonably expect that Government and Parliament will not 
discriminate. The following factors give rise to, and do not negate, this 
notion of „legitimate expectation‟. 
• The Parliament of New Zealand has acceded to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – which provides that there 
shall be no discrimination. 
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mandates 
that States Parties shall actively legislate to remove discrimination. 
• The New Zealand Parliament has not passed any legislation to 
actively negate any of its obligations under the international human 
rights covenants to which it is a signatory. 
• The New Zealand Parliament has no reservations on any of the 
international human rights treaties which would negate its accepted 
obligations in relation to prohibitions against discrimination. 
• Rather, Parliament has passed the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 which proclaims that it is “An Act to affirm, protect, and 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand, 
and to affirm New Zealand‟s commitment to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
• Parliament has passed the Human Rights Act 1993 which, with its 
more recent amendments, mandates that there shall be no 
discrimination in New Zealand on the grounds of sexual orientation, 
sex (gender), or marital status (all of which are relevant in the same-
sex marriage issue). 
• Parliament has passed a specific amendment to the Human Rights 
Act 1993 enabling individuals to seek a Declaration of Inconsistency 
in relation to any legislation which they can show to be 
discriminatory. 
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• Contrary to the legislatures of a number of states in the USA, the 
New Zealand Parliament has chosen not to legislate to restrict 
marriage to a man and a woman only. 
• Unlike the Government of Australia, New Zealand‟s Government has 
not sought to restrict same-sex couples, one or both of whom are 
New Zealand citizens or residents, from marrying in an overseas 
jurisdiction where same-sex marriage is valid and legal. 
In the presence of indications from the Government and Parliament of 
New Zealand of its commitment to ensuring the presence of prescribed 
human rights standards and, in the absence of any indications from the 
Government or Parliament of any negation of those commitments, it is 
wholly reasonable that gays and lesbians in New Zealand should expect 
that all barriers to equal treatment will be withdrawn, and that they can 
expect full and equal treatment under the law. 
 
One law for all 
Members of three parties in Parliament have associated themselves with 
the catch-cries “One law for all” and “One standard of citizenship for 
all”.21 This call has been made in the context of issues relating to the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and the occasional suggestions that there might be a 
case for a separate Maori legal system in New Zealand, or that, at least, 
there should be greater recognition of tikanga Maori (Maori customary 
lore) within the mainstream courts system.  
These catch-cries have not been voiced in relation to same-sex marriage. 
However, I consider that the same principle can be applied validly to the 
marriage context. If those same MPs who advocate “one law for all” with 
regard to Treaty of Waitangi or race-based issues were to apply that 
same logic to marriage, the logical extension would be that same-sex 
couples would be permitted to marry (or, conversely, no couples would 
be permitted to marry). In the main, however, those who advocate “one 
law for all” in one situation are the very ones who advocate the 
preservation of marriage for the exclusive use of heterosexuals only. 
It is not logically possible to advocate a principle and then to advocate 
the application of that principle on a selective basis – this makes a 
                                                 
21  National, New Zealand First, and ACT. 
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mockery of the term “principle”. In this instance, for example, it is not 
possible to have a principle of “one law for all” that applies only to 
“some”. 
In human rights terms, it is not plausible to have anti discrimination 
provisions that apply to all persons, and then exercise those provisions 
only in relation to some of those persons.  
 
Human rights not populist 
In the latter part of the 1990s and into the first half of the 2000s, we 
have witnessed an increase in the call for public referenda on a range of 
issues. In the United States of America, for example, this has taken the 
form of referenda seeking a mandate to amend State constitutions to 
prevent the possibility of marriage by same-sex couples. The marriage 
case in Hawai‟i, that was successful in the courts but was subsequently 
denied by constitutional amendment resulting from public referendum, 
is a prime example. 
Setting aside the standard Parliamentary Select Committee process in 
New Zealand, which provides an avenue for public submissions on any 
Bill being considered by Parliament, the first significant call for public 
views on the legal recognition of same-sex relationships came in the 
Ministry of Justice Discussion Paper “Same-Sex Couples and the Law” in 
1999.22 This was the first time that Government had attempted to 
canvass extensively the wider population about matters affecting gays 
and lesbians, their relationships and their families. 
Unfortunately, as a matter of principle, seeking public views on issues of 
human rights is fundamentally flawed. One of the key purposes of 
human rights legislation is to protect minority groups from majoritarian 
prejudice. This cannot result from an exercise which seeks to put in 
place the suggestions of the majority group on how they consider the 
minority group should be treated. 
The only time this would not ring true would be when the majority group 
has already been persuaded that certain forms of treatment are 
                                                 
22  Ministry of Justice, “Same-Sex Couples And The Law”, Ministry of Justice, 
Wellington (1999). 
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acceptable and certain other forms of treatment are not acceptable. In 
this circumstance, there would probably be no need to seek public views 
as there would be no opposition to equality and no large measure of 
discrimination to overcome. 
In other words, Parliament has gone to some length to ensure that, on 
paper at least, there are significant provisions in place designed to 
protect the rights of minority groups. It is untenable, therefore, to 
consider holding a public referendum to measure whether or not a 
majority group approves of treating a protected minority group with 
dignity, care and concern, respect in a manner that constitutes equality 
under the law. 
 
International drivers 
In 2001, The Netherlands was the first country in the world to allow 
equal access to marriage for same-sex couples. In 2009, there are 7 
countries, and 6 States within the United States of America, that permit 
same-sex marriage (13 jurisdictions in all). Five of these jurisdictions 
have provided this equal access within the last year or so. The extent of 
change in those overseas jurisdictions, and the momentum that has 
gathered in a very short period of time, must eventually have an impact 
on New Zealand. 
A greater adherence to international human rights laws must also 
influence New Zealand‟s future direction. Since the mid-1900s, with the 
initiation of international human rights laws and the subsequent 
development of international covenants to which New Zealand has 
acceded, New Zealand has accepted a raft of international human rights 
obligations. As the monitoring and enforcement of the international 
standards becomes consolidated, New Zealand may find itself under 
greater pressure, both domestically and internationally, to adhere to 
these standards.   
In relation to marriage, in particular, there is a significant role for the 
rules of comity.23 New Zealand is now in a position whereby its gay and 
lesbian citizens who are in relationships and wish to have those 
relationships recognised by way of marriage can travel overseas and get 
                                                 
23  See earlier discussion in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8.  
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married. The comity of laws – especially insofar as it relates to marriage – 
could be vitally crucial in facilitating access to marriage for same-sex 
couples in New Zealand. 
 
A FINAL WORD 
As the motto of LeGaLE states, “Only equal = equal”.24  
In relation to the recognition of caring, loving, committed interpersonal 
relationships, there are only two ways in which same-sex couples can be 
granted full and equal treatment compared with their different-sex 
counterparts. The two possibilities are that: 
Either same-sex couples must be provided with access to marriage 
under existing marriage legislation; 
Or the Marriage Act 1955 must be repealed so that neither same-
sex couples nor different-sex couples have access to marriage 
legislation. 
So long as those in positions of power are unable to understand some of 
the most fundamental issues outlined in this thesis, we can expect the 
barriers to same-sex marriage to remain unjustly in place. 
Conversely, at such time as logic, reason and understanding prevails, we 
will have reached the point where we can say, not only in theory but also 
in practice, that there are no impediments to same-sex marriage in New 
Zealand. 
I return to, what for me has become, an iconic quote from Justice 
Thomas of the Court of Appeal in the Quilter case:25 
… gays and lesbians are denied access to a central social institution and the 
resulting status of married persons. They lose the rights and privileges, 
including the manifold legal consequences which marriage conveys. They 
are denied a basic civil right in that freedom to marry is rightly regarded as 
a basic civil right. They lose the opportunity to choose the partner of their 
choice as a marriage partner, many again viewing the right to choose as a 
basic civil right of all citizens. In a real sense, gays and lesbians are 
effectively excluded from full membership of society. 
                                                 
24  LeGaLE is a group formed by the author with a focus on equal access to marriage for 
same-sex couples, and in interest in other legal issues affecting same-sex couples. 
25  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523: 537 (per Thomas J). 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 Chapter 10 
 
 
 
 
 500 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 501 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
CASES .......................................................................................................................................... 502 
LEGISLATION ........................................................................................................................... 506 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DOCUMENTS ............................................... 508 
BOOKS ........................................................................................................................................ 509 
PUBLISHED ARTICLES / PAPERS / SPEECHES ................................................................ 513 
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS / PAPERS / SUBMISSIONS .................................... 526 
HANSARDS ................................................................................................................................. 532 
MEDIA SOURCES ..................................................................................................................... 532 
 
 
 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 502 
 
 
CASES 
A v R [1999] NZFLR 249 
Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 
App.No. 12513/86 v United Kingdom [1989] 11 EHRR 49 
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 
Attorney-General v Family Court at Otahuhu (1994) 12 FRNZ 643; [1995] NZFLR 
57 (HC) 
B v B (Minors) (Custody, Care and Control) (1992] 21 Family Law 174 
B v P [1992] NZFLR 545 
B v Director-General of Social Welfare Unreported (AP 71/96. High Court, 
Wellington. 17 May 1997: Gallen and Goddard JJ) 
B v France (Transsexual) (1992] 22 Family Law 491; also [1993] 16 EHRR 1 
Baehr v Lewin 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) 
Baehr v Lewin First Circuit Court, Hawaii (1991) [Full citation not known] 
Baehr v Lewin 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) 
Baehr v Miike No.91-1394, First Circuit Court, Hawaii (1996) 
Baehr v Miike 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391 (1999) 
Baker v Nelson 291 Minn 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971) appeal dismissed, 409 
U.S. 810 (1972) 
Baker v. State 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) 
Barbeau et al v Canada (Attorney-General) et al 2003 BCCA 251 
Black v A-G (2000) 6 HRNZ 257 
Bowers v Hardwick 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) 
Braschi v Stahl Associates 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S. 2d 784 
(1989) 
Brause v Bureau of Vital Statistics No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998) 
Broeks v The Netherlands Communication No.172/1984 (UNHRC) 
C v C (A Minor) (Custody Appeal) [1991] 21 Family Law 175 
Coburn v Human Rights Commission [1994] 2 NZLR 257 
Cossey v United Kingdom (Case No. 16/1989/176/232) [1991] 21 Family Law 
362; also [1991] 13 EHRR 49 
Craig Dean and Patrick Gill v District of Columbia No.90-C.A.-13892 (D.C. 
Super.Ct. filed Nov.26, 1990) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 503 
 
Dean & Gill v District of Columbia No.90-C.A.-13892 (D.C. Super.Ct. filed 
Nov.26, 1990) 
Deane et al v Conaway et al (unreported, Circuit Court, Balitmore City, Case No. 
24-C-04-005390: 19 January 2006): citing Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-
35, 116 S.Ct. 120, 1628 (1996); and Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582-583, 
123 S.Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) 
Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292: 305 
Douglas v Canada  [1992] 19 CHRR 76 
Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and 
Others (10 September 2002) 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom [1981] 4 EHRR 149 
E.B. v France (Application No. 43546/02) (22 January 2008) 
EGALE Canada Inc et al v Attorney-General of Canada et al 2001 B.C.S.C. 1365 
Egan v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 
Fourie & Bonthuys and Lesbian and Gay Equality Project and Others v Minister 
of Home Affairs and Director-General of Home Affairs (Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, CCT 60/04 and CCT 10/05: 17 May 2005; 1 December 2005) 
Frette v France (36515/97) 
G v R (1989) 5 FRNZ 78 
Goodridge v Department Of Public Health 440 Mass. 309 (2003) 
Griswold 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
Haig v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (1992) 16 C.H.R.R. D/226, 
D/230 
Halpern v Canada (Attorney-General) (2002, 60 O.R. (3d) 321 (Div.Ct.) 
Halpern v Canada (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 161. 
Hamilton v Jurgens [1996] NZFLR 350  
Hendricks & Leboeuf v Attorney-General of Quebec & Attorney-General of 
Canada et al (Superior Court, Montreal, Quebec – N.500-05-059656-007, 8-15 
November 2001) 
Hendricks & LeBoeuf v Le Procureur General du Canada et La Procureure 
Generale du Quebec (Cour D‟Appel, Montreal, Canada – 500-09-012719-027 
(500-05-059656-007): (19 March 2004) 
Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 1 NZLR 641 
Hyde v Hyde & Woodmansee (1866) [1861-73] All ER 175 
In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. App. 1991) 
In the matter of C [Adoption] [2008] NZFLR 141 (Judge Walsh) 
In the Matter of J (Adoption) [1998] NZFLR 961 
In the matter of R [Adoption] NZFLR 145 (Judge Inglis) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 504 
 
In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384] 
J and B v Director General, Department of Home Affairs, and Others (28 March 
2003) 
J v J (1987) 3 FRNZ 33 
Jones v Hallahan (1973) 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) 
Joslin v New Zealand Communication No 902/1999 (UNHRC) 
Julian v McWatt [1998] NZFLR 257 
Kerrigan v Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 957 A.2d 407 (2008). 
Knodel v British Columbia (Medical Services Commission) (1991) 58 BCLR (2d) 
356 (S.C.), 371 
Law v Canada (Minister of Immigration) [1999] I.S.R.C. 497 
Lawrence v Texas 539 U.S. 558, 582-583, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) 
Layland v Ontario Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations (1993) 104 
D.L.R. (4th) 214 (Ont.Div.Ct) 
Leshner v Ontario (No. 2) (1992) 16 CHRR D/184 (Ont. Bd. Inq.) 
Lindo v Bellisario (1795) 1 Hag Con 215 
Loving v Virginia 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
M v C [2004] NZFLR 695 
M v H (1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) 
McKendrick v Denholm (1994) 12 FRNZ 231 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353: 374 
Minister of Home Affairs & Director General of Home Affairs v Fourie & Bonthuys 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa – CCT 60/04: 17 May 2005; 1 December 
2005) 
Modinos v Cyprus 7/1992/352/426, Council of Europe: European Court of 
Human Rights, 23 March 1993 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 
Mossop v Canada (Attorney General) [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 
MOT v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) 
Neate v Hutton [1992] NZFLR 314 
Norris v Ireland 1988-10-26 142 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Norris v Ireland 1987-03-12 142 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 
North and Matheson County Court of Winnipeg (1974) 
P v K [2003] NZFLR 489 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 505 
 
P v K [2006] NZFLR 22 
Poe 367 U.S. 497 
Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] 14 FRNZ 430 (High Court, Auckland) 
Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (Court Of Appeal, Wellington) 
Re Adoption by Paul and Hauraki [1993] NZFLR 266 
Re Application by T [1998] NZFLR 769 
Re C (A Minor) 139 New Law Journal 226 (1988); UK Ct of App. (Civ. Div.), 14 
Dec.1988 
Re D (Adoption) [2000] NZFLR 529 
Re Kevin [2001] FamCA 1074 
Re T W [Adoption] (1998) 17 FRNZ 349 (Judge von Dadelszen) 
Rees v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56 
Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage (Supreme Court of Canada – 29866: 6 and 7 
October 2004; 9 December 2004) 
Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35, 116 S.Ct. 120, 1628 (1996) 
Runyon v McCarthy 427 U.S. 160 (1976) 
Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (High Court: 
25 July 2002); confirmed by Satchwell v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Another (Constitutional Court: 17 March 2003) 
Singer v Hara 11 Wash App 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) 
Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
T v T [1994] NZFLR 586 
T v T [1998] NZFLR 776 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 
Thompson v Department of Social Welfare [1994] 2 NZLR 369 
Tinker 393 U.S. 503 
Toonen v Australia Communication No. 488/1992 (UNHRC) 
Varnum v Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, (Iowa 2009). 
Veysey v The Commissioner of Correctional Services (1990) 29 F.T.R. 64 
Vogel v Manitoba [1992] 16 CHRR 233 
V P v P M (1998) 16 FRNZ 621 
Vriend v Alberta [1994] 20 CHRR 358 
Zablocki v Redhail 434 U.S. at 374 (1978) 
 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 506 
 
 
LEGISLATION 
Accident Compensation Insurance Act 1992 
Accident Insurance Act 1998 
Acts Interpretation Act 1924 
Administration Act 1969 
Adoption Act 1955 
Alaska Marriage Code A.S.25.05.011(a) (Alaska, USA) 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 
Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Bill 1995 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada) 
Care of Children Act 2004 
Child Support Act 1991 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK) 
Civil Union Act 2004 
Civil Unions (Recognised Overseas Relationships) Regulations 2005 
Crimes Amendment Act 1941 
Criminal Code Act 1893 
Criminal Justice Act 1954 
De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (Northern Territory, Australia) 
Domestic Protection Act 1982 
Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (Australian Capital Territories, Australia) 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 
Electoral Act 1893 
Electoral Act 1952 
Electricity Act 1992 
Family Proceedings Act 1980 
Family Protection Act 1955 
Family Relationships Act 1975 (South Australia) 
Guardianship Act 1968 
Hawaii (Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law (Act 383) 1997  
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 507 
 
Harassment Act 1997 
Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986 
Housing Restructuring (Income-Related Rents) Act 2000 
Human Rights Act 1993 
Human Rights Amendment Act 1999 
Human Rights Commission Act 1972 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
Insolvency Act 2006 
Interpretation Act 1999 
Land Transfer Act 1952 
Law Commission Act 1985 
Marriage Act 1955 
Medical Services Act Regulations 144/68 s.2.01 (British Columbia, Canada) 
Mortgagors and Lessees Rehabilitation Act 1936 
Matrimonial Property Act 1976 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
Offences Against the Person Act 1867 
Old Age Pensions Act 1898 
Property Law Act 1952 
Property Law Act 2007 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (New South Wales, Australia) 
Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 
Registration of Partnership Act (No.372) 1989 (Denmark) 
Relationships Act 2003 (Tasmania, Australia)  
Relationships Act 2008 (Victoria, Australia)  
Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 
Status of Children Act 1969 
Sentencing Act 2002 
Significant Personal Relationships Act (New South Wales, Australia)  
Vermont Constitution (Vermont, USA) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 508 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW DOCUMENTS 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) (1990) 
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery (League of Nations) (1952) 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951). 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) (1969) 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) (1979) 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008) 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(signed by New Zealand on 26 May 1989 and entered into force for New Zealand 
on 26 August 1989) 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
“Promotion And Protection Of Human Rights: Fundamental Standards Of 
Humanity”, (“The Syracusa Principles”), Report of the Secretary General, 
GENERAL E/CN.4/1999/92 (18 December 1998) 
“Convention On Consent To Marriage, Minimum Age For Marriage And 
Registration Of Marriages”, Opened for signature and ratification by General 
Assembly resolution 1763 A (XVII) of 7 November 1962, entry into force 9 
December 1964 in accordance with Article 6 
“Recommendation On Consent To Marriage, Minimum Age For Marriage And 
Registration Of Marriages”, General Assembly resolution 2018 (XX) of 1 
November 1965 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.18 – on the 
meaning of “Non-Discrimination” (10 November 1989) 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.23 – on the 
meaning of “Non-Discrimination” (10 November 1989) 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning 
of Article 17 (1988) 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment – on the meaning 
of “Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage, and Equality of the Spouses” 
(27 July 1990) 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.3 - 
Implementation at the National Level Article 2 (31 July 1981) 
United Nations, General Comment No.18 (9 November 1989) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 509 
 
“Declaration of Montreal” endorsed by participants of the International 
Conference on LGBT Human Rights, Montreal, Canada (July 2006) 
“Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of Human Rights Law in Relation to 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity”, launched on 26 March 2007 
 
BOOKS 
Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group Out Law: A Legal Guide For Lesbians 
and Gay Men in New Zealand, Auckland Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Group, 
Auckland, New Zealand (1994) 
Babbie, Earl, The Practice Of Social Research, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
California, USA (1992) 
Bennion, F.A.R. (Ed), Bennion On Statutory interpretation: A Code, 5th Edition, 
LexisNexis, UK (2008) 
Boswell, John, The Marriage Of Likeness: Same-Sex Unions In Pre-Modern 
Europe, Harper Collins, London (1994) 
Bossuyt, Marc J., Guide To The „Travaux Preparatoires‟ Of The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 
(1987) 
Bozett, Frederick W., (Ed) Homosexuality And The Family, Harrington Park 
Press, New York (1989) 
Bullough, V., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979) 
Butler, Andrew, and Butler, Petra, The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act: A 
Commentary, LexisNexis NZ Limited, Wellington (2005) 
Carr, W., and Kemmis, S., Becoming Critical: Education, Knowledge And Action 
Research Lewes, Falmer (1986) 
Cassell, Catherine, and Symon, Gillian, (Eds), Qualitative Methods In 
Organizational Research: A Practical Guide, Sage Publications, London (1994) 
Chen, Mai, and Palmer, Sir Geoffrey, Public Law In New Zealand: Cases, 
Materials, Commentary, And Questions, Oxford University Press, Auckland 
(1994) 
Conte, Alex, & Davidson, Scott, and Burchill, Richard, Defining Civil And 
Political Rights: The Jurisprudence Of The United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Surrey, UJ (2004) 
Crisp, Quentin, (Ed), The Gay And Lesbian Quotation Book: A Literary 
Companion, Robert Hale, London (1995) 
Bullough, Vern L., Homosexuality: A History, Meridian Books, New York (1979) 
Collier, Richard, Masculinity, Law And The Family, Routledge, London (1995) 
Dannecker, Martin, Theories Of Homosexuality, Gay Men‟s Press, London (1981) 
Donnelly, J, Universal Human Rights In Theory And Practice, 2nd Edition, 
Cornell University Press, New York, USA (2003) 
Downing, Christine, Myths And Mysteries Of Same-Sex Love, Continuum, New 
York (1989) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 510 
 
 
Editors of the Harvard Law Journal, Sexual Orientation And The Law, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England (1990) 
Eekelaar, J., A Reader On Family Law 
Eekelaar, J. and Katz, S. (Eds), Marriage And Cohabitation In Contemporary 
Societies: Areas Of Legal, Social And Ethical Change: An International And 
Interdisciplinary Study, Butterworth's, Toronto (1980) 
Eichler, Margrit, Families In Canada Today: Recent Changes And Their Policy 
Consequences, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto (1988) 
Eskridge, William N., From Sexual Liberty To Covilized Commitment: The Case 
For Same-Sex Marriage, Free Press, New York (1996) 
Eskridge, Willian N., and Spedale, Darren R., Gay Marriage: For Better Or For 
Worse? What We‟ve Learned From The Evidence, Oxford University Press, New 
York (2006) 
Evans, J., Statutory Interpretation: Problems Of Communication, Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, New Zealand (1988) 
Foucault, Michel, The History Of Sexuality (Volume 1: An Introduction), 
Pantheon Books, New York (1978) 
Foucault, Michel, The History Of Sexuality (Volume 2: The Use of Pleasure), 
Penguin Books (1987) 
Fredman, Sandra, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2002) 
Frieden, Betty, The Second Stage, Summit Books, New York (1981) 
Gabaj, Robert P., and Purcell, David W., (Eds), On The Road To Same-Sex 
Marriage: A Supportive Guide To Psychological, Political, And Legal Issues, 
Jossey-Bass, San Francisco (1998) 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds), Understanding Human Rights, Pinter, 
London and New York (1996) 
Greenberg, David F., The Construction Of Homosexuality, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago & London (1988) 
Guy, Laurie, Worlds In Collision: The Gay Debate In New Zealand, 1960-1986, 
Victoria University Press, Wellington (2002) 
Harris, Jennifer, and Wisker, Alistair, Marriage, B.T.Batsford Ltd, London (1976) 
Heinze, Eric, Sexual Orientation – A Human Right: An Essay On International 
Human Rights Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston (1995) 
Herdt, Gilbert, The Sambia: Ritual And Gender In New Guinea, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., Fort Worth (1987) 
Hite, Shere, The Hite Report On The Family: Growing Up Under Patriarchy, 
Bloomsbury, London (1994) 
Inglis, B.D., Family Law, Sweet and Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington (1960) 
Isay, Richard A., Being Homosexual: Gay Men And Their Development, Penguin 
Books, London, (1989) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 511 
 
Joseph, Sarah, et al, The International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials, And Commentary (Second Edition), Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, (2004) 
Jorgensen, Danny L., Participant Observation: A Methodology For Human 
Studies, Sage, Newbury Park, Calif. (1996) 
Kenner, Jeff, EU Employment Law: From Rome To Amsterdam And Beyond, Hart 
Publishing (2003) 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc, Adoption By Lesbians And Gay 
Men: An Overview Of The Law In The 50 States, Lambda Legal Defense And 
Education Fund (1996) 
Marshall, Andrew, Together Forever?: The Gay Guide To Good Relationships, Pan 
Books, London (1995) 
Massey, A., and Walford, G., (Eds), Methodology Triangulation, Or How To Get 
Lost Without Being Found Out, JAI Press, Stamford (1999) 
Maxwell, Joseph A., Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach, Sage 
Publications, California (1996) 
Mendola, Mary, The Mendola Report: A New Look At Gay Couples, Crown 
Publishers Inc., New York (1980) 
Metge, Dame Joan, The Maoris of New Zealand, (specifically Chapter 9, „Kinship‟) 
Mohr, Richard D., Gays/Justice: A Study Of Ethics, Society And Law, Columbia 
University Press, New York (1988) 
Mount, Fredinand, The Subversive Family: An Alternative History Of Love And 
Marriage, Jonathan Cape, London (1982) 
Newbold, Greg, Crime and Deviance, Auckland, Oxford University Press (1992) 
O‟Donovan, K., Family Law Matters, Pluto Press, London (1993) 
Pallone, Nathaniel J., (Ed), Race, Ethnicity, Sexual Orientation, Violent Crime: 
The Realities And The Myths, The Haworth Press Inc., New York, (2000) 
Parker, Stephen, Informal Marriage 
Parker, Stephen, The Marriage Act 1753: A Case Study In Family Law-Making, 
Oxford University Press (1987) 
Payne, Geoff, and Payne, Judy, Key Concepts In Social Research Sage Key 
Concepts, California (2004) 
Pearsall, R., Public Purity, Private Shame: Victorian Sexual Hypocrisy Exposed, 
Weiderfield & Nicholson, London (1976) 
Reinharz, Shulamit, Feminist Methods In Social Research, Oxford University 
Press, New York (1992) 
Robertson, David, A Dictionary of Human Rights, Europa Publications Ltd, 
London (1997) 
Rodley, Nigel E., The Treatment Of Prisoners Under International Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford (1987) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 512 
 
Ropers, Richard H., and Pence, Dan J., American Prejudice: With Liberty and 
Justice For Some, Plenum Press, New York (1995) 
Rowse, A.L., Homosexuals In History: A Study Of Ambivalence In Society, 
Literature And The Arts, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London (1977) 
Schraz, Michael, and Walker, Rob, Research As Social Change: New 
Opportuinties For Qualitative Research, Routledge, London (1995) 
Smith, Rhona K.M., Textbook On International Human Rights (Second Edition), 
Oxford University Press, New York, (2005) 
Spiller, P. (Ed), Butterworth‟s New Zealand Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, 
LexisNexis Butterworths, Wellington (2002) 
Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Now: Families, Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington (December 1994) 
Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Now: Families And Households, Statistics 
New Zealand, Wellington (October 1998) 
Statistics New Zealand, Families And Households: New Zealand Census Of 
Households And Dwellings 2001), Statistics New Zealand, Wellington (December 
2002) 
Stone, Lawrence, The Family, Sex And Marriage In England: 1500-1800, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London (1977) 
Strasser, Mark, Legally Wed: Same-Sex Marriage And The Constitution, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca (1997) 
Stringer, Ernest T., Action Research: A Handbook For Practitioners, Sage 
Publications, California (1996) 
Sullivan, Andrew, Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality, Picador, 
London (1995) 
Symonds, Janusz, Human Rights: Concepts And Standards, UNESCO 
Publishing, England (2005) 
Symonides, Janusz, (Ed), Human Rights: Concept And Standards, UNESCO 
Publishing, Aldershot and Burlington, (2000) 
Tarnopolsky, Walter Surma, The Canadian Bill Of Rights, Carleton Library, 
Ottawa (1975) 
Toner, Helen, Partnership Rights, Free Movement, And EU Law, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford (2004) 
Waaldijk, Kees, and Clapham, Andrew (Eds), Homosexuality: A European 
Community Issue: Essays On Lesbian And Gay Rights In European Law And 
Policy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, International 
Studies in Human Rights - Vol 26 
Walker, D.M., The Oxford Companion To Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1980) 
Weisberg, Herbert F., and Bowen, Bruce D., An Introduction To Survey Research 
And Data Anlysis, W H Freeman and Company, San Francisco (1977) 
Wintemute, Robert, and Andenaes, Mads, (Eds), Legal recognition Of Same-Sex 
Relationships: A Study Of National, European, and International Law, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing (2001) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 513 
 
Wolfson, Evan, Why Marriage Matters: America, Equality And Gay People‟s Right 
To Marry, Simon & Schuster, New York (2004) 
Workers‟ Power (Britain) Lesbian And Gay Liberation: A Trotskyist Strategy, 
Workers‟ Power (Britain), London (1991) 
 
PUBLISHED ARTICLES / PAPERS / SPEECHES 
Achtenberg, Roberta, "Thanking The Right Wing", in [1993] 8 Berkeley Women's 
Law Journal 166 
Agnos, Dean, “Employee Benefits And The Paradox Of Same-Sex Marriages And 
Equal Rights”, in [2005-06] 8 U.Pa.J.Lab. & Emp.L. 543 
Ahdar, Rex Tauati, “The Right To Protection Of Religious Feelings”, in [2008] Vol. 
11, No. 4 Otago Law Review 629 
Allen, James, “No To A Written Constitution”, paper presented to the “Building 
the Constitution Conference”, Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Apel, Susan B., “Why Marriage Still Matters: A Response To Professor Greg 
Johnson‟s Essay „Civil Union: A Reappraisal‟ ”, in [2005-06] 30 Vt.L.Rev. 913 
Atkin, Bill, “Changing Family Forms World Themes And African Issues”, in 
[1997] 7 New Zealand Family Law Journal 172 
Atkin, Bill, “Child Support: Supporting Whom?”, in [1999] VUWLRev 35 
Atkin, Bill, “Editorial: When Is Enough Enough?”, in [2004] 4:12 New Zealand 
Family Law Journal 283 
Atkinson, Max, “Homosexual Law Reform”, in [1992] 11 University of Tasmania 
Law Review 206 
Aucoin, Peter, Smith, Jennifer, and Dinsdale Geoff, Responsible Government: 
Clarifying Essentials, Dispelling Myths And Exploring Change, Canadian Centre 
for Management Development, Canada (2004) 
Austin, Graeme W., “Queering Family Law”, in [1999] 8 Australasian Gay & 
Lesbian L. J. 39 
Badian, Sasha, “Same-Sex Unions And Domestic Partnership”, in [2001-02] 3 
Geo. J. gender & L. 355 
Barton, Chris, "Recognition Of Homosexual Marriage: A Case?", in [1990] 20 
Family Law (Australian) 209 
Barton, Chris, "Pre-Nuptial And Cohabitation Contracts: In At The Birth", in 
[1990] 20 Family Law (Australian) 
Bates, Frank, "When Is A Wife ...?", in [1993] 7 Australian Family Law Journal 
274 
Bennett, Barbara, “InhuMAN Rights: Women And Children Lose Again”, in [1997] 
Broadsheet 57 
Bonauto, Mary, “Ending Marriage Discrimination: A Work In Progress”, in [2007] 
XL:4 Suffolk University Law Review 813 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 514 
 
Boyd, Susan, "Expanding The "Family" In Family Law: Recent Ontario Proposals 
On Same Sex Relationships", in [1994] 7 Canadian Journal of Women and the 
Law 545 
Botd, Susan, and Young, Claire F.L., “ „Form Same-Sex To No Sex?‟: Trends 
Towards Recognition Of (Same-Sex) Relationships In Canada”, in [2002-03] 1 
Seattle J. Soc. Just. 757 
Bradley, David, "Homosexuality And Child Custody In English Law", in [1987] 1 
International Journal of Law and the Family 155 
Bradney, Anthony, "Transsexuals And The Law", in [1987] 17 Family Law 
(Australian) 350 
Breuer, Franz & Mruck, Katja, and Roth, Wolff-Michael, “Subjectivity And 
Reflexivity: An Introduction”, in [2002] 3:3 Forum: Qualitative Social Research 
Art.9, http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/ (Retrieved: 29 July 2009) 
Brodsky, Gwen, "Out Of The Closet And Into A Wedding Dress: Struggles For 
Lesbian And Gay Legal Equality", in [1994] 7 Canadian Journal of Women and 
the Law 523 
Brown, Carrie, “Gender-Role Implications On Same-Sex Intimate Partner Abuse”, 
in [2008] 23 J Fam Viol 457 
Buchanan, G., "Same-Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue" in [1985] 10:3 
University of Dayton Law Review 541 
Butler, Andrew, “Same-Sex Marriage And Freedom From Discrimination In New 
Zealand”, in [1998] Public Law 396 
Butler, Andrew, “Limiting Rights”, in [2002] VUWLRev 537 
Butler, Petra, “Human Rights And Parliamentary Sovereignty In New Zealand”, in 
[2004] VUWLRev 12 
Caldwell, John, "The High Court Declaration On Transsexual Marriages", in 
[1995] 1 Butterworths Family Law Journal 204 
Canada Privy Council Office, “Governing Responsibly: A Guide For Ministers And 
Ministers Of State”, Canada Privy Council Office (December 2003) 
Carlson-Wallrath, Sarah, “Why The Institution Of Civil Marriage Must Be 
Extended To Same-Sex Couples”, in [2004-2005] 26 Journal of Public Law & 
Policy 73 
Cartwright, The Honourable Dame Sylvia, PCNZM, DBE, Governor-General of 
New Zealand, Speech of her Swearing-In Ceremony, Parliament House, 
Wellington, New Zealand (4 April 2001) 
Cartwright, The Honourable Dame Sylvia, PCNZM, DBE, Governor-General of 
New Zealand, Speech to the United Nations Association of New Zealand, 
Wellington, New Zealand (25 May 2001) 
Casswell, Donald G., “Moving Towards Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2001] 80 La 
Revue du Barreau Canadien 810 
Chauveau, Veronique, and Hutchinson, Anne-Marie, "A Short History Of 
Cohabitation And Marriage", in [1995] New Law Journal 304 
 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 515 
 
Chemerinsky, Erwin, “Same-Sex Marriage: An Essential Step Towards Equality”, 
in [2005] 34 Southwestern University Law Review 579 
Christianson, Eric C., “Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic 
Rights And The South African Constitutional Court”, in [2006-07] Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 38  
Colombo, Monica, “Reflexivity And Narratives In Action Research: A Discursive 
Approach”, in [2003] 4:2 Forum: Qualitative Social Research Art.6, 
http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/ (Retrieved: 29 July 2009) 
Christie, Nigel C., “The New Zealand Same-Sex Marriage Case: From Aotearoa To 
The United Nations”, in Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenaes (Eds), Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and 
International Law, Hart Publishing, London (2000): 317 
Christie, Nigel C., “Same-Sex Relationships In The Nature Of Marriage”, in (2003) 
6 HRLP 188 
Cheer, Ursula, “More Censorship, Discrimination And The Bill of Rights”, in 
[2000] NZLJ 472 
Choukroune, Leila, “Justiciability Of Social, And Cultural Rights: The UN 
Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights‟ Review Of China‟s First 
Periodic Report On The Implementation Of the International Covenant On 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights”, in [2005-06] Colum.J.Asian.L. 30 
Coles, Matt, "The Right Forum, The Right Issue: Initiatives And Family Values", 
in [1993] Berkeley Women's Law Journal 180 
Collins, Tara M., “The Significance Of Different Approaches To Human Rights 
Monitoring: A Case Study Of Child Rights”, in [2008] Vol. 12, No. 2 The 
International Journal Of Human Rights 159 
Cooke, Sir Robin, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, “The Role Of The Judges”, a paper 
presented at the “Building The Constitution” Conference, Wellington, New 
Zealand (7-8 April 2000): 67 
Cooper, Davina, and Herman, Didi, "Getting 'The Family Right': Legislating 
Heterosexuality In Britain, 1986-1991", in [1991] 10 Canadian Journal of Family 
Law 41 
Cox, Barbara J., “Adoptions By Lesbian And Gay Parents Must Be Recognised By 
Sister States Under The Full Faith And Credit Clause Despite Anti-Marriage 
Statues That Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples”, in [2003] 31 Capital 
University Law Review 751 
Cox, Barbara J., "Same-Sex Marriage And Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry In Hawaii, 
Are We Still Married When We Return Home?", in [1994] 5 Wisconsin Law Review 
1033 
Craig, P.P., “Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis”, in [1992] 108 The 
Law Quarterly 79 
Davies, Christine, “Canadian Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: Individual rights, 
Community Strategy”, in [2008] University of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 
De Lamadrid, Marie Gil, "Expanding The Definition Of Family: A Universal 
Issue", in [1993] 8 Berkely Women's Law Journal 170 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 516 
 
Dent, George W., “Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending”, in [2003-04] 18 
BYU J. Pub. L. 419 
DiFonzo, James Herbie, “Unbundling Marriage”, in [2003-2004] 32 Hofstra Law 
Review 31 
Dnes, Antony W., “Marriage, Cohabitation, And Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2007] 
XII, N. 1 The Independent Review 85 
Dodge, Kirstin S., "'Bashing Back': Gay And Lesbian Street Patrols And The 
Criminal Justice System", in [1993] 11 Law and Inequality 295 
Douglas, Gillian, "The Family And State Under The European Convention On 
Human Rights", in [1988] International Journal of Law and the Family 76 
Dunlap, Aklilu, "The Bellows of Dying Elephants: Gay-, Lesbian-, And Bisexual-
Protective Hate Crime Statutes After R.A.V. v City of St Paul", in [1993] 12 Law 
and Inequality 205 
Dupuis, Martin, “The Impact Of Culture, Society, And History On The Legal 
Process: An Analysis Of Same-Sex Relationships In The United States And 
Denmark”, in [1995] 9 Journal of Law and the Family 86 
Eekelaar, John, “Personal Rights And Human Rights”, in [2002] 2 Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 181 
Eskridge, William N., Jnr, "A History Of Same-Sex Marriage", in [1993] 79 
Virginia Law Review 1419 
Eskridge, William N., Jnr, Review: "A Social Constructionist Critique Of Posner's 
'Sex And Reason': Steps Toward A Gay-Legal Agenda", in [1992] 102 Yale Law 
Journal 333 
Eskridge, William N., Jnr, “A History Of Same-Sex Marriage” in [1993] 79 
Virginia Law Review 1419 
Estin, Ann L., “Marriage And Belonging”, in [2001-02] 100 Mich.L.Rev. 1690 
Ettelbreck, Paula L., and Shapiro, Julie, “Are We On The Path Top Liberation 
Now?: Same-Sex Marriage At Home And Abroad”, in [2003-04] 2 Seattle J. Soc. 
Just. 475 
Feather, Nancy J., “Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State 
Constitutional Law”, in [1997] 70 Temple Law Review 1017 
Feldblum, Chai R., “Gay Is Good: The Moral Case For Marriage Equality And 
More”, in [2005] 17 Yale Journal Of Law And Feminism 139 
Finemann, Martha O., "Our Social Institution: The Ideal Of The Family In 
American Law And Society", in [1993] Utah Law Review 387 
Finlay, Henry, "Transsexuals, Sex Change Operations And The Chromosome 
Test: Corbett v Corbett Not Followed", in [1989] 19 Western Australian Law 
Review 152 
Fredman, Sandra, “Human Rights Transformed: Positive Duties And Positive 
Rights”, in [2006] Public Law 498 
Freeman, Jody, “Defining Family In Mossop v DSS: The Challenge Of Anti-
Essentialism And Interactive Discrimination For Human Rights Litigation”, in 
[1994] 44 University of Toronto Law Journal 41 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 517 
 
Friedman, A., "The Necessity For State Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriage: 
Constitutional Requirements And Evolving Notions Of Family", in [1987/88] 3 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 134 
Gabel, Dorothy, “Presidential Address: National Association For Research In 
Science Teaching”, San Francisco (24 April 1995), citing Hopkins, D., A Teacher‟s 
Guide To Classroom Research”, Philadelphia, Open University Press (1985), 
http://physiced.buffalostate.edu/danowner/actionrsch.html (Retrieved: 30 Jun 
2009) 
Galligan, Brian, and Larking, Emma, “Rights Protection: The Bill Of Rights 
Debate And Rights Protection In Australia‟s States And Territories”, in [2007] 28 
Adelaide Law Review 177 
Gardbaum, Stephen, “Human Rights As International Constitutional Rights”, in 
[2008] 4 19 European Journal Of International Law 1 
Garkarwe, Sam, “International human Rights And The Law Regarding Sexual 
Orientation”, in [1997] 7 Australasian Gay & Lesbian L.J. 69 
Geddes, Andrew, and Fenton, Bridget, “ „Which Is To Be Master?‟: Rights-
Friendly Statutroy interpretation In New Zealand And The United Kingdom”, in 
[2008] 25:3 Arizona Journal Of International & Comparative Law 733 
Geer, Martin A., “Human Rights And Wrongs In Our Own Backyard: 
Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil 
Rights Law – A Case Study Of Women In Untied States Prisons”, in [2000] 13 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 71 
Ghandhi, P.R., and MacNamee, E., "The Family In UK Law And The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights 1966", in [1991] 5 International Journal 
of Law and the Family 104 
Gomes, Charlene, “Partners As Parents: Challenges faced By Gays Denies 
Marriage”, in [2003] 63 The Humanist 14 
Gonen, Julianna S., Same-Sex Unions And Domestic Partnerships”, in [2000-01] 
2 Geo. J. Gender & L. 329 
Government Administration Committee, “Inquiry Into New Zealand‟s Adoption 
Laws”, Report of the Committee (August 2001) 
Graham, Rt Hon Douglas, “Minister of Justice‟s Opening Speech”, Family 
Property Symposium, Victoria University of Wellington (1 November 1994), in 
[1995] 25 VUWLR 3 
Grainer, Virginia, “What Family For The 21st Century?”, in 9 RJP/NZACL 
Yearbook 8 41 
Greiner, Katrina, “Foster Care And Adoption”, in [2004] 5 Geo. J. Gender & L. 
503 
Hamann, Ardath A., "Family Surrogate Laws: A Necessary Supplement To Living 
Wills And Durable Powers Of Attorney", in [1993] 38 Villanova Law Review 103 
Harwood, Catherine, “Dressed For Success? Gendered Appearance 
Discrimination In The Workplace”, in [2007] 38 VUWLR 583 
Hebert, Laura, “ „Go Back And Give Him What He Wants‟: The Limits Of A Legal 
Rights Approach To Gendered Human Rights Violations”, in 12:4 International 
Journal Of Human Rights 483 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 518 
 
Heinze, Eric, “Discourses Of Sex: Classical, Modernist, Post-Modernist”, in [1998] 
67 Nordic J. Int‟l L. 37 
Heinze, Dr. Eric, “Even-Handedness And The Politics Of Human Rights”, in 
[2008] 21 Harvard Human Rights Journal 7 
Henaghan, Professor Mark, “Adoption – Time For Changes”, in [2006] 5, No. 6 
New Zealand Family Law Journal 131. 
Henaghan, M., and Tapp, P., “Legally Defining The Family” in Family Law Policy 
In New Zealand, Henaghan and Aitkin (1992). 
Henderson, Prof. David, “The MAI Affair: A Story And Its Lessons”, Groupe 
d‟Economie Mondiale, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (Paris) / 
International Economics Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(London) / New Zealand Business Roundtable (New Zealand): 5 
Henson, Deborah M., "A Comparative Analysis Of Same-Sex Partnership 
Protections: Recommendations For American Reform", in [1993] 7 International 
Journal of Law and the Family 282 
Hervey, Tamara K., “Sex Equality As Substantive Justice”, [1999] 62 Modern Law 
Review 614 
Hodge, Henry, "Equal And Decent Treatment", in [1995] New Law Journal 303 
Hohengarten, William M., "Same-Sex Marriage And The Right Of Privacy", in 
[1994] 103 The Yale Law Journal 1495 
Hsu, Kenneth K., “Why The Politics If Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal And 
Strategic Approaches On Both Sides Of The Debate On Same-Sex Marriages”, in 
[2005-2006] 20 BYU Journal Of Public Law 275 
Hughes, Vivien, “How The Famous Five In Canada Won Personhood For Women”, 
in [2001/2002] 17 London Journal Of Canadian Studies 60 
Human Rights Commission, “Same-Sex Couples And The Law” (28 April 2000) 
Human Rights Review Tribunal, “Trevethick v Ministry Of Health”, in [2007] 5 
Employment Law Bulletin (NZ) 82 
Huscroft, Grant, “Same-Sex Marriage and the Human Rights Commission”, in 
[1997] NZLJ 41 
Ionatana, Hon, Ionatana, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, “The Importance And Central 
Role Of Monitoring Institutions And Officials In Upholding Democratic Principles 
Of Good Governance”, paper presented to the Pacific Parliamentarians 
Conference, Nadi, Fiji (27-30 March 2000) 
Jackson, Sara, “Designing Human Rights Legislation: ‟Dialogue‟, The 
Commonwealth Model And The Roles Of Parliaments And Courts”, in Auckland 
University Law Review 89 
Jolly, R., “One Family Or Two”, in [1994] 6 Our Planet 5 
Joseph, Sara, “Human Rights Committee: Recent Cases”, in [2004] 4 
Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 109 
Joydeep, Sengupla, “How The UN Can Advance Gay Rights”, in [2003] 10:6 The 
Gay And Lesbian Review Worldwide 32 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 519 
 
Juel, Edward J., "Non-Traditional Family Values: Providing Quasi-Marital Rights 
To Same-Sex Couples", in [1993] 13 Boston College Third World Law Journal 317 
Kramer, Zachary A., “Exclusionary Equality And The Case For Same-Sex 
Families: A Reworking Of Martha Fineman‟s Re-visioned Family Law”, in [2003-
04] 2 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 505 
Laplante, Lisa J., “On The Indivisibility Of Rights: Truth Commissions, 
Reparations, And The Rights To Development”, in [2007] 10 Yale Hum.Rts. & 
Dev.L.J. 141 
Lau, Holning, “Assessing The Harms Of Noncompliance With The International 
Covenant On Civil And Political Rights‟ Protections Of Sexual Minorities”, 
Williams Institute, UCLA [2006], 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/uclalaw/williams/lau_1 (Retrieved: 17 July 2009) 
Lee, Tiffany N., “Family Law Chapter: Marriage”, in [2000-01] 2 Geo. J. Gender 
& L. 321 
Lesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service, "The Bride Wore Pink", in [1993] 3 
Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 67 
Lisle, Angela Mary, “All Hail Reflexivity”, in [2000] Annual Review Of Critical 
Psychology 109 
Kay, Herma Hill, “Private Choices And Public Policy: Confronting The Limitations 
Of Marriage”, in [1991] 5 Australian Family Law Journal 69 
Keane, Thomas M., “Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional And Choice Of Law 
Arguments For Recognition Of Same-Sex Marriages”, in [1995] 47 Stanford Law 
Review 499 
Keith, Sir Kenneth, “The Application Of International Human Rights Law In New 
Zealand”, in [1997] Texas International Law Journal 401 
Keith, Sir Kenneth, “ „Concerning Change‟: The Adoption And Implementation Of 
The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990”, in [2000] VUWLRev 37 
Kenner, Jeff, “Combating Discrimination – New Concepts, New Laws, New 
Hierarchies?” in EU Employment Law: From Rome To Amsterdam And Beyond, 
Hart Publishing, Portland, Oregon (2003): 425 
Kinley, David, “Human Rights Fundamentalisms”, in [2007] 29 Sydney Law 
Review 545 
Kirby, Hon Justice Michael, “Robin Cooke, Human Rights And The Pacific 
Dimension”, in [2008] 39 VUWLR 119 
Kirby, Justice Michael, “The Role Of The Judge In Advancing Human Rights By 
Reference To International Human Rights Norms”, at the Judicial Colloquium in 
Bangalore (24-26 February 1988): 71 
Koch, Ida E., “The Justiciability Of Indivisible Rights”, in [2003] Nordic Journal 
Of International Law 72 
Koh, Harold Hongju, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?”, in [1997] 106 
The Yale Law Journal 2599 
Koppelman, Andrew, "Why Discrimination Against Lesbians And Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination", in [1994] 69 New York University Law Review 197 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 520 
 
Kuykendall, Mae, “Gay Marriage And Civil Unions: Democracy, The Judiciary 
And Discursive Space In The Liberal Society”, in [2001] 52 Mercer Law Review 
1003 
Lallah, Justice Rajsoomer, “Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The 
Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms”, at the Judicial 
Colloquium in Bangalore (24-26 February 1988): 7 
Lau, Holning, “Transcending The Individualist Paradigm In Sexual Orientation 
Antidiscrimination Law”, in [2006] 94 California Law Review 1271 
LaViolette, Nicole, “Waiting In A New Line At City Hall: Registered Partnerships 
As An Option For Relationship Recognition Reform In Canada”, in [2002] 19 
Canadian Journal Of Family Law 115 
Lindell, Geoffrey, “Constitutional Issues Regarding Same-Sex Marriage: A 
Comparative Survey – North America And Australasia”, in [2008] Vol. 30, No.2 
Sydney Law Review 27 
LisleLesbian and Gay Legal Rights Service, "The Bride Wore Pink", in [1993] 3 
Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 67 
Logue, Patricia M., “The Rights Of Lesbian And Gay Parents And Their Children”, 
in [2002] 18 Journal Of The American Academy Of Matrimonial Lawyers 95 
Ludbrook, R., “Family Law In Context” in Ludbrook‟s Family Law Practice (1991) 
McGinnis, John O., and Somin, Ilya, “Demmocracy And International Human 
Rights Law”, Research Paper Series, Northwestern University School Of Law, 
Public Law And Legal Theory Series (March 2008) 
Mackenzie, Robin, "Transsexuals' Legal Status And Same-Sex Marriage In New 
Zealand", in [1992] 7 Otago Law Review 556 
MacDougall, B., “The Celebration Of Same-Sex Marriage”, in (2000) 32:2 Ottawa 
Law Review 235 
McLachlin, Beverley, “The Canadian Charter and the Democratic Process”, in 
Gearty, Conor, and Tomkins, Adam, (Eds),  Understanding Human Rights, 
Pinter, London (1996], 20 
McNorrie, Kenneth McK., “Recognition Of Overseas Relationships In New 
Zealand”, in [2009] 23 New Zealand Universities Law Review 339 
McCrudden, Christopher, “Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation of Human 
Rights”, Working Paper No.24/2008, University of Oxford, Faculty of Law, Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series (2008) 
Maton, Karl, “Reflexivity, Relationism and Research”, in [2003] Space And 
Culture 52 
Marshall, Steve, “The Case Of New Zealand”, in The Role Of Civil Society In 
Promoting Decent Work: Lessons From Innovative Partnerships In Ireland, New 
Zealand And South Africa, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva 
(2000) 
Marzano-Lesnevich, Madeline, and Moskowitz, Galit, “In The Interest Of Children 
Of Same-Sex Couples”, in [2005] 19 Journal Of The American Academy Of 
Matrimonial Lawyers 255 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 521 
 
Ministry of Justice, “Same-Sex Couples And The Law”, Discussion Paper, 
Ministry of Justice, Wellington (1999) 
Ministry of Justice, “The Concept Of Discrimination”, in “Same-Sex Couples And 
The Law: Background Paper”, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (1999) 
Ministry of Justice, “Re-Evaluation Of Human Rights Protections In New 
Zealand”, Submission of the New Zealand AIDS Foundation (May 2001): 14 
Ministry of Justice, “Re-Evaluation Of Human Rights Protections In New 
Zealand”, Submission of the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties (May 2001): 14 
Mohr, Richard D., Book Review: "Gays/Justice: A Study Of Ethics, Society, And 
Law" in Mohr, Obis, Nick, “Religion, Tradition and Equal Rights”, in Alternative 
Family 
Mohr, Richard D., Book Review: “Gays/Justice: A Study Of Ethics, Society And 
Law”, in [1989] 7 Law and Inequality 321 
Mohr, Richard D., “Equal Dignity Under The Law”, in [2004] September-October 
The Gay And Lesbian Review 30 
Mohr, Richard D., "The Case For Gay Marriage", in [1995] 9 Notre Dame Journal 
of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 215 
Monagas, Enrique A., “California‟s Assembly Bill 205, The Domestic Partner 
Rights And Responsibilities Act Of 2003: Is Domestic Partner Legislation 
Compromising The Campaign For Marriage Equality?”, [2006] 17 Hastings 
Women‟s L.J. 39 
Morgan, Shaughn, "Legal Recognition Of Gay And Lesbian Relationships", in 
[1993] 3 Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 57 
Morgan, Wayne, and Walker, Kristin, “Tolerance And Homosex: A Policy Of 
Control And Containment”, in [1995] 20 Melbourne University Law Review 202 
Mountbatten, John, "Transsexuals And Social Security Law: The Return Of 
Gonad The Barbarian", in [1994] Australian Family Law Journal 
Mubangizi, John C., “Towards A New Approach To The Classification Of Human 
Rights With Specific Reference To The African Context”, in [2004] 4 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 93 
Mullins, Morell E., “Tools Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature Of Statutory 
Interpretation”, in [2003-04] 30 J Legis 1. 
Murphy, John, “Some Wrongs And (Human) Rights In The English Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate”, in [2003-04] 18 BYU Journal Of Public Law 543 
Musselman, James L., “What‟s Love Got To Do With it?: A Proposal For Elevating 
The Status Of Marriage By Narrowing Its Definition, While Universally Extending 
The Rights And Benefits Enjoyed By Married Couples”, in [2009] 16 Duke J. 
Gender L. & Pol‟y 37 
Nath, Sujaya, “Equitable Parenthood Principles For Lesbian Mothers: The 
Difference Between Legal Parents And Legal Strangers”, in [2003] 23 No. 3 
Children‟s Legal Rights Journal 33 
Neumayer, Eric, “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations To International 
Human Rights Treaties”, in [ 2007] 36 Journal Of Legal Studies 397 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 522 
 
 
New Zealand Law Commission, “Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) 
Act”, NZLC R39 (August 1997) 
New Zealand Law Commission, “Recognising Same-Sex Relationships”, Study 
Paper 4, Law Commission, Wellington (NZLC SP4) (1999) 
New Zealand Law Commission, “Editorial: Recognising Same-Sex Relationships” 
(downloaded 9 December 1999) 
New Zealand Law Commission, Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different 
Approach and a New Framework, NZLC R65 (September 2000). 
Nielsen, Linda, "Family Rights And The 'Registered Partnership' In Denmark"  in 
[1990] 4 International Journal of Law and the Family 297 
O‟Brien, Jodi, “Seeking Normal?: Considering Same-Sex Marriage”, in [2003-04] 
2 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 459 
O‟Brien, Rory, “An Overview Of The Methodological Approach Of Action 
Research”, in Richardson, Roberto, Theory And Practice Of Action Research, 
Universidade Federal da Paraiba, João Pessoa, Brasil (2001) 
O‟Connell, Rory, “The Role Of Dignity In Equality Law: Lessons From Canada 
And South Africa”, in [2008] 6 I-CON 267 
O‟Flaherty, Michael, and Fisher, John, “Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity And 
International Human Rights Law: Contextualising The Yogyakarta Principles”, in 
[2008] 8:2 Human Rights Law Review 207 
Office of Ethnic Affairs “Education is the Best Weapon in the Battle Against 
Racism”, in (2001) Ethnic Link 3 
Ogata, Shirley C., “Are Wedding Bells Ringing For Same-Sex Marriages? The 
Legal Trends And Social Perspectives of Europe, Canada And The United States”, 
in [2006] VI, No. 1/2 European Journal Of Law Reform 181 
Otlowski, Margaret, "Doyle v Doyle: Family Court Awards Custody To 
Homosexual Father", in [1992] 11 University of Tasmania Law Review 261 
Pavano, Thomas Adolph, "Gay And Lesbian Rights: Adults Adopting Adults", in 
[1987] 2 Connecticut Probate Law Journal 251 
Pearson, Geoff, “The Researcher As Hooligan: Where „Participant‟ Observation 
means breaking The Law”, in [2009] 12:3 International Journal Of Social 
Research Methodology 243    
Pederson, Marianne Hojgaard, "Denmark: Homosexual Marriages And New Rules 
Regarding Separation And Divorce", in [1991/92] 30 Journal of Family Law 389 
Penas, Dwight J., "Bless The Tie That Binds: A Puritan-Covenant Case For 
Same-Sex Marriage", in [1990] 8 Law and Inequality 533 
Polikoff, Nancy D., “Recognizing Partners But Not Parents / Recognizing Parents 
But Not Partners: gay And Lesbian Family Law In Europe And The United 
States”, in [2000-01] 17 N. Y. U. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 711 
Polikoff, Nancy D., “For The Sake Of All Childern: Opponents And Supporters Of 
Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss The Mark”, in [2005] 8 New York City Law Review 
573 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 523 
 
Polikoff, Nancy D., "We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay And 
Lesbian Marriage Will Not 'Dismantle The Legal Structure Of Gender In Every 
Marriage'", in [1993] 79 Virginia Law Review 1535 
Polster, Heike, “Gender Identity As A New Prohibited Ground of Discrimination”, 
in [2003] 1 NZJPIL 157 
Prasad, Rajan, “Human Rights Education In New Zealand Schools”, in [2003] 
Human Rights Education in Asian Schools 65 
Radbord, Joanna, “Lesbian Love Stories: How We Won Equal Marriage In 
Canada”, in [2005] 17 Yale Journal Of Law And Feminism 99 
Ramolotja, M.A., “The Role of the Courts in the Implementation of Human 
Rights: The South African Perspective”, in [1997] Codicillus 31 
Regan, Milton C., Jnr, "Reason, Tradition, And Family Law: A Comment On 
Social Constructionism", in [1993] 79 Virginia Law Review 1515 
Rhoads-Weaver, Barbara, and Rhoads-Weaver, Heather, “In The Pursuit Of 
Happiness: One Lesbian Couple‟s Personal Thoughts On Marriage”, in [2003-04] 
2 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 539 
Richards, Claudina, “The Legal Recognition Of Same-Sex Couples: The French 
Perspective”, in [2002] International and Comparative Law Quarterly 305 
Rishworth, Paul, “Coming Conflicts Over Freedom Of Religion” in Huscroft, G. 
and Rishworth, P., (Eds), Rights And Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill Of Rights 
Act 1990 And The Human Rights Act 1993, Brookers, Wellington (1995): 230 
Rishworth, Paul, “Human Rights”, in [2001] N.Z.L.Rev. 217 
Rishworth, Paul, “Human Rights”, in [2003] N.Z.L.Rev. 261 
Rishworth, Paul, “The Religion Clauses Of The New Zealand Bill Of Rights”, in 
[2007] N.Z.L.Rev. 631 
Rivera, Rhonda R., "Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law In The Mid-Eighties - 
Part II", in [1986] 11:2 University of Dayton Law Review 275 
Robinson, Mary, Former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Farewell Speech in Geneva (10 September 2002) 
Robinson, Mary, “Making Human Rights Matter: Eleanor Roosevelt‟s Time Has 
Come”, in [2003] 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1 
Ronner, Amy D., “Homophobia: In The Closet And In The Coffin”, in [2003] 21 
Law & Ineq. 65 
Rosenblum, Darren, “Geographically Sexual?: Advancing Lesbian and Gay 
Interests Through Proportional Representation”, in [1996] Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Reform 119 
Rowe, Susan, “Maintaining Good Relationships In The Workplace: Avoiding 
Discriminatory Practices”, in [2006] 7 Employment Law Bulletin 132 
Ruggles, Steven, "The Transformation Of American Family Structure", in [1994] 
99 American Historical Review 103 
Russell, Frances, "Sexual Orientation Discrimination And Europe", in [1995] New 
Law Journal 374 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 524 
 
Russman, David P., "Alternative Families: In Whose Best Interests?", in [1993] 
29 Suffolk University Law Review 31 
Ryder, Bruce, "Equality Rights And Sexual Orientation: Confronting 
Heterosexual Family Privilege", in [1990] 9 Canadian Journal of Family Law 39 
Samar, Vincent J., “Privacy And The Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage Versus 
Unions”, in [2004-05] 54 DePaul L. Rev. 783 
Samar, Vincent J., “Throwing Down The International Gauntlet: Same-Sex 
Marriage As A Human Right”, in [2007-08] 6 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol‟y & Ethics J. 1 
Samar, Vincent J., “Privacy And Same-Sex Marriage: The Case For Treating 
Same-Sex Marriage As A Human Right”, in [2007] 68 Mont. L. Rev. 335 
Sanders, Professor Douglas, “The Role Of The Yogyakarta Principles”, (4 August 
2008) 
Sandland, R., "Adoption, Law And Homosexuality: Can Gay People Adopt A 
Child?", in [1993] 5 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 321 
Saphire, Richard B., "Gay Rights And The Constitution: An Essay On 
Constitutional Theory, Practice, And Dronenburg v Zech", in [1985] 10:3 
University of Dayton Law Review 761 
Schwarzchild, H., "Same-Sex Marriage And Constitutional Privacy: Moral Threat 
And Legal Anomaly", in [1988/89] 4 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 94 
Seuffert, Nan, “Sexual Citizenship And The Civil Union Act 2004”, in [2006] 37 
VUWLR 281 
Shin, Eileen, “Same-Sex Unions And Domestic Partnerships”, in [2002-03] 4 Geo. 
J. Gender & L. 261 
Singh, Dr S.K., “Human Rights: Preachers The Real Violators”, in [1996] XX 
CULR 441 
Skiffington, Lorraine J., “Editorial: Creating A Human Rights Culture”, in [1999] 
3 Employment Law Bulletin 42 
Smart, Carol, “Same Sex Couples And Marriage: Negotiation Relational 
Landscapes With Families And Friends”, in [ 2007] 55:4 The Sociological Review 
671 
Spindelman, Marc, “Homosexuality‟s Horizon”, in [2005] 54 Emory Law Journal 
1361 
Stamatakos, P.S., “The Bar In America: The Role Of Elitism In A Liberal 
Democracy” in [1992/93] 26 University of Michigan Journal Of Law Reform 853 
Stanford, Peter, "The Truth About Truths" - a review of John Boswell‟s The 
Marriage Of Likeness: Same-Sex Unions In Premodern Europe, Harper Collins 
Stoddard, Thomas B., “Bleeding Heart: Using Lawyering To Make Social Change”, 
in [1997] 72:5 New York University Law Review 1 
Stradley, Belinda S., Book Review: "Why Can't Karen Kowalski Come Home?", in 
Berkeley Women's Law Journal 
Sunstein, Cass R., “The Right To Marry”, in [2005] 26:5 Cardozo Law Review 
2081 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 525 
 
Szlezak, Andrzej, "Cohabitation Without Marriage In Poland", in [1991] 5 
International Journal of Law and the Family 1 
Taitz, Jerold, "A Transsexual's Nightmare: The Determination Of Sexual Identity 
In English Law", in [1988] 2 International Journal of Law and the Family 139 
Tapp, Pauline, “Family Law”, in [1994] NZ Recent Law Review 140 
Tate, Pamela, “Protecting Human Rights In A Federation”, in [2007] Vol. 33, No. 
2 Monash University Law Review 220 
Thomas, Keith, "Like Lovers' Historic Rites" – a review of John Boswell‟s The 
Marriage of Likeness: Same-Sex Unions In Premodern Europe, Harper Collins 
Thomas, Prof Paul G., “A Canadian Perspective On „The New Public Service‟ ”, 
Commentary presented to the Annual Conference Of The Institute Of Public 
Administration Of Canada (25 August 2003) 
Tortell, Lisa, “Taunoa: Monetary Remedies For Breaches Of The Bill Of Rights”, 
in [2008] 11 New Zealand Law Journal 11 
Treadwell, Paul, “Inequality And Discrimination In The Division Of Property”, in 
[1998] 10 New Zealand Family Law Journal 
Truijt, Ed, and De Goede, Martijn, “Changing Family Structure And Adolescent 
Well-Being In The Netherlands”, [1996] International Journal of Law, Policy and 
the Family 1 
Tsekeris, Charalambos, and Katrivesis, Nicos, “Reflexivity In Social Theory And 
Social Action”, in [2008] 7:1 Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History 1. 
Waaldijk, Kees, “Small Change: How The Road To Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved 
In The Netherlands”, in Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenaes (Eds), Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and 
International Law, Hart Publishing, London (2000): 437 
Waaldijk, Kees, “Taking Same-Sex Partnerships Seriously: European Experiences 
As British Perspectives?”, in [2003] International Family Law 84 
Waddington,  Lisa, “Reassessing The Employment Of People With Disabilities In 
Europe: From Quota To Anti-Discrimination Laws”, in [1996-97]18 
Comp.Lab.L.J. 62 
Wald, Michael S., et al, “An Analysis Of Proposition 22: The Knight Initiative” 
(The Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender / The Stanford 
Center on Adolescence (December 1999) 
Walker, Kristen, “Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality”, in [1999-
2000] 6 ILSA J. Int‟l & Comp. L. 343 
Wardle, Lynn D., “Some New Threats to Marriage and the Marriage-Based 
Family: A Review and Responses”, in [2000] 48 Cutting Edge 38 
Webb, Dick, "The Sex Of Parties To A Marriage", in [1995] 1 Butterworths Family 
Law Journal 199 
Webb, Professor P R H, “The Civil Union Bill: Why All The Fuss?”, in [2004] 1 
No.11 New Zealand Family Law Journal 
Wilets, James D., “International Human Rights Law And Sexual Orientation”, in 
[1994] 18 Hastings Int‟l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 526 
 
William J. Bradley, “Roman Catholic Christian Teaching On Marriage”, Catholic 
Mission, Ontario, Canada (2004) 
Williams, Hannah Koopmann, and Bowen, Rachel E., “Marriage, Same-Sex 
Unions, And Domestic Partnerships”, in [1999-2000] 1 Geo. J. Gender & L. 337   
Williams, Kerry, “ „I Do‟ or „We Won‟t‟: Legalising Same-Sex Marriage In South 
Africa”, in [2004] 20 S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts. 32 
Wintemute, Robert, “Sexual Orientation And The Charter: The Achievement Of 
Formal Legal Equality (1985-2005) And Its Limits”, in [2004] 49 McGill L.J. 1143 
Wintemute, Robert, “International Trends In Legal Recognition Of Same-Sex 
Partnerships (Edited Remarks)”, in [2004-05] 23 QLR 577 
Wintemute, Robert, “From Sex Rights To Love Rights: Partnership Rights As 
Human Rights”, in Nicholas Bamforth, (Ed), Sex Rights, Oxford University Press 
(2005) 
Wintemute, Robert, "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity", in Colin Harvey, 
(Ed), Human Rights in the Community:  Rights as Agents for Change, Oxford, 
Hart Publishing (2005) 
Winters, Sylvia, "Gay And Lesbian Relationships And The Law Of NSW", in 
[1992] 2 Australian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 73 
Wintemute, Robert, “Case Analysis: Same-Sex Couples In Secretary of State For 
Work And Pensions v M: Identical To Karner and Godin-Mendoza, Yet No 
Discrimination?”, in [2008] EHRLR 722 
Wojcik, Mark E., “The Wedding Bells Heard Around The World: Years From Now, 
Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?”, in [2003-2004] 24 
Northern Illinois University Law Review 589 
Woolley, Alice, "Excluded By Definition: Same-Sex Couples And The Right To 
Marry", in [1995] 45 University of Toronto Law Journal 471 
 
MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS / PAPERS / SUBMISSIONS 
Allan, James, “No to a Written Constitution”, paper presented at the Building 
The Constitution Conference, Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Allum, Margaret, “Whose Conscience Counts?”, in Green Weekly, 
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/2000/417/417p12.htm: (Retrieved: 17-Jan 
2004) 
Amann, Diane M., “The Course Of true Huamn Rights Progress Never Did Run 
Smooth”, forthcoming publication in [2008] Harvard Human Rights Journal 
Annan, Kofi (Secretary General of the United Nations), “Text Of Kofi Annan‟s 
Wellington Address”, in Council Brief, the monthly newsletter of the Wellington 
District Law Society (April 2000) 
Annan, Kofi, “Address To The Commission On Human Rights”, Geneva (24 April 
2003) 
Association Of Social Science Researchers, “ASSR Code Of Ethics”, 
http://assr.rsnz.org/ethics/html (Retrieved: 3 April 2009) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 527 
 
Ayton-Shenker, Diana, “The Challenge Of Human Rights And Cultural Diversity”, 
United Nations Background Note, http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1627e.htm 
(Retrieved: 8 August 2008) 
Baragwanath, Hon Justice David, “How Can The Law Contribute To An Equal 
And Just Society?”, address to Wellington Gay Association of Professionals, 
Wellington (26 February 1998) 
Barnett, Tim, “Law Reform And Politicians”, Paper presented to the Australasian 
Law Reform Conference 
Bennachie, Calum, “Anti-Gay Hate Crimes 1990-2001”, 
(www.gaynz.com/archives/hate_crimes.asp) (Retrieved: 10 July 2004) 
Bradley, William J., “Roman Catholic Christian Teaching On Marriage”, Catholic 
Mission, Ontario, Canada (2004) 
Brookers Online, (Eds), “Adoption by Same-Sex Partners”, in section PA2.6 of 
Child Law: Principles of Adoption, a Brookers Online publication of Family Law 
principles,  
http://www.brookersonline.co.nz /databases/modus/family/childlaw/DISC-
CHILD!41~GRP1.PA2?si=57359&sid= 
65i7lhb65ux2374bejjmdp3ohe2a3pgi&hli=0&sp=childlaw&p=4) (Retrieved: 8 May 
2009) 
Butler, Petra, “Lessons From New Zealand”, paper presented to the Conference 
Australian Bills Of Rights: The ACT And Beyond, University of New South Wales 
(21 June 2006) 
Cartwright, The Honourable Dame Silvia, PCNZM, DBE, Governor-General of 
New Zealand, Speech at her Swearing-In Ceremony, Parliament House, 
Wellington, New Zealand Government Press Release (04 April 2001) 
Chicago Anti-Bashing Network (CABN), “Two Face Felony Charges For Protest 
For Gay Marriage”, Press Release (17 February 2001) 
Christie, Nigel, Letter of Resignation to the Civil Union Bill Committee (CUB 
Committee) (11 April 2001)  
Cooke, Sir Robin, “The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act”, paper presented to the 
“1993 New Zealand Law Conference: The Law and Politics”, Wellington (March 
1993) 
Cooke, Sir Robin, Lord Cooke of Thorndon, “The Role of the Judges”, paper 
presented at the Building The Constitution Conference, Legislative Council 
Chamber, Parliament Buildings, Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Corcoran, Trish, “Politicians Attack The Right To Choose” in Green Weekly, 
http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1996/234/234p9b.htm (Retrieved: 17 
January 2004) 
Counsel for the Plaintiff, Submission in the Case of: Human Rights Commission 
v (A Superannuation Company) High Court, Auckland (1993) 
Crown Law Office, “Discrimination in Terms of Section 19 of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990”, Crown Law Office Seminar (14 February 2001) 
CUB Committee, “Draft Proposal for the Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples 
in New Zealand”, prepared by the Civil Union Committee chaired by Tim Barnett 
MP (March 2001) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 528 
 
Dawson, T. Brettel, “Status Symbol: Sexual Orientation And Human Rights In 
Canada”, unpublished paper for the Feminist and Legal Theory Forum, 
University of Waikato (6 April 1993) 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Cabinet and Cabinet Committee 
Processes: Step-by-Step Guide”, http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/cabinet/index.htm 
(Retrieved: 3 August 2009) 
Department of Social Welfare, “The Concept Of Family” (Draft Paper), 
Department of Social Welfare, Wellington (1994) 
Dunne, Peter, “Why Work With Labour And Not National”, United Future New 
Zealand, Press Release (18 February 2004) 
Eichler, Dr Margrit, Affidavit sworn 15 November 2000, in Halpern v Canada 
(Attorney-General), Court File No.684/00: 266-277 
Elias, Right Hon Dame Sian, Chief Justice of New Zealand, “The Impact Of 
International Conventions On Domestic Law”, paper presented to the Inaugural 
Meeting of the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (New Zealand 
Chapter) (March 2000) 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand, (http://www.teara.govt.nz/en): “Notable Trials: 
The Notorious Amy Bock, 1909”, 
http://www.teara.govt.nz/1966/T/TrialsNotable/TheNotoriousAmyBock1909/en  
(Retrieved: 10 August 2009) 
Fierstein, Harvey, in Michael Portantiere, “Interview With Harvey Fierstein”, 
AfterElton.com, http://www.afterelton.com/people/2998/3/harveyfierstein 
(Retrieved: 26 March 2008): 
Glazebrook, Justice Susan, “The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990: Its 
Operation And Effectiveness”, paper presented at the South Australian Legal 
Convetion (22–23 July 2004) 
Goff, Hon Phil, “Democracy And Strengthening Institutions”, Closing Address to 
the Asia Pacific Forum, Rotorua (8 August 2000) 
Government Administration Committee, “Report: Inquiry Into New Zealand‟s 
Adoption Laws” (August 2001) 
Graham, Hon Doug A. M., Minister of Justice, “The Minister Of Justice‟s Opening 
Speech”, at a Symposium on Family Property, Victoria University of Wellington, 
in [1995] VUWLR 3: 3. 
Haleem, Mr Justice Muhammed (Chief Justice of Pakistan), “The Domestic 
Application Of International Human Rights Norms”, paper presented to 
Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application Of 
International Human Rights Norms, a Judicial Colloquium in Bangalore (24-26 
February 1988) 
Hartinger, Brent, “Ceremonial Wedding Of Gay Partners Affirms Values Of 
Family, Friends”, Tacoma News Tribune (4 March 2001) 
Hughes, R.W., (Director of Research), “Civil And Religious Divorce: Part 2”, 
Family Law Council, Office of the Attorney-General of Australia (3 August 1998) 
Human Rights Commission, “Submission To The Ministry Of Justice On The 
Ministry‟s Discussion Paper On „Same-Sex Couples And The Law‟ ” (April 2000) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 529 
 
Human Rights Commission, “Options for Law Reform In New Zealand: The 
Problem Of Inequality” from: (Retrieval: 15 December 2004): 
http://hrc.co.nz/index.php?=13681&id=13688&wd0=samesex&wd1=same-
sex&format=   
Human Rights Commission, “Fact Sheet #04”, (Retrieved: 06-July-2009). 
http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/09-May-2008_13-19-
52_Factsheet_01_Welcome.doc  
Jean, “Two Men Who Were Married”: [Note: Surname withheld] 
http://cangay.com/relation/relationship.htm) (Retrieved: 20 February 2001) 
Jois, Hon Justice M. Rama, “Opening Ceremony Address”, paper presented to 
Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application Of 
International Human Rights Norms, a Judicial Colloquium in Bangalore (24-26 
February 1988) 
Kirby, Hon Justice Michael, “The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights 
by Reference to International Human Rights Norms”, paper presented to 
Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic Application Of 
International Human Rights Norms, a Judicial Colloquium in Bangalore (24-26 
February 1988) 
Lallah, Justice Rajsoomer (Mauritius), “International Human Rights Norms”, 
paper presented to Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence: The Domestic 
Application Of International Human Rights Norms, a Judicial Colloquium in 
Bangalore (24-26 February 1988) 
Laurie, Alison, Submission (oral) to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee 
on the Property (Relationships) Bill 2001 
Law Commission, “Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act”, NZLC R39 
(August 1997)  
Law Commission, “Recognising Same-Sex Relationships”, Study Paper 4, Law 
Commission, Wellington (December 1999) 
Law Commission, “Discussion Paper: Battered Defendants – Victims Of Domestic 
Violence Who Offend”, Preliminary Paper 41, Law Commission, Wellington 
(August 2000) 
Law Commission, “Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different Approach and a 
New Framework”, NZLC R65 (September 2000) 
Lawrence, Chris, former Proceedings Commissioner with the Human Rights 
Commission, “Safeguards Needed To Protect Human Rights Gains”, express (28 
August – 10 September 2002) 
Legislation Advisory Committee (States of Jersey), “Civil Partnerhsips: Green 
Paper”, presented to the States on 14 December 2007 by the Chief Minister 
(November 2007) 
McCrudden, Christopher, “Human Dignity And Judicial Interpretation Of Human 
Rights”, forthcoming publication in European Journal Of International Law (July 
2008) 
McDowell, Barbara, “The Importance Of Being Married”, 
http://cangay.com/relation/partner/barb_gail.htm (Retrieved: 20 February 
2001) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 530 
 
McLachlan, Chief Justice of Canada, “The Civilization of Difference”, a Lecture 
delivered in Toronto on 7 March 2003 and subsequently published in The Globe 
and Mail (8 March 2003) 
Macky, James, “Private Lives”, Metro (September 2000): 90 
Mansfield, Bill, “The Constraints of Treaties and International Law”, paper 
presented at the Building The Constitution Conference, Legislative Council 
Chamber, Parliament Buildings, Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Matthews, Richard, “Partners In Crime”: Bringing Same-Sex Marriages Out Of 
The Closet”, NZ Listener (18 September 1999) 
Minister of Justice, “A Bill Of Rights For New Zealand: A White Paper”, presented 
to the House of Representatives by Leave by the Hon Geoffrey Palmer Minister of 
Justice, Wellington (1985) 
Ministry of Justice, “Report on the Social Security (Long-term Residential Care) 
Amendment Bill 2003”: http://www.justice.govt.nz/bill-of-rights/bill-list-
2003/s-bill/section7-social-sec.pdf: (Retrieved: 07 August 2009) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Human Rights In New Zealand: Report To 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee Under The International Covenant 
On Civil And Political Rights”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington 
(June 1995) 
Ministry of Justice, “Discussion Paper: Same-Sex Couples And The Law”, 
Ministry of Justice, Wellington (August 1999) 
Ministry of Justice, “Discussion Paper: Re-Evaluation Of Human Rights 
Protections In New Zealand”, Ministry of Justice, Wellington (October 2000) 
Ministry of Justice, “The Guidelines On The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act 1990: 
A Guide To The Rights And Freedoms In The Bill Of Rights Act For The Public 
Sector”, Ministry of Justice (2004), 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/2004/bill-of-rights-
guidelines/index.html (Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
New South Wales (NSW) Law Reform Commission, “Report 113: Relationships”, 
NSW Law Reform Commission (June 2006) 
New Zealand Law Society, “The Bill Of Rights: Getting The Basics Right”, Papers 
for Seminar presented by Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Paul Rishworth 
(November 2001) 
New Zealand Law Society, “Statutory Interpretation”, Papers for Seminar 
presented by Professor John Burrows and John Fogarty QC (April 2001) 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “What Are Human Rights?”, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (Retrieved: 11 
August 2008) 
Oregon Blue Book: Initiative, Referendum and Recall: 1988-1995, 
http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/elections/elections21.htm (Retrieved: 8  
August 2009) 
Palmer, Sir Geoffrey, “The Bill Of Rights Fifteen Years On”, Keynote Speech, 
Ministry of justice Symposium On The New Zealand Bill Of Rights Act {10 
February 2006) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 531 
 
Quilter, Lindsay, “Going For Our Lives: „By The Power Vested In Me … I Now 
Pronounce You Man And Wife…‟ – A Personal View Of Legal Same-Sex Marriage”, 
An Essay (1996) 
Rishworth, Dr Paul, “The Rights Debate: Can We, Should We, Adopt a Written 
Constitution Including a Bill of Rights?”, paper presented at the Building The 
Constitution Conference, Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament Buildings, 
Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Robertson, Hon Justice Bruce, “Access For All To The Law And Its Protection”, 
Address to the Pacific Judicial Conference, Vanuatu (25-29 July 2005) 
Robinson, Mary, Former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Farewell Speech, Geneva (10 September 2002) 
Sensible Sentencing Website (www.safe-nz.org.nz/Data/vodb.htm) (Retrieved: 10 
July 2004) 
Society For The Promotion Of Community Standards, “ „Homophobia‟, Same-Sec 
„Marriage‟ And The Aggressive Lesbian Political Agenda”, 
http://www.spcs.org.nz/2007/homphobia-same-sex-marriage-and-the-
aggressive-lesbian-agenda (2007) (Retrieved: 16 June 2009) 
State Library of Queensland, “Family History” No.3.6 (2007), 
http://www.slq.qld.gov.au/info/fh/divorce (Retrieved: 12 August 2009). 
State Services Commission, “The Practice Of Government: How The Public 
Service Plays Its Part”. (Retrieved: 05 August 2002) 
http://www.ssc.govt.nz/Documents/working_under_pr/workpr3.html). 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, “Opinions of the Justices to the 
Senate”, SJC-09163 (3 February 2004)  
Taggart, Mike, “What Role for Judges?”, paper presented at the Building The 
Constitution Conference, Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament Buildings, 
Wellington (7-8 April 2000) 
Thomas, Prof Paul G., “A Canadian Perspective On „The New Public Service‟ ”, 
Commentary presented to the Annual Conference Of The Institute Of Public 
Administration Of Canada (25 August 2003) 
University of Waikato, “Te Mätähauariki”, Report of the Law School Committee, 
University of Waikato (February 1988) 
Wald, Michael S., et al, “An Analysis Of Proposition 22: The Knight Initiative”, 
The Stanford Institute for Research on Women and Gender / The Stanford 
Center on Adolescence (December 1999) 
Waring, Professor Marilyn, “Inaugural Professorial Lecture”, Auckland University 
Of Technology (AUT) (3 April 2007) 
Wilson, Hon Margaret (Attorney-General), “National Human Rights Institutions 
And The Protection And Promotion Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: 
International, Regional And National Strategies”, Opening Address to the Asia 
Pacific Forum, Rotorua (8 August 2000) 
Young, Hugh, “Before Stonewall and NZ Gay Liberation – Part 1”, 
http://www.queerhistory.net.nz/Part1.html (Retrieved: 10 August 2009). 
Ytterberg, Hans, “„Pride And Prejudice‟ Or „There Is No Justice, Only The Eternal 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 532 
 
Struggle Against Justice‟”, keynote speech to the Interpride 2001 Conference, 
Auckland, New Zealand (5 October 2001) 
 
HANSARDS 
24 July 1974 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Crimes Amendment Bill: 
Mr Venn Young (Egmont) 
1 August 1980  Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Crimes Amendment Bill: 
Hon J. K. McLay (Minister of Justice) 
16 May 1995 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates (Australia) – Hon Elizabeth 
Evatt (former Chief Judge of the Family Court) 
4 February 1998 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates Hon Jenny Shipley (Prime 
Minister) – Questions for Oral Answer: Relationship Property 
6 May 1998 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Second Reading, De 
Facto Relationships (Property) Bill and Matrimonial Property 
Amendment Bill: Hon Phil Goff (Labour) 
8 June 1999 Hansard: House Of Common Debates (Parliament of Canada) 
1st Session, 36th Parliament, No.240 
13 July 1999 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Second Reading, Human 
Rights Amendment Bill (No.2): Lianne Dalziel (Labour) 
13 July 1999 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Second Reading, Human 
Rights Amendment Bill (No.2): Tim Barnett (Labour) 
4 May 2000 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Matrimonial Property Bill 
8 December 2004 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Hon Dr Michael Cullen (Labour) 
8 December 2004 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Brian Donnelly (NZ First) 
8 December 2004 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Gordon Copeland (United Future) 
8 December 2004  Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Hon Dr Michael Cullen (Deputy Prime Minister) 
9 December 2004  Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Rt Hon Winston Peters (New Zealand First) 
9 December 2004 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates – Third Reading, Civil 
Union Bill: Russell Fairbrother (Labour) 
 
MEDIA SOURCES 
“Queer Baiting In The Culture War”, Cooper, M., in Village Voice (13 October 
1992) 29 
“Joe Melillo/Pat Lagon/Genora Dancel/Ninia Baehr v State Of Hawaii”, 
Washington Post (5 May 1993) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 533 
 
“Talkback With Jenny Anderson”, Radio Pacific (17 January 1995) 
“Fa‟afafine: Queens Of Samoa”, „Tuesday Documentary‟, TVNZ (29 August 1995) 
"When Love Sours", Interview with Rt Hon Robert Muldoon, „Assignment‟ 
Documentary on Partnership Property, TVNZ (31 August 1995) 
"When Love Sours", Interview with Hon Jim McClay, „Assignment‟ Documentary 
on Partnership Property, TVNZ (31 August 1995) 
“When Love Sours”, 'Assignment' Documentary on Partnership Property, TVNZ 
(31 August 1995) 
“Property Rights Under Scrutiny”, New Zealand Herald (18 January 1996) 
“Change Law For Gays: MPs”, Waikato Times (18 January 1996) 
“Marriage Lines”, Editorial, New Zealand Herald (20 January 1996) 
“Couples' Rights Need Firm Legal Foundation”, Editorial, Waikato Times (20 
January 1996) 
“Woman And Wife”, Sarah Stuart, Sunday Star-Times (25 February 1996) 
“Hon John Banks Resigns From Cabinet”, Prime Minister, Rt Hon Jim Bolger, 
Government Press Release (1 November 1996) 
“Attorney-General Backs Judges‟ Ability To Determine Bail Issues”, Hon Paul 
East, Attorney-General, Government Press Release (6 November 1996) 
“State Planning To Exempt Itself From Laws On Rights”, New Zealand Herald (20 
August 1997) 
“Shipley Supports Gay Rights – Except Marriage”, Matthew Brockett, The 
Dominion (16 February 1999) 
“Partners In Crime”: Brining Same-Sex Marriages Out Of The Closet”, Richard 
Matthews, NZ Listener, (18 September 1999) 
“A Man And A Woman, Period: Holy Matrimony Excludes Same-Sex Unions, 
Interfaith Coalition Says”, Csillag, Ron, TheStar.Com (17 February 2000)  
“No Sex Please, We‟re Kiwis: TV Goes In Search Of That Scary Institution, The 
New Zealand Family”, Listener (26 February 2000) 
“New Zealand Family And Foster-Care Federation Wrong To Open Door To 
„Lesbian Fostering‟”, Press Release, Christian Heritage Party (7 March 2000) 
“B.C. Makes History: Supports Same-Sex Couples‟ Right To Marry”, EGALE, 
Press Release, Canada (29 May 2000) 
“Private Lives”, James Macky, Metro (September 2000) 
“Sexuality Factors In Youth Suicide”, Christchurch Press (21 November 2000) 
“The Uncle‟s Story” by Witi Ihimaera – A Review by Rowan Metcalfe in Tu Mai 
(November-December 2000) 
“Two Face Felony Charges for Protest for Gay Marriage”, Chicago Anti-Bashing 
Network (CABN), Press Release(17 February 2001) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 534 
 
“Ceremonial Wedding of Gay Partners Affirms Values of Family, Friends”, Brent 
Hartinger, Tacoma News Tribune (4 March 2001) 
“Wellington Watch: A Weekly Bulletin Of Parliamentary And Political 
Information”, Issue 2001/8, Chen Palmer and Partners (16 March 2001) 
“Amsterdam to Celebrate „Gay Marriage”, Gay.com UK (27 March 2001) 
“Dutch Women Plan Same-Sex Wedding”, Associated Press (30 March 2001) 
“ACT Discussion Paper: Treaty of Waitangi”, Prebble, Richard, ACT Party (Policy – 
Treaty of Waitangi and Mäori Affairs) (24 July 2001) 
“British Columbia Supreme Court to Hear Landmark Same-Sex Margate 
Challenge”, EGALE, Press Release, Canada (July 2001)  
“First Step In Struggle For State Recognition Of Same- Sex Couples‟ Right To 
Civil Marriage”, Quebec Coalition for Same-Sex Relationship Recognition, Press 
Release (2 October 2001) 
“First Gay Banns Read in Toronto”, PlanetOut News (11 December 2001) 
“Education is the Best Weapon in the Battle Against Racism”, Office of Ethnic 
Affairs, in Ethnic Link, (December 2001) 
“Domestic Partnership, Boon or Bane: Momma Told Me To Watch Out What I 
Ask For Because I Might Get It”, Ryan Gierach, Genre (April 2001) 
“Vermont Rejects Civil Unions Challenge”, Associated Press (3 January 2002) 
“It Is Time That Unmarried Couples Were United In The Eyes Of The Law”, Lord 
Lester of Herne Hill, QC, The Times, London (10 January 2002) 
“Goff‟s Attack on the Judiciary is Scandalous”, Stephen Franks, MP, Act New 
Zealand, Press Release, (3 August 2002) 
“United To Strike Family Deal With Labour”, StuffNZ (8 August 2002) 
“„Trojan Horse‟ Takeover”, StuffNZ (8 August 2002) 
“Safeguards Needed To Protect Human Rights Gains”, Lawrence, Chris, former 
Proceedings Commissioner with the Human Rights Commission, express (28 
August – 10 September 2002) 
“Annan Stresses Universality And Indivisibility Of Human Rights”, UN News 
Centre (24 April 2003 
“PC Constricts Common Mode Of Citizenship”, English, Hon Bill Indian Newslink 
(22 May 2003) 
“June Weddings A First For Gays In Belgium: Couples Savour Their „Perfect Day‟ 
- Event Causes Little Fuss Elsewhere”, Toronto Star (23 June 2003) 
“Same-Sex Marriage Now Legal In BC!”, EGALE, Press Release, Canada (8 July 
2003) 
“First Feedback Points To Key Human Rights”, Human Rights Commission, Press 
Release (9 December 2003) 
“One Law For All”, ACT New Zealand, Press Release (12 February 2004) 
 
Nigel Christie 3 September 2009 References 
 
 
 
 
 535 
 
“Why Work With Labour And Not National”, Dunne, Peter, United Future New 
Zealand, Press Release (18 February 2004) 
 “What National Stands For”, Office of the Leader of the Opposition, Parliament 
Buildings, Wellington (February 2004) 
“One Law For All Says Mark”, Ron Mark, New Zealand First Party, Press Release, 
(15 March 2004) 
“NZ First Offers Labour A Deal On Foreshore And Treaty”, Audrey Young and 
Helen Tunnah, New Zealand Herald (18 March 2004) 
“Quebec Becomes Third Province To Allow Same-Sex Couples To Marry”, EGALE, 
Press Release, Canada (19 March 2004) 
“What Can Denmark Tell Us About The Same-Sex Marriage Debate”, 
Throckmorton, Warren, The American Daily (14 April 2004) 
“Spain Bishops March Against Gay Marriage”, PlanetOut Network (17 June 2005) 
“Spain Defies Church to Legalise Gay Marriage”, Reuters (30 June 2005) 
“Gays Hit In Overseas Nuptial Bid”, Szego, Julie in The Age (14 January 2006) 
“Meaning Of Normal Is At Heart Of Gay Marriage Ruling”, Anemona Hartocollis, 
New York Times (8 July 2006) 
“Embryo From Same-Sex Parents Tested”, The Guardian (10 September 2006)  
 “Experts Release Groundbreaking Principles On Sexual Orientation, Gender 
Identity, And Human Rights: „Yogyakarta Principles‟ Call For Action World-Wide 
Against Discrimination And Abuse”, Press Release, International Service for 
Human Rights and the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva (26 March 
2007) 
“Interview with Harvey Fierstein”, Interview with Michael Portantiere, 
AfterElton.com (26 March 2008) 
 “Using The Law As A Sword” , Darise Ogden, NZ Lawyer (20 March 2008) 
“Gay Marriage To Stay In The Federal Government‟s Closet”, Lauren Dickinson, 
NZ Lawyer (30 May 2008) 
“House of Lords upholds Importance Of Family As A Whole”, Darise Ogden, NZ 
Lawyer (11 July 2008) 
“Family Relief As Teen Found Guilty Of Murder”, The Dominion-Post (22 July 
2008) 
“Australia Gay Partner Bill Passes Lower House”, 365Gay.com (24 September 
2008) 
 
 
 
